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Abstract 
 This study investigates the history of a Sufi conception of ijtihād, the key figure 
of which is Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). It seeks to clarify Ibn ʿArabī’s legal 
theory and to identify its guiding principles. In order to do this it investigates the origins 
of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought in the writings of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. c. 298/910). It also 
investigates the nature of the similarities between the legal theory of Ibn ʿArabī and the 
Ẓāhirī school. This study challenges the view that Ibn ʿArabī was a Ẓāhirī and 
demonstrates that he adopted only those Ẓāhirī principles that agreed with his 
understanding of the Sharīʿa. It further argues that Ibn ʿArabī’s legal theory was closely 
linked to his concept of sainthood, which is highly influenced by that of al-Tirmidhī 
before him. 
 Through attaining a clear understanding of Ibn ʿArabī’s jurisprudential thought, 
it becomes possible to examine the extent to which his legal theory influenced his later 
followers. The works of ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī (d. 973/1565) are examined, and it 
is argued that his theory of the Scale of the Sharīʿa has its roots in Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teachings. A detailed examination of another key figure, Aḥmad ibn Idrīs (d. 1837), 
reveals that he was a follower of Ibn ʿArabī’s legal opinions. The study argues that the 
revivalist Sufi orders inspired by Ibn Idrīs were also guided by Ibn ʿArabī’s legal 
theory. 
 This study shows a continuous transfer of ideas on both sainthood and the law 
from al-Tirmidhī to Ibn Idrīs and his followers. It also shows the close connection 
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 The Andalusian Sufi Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240), known to his 
admirers as al-Shaykh al-Akbar (The Greatest Master), began his magnum opus al-
Futūḥāt al-makkiyya (The Meccan Revelations) by describing a vision he saw. This 
vision defined his entire teaching and purpose, as he saw it, and subsequently led to the 
composition of the Futūḥāt. The vision culminated in a pulpit being erected for him to 
ascend, in front of an assembly of all of God’s prophets and messengers, led by 
Muḥammad and his four caliphs, and surrounded by the rest of Muḥammad’s followers. 
On it, the following words were inscribed with radiant light, ‘This is the pure 
Muḥammadan Station. Whoever ascends to it is an heir [of Muḥammad], and has been 
sent by God to preserve the sanctity of the Sharīʿa.’  1
  
 Ibn ʿArabī, whose honorific title Muḥyī al-Dīn means Reviver of the Religion, 
clearly saw the service of the Sharīʿa as central to his mission. Yet as a recent survey of 
studies on Ibn ʿArabī showed, his writings on Islamic law have been ‘scarcely 
explored,’  as most studies focused on his views on walāya (sainthood),  prophecy, love 2 3
and mercy, and other themes. It is ‘crucial,’ wrote Ali Hussain, that his works on 
jurisprudence be ‘further explored and analysed.’  4
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1: 2-3. On the significance of this vision see Addas, Quest, 205.1
 Hussain, ‘Endless Tajalli,’ 100. This survey was limited to studies published in the West, but this 2
judgement is correct in general.
 Literally ‘Proximity to God.’ I have chosen to use the popular translation of ‘sainthood’ even though it 3
is not entirely satisfactory. The term walāya has many meanings such as friendship, nearness, support, 
alliance, and others. Perhaps the best definition is that of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) who clarified its 
meaning by way of its opposite. He wrote, ‘Walāya is the opposite of enmity. The origin of walāya is love 
and nearness, and the origin of enmity is hatred and distance…the walī is one who is near’ (Ibn 
Taymiyya, al-Furqān, 9). It should also be noted that both walāya and wilāya are correct, but I have 
chosen the first as it is Ibn ʿArabī’s own preference (See Chodkiewicz, Seal, 21-5 for an excellent 
discussion on this term).
 Hussain, ‘Endless Tajalli,’ 116.4
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 That the jurisprudential thought of one of the most influential Muslim thinkers 
of the past eight centuries has not been adequately studied is not the only problem. 
Without a full understanding of his thought, one cannot fully assess its influence on later 
figures. It would be hard to imagine that over centuries, countless Sufis and scholars 
who believed that Ibn ʿArabī was the ‘Greatest Master’ benefitted only from his 
writings on Sufism and ignored what he wrote on the law. Ibn ʿArabī was a 
controversial figure who had many detractors, and so many Sufis who were highly 
influenced by his teachings did not mention him at all, though the mark of the influence 
and borrowings is clear.  Was this also the case with regard to his jurisprudential 5
thought? In order to establish this, our primary task would be firstly to arrive at a 
comprehensive and clear understanding of his legal theory. This is the central objective 
of this study. 
 In order to understand Ibn ʿArabī’s legal views fully, one must investigate the 
origins for his ideas in earlier sources. This is another area of Akbarī studies that is 
severely lacking. The above-mentioned survey stated that Ibn ʿArabī’s sources of 
influence are ‘perhaps the most crucial yet least explored area of research in Ibn ʿArabī 
studies.’  Gerald Elmore wrote, 6
Little has yet been offered by modern scholarship in the way of documenting the 
specific literary influences on the Shaykh’s published doctrine and style in the 
works of such illustrious predecessors such as Dhū l-Nūn al-Miṣrī, Abū Yazīd al-
Bisṭāmī, Sahl al-Tustarī, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, [etc….].  7
Therefore, the first task to be pursued in this thesis is to trace the origins of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
ideas, and it is al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. c. 298/910) with whom we are interested most. 
Those who have studied Ibn ʿArabī’s writings on sainthood have long recognised the 
influence of al-Tirmidhī,  but they have not given much attention to the jurisprudential 8
 See Chodkiewicz, Ocean, 3-17.5
 Hussain, ‘Endless Tajalli,’ 106.6
 Elmore, ‘Road to Santarem,’ 2-3.7
 Radtke, ‘Forerunner,’ 42-9; Chodkiewicz, Seal, 27-33; and Elmore, ‘Review,’ 103-6.8
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work of either, despite the close relationship between jurisprudence and Sufism in the 
thought of both authors. Those who studied the jurisprudence of al-Tirmidhī, on the 
other hand, seem not to have been aware of the jurisprudential thought of Ibn ʿArabī or 
at least not to have made the connection between the two. Instead, Ibn ʿArabī has often 
been described as a follower of the Ẓāhirī school of jurisprudence which was founded 
by al-Tirmidhī’s contemporary Dāwūd ibn ʿAlī ibn Khalaf (d. 270/883), more 
commonly known as Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī. Therefore, the first part of this study will be 
dedicated to the thought of al-Tirmidhī. In the first chapter we will look at those of al-
Tirmidhī’s writings on sainthood that are at the root of his ideas on jurisprudence. 
Although there have been some studies that summarised al-Tirmidhī’s views on 
sainthood, none have explained them satisfactorily. The second chapter will be 
dedicated to al-Tirmidhī’s writings on jurisprudence directly, and will focus on those 
passages that may have influenced Ibn ʿArabī’s own approach to jurisprudence, using 
several key passages that have been overlooked by earlier studies. Although al-
Tirmidhī’s views on jurisprudence are the direct result of his Sufism, and in particular 
his views on sainthood, it will be necessary to situate his thought among other trends in 
such an early period in Islamic history. This will be the second major objective of the 
study. 
 In Chapter Three, we will study Ibn ʿArabī’s own writings on sainthood, again 
presenting those ideas in particular that influenced his approach to jurisprudence. This 
chapter aims to clarify the link between the writings of al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī on 
this subject, which again has not been so far studied in detail. Chapter Four will 
examine Ibn ʿArabī’s legal theory. Much of al-Tirmidhī’s influence on Ibn ʿArabī’s 
legal thought came through his influence on Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of sainthood, but 
this study will investigate how much of his jurisprudential thought directly influenced 
that of Ibn ʿArabī. Ibn ʿArabī also benefited from the Ẓāhirī school in legal theory. 
Therefore, this chapter will aim to present, for the first time, a comprehensive 
comparison between the legal principles of Ibn ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirīs. By finding and 
analysing where they differ, the study will reveal the true nature of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
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understanding of the Sharīʿa and why he adopted some of the key principles of Ẓāhirī 
thought. 
 After having studied the jurisprudential thought of Ibn ʿArabī and its origins, we 
can come to the third major objective, which is to show how it influenced later figures. 
The 18th and 19th centuries saw the emergence of a group of Sufi ṭuruq with revivalist 
tendencies that initiated internal reform and renewal in Muslim communities, both in 
the fields of Sufism and the Sharīʿa, many of which also fought against European 
colonialists. Some studies argued that a rejection of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings was among 
the characteristics of these ṭuruq, portraying these ‘Sharīʿa-minded Sufis’ as being at 
odds with the Sufism of Ibn ʿArabī.  The truth, in fact, is the complete opposite. The 9
reformist tendencies of every one of these movements was very much influenced by Ibn 
ʿArabī.  Knut S. Vikør looked at the call for ijtihād among several of these Sufi authors 10
of the 18th and 19th centuries,  to see if Sufism had anything to do with their shared 11
call for ijtihād; his conclusion was that it did not. However, we will show in this study 
that, if the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī on the subject are considered, and the dedication of 
these authors to Ibn ʿArabī was made clear, the answer is undoubtedly yes: the call for 
ijtihād among these authors was directly influenced by Ibn ʿArabī.  
 The first major figure whose writings on jurisprudence we will study is ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī (d. 973/1565). Al-Shaʿrānī is famous first and foremost as a 
populariser of Ibn ʿArabī’s theological and Sufi doctrines. The influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
conception of ijtihād on al-Shaʿrānī’s most famous legal works has been looked into, 
but no one has shown the true extent of that influence. Several studies have given most 
of the credit instead to al-Shaʿrānī’s immediate teacher al-Khawwāṣ. In Chapter Five, I 
 Levtzion, ‘Sharīʿa,’ 382-4, 402-3.9
 For example, Levtzion herself points out that the main two figures behind the 16th and 17th century 10
revival in ijtihād and the rejection of taqlīd, al-Shaʿrānī and al-Qushāshī, were ‘prolific defender[s]’ of Ibn 
ʿArabī (Levtzion, ‘Sharīʿa,’ 383). She likewise points out the frequent references to Ibn ʿArabī in the 
writings of the Tijāniyya and Khalwatiyya (ibid).
 Vikør, ‘Shaykh as Mujtahid,’ 351-375.11
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will argue that the true source of al-Shaʿrānī’s ideas was Ibn ʿArabī. I will show the 
extent to which Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas formed al-Shaʿrānī’s understanding of the Sharīʿa. I 
will also show how this influence was the primary inspiration for al-Shaʿrānī’s original 
theory of the Sharīʿa which he called ‘The Scale.’ 
 Chapter Six will look at the second major figure, Aḥmad ibn Idrīs (d. 
1253/1837), who founded one of the most important of those revivalist ṭuruq of the 19th 
century. A rather vague similarity has been noted between the thought of Aḥmad ibn 
Idrīs on one hand, and that of al-Tirmidhī and al-Shaʿrānī on the other, on the issue of 
scholarly authority in the field of jurisprudence.  However, the thought of the last two 12
on the subject has not received the attention that it deserves. One study described in 
more detail many of the similarities between the arguments of Ibn Idrīs’ student al-
Sanūsī and al-Shaʿrānī, but did not believe that their Sufi beliefs had much influence on 
their jurisprudential writings.  Other studies continue to hold that Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas 13
were antithetical to those of the ‘Sharīʿa-oriented’ Sufi movements like the Idrīsiyya 
and its Sanūsī offshoot. This chapter will be the first to establish the degree to which 
Ibn Idrīs was influenced by Ibn ʿArabī, both in Sufism and jurisprudence. This will be 
the first time that the jurisprudential thought of Ibn Idrīs will be investigated beyond the 
usual comments that he was an independent mujtahid. I will show that while he was 
indeed a mujtahid, he was also a dedicated follower of Ibn ʿArabī in jurisprudence. 
 If there is no school of jurisprudence without followers, then this investigation 
into the thought and practice of al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn Idrīs will establish whether or not 
they were followers of what we may term the ‘Akbarī School.’ 
  
 Radtke et al., Exoteric, 15-16.12
 Vikør, ‘Shaykh as Mujtahid,’ 351-375.13
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Chapter 1: Al-Tirmidhī on Juristic Authority 
 This chapter will investigate the life of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī and his doctrine on 
sainthood (walāya) and the saints (awliyāʾ Allāh).  These ideas will in turn form the 14
basis for al-Tirmidhī’s views on ijtihād which will be dealt with in the following 
chapter. It is the ideas in this chapter that will have a direct influence on Ibn ʿArabī’s 
own doctrine on sainthood, and which in turn will form the basis for his views on 
ijtihād. The first part of the chapter will deal briefly with al-Tirmidhī’s life and career. 
The second, greater part of the chapter, will deal with al-Tirmidhī’s doctrine. 
1.1 A Brief Sketch of al-Tirmidhī’s Life and Intellectual Upbringing  
 Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī, known as al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, was born 
between 205/820 and 215/830 in Tirmidh, present day Uzbekistan, where he also died 
around 298/910.  He, therefore, lived a long life that covered most of the third Islamic 15
century. Al-Tirmidhī composed works in most Islamic disciplines, such as Qur’ānic 
exegesis, prophetic traditions, Sufism, jurisprudence, theology, and the Arabic language, 
but many of his works fused several of these disciplines together in a unique and 
innovative manner, making them difficult to classify. His greatest legacy is in the field 
of Sufism as he is remembered mostly as a Sufi, but is also counted among the well-
known traditionists because of his ḥadīth collection and commentary Nawādir al-uṣūl. 
 ‘Those who are near to God.’ (See Introduction, p.6, n.3).14
 Radtke, ‘Wilāya,’ 483-4. This means that he lived for around 83-93 years, a very long life in that age. 15
Al-Dhahabī estimated that he lived for around eighty years (Tadhkira, 2:171) whereas Ibn Ḥajar 
estimated a life of around ninety years. However, he claimed that al-Tirmidhī lived until around 
318/930 based on a claim that Abū Bakr ibn al-Anbārī (d. 328/939) took prophetic traditions from him 
that year (Ibn Ḥajar, Lisān, 5: 310). This is most probably a mistake. Gobillot likewise claimed that he 
died in 318/930, at the age of around one hundred years (Gobillot, Livre, 17). Baraka and Marquet both 
believed that he lived from 205/820 until 320/932, an extraordinarily long life of 115 years (Baraka, al-
Ḥakīm, 1:198; Marquet, ‘al-Tirmidhī,’ in EI2). Radtke attributed the errors regarding his death date to the 
uncritical attribution of works to al-Tirmidhī that were most likely not his (Radtke, ‘Wilāya,’ 487), 
however, Ibn Ḥajar’s quote of a claim that he was narrating prophetic traditions in 318/930 is the main 
reason behind this error.
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Al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1621), the Ottoman-era Sufi biographer and traditionist, said of 
him, ‘He was distinguished among the Sufis by the amount of his narrations and the 
loftiness (i.e. shortness) of his chains of narration.’  Al-Tirmidhī was without doubt 16
one of the most influential early figures of Sufism, his influence coming mostly through 
his writings which were very popular. He was ‘by far the most prolific author during the 
whole period of classical Islamic mysticism.’  The early Sufi biographer al-Hujwīrī (d. 17
c. 465/1072) described the wide circulation of al-Tirmidhī’s writings among scholars 
and theologians in the 5th/11th century.  The great popularity of al-Tirmidhī’s works 18
until this day, and their large distribution in the libraries and publishing houses of the 
Muslim world, has been noted by Nicholas Heer and Osman Yahya as evidence of his 
lasting influence on Sufi thought.   19
 Al-Tirmidhī was known as al-Ḥakīm, ‘the wise man,’ as were two of his 
contemporaries. This led some scholars to believe that the ‘ḥakīm’ was a social type 
particular to the north-eastern Islamic lands of Khorasan and Transoxania, a title given 
to persons who possessed spiritual knowledge. All three figures who possessed this title 
were also learned in jurisprudence, theology, Qur’ānic exegesis, and traditions, 
indicating that the title might have been reserved for people who mastered a host of 
different religious sciences and combined them with spiritual insight.  Like al-20
Tirmidhī, Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar Abū Bakr al-Warrāq al-Ḥakīm (d. 280/893) ‘warned 
against one-sided training in kalām, fiqh, and zuhd, and advocated a synthesis of all 
three as the only safe approach.’  Studies have therefore suggested that there was a 21
tradition in those lands of ahl al-ḥikma (the People of Wisdom) who insisted on 
combining spirituality with the other Islamic sciences. This was especially true for al-
 Al-Munāwī, al-Kawākib, 2:130.16
 Radtke and O’Kane, Concept, 2.17
 Al-Hujwīrī, Kashf, 141.18
 Baraka, al-Ḥakīm, 1:198.19
 Karamustafa, Sufism, 47.20
 Karamustafa, Sufism, 47.21
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Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī who had the concept of ḥikma (wisdom) at the core of all his 
teachings. As we will show in more detail, wisdom to him was a more profound 
understanding of the Qur’ān, prophetic traditions, and the law, which is gained through 
spirituality. Another possibility is that al-Tirmidhī himself started this tradition. The 
evidence for this is that al-Warrāq treated al-Tirmidhī as his teacher, and whatever is 
preserved of his teachings is almost identical to those of al-Tirmidhī.  As for the third 22
person, Abū l-Qāsim Isḥāq ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī (d. 342/953), he 
was in turn the student of al-Warrāq.  23
 It is difficult to create a clear chronology of al-Tirmidhī’s life and education. We 
know that he began his studies at the age of eight, learning prophetic traditions and 
Ḥanafī jurisprudence under the direction of a shaykh. He was to dedicate himself 
wholly to these two fields of learning until the age of twenty-seven. Al-Tirmidhī does 
not name this shaykh who gave him his earliest guidance, but al-Hujwīrī, who himself 
stated that he was wholly devoted to al-Tirmidhī, mentioned that al-Tirmidhī studied 
jurisprudence at the hands of one of Abū Ḥanīfa’s close disciples.  Nicholas Heer 24
understandably found that difficult to accept, considering Abū Ḥanīfa’s death in the year 
150/767, which meant that the shaykh would have had to be over the age of seventy-
five to have studied under Abū Ḥanīfa and to then have begun teaching al-Tirmidhī in 
the year 213/828.  I propose a simple explanation for al-Hujwīrī’s confusion. Al-25
Tirmidhī frequently narrated traditions in his books from ‘al-Jārūd,’ whose full name 
was al-Jārūd ibn Muʿādh al-Sulamī (d. 244/858) and who lived in Tirmidh.  Al-26
Hujwīrī, who was a follower of the Ḥanafī school of law, must have assumed that this 
‘al-Jārūd,’ was al-Jārūd al-ʿĀmirī al-Nīshāpūrī (d. 206/821), one of the most 
 See the teachings of al-Warrāq as preserved in al-ʿAṭṭār, Tadhkirat al-awliyāʾ, 537-544. Unfortunately 22
the works of al-Warrāq are now lost (Radtke, ‘Wilāya,’ 495). Radtke does not agree with the portrayal of 
al-Warrāq as al-Tirmidhī’s student but rather sees him as a compatriot. However, the way that al-
Warrāq narrated stories about al-Tirmidhī reflects the attitude of a loving student.
 On this figure see Karamustafa, Sufism, 47.23
 Al-Hujwīrī, Kashf, 141.24
 Baraka, al-Ḥakīm, 1:37.25
 See al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb, 4: 476-8, where al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī is mentioned as one of his students.26
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distinguished of Abū Ḥanīfa’s students. Al-Tirmidhī’s remarks that he studied 
jurisprudence (what he called raʾy) from a young age at the direction of a shaykh would 
have helped al-Hujwīrī make this mistaken assumption.  
 Al-Tirmidhī also studied traditions at the hands of both his parents and narrated 
from them as well as other scholars from his home town. Sometime before the year 
230/844, when he was still under the age of twenty-five, al-Tirmidhī began his travels 
for the acquisition of traditions. He travelled to Balkh in present day Afghanistan where 
he took from three great traditionists, including the most illustrious of his teachers, the 
traditionist and jurist Qutayba ibn Saʿīd al-Thaqafī al-Balkhī (d. 240/854). Qutayba was 
a student of Mālik ibn Anas, al-Layth ibn Saʿd, and Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna, among others, 
and taught the likes of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, al-Bukhāri, Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, and Abū 
ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī.  In Balkh al-Tirmidhī also met the great Sufi of the age, Abū Turāb al-27
Nakhshabī, as well as Aḥmad ibn Khaḍrawayh (d. 240/854), one of the great shaykhs of 
Khorasan. Al-Tirmidhī accompanied these masters and travelled with them to Iraq 
where he met more Sufis and more traditionists.  At the age of twenty-eight, al-28
Tirmidhī performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, and there he had a spiritual experience or 
vision that changed his life. Al-Tirmidhī decided to dedicate himself first and foremost 
to the spiritual path, dedicating his time to the memorisation of the Qur’ān and spending 
his nights in prayer. Al-Tirmidhī was on the course to becoming a Sufi first and a 
traditionist second, rather than the other way around. That is, the spiritual path now 
became his first and foremost concern. He seems to have joined a group of young Sufis 
like himself who were attempting to purify their souls, and he found a Sufi treatise 
whose advice and instruction he followed. Ultimately, however, he did not find the 
guidance he was looking for with any groups or shaykhs, and attributed his guidance to 
God directly. Al-Tirmidhī soon became a teacher with a circle of followers, and gained 
fame in his home town. Rival scholars aroused public opinion and the governor of 
Balkh against him, but the persecution ended, likely with the change of governor,  and 29
 Al-Ḥusaynī, al-Maʿrifa, 14; Baraka, al-Ḥakīm, 1: 38.27
 Al-Ḥusaynī, al-Maʿrifa, 14-5.28
 Al-Juyūshī (ed.) in al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 26.29
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al-Tirmidhī stated that he emerged even more popular after that.  Al-Sulamī (d. 30
412/1021) recorded that al-Tirmidhī was persecuted a second time toward the very end 
of his life, and this time exiled from the city because of his two works Khatm al-awliyāʾ 
and ʿIlal al-sharīʿa,  both of which will be discussed in this study. In this final 31
persecution, al-Tirmidhī left to the city of Balkh where he was received and accepted 
because its people agreed with his views, and where he was to acquire a large 
following.  The presence of his tomb in his home town of Tirmidh indicates that al-32
Tirmidhī returned once more to his home town sometime before his death, though this 
led others like Radtke and O’Kane to doubt the story of that second exile altogether.  33
Whether al-Tirmidhī returned to Tirmidh after exile or never left it, he must have died 
loved and revered by his townsfolk, as al-Hujwīrī relates in the present tense that he 
was known in Tirmidh as ‘al-Ḥakīm’ and that he had followers in that region known as 
the ‘Ḥakīmīs.’  34
1.2 Al-Tirmidhī’s Hierarchy of Sainthood 
 As al-Hujwīrī noted, the main focus of al-Tirmidhī’s writings was on the nature 
of sainthood, as well as the ranks and degrees of the saints. That is why al-Hujwīrī 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Budū shaʾn, 21-2.30
 This is most likely Ithbāt al-ʿilal. 31
 See al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 30-1, where the editor al-Juyūshī compares the different words of al-32
Dhahabī and Ibn Ḥajar based on the information that they took from a now lost work of al-Sulamī, to 
gain more knowledge on the subject.
 Radtke and O’Kane, Concept, 1.33
 Al-Hujwīrī, Kashf, 141. Contemporary historians struggled to explain why some manuscripts of al-34
Tirmidhī’s works had notes on them describing him as ‘the Shaykh of the Shāfiʿī scholars in 
Iraq’ (Baraka, al-Ḥakīm, 37). Whoever wrote these notes must have confused our al-Tirmidhī with 
another Muḥammad al-Tirmidhī who died in 295/907, whereas our al-Tirmidhī most likely died in 
298/910. This Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Naṣr al-Tirmidhī al-Shāfiʿī was invariably described in his 
biographical entries as ‘the Shaykh of the Shāfiʿī Scholars in Iraq,’ and was also known as an ascetic. For 
more on him see al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 13:545-7.
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chose to discuss the issue of sainthood in his section on al-Tirmidhī’s followers.  Al-35
Hujwīrī tells us that other works were written on the subject prior to al-Tirmidhī and 
that they were rare and soon became lost.  No contemporary or predecessor of al-36
Tirmidhī is known to have discussed this issue as systematically or to the same extent 
and degree of sophistication.  The most important work written by al-Tirmidhī on the 37
subject is Khatm al-awliyāʾ (Seal of the Saints),  but discussions on sainthood pervade 38
all of al-Tirmidhī’s works, such as his works on prophetic traditions, language, or ritual 
worship and jurisprudence. 
 Al-Tirmidhī’s conception of the saint’s journey to God is highly sophisticated 
and complex, and includes novel categorisations of the saints. These ideas have been 
summarised by Radtke  and McGregor.  However, these two excellent summaries rely 39 40
mostly on one work, Khatm al-awliyāʾ, and do not give a full presentation of the ideas 
relevant to our main concern, which is the saints’ knowledge of the Sharīʿa. I will, 
therefore, present these ideas in a clearer fashion using other works of al-Tirmidhī to 
 Al-Hujwīrī, Kashf, 210. Al-Hujwīrī calls the followers of al-Tirmidhī the ‘Ḥakīmīs,’ one of twelve groups 35
among the Sufis. However he does not say anything about them as a group, only that their teachings 
focused on the nature of sainthood.
 Al-Hujwīrī, Kashf, 212.36
 Radtke, ‘Wilāya,’ 48; McGregor, Sanctity, 9. Two works by Iraqi contemporaries are known: al-Awliyāʾ by 37
the traditionist Ibn Abī al-Dunyā (d. 281/894), and Kitāb al-kashf wa-l-bayān by the Sufi Abū Saʿīd al-
Kharrāz (d. 286/899). The first is a collection of narrations starting with statements of the Prophet 
Muḥammad and followed by stories and statements of early pious figures (Ibn Abī al-Dunyā, al-Awliyāʾ, 
9-49). The work by al-Kharrāz is much simpler and smaller in size than al-Tirmidhī’s Khatm al-awliyāʾ for 
example. It discussed issues like the superiority of the prophets over the saints, the difference between 
the miracles of the prophets and those of the saints, and whether the saints could receive inspiration. 
(Radtke, ‘Wilāya,’ 483-6). The doctrine of al-Junayd (d. 298/910) on sainthood was reconstructed from 
some of his works by Karamustafa (see Karamustafa, ‘Walāya,’ 64-70).
 This work was first edited and published under this name, by which it is well known, by Osman 38
Yahya. Radtke then edited it and published it again under the title Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, which he believes is 
the original title of the work. He also translated it as The Life of the Friends of God. However, I have 
decided to keep the title Khatm al-awliyāʾ as it is the title by which this work is known, and because of 
the possibility that Sīrat al-awliyāʾ is a different work. I will rely on Radtke’s superior edition, however, 
and therefore in the references it will appear as Sīrat al-awliyāʾ.
 Radtke, ‘Wilāya,’ 483-496.39
 McGregor, Sanctity, 9-16.40
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paint a more accurate picture of his ideas, and will note the places where the previous 
studies may have oversimplified or overcomplicated al-Tirmidhī’s ideas. 
 Below the realm of sainthood, at the bottom of the hierarchy, al-Tirmidhī placed 
the normal believers who are occupied with the world. Above these are the devout 
worshippers (ʿubbād) and ascetics (zuhhād) whose main goal is Paradise.  These two 41
categories remain servants to their own egos, occupied not with God but with His 
kingdom, whether earthly or paradisal. These remain within the earthly realm where 
they receive those benefits that are ‘thrown to them on their earth.’  Above the level of 42
the ascetics and devout worshippers is that of the sincere seeker who rectifies his 
outward states, and then, inspired by the experiences and teachings of the saints, wishes 
to rectify his inner states and purify his heart. If this seeker’s intention is correct, which 
is not to gain Divine recompense, but rather to be a pure servant of God (khāliṣ al-
ʿubūda), he will be granted access to the realm of sainthood.  The key for al-Tirmidhī, 43
as he reiterates time after time, is not in one’s own effort but in the sincerity of one’s 
intention. This seeker will expend every possible effort to purify his heart but will find 
that he has failed to do so. In desperation, he will give up all hope in his own efforts and 
will beg God to rescue him. This is when God’s mercy will transport this servant into 
the realm of sainthood. Within an instant his heart would have flown above the seven 
heavens to the Station of Proximity (maḥall al-qurba) near God’s throne. He has been 
transported from the station of the sincere seekers (ṣādiqūn) to that of the purely sincere 
(ṣiddīqūn), who are the saints.   44
 Once a seeker has entered the realm of sainthood, he is not yet a true saint (walī 
Allāh) but rather what al-Tirmidhī calls a walī ḥaqq Allāh. This term seems to signify 
 Al-Tirmidhī, al-Mufarridīn, 56-7. Here the hierarchy is as follows: Believers - Ascetics - ṣiddīqūn (i.e. 41
awliyāʾ) - ʿarifūn (Knowers of God).
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 79.42
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 4.43
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 15-18, 31-2.44
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for al-Tirmidhī that those who have reached this rank are not yet attached to God 
Himself, but rather to the right due to God, which is worship. The Station of Proximity 
is a temporary station in which the seeker is placed in order to be purified, with the 
condition that he is content to remain there, and that he does not attempt to get closer to 
God through any actions of his own will. If the walī ḥaqq Allāh attempts to get closer to 
God of his own actions rather than remain where he has been placed by God, then that 
is because of what remains of the hold of his ego and his desires. He will fail to arrive at 
true sainthood, though he may still be called a saint because he was transported by God 
to the Station of Proximity. However, such a person will not reach God Himself and will 
remain in grave danger of falling off the path.  The seeker who remains firm in the 45
Station of Proximity with patience will be purified by lights that come to him from 
higher stations, until eventually his hidden ego and its evils are vanquished, and he is 
spiritually elevated. He then reaches the station of true sainthood. The walī ḥaqq Allāh 
is transported in an instant, out of God’s generosity, from the Station of Proximity, to 
God Himself.  Here the journey of the saint is to traverse the different kingdoms of 46
God’s Names, in order to know God by His different Names, and different saints stop at 
different Names according to their ultimate rank.  47
 Al-Tirmidhī equated sainthood with ṣiddīqiyya. Ṣiddīqiyya is a spiritual rank that 
comes below the prophets and above the martyrs, as mentioned in the Qur’ān, 
‘Whoever obeys God and the Messenger will be among those He has blessed: the 
messengers, the ṣiddīqūn, the martyrs, and the righteous’ (Q 4:69).  The Qurʾān 48
granted this rank or title to Mary the mother of Jesus: ‘his mother was a ṣiddīqa,’ (5:75) 
and it is of course a title or rank that was given by the Prophet Muḥammad to his 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 17-20; 31-3.45
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 33.46
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 33.47
 Al-Tirmidhī did not define this term, and in fact challenged claimants to true sainthood to define it as 48
part of his questionnaire for those who claimed sainthood (Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 25). On these 
four ranks see also Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, 80.
 19
Companion Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq.  In the ḥadīth literature, this title of ṣiddīq is given to 49
those who possess two complementary qualities of strict truthfulness and firm faith in 
the truthfulness of the Prophet.  The word ṣidq, from which ṣiddīq derives, could mean 50
truthfulness or sincerity, and al-Tirmidhī’s conception of the ṣiddīqūn clearly derives 
from the second meaning.  Al-Tirmidhī never concerned himself with the number of 51
true saints. Al-Hujwīrī, who claimed that his section on sainthood is based on the 
teachings of al-Tirmidhī and his followers, stated that there are 4,000 lower-ranking 
saints who are not aware of their sainthood, and an assembly of 356 higher-ranking 
saints.  It is possible that by the 4,000 al-Hujwīrī meant the awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh. As for 52
the 356, they were mentioned in a prophetic statement that Abū Nuʿaym narrated on the 
authority of Ibn Masʿūd.  Al-Tirmidhī himself did not narrate this tradition or refer to 53
it, but he narrated many traditions about the ‘forty abdāl,’ whom he considered to be the 
highest of the saints. These forty are what is meant by the Prophet’s ‘family,’ ‘folk,’ or 
‘household,’ (ahl, āl, ahl al-bayt) and their presence is a source of safety for the Earth’s 
inhabitants.   54
 See Ibn al-Qayyim, Miftāḥ, 80.49
 In a canonical tradition, the Prophet states that those who are very careful to speak only the truth 50
will be granted this appellation in the sight of God (Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 4:2013). Abū Bakr was given his title 
for immediately believing in the Prophet’s account of his night journey and ascension (Lings, 
Muḥammad, 103).
 See the dream mentioned in his autobiography where the sincerity of the ṣiddīq is symbolised by the 51
evergreen myrtle which remains fresh all year long. This is contrasted with the basil which is only fresh 
in summer, and which symbolises the impetus for worship among the ʿubbād (al-Tirmidhī, Budū shaʾn, 
22). Al-Tirmidhī also gave a description of the ṣiddīqūn and their sincerity in Nawādir, 2:332-3. Radtke 
and O’Kane translated ṣiddīqiyya as ‘strict truthfulness.’
 Al-Hujwīrī, Kashf, 213-4.52
 Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥilya, 1:8-9.53
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 44; Nawādir, 1:261-5; 2:97; 3:63. Radtke believed that those forty are the 54
only saints (Radtke, ‘Wilāya,’ 492), though al-Tirmidhī’s wording suggests that they are the highest forty 
among many others (see Nawādir, 2:97). This understanding of the ahl al-bayt is another  concept that 
Ibn ʿArabī took from al-Tirmidhī and developed. See Addas, ‘The Muhammadian House,’ 92.
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 Among the highest of the saints there is a special category called the 
muḥaddathūn.  They are the elect among God’s saints. Unlike the saints below them, 55
these saints are similar to the prophets and messengers in that God chose them and drew 
them near to Him without a struggle on their part. They, therefore, did not traverse any 
of the difficulties of the spiritual path like the other saints. Instead, God chose to make 
their path to sainthood easy and then made them the elites among the saints.  The 56
number of these elect saints is less than ten.  Finally, at the top of the hierarchy is the 57
Seal of Sainthood (khātim al-wilāya). He is not called a seal because he is the last of the 
saints, but rather because he reached a state of perfect sainthood in which there is not a 
single share for his ego, thus ‘sealing’ his sainthood.  However, it is not clear if this 58
station is reached by a single person only, as some passages suggest,  or if this is a 59
‘ṭabaqa’ or rank that more than one person can reach, as one line suggests.  It is the 60
 Al-Tirmidhī’s contemporary al-Kharrāz also described a hierarchy within sainthood, stating that after 55
the level of the saints there was the final level of the muqarrabūn (those brought near to God) (see al-
Dhahabī, Siyar, 12:421).
 In Radtke’s understanding, the awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh are those who had to struggle to reach God’s 56
nearness, whereas the actual saints are chosen and pulled to God without effort. According to him the 
actual saints are the muḥaddathūn. However, this is not fully accurate. The passages that were quoted 
earlier make it clear that the majority of saints had to struggle to reach sainthood. At first, through 
God’s mercy, they reached the awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh stage. Then, through God’s generosity, they reached 
sainthood. It is only the muḥaddathūn among the saints who are the people of election (ijtibāʾ ), whom 
he also calls the majdhūbūn (those who were pulled to God), and who did not experience the difficulties 
or tests of the path (see also al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 94-5). 
 ‘Their number does not reach the number of one’s fingers’ (al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 67). Therefore, 57
they cannot be the forty abdāl as Radtke held. This distinction is further supported by a recently 
published text where al-Tirmidhī provides a hierarchy of zāhid - ṣiddīq - ʿārif  (al-Tirmidhī, al-Mufarridīn, 
57). The ʿārif is the muḥaddath and is higher than the normal saint. McGregor found a difficulty 
reconciling two different typologies: the normal saints - muḥaddathūn on the one hand, and the awliyāʾ 
ḥaqq Allāh - awliyāʾ Allāh on the other, stating that the latter typology made the picture ‘less 
clear’ (McGregor, Sanctity, 12). However, I have presented the ideas in a way that hopefully removes any 
confusion. The awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh are those who have not yet become true saints, and who may progress 
to true sainthood. The muḥaddathūn are the elites among the actual saints. Furthermore the 
muḥaddathūn became saints without passing through the awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh stage. 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 110.58
 e.g. al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 110.59
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 62.60
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muḥaddathūn who are of most concern to this study. To sum up, al-Tirmidhī’s hierarchy 
of the degrees of sainthood (from bottom to top) is the following: 
awliyāʾ ḥaqq Allāh - awliyāʾ - abdāl - muḥaddathūn - khātim al-wilāya. 
1.3 The Elect Among the Saints 
  
 According to al-Tirmidhī, saints possess three particular gifts: the spiritual 
station and quality of pure sincerity (ṣiddīqiyya), as well as clairvoyance (firāsa), and 
divine inspiration (ilhām).  This inspiration is communication (najwā) that is thrown 61
into their hearts.  However, the saint does not have any assurance that this inspiration 62
has not been effected or tampered with by his ego or by Satan.  The elect among the 63
saints have all of the above, but also receive something else: Heavenly Speech (ḥadīth), 
hence they are called the muḥaddathūn, those who receive speech.  This speech comes 64
from God’s treasuries, which contain His gifts for His chosen servants,  and is 65
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 54.61
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 54. Those who travel the path converse with God (yunājūn) meaning that 62
they call out to God in prayer and supplication. The saints might hear a response (yunājawn) or receive 
utterances (maqālāt) that are cast into their hearts in the form of light (idem, 48).
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 48.63
 Or ‘those who are spoken to.’ Henceforth I will use ‘the Elect’ rather than the ‘muḥaddathūn.’64
 Khazāʾin: treasuries or storehouses. Radtke and O’Kane translated it as treasure chambers. In his work 65
ʿIlm al-awliyāʾ al-Tirmidhī stated that for every name of God there is a treasury beside His throne (see 
Radtke and O’Kane, Concept, 112, n.3). In Khatm al-awliyāʾ al-Tirmidhī mentioned a treasury for the gifts 
given to the saints called the Treasury of Divine Favours, another treasury for the prophets called the 
Treasury of Divine Closeness, and a third intermediary Treasury called the Treasury of Running (i.e. 
Between Both Treasuries) which is for the Seal of Sainthood (al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 62). The origin 
for this expression is most probably the Qur’ān which mentions treasuries of God’s mercy (Q17:100) and 
treasuries of the Heavens and the earths (Q63:7). The context of the latter verse indicates that the 
treasuries of the earths refers to wealth.
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protected by guards, including sakīna, which is a spirit that brings peace of mind.  66
There is a parallel between this speech (ḥadīth) and prophecy, which is a different 
speech (kalām) that comes from God (as opposed to God’s treasuries), and is protected 
by the Spirit (rūḥ).  The Spirit protects divine revelation as it is delivered to the hearts 67
of the prophets and then seals it, and similarly the sakīna protects the Heavenly Speech 
as it enters the hearts of the Elect, and then reassures them about its veracity and 
removes doubts from their hearts.  This Heavenly Speech either relates to knowledge 68
of God Himself,  glad tidings and support for the recipient,  or matters related to the 69 70
Sharīʿa. In the case of the latter, it gives the Elect an increased understanding of the law 
that was brought by the Messenger, and can never be anything above the law or contrary 
to it.  71
1.3.1 The ‘Muḥaddathūn’ in the Revealed Sources 
 The muḥaddathūn were mentioned in the revealed sources. A tradition 
mentioning them is narrated in the two great canons of prophetic traditions: Ṣaḥīḥ al-
Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim; twice in the former. It is also narrated in Abū ʿĪsā al-
Tirmidhī’s Sunan and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal’s Musnad. It states, ‘There had been in the 
 The sakīna is mentioned in the Qurʾān as descending upon the Prophet and the believers (Q9:26; 48:26) 66
and even just upon the hearts of the believers (Q48:4; 48:18). In Judaism, the Shekhinah is understood to 
be a form of divine presence. Al-Tirmidhī describes the sakīna as an active force that can speak, not 
simply as peace of mind (see al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 49). I am grateful to McGregor for explaining 
both rūḥ and sakīna as two forms of spirit that accompany these two forms of divine communication. In 
McGregor’s understanding these may be two forms of the same Spirit (McGregor, Sanctity, 12).
 The rūḥ which is described in the Qurʾān as a vehicle for delivering the revelation to the Prophet 67
Muḥammad is often understood to be Gabriel (26:192-4).
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 50-1.68
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 47.69
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 51.70
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 50-1.71
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nations that came before you people who were spoken to. If there are any such people 
among my nation, then ʿUmar ibn al-Khattāb is one of them.’ The tradition seems to 
have intrigued these very narrators, as the first three of them followed it with 
explanations of the term muḥaddathūn. Muslim quoted Ibn Wahb (d. 197/818) as 
saying, ‘the explanation of muḥaddathūn is: inspired.’  Abū ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī quoted 72
Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna’s (d. 198/813-4) explanation: ‘those who are granted understanding 
[by God].’  As for al-Bukhārī, he explained the term by narrating a different version of 73
the same tradition in which the word muḥaddathūn is substituted by its synonym 
yukallamūn: ‘they are spoken to, though they are not prophets.’  This more strongly 74
indicates direct speech, and it is of course the same word used to describe God’s 
communication with Moses in the Qurʾān. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1448), in his 
commentary on this tradition, supported this other narration by quoting a tradition in 
which ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAwf, upon hearing a sermon of ‘Umar, exclaimed, ‘I bear 
witness that you are one who is spoken to (mukallam).’  75
 Perhaps more significantly than the above canonical traditions, however, is that 
the word muḥaddathūn was part of a non-canonical reading of the Qur’ān, and that this 
reading was preserved in the most authoritative canon of prophetic traditions: Ṣaḥīḥ al-
Bukhārī. After narrating the Prophet’s statement mentioned above, al-Bukhārī also 
stated that the Prophet’s cousin Ibn ʿAbbās, the father of Qurʾānic exegesis, used to 
recite the word muḥaddathūn as part of the Qurʾānic verse 22:52. The verse as it is 
 Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 4:1864.72
 Al-Tirmidhī, Abū ʿĪsā, Sunan, 5:622.73
 Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, 5:12.74
 The tradition comes from Ibn Saʿd’s (d. 230/845) Ṭabaqāt. See Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ al-Bārī, 7:50. However, as 75
Yohanan Friedmann wrote, 
‘The main thrust of the arguments presented by al-ʿAsqalānī…reflects the orthodox attempt to divest 
the muḥaddathūn of any prophetic qualities and to discredit any opinion supporting the existence of 
affinity between them and the prophets.’ (Friedmann, ‘Finality of Prophethood,’ 204).
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found in the Qurʾān reads, ‘Never have We sent a messenger or a prophet before you  (O 
Muḥammad) except that when he wished [for something], Satan tampered with his 
wishing.’ According to al-Bukhārī, Ibn ʿAbbās used to recite, ‘...a messenger or a 
prophet or a muḥaddath…’.  According to the great authority on ḥadīth, Ibn Ḥajar, this 76
was narrated by the early traditionist ʿAbd ibn Ḥumayd (d. 249/863)  with an authentic 77
chain, and likewise by Sufyān ibn ʿUyayna in his Jāmiʿ.  Al-Suyūṭī mentioned in his 78
Qurʾān commentary that Ibn al-Anbārī likewise narrated this in his book on the variant 
readings of the Qurʾān, al-Maṣāḥif.  It is therefore widely accepted that this word was 79
revealed as part of the Qurʾān, but was later abrogated.  Al-Tirmidhī narrated the 80
tradition of Ibn ʿAbbās with his own chain of narrators in Khatm al-awliyāʾ.   81
 According to Muslim scholars, there are verses of the Qurʾān that were revealed 
and then later abrogated. There are three possible scenarios here: abrogation of the rule 
within a text but not the recitation of the text; abrogation of the recitation of a text but 
not the rule contained within it; abrogation of both the rule and the recitation.  The 82
verse above however does not contain a rule but a report or an assertion. There is a 
debate amongst scholars on whether God can abrogate a report or assertion within a 
 Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, 5:12.76
 He wrote a musnad, which is published, and a tafsīr. He was one of the teachers of Muslim and Abū ʿĪsā 77
al-Tirmidhī.
 Ibn Ḥajar, Fatḥ, 7:51.78
 Al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-manthūr, 6: 65. 79
 Al-Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-manthūr, 6:65. Al-Suyūṭī listed four Qurʾānic figures whom he considered to be 80
examples of muḥaddathūn: the pious man mentioned in Sūra Yāsīn (36:20-8), Luqmān ‘the 
Wise’ (31:12-19), al-Khaḍir (18:65-82), and ‘the believer from among the Pharoah’s household’ (4:28-45). 
What is noteworthy about these figures is that their speech was quoted in the Qur’ān, sometimes at 
length. It is likely that their speech was seen as having been inspired, much like the Qurʾān is believed 
to have confirmed many of ʿUmar’s statements and judgements (see al-Suyūṭī, al-Itqān, 1:127-9; Tārīkh 
al-khulafāʾ, 1:99-101).
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 50.81
 Weiss, God’s Law, 515. For a full discussion of this issue as it relates to legal matters see pp. 515-19. See 82
also al-Suyūṭī, al-Itqān, 3:70-88.
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verse.  Al-Tirmidhī implied that the report in this verse is not of the type that would be 83
abrogated. Therefore, while the recitation of the verse may have been abrogated for a 
wisdom, the information within it is still true. He did this by likening it to another 
Qurʾānic verse that was also abrogated in terms of recitation, but that simply contained 
an assertion that was still true: ‘If the offspring of Adam possessed two rivers of gold, 
they would desire a third one besides.’  Therefore, al-Tirmidhī was saying that though 84
the word was removed from the Qurʾān, it was still an authentic divine revelation whose 
meaning remained true. It is clear then that these muḥaddathūn, as a category of 
inspired people, were well known in early Islam as they were mentioned in the Qurʾān 
and the canonical traditions, and many explanations of the term muḥaddathūn are 
attributed to different early Muslim scholars.  However, it is not known that anyone 85
spoke at length about them or gave a similar explanation of the speech that they 
received or heard, other than al-Tirmidhī. 
1.3.2 The Rank and Role of the Elect 
 The non-canonical Qurʾānic reading mentioned above places the muḥaddathūn 
next to the messengers and prophets: ‘Never have We sent a messenger, a prophet, or a 
muḥaddath…’ Similarly, the traditions suggest that they receive speech or are addressed 
‘though they are not prophets’ as the secondary narration by al-Bukhārī stated. These 
traditions suggest a degree of similarity between the prophets and the Elect. Al-Tirmidhī 
developed his ideas further by stating that the muḥaddathūn had a great share of 
prophethood. All believers have a share of prophethood, which is in their virtuous 
behaviour, right guidance, the possession of certain character traits, and in seeing dream 
 Weiss, God’s Law, 519-520.83
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 47. On this verse see al-Suyūṭī, al-Itqān, 3:83.84
 Friedmann saw in this plethora of explanations about the term quoted in Ibn Ḥajar’s commentary, a 85
‘debate concerning the spiritual role of the muḥaddathūn,’ seemingly prompted to a large extent by 
‘attitudes such as those reflected in Khatm al-awliyāʾ (of al-Tirmidhī).’ (Friedmann, ‘Finality of 
Prophethood,’ 204).
 26
visions that came from God; however, the share of the Elect is much higher. Al-
Tirmidhī used two canonical prophetic statements as a basis for this claim. The first is 
the tradition that states, ‘Adopting a middle course, right guidance, and virtuous 
behaviour constitute one portion of the twenty four portions of prophethood.’  The 86
second states: ‘The dream vision of the believer is one portion out of forty-six portions 
of prophethood.’  In Nawādir al-uṣūl he wrote,  87
If speech (kalām) directed to the spirit in a dream is one of the forty-six parts of 
prophethood, then speech that reaches the heart in a waking state is more than one 
third of prophethood.   88
In Khatm al-awliyāʾ he further said that while some of the Elect have one third of the 
portion of prophethood, others of higher rank have half, and others even more. The 
highest in share of prophethood is the one who possesses the Seal of Sainthood, but al-
Tirmidhī did not disclose how much of prophethood he believed this person to have, as 
even some of his students had difficulty with the concept that saints had a share of 
prophecy.  The Elect among the saints, no matter how much their portion of 89
prophethood, do not have prophethood itself, and can never be equal to the prophets in 
rank.  It is noteworthy in this regard that the multiple traditions about the ‘forty abdāl’ 90
state that thirty of them are ‘upon the heart of Abraham,’ or ‘have a degree of certainty 
equal to that of Abraham.’  91
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 47. This is a canonical tradition narrated by al-Bukhārī in al-Adab al-86
mufrad, Abū ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī in his Jāmiʿ, Abū Dāwūd in his Sunan, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal in his Musnad, and 
others. Most have the fraction at 1/25th rather than 1/24th.
 Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, 9:30. Also narrated by Mālik, Muslim, al-Tirmidhī, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Māja. 87
 Al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 1:392; also see Radtke and O’Kane, Concept, 236.88
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 47.89
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 54, 84.90
 Al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 1:261-2. For more narrations see al-Suyūṭī’s treatise on the existence of the 91
abdāl (al-Ṣuyūṭī, al-Khabar al-dāl, 291-307).
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 If the verse of the muḥaddathūn stated that they were ‘sent,’ it does not mean 
that they were sent to communities in the way that messengers were sent. Rather, they 
were sent from God, not by God, that is: after having reached spiritual heights, they 
now had a role to play on Earth. For example, God used the same word ‘sent’ to 
describe the people He sent to punish the Israelites (Q 17:5).  This role is similar to that 92
of pre-Islamic prophets. According to al-Tirmidhī’s definition, messengers were those 
who received prophecy and were commanded to deliver a message to people; this role 
of delivering the message is what made them messengers rather than prophets; 
furthermore, the prophecy that they received included a law for the people to live by. As 
for the prophets who came after the messengers, the prophecy that they received was for 
their own benefit. However, if they were asked, it was their duty to explain and teach 
people what they knew, and to call them to God, counsel them, and clarify to them how 
best to follow the law brought by the messenger who had come before them. The role of 
the Elect among Muḥammad’s followers is similar to the role of the prophets among the 
followers of earlier messengers. What they receive is an increased understanding of the 
law through which they can guide people to follow the law of Muḥammad, answer their 
questions, and give them counsel. There is one major difference however. What 
prophets received was revelation: God’s speech. Rejecting that entailed kufr (disbelief). 
What the Elect receive is knowledge of God or an increased understanding of God’s 
speech, but not God’s speech (revelation) itself. It is simply bestowed upon its recipient 
because of God’s love of him. Therefore, those who reject it are not disbelievers. The 
Elect want that which is good for the people, and those who reject them lose out on this 
good, and lose out on the blessings of the Elect and their light.  In a famous canonical 93
tradition about the saints on the authority of Abū Hurayra, the Prophet related that God 
stated, ‘When I love [my servant] I become his hearing with which he hears, his seeing 
with which he sees, his hand with which he strikes and his foot with which he walks.’  94
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 50-1.92
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 46-7; 51-2.93
 Al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, 8:105.94
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A less canonical version preferred by al-Tirmidhī on the authority of ʿĀʾisha includes, 
‘[and I become] his heart with which he understands.’  Al-Tirmidhī understood this 95
tradition to refer not to all saints but to the muḥaddathūn. Their hearts are in the grasp 
(qabḍa) of God, and so their intelligence ‘has become extinguished in the Supreme 
Intelligence (al-ʿaql al-akbar).’ Their limbs no longer move at the command of any 
lusts or desires, rather, God controls them, and they are His agents on Earth.  When 96
they speak, they only speak the truth, and when they judge, they judge justly. Their 
understanding of the Sharīʿa is inspired.  As such, the Elect deserve to be the leaders of 97
the Muslim community. The Qurʾān states, ‘O you who believe, obey God and the 
Messenger and those possessing authority (ulūl-amr) among you’ (Q 4:59). Sunnī 
scholars traditionally held that obeying God meant following the Qurʾān and obeying 
the Messenger, after his passing, meant following his Sunna. They differed after that on 
the meaning of the people possessing authority. There were those who understood it to 
refer to military and political leaders, and those who understood it to refer to religious 
scholars.  Al-Tirmidhī agreed that God’s command could be found in the Qurʾān and 98
the Messenger’s command could be found in his Sunna. In terms of the people 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 34; Ibn Abī al-Dunyā، al-Awliyāʾ, 23.95
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 34, 67. Al-Tirmidhī also calls them the ‘people in God’s grasp’ (ahl al-96
qabḍa). The most detailed discussion by al-Tirmidhī on this issue is in Adab al-nafs, 42-52 (see also al-
Furūq, 192-3). Elsewhere al-Tirmidhī explicitly states that the ‘people in God’s grasp’ are an elite rank 
above the ṣiddīqūn (al-Furūq, 291).
 Al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 368. 97
 Or both. See al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-bayān, 7:175-181; Ibn Kathīr, Tafsīr, 2:304. For the Twelver Shīʿa, who 98
would only crystallise as a movement after al-Tirmidhī’s passing, this verse referred to the infallible 
imams from among the Prophet’s descendants (al-Ṭūṣī, al-Tibyān, 4:59).
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possessing authority, he agreed with the second opinion, except that he restricted it to a 
very select group of learned men (or women): the Elect.  99
1.3.3 The Knowledge of the Elect 
The knowledge of the Elect consists of four branches.  They are: 100
1) Knowledge of the beginning of creation (ʿilm al-badʾ).  101
2) Knowledge of the Day of the Covenant (Q 7:172) 
3) Knowledge of God’s decrees (ʿilm al-maqādīr) 
4) Knowledge of the letters of the alphabet (ʿilm al-ḥurūf) 
These four types of knowledge are the ‘foundations’ of what al-Tirmidhī terms the 
‘supreme wisdom’ (al-ḥikma l-ʿulyā).  It is the knowledge of God’s decrees which 102
relates to the Sharīʿa, because it reveals the inner workings of the Law, meaning, the 
 Al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 368, 380. As stated in a previous note, Radtke believed that the saints were forty 99
in total, the abdāl, and that they were the leaders of the community after Muḥammad’s passing. He did 
not hold this opinion based on these passages in al-Furūq which state that the Elect were ‘those 
possessing authority,’ but rather because of a passage in Khatm al-awliyāʾ which states that after 
Muḥammad’s passing, God ensured the existence of forty saints on Earth (see Radtke, ‘Wilāya,’ 292; al-
Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 44). However, a chapter in Nawādir al-uṣūl makes it clear that the role of the 
forty abdāl was not an active one. Rather, with the passing of the Prophet who was the locus of God’s 
remembrance, forty saints were needed to replace the Prophet as the loci of God’s remembrance on 
Earth. Their hearts remembered God without distraction and their faith was unadulterated. Had it not 
been for the existence of these loci of remembrance on Earth, the Earth would lose all sanctity and 
destructive tribulations would bring about its corruption and ruin. They, therefore, are not the leaders 
of the Muslims, but they play a more general role in preserving the entire Earth from ruin, as per the 
wording of the prophetic traditions regarding them: ‘It is for their sake that rain comes down, that 
victory is given over enemies, and that tribulations are averted from the inhabitants of the Earth.’ (See 
the 222nd aṣl in al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 3:61-9). These forty ṣiddīqūn correspond to the thirty-six Tzadikim 
in Judaism who have the same role of justifying the existence of the world in the eyes of God, and 
without whom the world would end. As for the small number of the Elect, who may be from among the 
forty, they deserve to be the active leaders of the Muslim community as its authoritative guides to the 
application of the Sharīʿa.
 In Khatm al-awliyāʾ he uses the expression ‘the chiefs (or greats) among the saints’ (kubarāʾ al-awliyāʾ) 100
(al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 58). Elsewhere they are identified as the muḥaddathūn and the ‘people in 
God’s grasp’ (al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 368, 380).
 Radtke and O’Kane translated it as ‘primordial beginning.’ (Radtke and O’Kane, Concept, 126).101
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 58. I have reversed the ordering of the middle two.102
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‘reasoning’ behind it, and therefore it is the source of the increased understanding of the 
law that the Elect possess. This knowledge itself comes from the knowledge of the 
twenty-eight letters of the alphabet, which are the root or foundation of all knowledge, 
including the three above it. Al-Tirmidhī wrote, 
All branches of knowledge are contained within the letters of the alphabet. This is 
because the beginning of all knowledge is in the names of God. From [the names 
of God] emerged God’s creation of the world and His governance of it. Likewise 
(from the names of God) emerged His judgements regarding what He made 
permissible and what He made impermissible. The names themselves appeared 
from the letters, and return to the letters. This is a hidden science, understood only 
by the saints whose intellects understand through God, and whose hearts are 
attached to God…[For them] the veils over these letters, as well as the attributes 
of God’s essence, have been lifted.  103
Furthermore, the names of things point to their inner realities or qualities. The Qurʾān 
states that God taught Adam ‘the names’ (Q 2:31). Adam was not only taught the names 
of things but was also taught the knowledge or science of the letters. This gave him the 
ability to know the true inner substance and reality of every created thing. The Elect 
among the saints also possess this knowledge.  These branches of knowledge give the 104
Elect the ability to understand God’s revelation and His Sharīʿa in a way that makes 
them equipped to practice ijtihād, as will be explained in the next chapter. Al-Tirmidhī 
was highly concerned with this matter of explaining the wisdom behind the Sharīʿa. He 
authored several texts with the aim of illuminating the wisdom behind God’s laws based 
on his inspired knowledge. The most important of these works are: 
1.  Nawādir al-uṣūl. It is al-Tirmidhī’s most voluminous and well known work, in 
which he narrated and used prophetic traditions as a starting point for his discussions 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ṭaḥṣīl, 104-5. Therefore al-Tirmidhī’s hierarchy of knowledge, as it relates to the Sharīʿa, 103
is the following (from top to bottom): knowledge of the letters - knowledge of the names of God - 
knowledge of God’s decrees - knowledge of the Sharīʿa.
 See the passage from ʿIlm al-awliyāʾ translated in Radtke and O’Kane, Concept, 223-4. See also 104
ʿAbdullāh, al-Ḥakīm, 261; Sviri, ‘Words of Power,’ 211-2.
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of a wide range of topics. In this work, al-Tirmidhī interpreted many of the traditions 
by way of inspired knowledge. Al-Ḥusaynī believes this to be al-Tirmidhī’s earliest 
work, because it is mentioned in most of his later works, and because despite its large 
size, it does not mention any of his other works.  105
2. Kitāb al-ṣalāt. In this work, al-Tirmidhī gave inspired explanations of the rituals of 
the prayer.  
3. Kitāb al-ḥajj. This work is like the work above, except that it deals with the rites of 
Pilgrimage. Al-Tirmidhī referred to it in his refutation of analogy in al-Furūq.   106
4. Kitāb ʿilal al-ʿibādāt. A work dedicated to the wisdom behind prayer and some 
connected matters like the ritual bath and the use of the siwāk toothbrush. 
5. Kitāb al-manhiyyāt. This is a work devoted only to the prophetic traditions that deal 
with prohibitions. In it, al-Tirmidhī explained more than 800 prophetic traditions, to 
show that the prohibitions in them are based on truth (ḥaqq), and that they are to 
prevent the believer from harm on his path to his Lord. He frequently gave inspired 
explanations for these prohibitions. In his introduction to the work he wrote, ‘We 
have found that prohibitions from [the Prophet] (peace be upon him) are of two types: 
prohibition of taḥrīm (actual prohibition, meaning that doing what is prohibited is 
ḥarām or forbidden and constitutes a sin), and prohibition of taʾdīb (teaching 
propriety). Whoever leaves the propriety descends from its (high) rank, but whoever 
jumps at the forbidden falls into perdition.’  Here we see al-Tirmidhī using the 107
word ‘adab’ or propriety as the reason behind a great deal of the Sharīʿa’s teachings, 
and explaining that not all prohibitions deal with sinful or destructive matters.  This 
 Al-Ḥusaynī, al-Maʿrifa, 22.105
 A book attributed to al-Tirmidhī by this name (more fully: al-Ḥajj wa-asrāruh) was published in Cairo 106
in 1970 by Ḥusnī Nasr Zaydān. Radtke and O’Kane, however, list this book among those ‘incorrectly 
attributed to Tirmidhī, at least in their present form’ (Radtke and O’Kane, Concept, 3).
 Al-Tirmidhī, al-Manhiyyāt, 6.107
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division of Prophetic prohibitions in particular was held by some early scholars.  108
However, most scholars give sinful acts the value judgement of ḥarām (forbidden), 
and assign the value judgement makrūh (disliked) for things that are best avoided, 
and they do not employ the division used by al-Tirmidhī. Sufis have always 
emphasised the proper set of proprieties or ādāb that the Sufi must observe with his 
Creator, with the rest of creation, and with his own self, and so did al-Tirmidhī.  109
6. Al-Akyās wa-l-mughtarrīn. This is a work in which al-Tirmidhī critiqued different 
types of religious groups in his times for their shortcomings, such as the jurists, the 
traditionists, the mystics, and the ascetics. In his criticism of the jurists he criticised 
their legal methodology. Likewise, his discussion of the traditionists emphasised the 
need for wisdom and inner illumination in order to be a good traditionist. Nicholas 
Heer and Osman Yahya believe that al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) benefited from this 
work when writing Book Thirty of his Iḥyāʾ: ‘On Condemnation of Self-Delusion.’  110
It was published in 1989 under the name Ṭabā’iʿ al-nufūs.  111
7. Al-Furūq wa-manʿ al-tarāduf. This is the work in which al-Tirmidhī discussed his 
views on ijtihād and analogy in the most depth. Each chapter of this book discussed 
the difference between two similar concepts, and the final and longest chapter is 
dedicated to the difference between inspired ijtihād and the rationalistic legal 
reasoning of the jurists. Al-Tirmidhī discussed his ideas on the subject at length and 
 Al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) upheld this division in his works (see al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, 7:305; al-Risāla, 108
1:343-53), as did Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) (see Abū Yaʿlā, al-ʿUdda, 2:425-6). According to the early 
scholar Sallām ibn Abī Muṭīʿ (d. 164/780 or 781), the Companion ʿAbdullāh ibn ʿUmar rebuked his 
student Abū Dakhīla for paraphrasing his statement that the Prophet forbade act x as ‘the Prophet 
declared act x to be ḥarām.’ After narrating this incident on the authority of Abū Dakhīla’s son, Sallām 
commented, ‘It is as if [Ibn ʿUmar] was saying that from amongst the Prophet’s prohibitions there were 
things prohibited for the sake of adab’ (See the discussion in Ibn Rajab, Jāmiʿ, 2:158-160).
 See Ohlander, ‘Adab, in Ṣūfism,’ in EI3;  al-Tirmidhī, Adab al-nafs, 63-6.109
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-ʿilal, 27.110
 Al-Tirmidhī, Tabaʾiʿ al-nufūs, ed. Aḥmad al-Sāyiḥ, Cairo: al-Maktab al-Thaqāfī, 1989. I have not been 111
able to consult this work.
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gave detailed examples of faulty analogical reasoning. He provided very lengthy 
explanations, in some instances at least, of what he argued was the true understanding 
of the jurisprudential matters that he discussed. We will look at his arguments in 
depth in the following chapter. 
8. Kitāb ithbāt al-ʿilal. In this work, al-Tirmidhī aimed to show the wisdom behind 
different rituals in the Sharīʿa, covering all the five pillars of Islam as well as other 
commandments, prohibitions, and prophetic practices. He began the work by 
defending the view that everything in the Sharīʿa has a purpose. It is also one of the 
two works, the other being Khatm al-awliyā’, that are said to have caused his 
persecution and caused him to leave his home town of Tirmidh.  We will look at 112
important passages from this work in the next chapter. However a summary of its 
introduction is also of benefit. In his introduction al-Tirmidhī gave his arguments in 
support of the existence of ratios behind the divine injunctions, and built his case for 
the ability of the People of Wisdom to discover these ratios. 
 Al-Tirmidhī wrote Kitāb ithbāt al-ʿilal in response to a request that he speak on 
a matter that had divided the people of his time: whether or not there was a ratio legis 
behind each of God’s commands and prohibitions, and if they did exist, to explain these 
ratios.  He began by proving the existence of ratios by quoting Qur’ānic verses in 113
which explanations were given for some commandments in the Sharīʿa. He then argued 
that, even if the commands and prohibitions were only there to test people’s obedience, 
they would either have to be arbitrary, or there was a wisdom behind them. Since no one 
would dare say that God’s commands and prohibitions were simply arbitrary, and thus 
more akin to play, then there must be a wisdom behind them; those who deny that are 
simply deprived of knowing it. Al-Tirmidhī discussed why most people were deprived 
of this wisdom, and how it may be obtained. Al-Tirmidhī went on to define wisdom as 
 Zahrī (ed.) in al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-‘ilal, 18.112
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-‘ilal, 67.113
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the knowledge that underlies the law, like a kernel within the shell; it is from the kernel, 
not from the shell, that one derives benefit, he said.  114
 In order to support his understanding of wisdom, al-Tirmidhī quoted two 
Qur’ānic verses showing that wisdom is not given to everyone, but rather to God’s 
chosen ones who, 
 …struggled against their own selves for the sake of God, emptied their chests from 
love of the self and its desires, and so deserved His mercy and were supported by 
light. When the light shone in their chests, they were able to see the wisdom with the 
eyes of their hearts.   115
He began with the verse that says, ‘He grants wisdom to whom He wills, and he who is 
given wisdom has been given a lot of good.’ This establishes that wisdom is not given to 
anyone. The verse then continues, saying, ‘None will remember except those of 
understanding’ (Q 2:269). The word for understanding, or mind (lubb), is the same word 
for kernel, and the verse could be understood to mean, ‘the people of the kernel.’ The 
verse ‘We have given wisdom to Luqmān’ (Q 31:12) further confirms for al-Tirmidhī 
that wisdom is only given to God’s chosen ones.  
 Al-Tirmidhī used two sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad about the Qur’ān to 
further support this. The first states, ‘For each of its verses there is an outward and an 
inward (meaning).’ In the other tradition, the Prophet was asked by his Companions 
why they found such pleasure in listening to his recitation of the Qur’ān in prayer, and 
did not find the same pleasure when they recited it in their own homes. The Prophet is 
said to have replied, ‘That is because you read it for its outward, and I read it for its 
inward.’ Al-Tirmidhī commented on this, saying, 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-‘ilal, 69.114
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-‘ilal, 75.115
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We understand it to mean that when he used to recite, he would be viewing the 
wisdom, and so the listener would find pleasure from his recitation, because it is 
was recitation that was clothed with the light of wisdom.   116
  
The final step for al-Tirmidhī was to apply this understanding of wisdom to the Sharīʿa, 
and to the concept of understanding the ratio legis. For this he quoted al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī 
(d. 110/728) as having said, 
Those ratios that we understood by way of wisdom, we spoke about and clarified 
in order to explain the wisdom behind them. We did not make judgements about 
what God made unseen. That which remained hidden from us, we simply accepted 
it, and we preserved our servanthood in acting upon it.   117
With this evidence, al-Tirmidhī began his task of explaining the ratio legis or wisdom 
behind the Sharīʿa and its practices. As Khālid Zahrī pointed out, al-Tirmidhī’s inspired 
explanations of the ratio legis of different parts of the law were often inspired by 
explanations from the Qur’ān and Sunna themselves, and sometimes inspired by the 
language and structure of the terms whose ratios he was explaining. To give a few 
examples, he linked the word taḥiyyāt (greetings) to God’s name al-Ḥayy (the Living), 
the fasting in Ramadan to the burning (irmāḍ) of sins, and the compulsory alms-giving 
Zakāt to growth (zakā’) in the giver’s wealth.  While these examples do not represent 118
the majority of his explanations, they are important to note because Ibn ʿArabī would 
also use the similar technique. 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-ʿilal, 75. The Medinan scholar Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765) is reported to have 116
preceeded al-Tirmidhī in attributing different layers of meaning to the Qurʾān. He stated that the 
Qurʾān’s clear expressions were for the laymen, its allusions were for the scholars, its subtleties were 
for the saints, and its realities were for the prophets (Sands, Sufi Commentaries, 13). I translated khawāṣṣ 
as scholars rather than ‘elites’ in this context. There is a partial Sufi commentary on the Qurʾān 
attributed to al-Ṣādiq (see Sells, Early Islamic Mysticism, 75-89).
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-‘ilal, 77.117
 Zahrī (ed.) in al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-‘ilal, 48.118
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1.4 Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to provide a clear and comprehensive picture of 
al-Tirmidhī’s highly sophisticated and original conception of sainthood in general. Al-
Tirmidhī, like some of his contemporaries, spoke of a hierarchy within sainthood, 
distinguishing between the normal saints and the Elect among them whom he called the 
muḥaddathūn. These Elect were just below the prophets in rank, and shared a greater 
portion of prophethood than the other believers. This share included their greater 
character traits, their knowledge, and most importantly, the types of inspiration that they 
received. All saints possessed clairvoyance and inspiration, but the Elect also received 
Heavenly Speech which could give them certain knowledge. This certain knowledge 
provided them with a greater understanding of the Sharīʿa. Furthermore, the hearts of 
these Elect were in God’s grasp, meaning that their thoughts and actions were divinely 
guided. They spoke the truth and their judgements were just. Al-Tirmidhī believed that 
these qualifications meant that the Elect were the most authoritative guides to 
understanding and applying God’s Law, and that they were the ones whose obedience 
was made necessary in the Qurʾān after God and His Messenger. However, those who 
disobeyed them did not exit the fold of Islam because what they brought was not divine 
revelation, and the Heavenly Speech that they received was unlike God’s own speech, 
the Qurʾān. Those who rejected the guidance of the Elect were deprived of their light, 
guidance, and blessings. These ideas formed the underlying basis for al-Tirmidhī’s 
critique of the authority of the jurists and of their ability to interpret God’s commands 
and prohibitions. Al-Tirmidhī argued that it was the Elect who were most equipped to 
practice ijtihād. The next chapter will deal with his criticism of rationalist legal thought, 
and his proposed alternative: the inspired ijtihād of the Elect. As we will show in 
Chapter Three, the ideas presented here directly influenced Ibn ʿArabī’s own conception 
of sainthood and of ijtihād.  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Chapter 2: Al-Tirmidhī on Juristic Method 
This chapter will investigate al-Tirmidhī’s critique of legal theory in his time, and his 
proposed alternative, which is based on his concept of sainthood. Before presenting al-
Tirmidhī’s ideas, it would be helpful to give a brief sketch of the intellectual 
environment of his time as well as the different approaches to jurisprudence. 
2.1 The Major Schools in the Age of al-Tirmidhī 
 The age in which al-Tirmidhī lived was characterised by a clash of approaches 
to jurisprudence. After the passing of the Prophet and the generation of his immediate 
followers (the Companions), scholars were left with the task of creating a system of 
thought capable of responding to new issues for which there was no direct guidance in 
the Qur’ān and Sunna. There were not yet schools of jurisprudence (madhhabs) during 
the 2nd/8th century, but there were a number of scholars who rose to prominence for 
their knowledge and piety, and developed their own personal approaches or legal 
doctrines for the process of ijtihād. As Wael Hallaq showed, these doctrines were not 
binding upon those who chose to adhere to them and apply them.  Starting mainly 119
from the middle of the 3rd/9th century, schools of jurisprudence began to arise based on 
the doctrines of some of these scholars and their students, and each school had its own 
unique theoretical principles and body of individual opinions. As these schools matured, 
taqlīd or the notion of the authoritativeness of the opinions of the schools, and of the 
importance of following the principles of a single school, came to prominence. Hallaq 
wrote,  
Taqlīd was the external expression of the internal juridicial dynamics that came to 
dominate and characterise the madhhab both as an established and authorised 
body of doctrine and as a delimited hermeneutical enterprise. One of the functions 
 Hallaq, ‘Regional,’ 21.119
 38
of taqlīd was the defence of the school as a methodological and interpretive entity, 
an entity that was constituted of identifiable theoretical and substantive 
principles.  120
 The schools that emerged were many, but could be roughly grouped into two 
larger movements: the Traditionalists (ahl al-ḥadīth)  and the Rationalists (ahl al-121
raʾy).  Each of these movements consisted of different groups, for which these terms 122
could carry very different meanings. There were two types of reasoning that were 
referred to as ra’y. The first was that of ‘free human reasoning based on practical 
considerations and bound by no authoritative text.’  This type was not widely used and 123
did not survive past the second Islamic century.  The second type was free reasoning 124
that was based on an authoritative text but was also ‘motivated by practical 
considerations.’  This type of reasoning became stricter, more systematised, and relied 125
increasingly on prophetic traditions as its textual basis instead of the authorities of later 
generations or inherited practice.  By the beginning of the 3rd/9th century, the term 126
 Hallaq, ‘Regional,’ 21.120
 The term ‘traditionalist’ indicates ‘someone who systematically prefers to base his law and theology 121
on textual sources as opposed to speculative reasoning’ which is different from ‘traditionist’ which 
indicates a muḥaddith, ‘someone who studies and transmits ḥadīth, whatever his theological 
inclination’ (Melchert, Traditionist-Jurisprudents, 386).
 It is important to note that the word ra’y (lit. opinion) sometimes referred to the considered 122
judgement of a scholar, or the product of his ijtihād, based on the Qur’ān and Sunna or materials of 
religious authority (see Hallaq, History, 15). Likewise, the expression ‘the People of ra’y’ could refer to 
scholars whose judgements were deemed authoritative or strong, regardless of their methodology or 
the camp to which they belonged. In this context, this expression could be understood to mean ‘the 
people of good sense’ as Hallaq translated it (Hallaq, History, 15). This was regardless of whether they 
were people who relied more on prophetic traditions or on reason and free thinking. However, the term 
ra’y became mostly associated with types of reasoning by legal jurists, and that is where the division 
between the Rationalists and Traditionalists was created.
 Hallaq, History, 15.123
 Hallaq, History, 19.124
 Hallaq, History, 15.125
 Hallaq, History, 19.126
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ra’y became associated with systematic analogy-based reasoning, called qiyās.  Qiyās 127
is an extension of the Lawgiver’s rulings on certain acts (such as obligations and 
prohibitions), to other similar acts which are not mentioned in the Sharīʿa. For example, 
if the Prophet stated that act ‘x’ is prohibited because of quality ‘y,’ then other acts that 
also shared ‘y’ quality would be deemed prohibited as well by the jurists. The ‘y’ quality 
is the effective cause for the Divine ruling, the ratio legis (ʿilla). In most cases the ratios 
for divinely revealed rulings were not stated and had to be discovered by the jurists.  128
This meant that if new cases arose for which the Qur’ān and ḥadīth literature did not 
provide a direct ruling, the jurist, by using qiyās, would search for a ‘parallel textual 
case for which a solution is provided. If the new case has the same ratio legis (ʿilla) as 
that given to the parallel textual case, the ruling in the text must be transferred to the 
new case.’  For our purposes, it is important to note that the metaphor of a tree was 129
used in the terminology of analogical reasoning. A new case was called a farʿ (lit. 
branch) and the original textual case with which it was compared was called an aṣl (lit. 
source or stem).  Difference of opinion on the use of rational methods like analogical 130
reasoning, as well as the extent to which they were used, were the main factors 
separating the different schools and approaches by al-Tirmidhī’s time. 
 During al-Tirmidhī’s lifetime, the spectrum of schools ranged from the Ḥanafī 
school on one side, who were seen as those who used analogy-based reasoning the 
most, to the Ẓahirīs and the Traditionist-Jurisprudents on the other side of the scale. Ibn 
 The term qiyās does not always refer to analogical arguments. As Hallaq noted, qiyās ‘cannot be given 127
the fixed definition of analogy. Instead, it should be a relative term whose definition and structure vary 
from one jurist to another’ (Hallaq, ‘Non-Analogical Arguments,’ 305).  For non-analogical arguments 
that many Sunni jurists label as a type of qiyās see Hallaq, History, 96-104; ‘Non-Analogical Arguments,’ 
286-306. One of these is the mafhūm al-muwāfaqa which is discussed in Chapter Four, Section 4.1.3. 
However, here I give the example of the main type of reasoning that is meant when the word qiyās is 
used, which is analogical reasoning.
 An overview of the three main methods for inferring the ratio legis is given in Hallaq, History, 88-95.128
 Hallaq, History, 20, 23.129
 Hallaq, History, 84.130
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al-Nadīm (f. 377/987-88) mainly equated the Rationalists with the Ḥanafī school, 
although he seemed to place the formation of the school not in the lifetime of its 
eponym Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767), but around the death of his two most famous 
disciples, Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (d. 189/804-5).  Other 131
schools included the Shāfiʿī school of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), a 
traditionalist school in that it advocated the systematic use of prophetic traditions as the 
basis of its jurisprudence, and yet also accepted the use of qiyās, as well as the Mālikī 
school named after its founder Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795).   132
 On the other end of the traditionalist scale were the Traditionist-Jurisprudents 
and the Ẓāhirīs. The Traditionist-Jurisprudents were ḥadīth specialists who expended 
their efforts on the learning and transmission of prophetic traditions in order to provide 
an authoritative text for every problem that was posed. This group included the likes of 
ʿAbd al-Razzāq (d. 211/827), Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849), Isḥāq ibn Rāhwayh (d. 
238/853), and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). A distinctive feature of these 
traditionists was that their answer to problems of jurisprudence was simply a narration 
or a set of narrations of relevant traditions. Most of them authored works known as al-
Sunan, which had the format of books of jurisprudence but were mostly composed of 
ḥadīth narrations.  As Melchert said of Ibn Ḥanbal’s approach - and this was true of 133
 On the equating of the Ḥanafīs to the Rationalists, see Melchert, ‘Traditionist-Jurisprudents,’ 385. On 131
the dating of this school see Stewart, ‘Structure of the Fihrist,’ 374. These recent studies by Melchert 
and Stewart have shown the importance of Ibn al-Nadīm as a historian of the early schools of law, and 
the careful thought that he put into studying, categorising, and dating these schools.
 Ibn al-Nadīm considered them two distinct groups, neither among the Rationalists, nor among the 132
Traditionist-Jurisprudents (see Melchert, ‘Traditionist-Jurisprudents,’ 385). The traditionist Ibn Qutayba 
(d. 276/889), from the point of view of a Traditionist-Jurisprudent like his teacher Isḥāq ibn Rāhwayh 
(d. 238/853), classified Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and al-Thawrī (d. 171/778) among the Rationalists. In a later 
work, however, using a different definition that reflects an understanding of the larger grouping of the 
Traditionalists, Ibn Qutayba grouped them among the ‘People of Ḥadīth’ (see Melchert, ‘Traditionist-
Jurisprudents,’ 404-5). For a comparison of Mālik’s use of raʾy to that of the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī schools 
see Abd-Allah, Mālik, 141-181.
 See Melchert, ‘Traditionist-Jurisprudents,’ 385, 388-9; Schacht, ‘Ibn Rāhwayh.’133
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the other Traditionist-Jurisprudents as well - ‘ḥadīth reports [were] not just authorities 
corroborating his opinions, they practically [were] his opinions.’   134
 The Ẓāhirī school was founded by Dāwūd ibn Khalaf al-Ẓāhirī (d. 270/883) who 
was born at around the same time as al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī in Kufa, but later resided 
and taught in Baghdad.  This school will be given more attention than the others 135
because of its similarities to the thought of al-Tirmidhī and Ibn ʿArabī. The Ẓāhirīs 
were different from the Traditionist-Jurisprudents in their concern with developing a 
legal method based on clear rules.  The Ẓāhirīs completely rejected taqlīd and the use 136
of analogical reasoning. Al-Ẓāhirī’s jurisprudence was primarily tradition-based, and he 
accepted the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, and the consensus of the Companions as the only sources 
of law. As for analogical reasoning, he said of it: ‘the first to use qiyās was Iblīs 
(Satan).’  This statement, as we will see, was repeated by al-Tirmidhī and others. 137
 The position of the majority of jurists is that the Sharīʿa must contain a ruling 
for every possible act in existence. Due to the limited number of Qur’ānic verses and 
prophetic reports, and the unlimited number of issues, they first resort to extracting 
more out of the texts by analysing different types of meanings that could be inferred 
from the language of the texts, such as its allusions and implications. When they have 
no texts to work with, they resort to analogical reasoning and other methods of 
reasoning, according to the different methodologies of the schools.  The use of such 138
rationalist methods is based on the idea that there is a ratio legis for each ruling in the 
Qur’ān and ḥadīth, and a general wisdom and higher principle that the Sharīʿa aims to 
achieve. These scholars thus aim to discover the wisdom in the Sharīʿa and its rulings, 
 Melchert, ‘Traditionist-Jurisprudents,’ 389.134
 Melchert, Formation, 179; Osman, History and Doctrine, 10-11.135
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 224-5.136
 Al-Ḥajwī, al-Fikr al-sāmī, 385.137
 Al-Ḥajwī, al-Fikr al-sāmī, 389-393. For the different textual implications that could be extracted by the 138
jurists, see Kamali, Principles, 167-186.
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to be able to increase the number of rulings, whether they be judgments of obligation, 
prohibition, or permissibility, as new issues arise.   139
 For Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī and his followers, there was no evidence that God had a 
ruling for every issue, and they argued that anything that was not given a judgement in 
the Qur’ān and ḥadīth explicitly, had been purposely omitted as a mercy from God and 
that God would not take anyone to account over it. They quoted the saying of the 
Prophet’s cousin Ibn ʿAbbās, 
God sent His Messenger and sent down His Book in which He declared what is 
lawful and what is unlawful. Therefore what He made lawful is lawful and what 
He made unlawful is unlawful, and what He remained silent about has been 
pardoned.  140
The Ẓāhirīs argued that if analogical reasoning was used, this section of things 
purposely omitted by God would cease to exist and everything would have a ruling.  141
 The Ẓāhirīs also rejected the existence of a ratio legis for God’s rulings. Ibn 
Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), who would be Ibn ʿArabī’s reference for Ẓāhirī teachings (see 
Chapter Four, Section 4.1), argued that even if the Lawgiver mentioned certain qualities 
as causes (asbāb) of Divine rulings on certain acts, the Ẓāhirīs did not allow for the 
same rulings to be applied to other acts not mentioned by the Lawgiver that shared these 
same qualities. Ibn Ḥazm attributed this position to Dāwūd himself.  However, 142
according to the Shāfiʿī jurist Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1340), Dāwūd had a different 
position. Based on a manuscript in his possession which he attributed to Dāwūd himself, 
al-Subkī held that Dāwūd did accept the extension of rulings in such cases, but not on 
 Abū Zahra, Ibn Ḥazm, 342. Ashʿarī theology, however, maintained that ‘man is incapable of knowing 139
the wisdom behind [God’s] commands and that God is not obliged to command what is good for His 
subjects.’ They therefore maintained that ‘the legal cause embodied in the ratio legis is nothing but a 
sign which signifies the legal rule but does not actually “effect” it’ but could be seen as more of an 
occasioning factor’ (Hallaq, History, 136).
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 8:28.140
 Al-Ḥajwī, al-Fikr al-sāmī, 391. See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 8:13-18.141
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 76-7; al-Shawkānī, Irshād, 2:95.142
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the basis of qiyās, which he categorically rejected. Rather, said al-Subkī, ‘it is as if 
[Dāwūd] did not call (this extension) qiyās if the ratio legis was specified (by the 
Lawgiver).’  If this attribution is correct, it may reflect the influence of the early 143
Muʿtazilī thinker Ibrāhīm al-Naẓẓām (d. 221/835 or 231/845), who many believe was 
the first to reject the use of analogy in the law.  As Shehaby showed, al-Naẓẓām held 144
that, ‘the text in which an ʿilla is explicitly given for a certain judicial judgement must 
be read as though it states all the cases that are covered by that ʿilla.’  Therefore if a 145
text states, for example, that goat’s meat is forbidden because the goat is four-footed, al-
Naẓẓām would read such a statement ‘as though it said that the meat of all four-footed 
animals are forbidden.’  He would therefore argue that all cases of four-footed animals 146
are covered by such a statement without the use of analogy. Regardless of Dāwūd’s 
exact position, one thing is clear and that is his categorical rejection of qiyās as a juristic 
method. 
 Al-Tirmidhī was born at a time when the anti-rationalist movement was on the 
rise, and most of the 3rd/9th century in which he lived was dominated by the careers 
and legal doctrines of Ibn Ḥanbal and Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī.  However, there was another 147
movement at the time that aligned itself, for the most part, with the Traditionalists, and 
 Al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:290.143
 Shehaby, ‘ʿIlla and Qiyās,’ 36; Lucas, ‘Legal Principles,’ 319 n. 118. Devin Stewart has shown that the 144
earliest works of jurisprudence were most likely written by Ḥanafī jurists and Muʿtazilī theorists 
(Stewart, ‘al-Ṭabarī,’ 34). Muʿtazilīs seem to have played a particularly important role, and the first work 
on jurisprudence that Stewart believes ‘we know about with any certainty’ was that of al-Naẓẓam’s 
student al-Jāhiẓ (d. 255/869), which frequently cited the opinions of his teacher (idem, 344, 346).  
According to Stewart, ‘there is a strong possibility’ that al-Naẓẓām had composed a work on the subject 
(idem, 344). Stewart has shown that the works of Dāwūd and his son represent a group of authors from 
the larger Shāfiʿī tradition, who were writing as a reaction to the early Ḥanafī and Muʿtazilī works 
(idem, 341). These reactionary works, Stewart has shown, were influenced by the works to which they 
responded, and adopted the form and structure of those earlier works, which distinguishes them from 
the arrangement of later works of jurisprudence (idem, 336-341).
 Shehaby, ‘ʿIlla and Qiyās,’ 36.145
 Shehaby, ‘ʿIlla and Qiyās,’ 36.146
 Hallaq, History, 32.147
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it was to this movement, not to any of the schools above, that al-Tirmidhī truly 
belonged. 
2.2 Al-Tirmidhī and the Early Sufi Attitude to Rationalism 
 As we have seen (Chapter One, Sections 1.32 and 1.33) al-Tirmidhī believed 
that the correct understanding of the Sharīʿa, and having certain knowledge of its 
precepts, could only be achieved through divine inspiration and the attainment of what 
he called the ‘supreme wisdom.’ This was not unique to al-Tirmidhī and the tradition of 
the People of Wisdom in Tirmidh and its surrounding areas, but was also true of other 
mystics like the Sufis of Baghdad.  Like al-Tirmidhī and the People of Wisdom, the 148
‘first Sufis clearly formed an intellectual elite who were highly literate and learned in 
the Qur’ān, the ḥadīth, and much else besides.’  It was because they denied the use of 149
human reason in the attempt to attain knowledge of God that, 
The Sufis were at best skeptical, and at worst dismissive, of scholarly pursuits 
other than the study of the Qur’ān and the ḥadīth such as jurisprudence, rational 
speculation on the foundations of Islam (kalām), and even belles lettres (adab).   150
Some of the early mystics belonged to traditionalist schools of law, and others rejected 
them completely, but there were cases of mystics who also followed rationalist 
schools.  In Baghdad where Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī taught, there seems to have been a circle 151
of Sufis closely connected to the Ẓāhirīs. Among them was al-Junayd al-Baghdādī (d. 
298/910) who was a student of Abū Thawr (d. 240/855).  Abū Thawr had been a 152
 Karamustafa, Sufism, 22. At the time, not all mystics were known as Sufis, and this appellation was 148
mostly confined to a group of major mystical figures in Baghdad. Al-Tirmidhī himself never used the 
term Sufi and was not considered one by the Sufis of Baghdad. It was only later that this term came to 
be used for other mystics (See Sviri, ‘Spiritual Chivalry,’ 592-6).
 Karamustafa, Sufism, 21. Cf. Melchert, ‘Early Renunciants,’ 407-18.149
 Karamustafa, Sufism, 21.150
 See examples of Ḥanbalī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī and Ḥanafī Sufis of Baghdad in Karamustafa, Sufism, 22.151
 Karamustafa, Sufism, 21.152
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Rationalist until he met al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) and became one of his students. He later 
founded his own school which was considered an offshoot of the Shāfiʿī school.  153
Dāwūd was also one of the closest students of Abū Thawr, and al-Junayd is also counted 
among Dāwūd’s teachers.  Among Dāwūd’s students was Ruwaym ibn Aḥmad (d. 154
303/915-16), a wealthy judge from Baghdad and one of the leading Sufi figures of his 
age. He was also a close friend of al-Junayd.  Ruwaym was remembered as one of the 155
most distinguished early scholars of the Ẓāhirī school, and it is very likely that he 
authored tracts on the subject that were available in al-Andalus a century and a half after 
his death.  Likewise, there was a lesser Sufi figure who was nonetheless one of those 156
Sufi masters mentioned in al-Qushayrī’s Risāla and al-Hujwīrī’s Kashf, Abū Saʿīd ibn 
al-Aʿrābī (d. 340/951 or 341/952), who was another friend of al-Junayd. Abū Saʿīd was 
described as leaning toward the Traditionalists and the Ẓāhirīs, and was highly regarded 
as a traditionist by ḥadīth critics of his age.  157
 Outside this circle of Sufis from Baghdad we find Yaḥyā ibn Muʿādh al-Rāzī (d. 
258/871) who accused the jurists of following madhhabs that deviated from the 
‘Muḥammadan way.’  His words indicate a possible reference to legal devices for 158
evading clear injunctions (ḥiyal). This is something which al-Tirmidhī himself criticised 
in more than one work.  Al-Ḥallāj (d. 309/922), upon being asked what school he 159
 Melchert, Formation, 72; Osman, History, 32.153
 Osman, History, 30-31.154
 Al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 14:235-6, al-Hujwīrī, Kashf, 136.155
 In his treatise on the virtues of al-Andalus, the great Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm mentioned Ruwaym as one of 156
the greatest scholars of the Muslim East when attempting to show that al-Andalus produced scholars of 
equal calibre (see Osman, History, 96). Based on this, Adang believed that his works must have been 
available to Ibn Ḥazm (see Adang, ‘Beginnings,’ 123). 
 Osman, History, 61. Al-Qushayrī wrote a very brief entry on him in al-Risāla, 1:132.157
 Goldziher, Ẓāhirīs, p. 165.158
 On al-Tirmidhī’s attacks on ḥiyal see Baraka, al-Ḥakīm, 1:98-9.159
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followed, replied, ‘I am upon the madhhab (lit. path) of my Lord.’  Similarly, al-160
Qushayrī (d. c. 465/1072) warned in the counsel with which he concluded his Risāla 
that it did not befit the Sufi to adhere to any legal schools, stating that the Sufis rose 
above both the Traditionalists and the Rationalists. The Sufis had spiritual insight and 
certainty, so could plainly see what was hidden from the jurists who had to search for it 
by way of either traditions (naql and athar) or rational thought (ʿaql and fikr). As for the 
seeker who did not yet attain such a level of insight, he was counselled to ask the 
scholars without attachment to any school.   161
 Although many early Sufis and mystics rejected rationalism in legal and 
theological disciplines, none are known to have written a detailed critique of analogical 
reasoning or other rational methods used by the jurists, other than al-Tirmidhī. 
However, a brief criticism attributed to the early Medinan jurist and mystic Jaʿfar al-
Ṣādiq (d. 148/765) bears resemblance to the later and more sophisticated arguments put 
forth by al-Tirmidhī. Like Dāwūd and al-Tirmidhī, al-Ṣādiq held that the first to use 
qiyās was Iblīs (Satan) when he compared himself to Adam and said, ‘I am better than 
him: You created me from fire and him from clay’ (Q 7:12). It should be noted here that 
the word qiyās literally means comparison or measurement. Al-Ṣādiq argued that Iblīs’ 
qiyās was a faulty type of qiyās, and argued that there was a real qiyās which, if Iblīs 
had known, he would have recognised the superiority of Adam over himself. Iblīs had 
stopped at the surface and compared his constitutional element of fire with Adam’s 
mud, but if he had looked deeper beneath the surface and compared the light of Adam 
with the light of his own fire, he would have seen that Adam’s light was purer and 
greater than his.  This is the same type of argument used by al-Tirmidhī. Al-Tirmidhī 162
 Al-Hamadānī, Tamhīdāt, 22. Al-Ḥallāj was for some time associated with the Sufis of Baghdad but 160
broke away from his teachers and traveled to Khurasān, Transoxania, and India (see Karamustafa, 
Sufism, 25-6).
 Al-Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 2: 571-3.161
 Al-Ṣādiq’s rejection of analogical reasoning, and his statement that Iblīs was the first to use it, are 162
well attested in Shīʿī sources (see Gleave, ‘Refutations,’ 267-8). This particular narration comes from al-
Kulīnī, al-Kāfī, 1:34-5.
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argued that Iblīs looked at the mud of Adam, which came from darkness, and found it 
inferior to his own fire, which was made of light. Iblīs’ mistake was in his failure to 
look at the origin of mud. He knew that the earth at one point did not exist, and that its 
origin, water, also at one point did not exist. Had this occurred to Iblīs he would not 
have assumed that mud came from darkness. The reason that Iblīs could not go further 
to see the true origin of Adam’s mud was that he did not have the spiritual power to 
penetrate beneath the surface and go all the way back to the origin of things. Only the 
prophets and saints had the ability to penetrate through the surface of things and see 
their origin in the realm of God’s decrees. We now come to al-Tirmidhī’s conception of 
ijtihād. 
2.3 Al-Tirmidhī’s Conception of Ijtihād 
 Al-Tirmidhī’s criticism of analogical reasoning has been summarised by ʿAbd 
al-Fattāḥ Baraka, however it would be necessary to present it here. Furthermore, Baraka 
only summarised al-Tirmidhī’s own arguments without attempting to explain what al-
Tirmidhī meant by the expression ‘true qiyās’ and what type of process he was truly 
advocating.  
 The Arabic word ‘qiyās’ means to measure or compare. Al-Tirmidhī rejected the 
process of qiyās as jurists practiced it, and wanted to replace it with a different process. 
Therefore, he used the term qiyās to mean ijtihād - two terms that have often been used 
interchangeably. In order to do this, al-Tirmidhī, who believed that the root letters of 
Arabic words held within them the secrets to understanding them, held that ‘true qiyās’ 
or the process of ijtihād as it should be, was found in the anagram of the word qiyās: 
siyāq.  This connection was made because of the two major root letters, the 163
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consonants sīn and qāf, which both words have in common.  Siyāq means ‘to drive 164
something’ and to al-Tirmidhī it meant to drive something back to its ‘origin,’ which I 
will explain shortly. For him, the qiyās of the jurists was not qiyās (according to his new 
definition), but what he called ‘mushākala’ and ‘mushābaha’: a drawing of similarities 
and resemblances between different things. The word mushākala could in fact be a more 
accurate Arabic word for the English ‘analogy’ than the word qiyās. Therefore, to avoid 
confusion, rather than hold on to al-Tirmidhī’s division of ‘true qiyās’ vs mushākala, it 
would be simpler to translate mushākala as analogy. As for al-Tirmidhī’s ‘true qiyās’ or 
‘siyāq,’ I will translate it as ijtihād. 
 As mentioned above (Section 2.1), there is a clear tree metaphor in the 
terminology used by jurists for analogical reasoning, as the new case is called a branch 
(farʿ) and the original case is called a stem (aṣl). Al-Tirmidhī argued that in reality the 
process of analogy was that of comparing two branches of a tree, not a branch with a 
stem. Jurists took a new case (branch) that needed a value judgement and searched for 
an existing value judgement on another matter (branch) which they then named a stem. 
He admonished the jurists by saying, ‘You took knowledge of this matter from the 
middle, not from its source’ and told them that their ijtihād must reach the ‘source’ of 
the matter.   165
 Sviri summed up al-Tirmidhī’s teachings on the Arabic language. For al-Tirmidhī, the Arabic 164
language, 
‘…is the vessel within which God concealed His secrets. In the quest for divine gnosis (maʿrifa) these 
secrets can and, in fact, should, be deciphered.…The power to decipher the hidden ‘meanings’ that 
language holds is part and parcel of the special science (ʿilm) that God’s men, the awliyāʾ, have inherited 
from the prophets. Mystical linguistics, according to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, is the foundation of the 
‘science of the saints’ (ʿilm al-awliyāʾ)…the disclosure of God’s mysteries encapsulated in words and 
letters was reserved for Adam and after him for the prophets and the awliyāʾ.’ (Sviri, ‘Words of Power,’ 
210).
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 In al-Tirmidhī’s opinion, the best way to describe the process of ijtihād is 
through the metaphor of intertwined grape vines, and not a tree of different branches. 
With the tree metaphor, jurists simply compare different branches without going back to 
any origin, and falsely call one of these branches an origin or a stem. With grape vines, 
however, there are multiple sources or vines that extend and intertwine with each other. 
The act of ijtihād here is to trace each vine to its original source. Not everyone has the 
ability to trace each vine to its original source, but only by going to the source can one 
discover the ruling. Jurists, then, need to go from the furthest most tip of a grape vine to 
its beginning, and not compare one vine or one branch to another. He argued that this 
source, which all of God’s rulings come from, is the realm of God’s decrees and 
apportionment. Only the Elect can access this realm through penetrating wisdom (ḥikma 
bāligha). By using the light of this wisdom in their hearts, the Elect can gaze at a case 
and penetrate through it until they drive it back to its origin in the realm of God’s 
decrees and apportionment.  166
 The best way to understand al-Tirmidhī’s process of ijtihād is to see it as a 
holistic conceptualisation of the act for which a judgement was needed. The ratio legis 
was not to be found within each act, but rather by stepping outside of it and looking at 
its true nature. When one understands the true nature of any act, one can assign it a 
value judgement, without recourse to another case for comparison. The following 
examples will clarify this.  
 One example used by al-Tirmidhī is the ruling on performing worship on behalf 
of the dead. He stated that there are prophetic traditions establishing that one may 
perform Ḥajj or give charity on behalf of someone who is dead, so that the reward of 
this act is passed on to them. Scholars have differed in this regard. One group said that 
if charity and Ḥajj were accepted on behalf of the deceased, then all other acts of 
worship like fasting and prayer must be accepted too. Another group said that the only 
reason Ḥajj is accepted on behalf of the dead is because it requires the spending of 
 Al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 365, 166
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money. They therefore believe that the Prophet only allowed it because of its similarity 
to charity, because in both cases one is spending their wealth on behalf of the deceased. 
Fasting and prayer, however, are not similar to charity because they do not rely on 
money. According to al-Tirmidhī, those who accepted prayer and fasting by comparing 
them to Ḥajj were correct but only by chance, as they did not know the ratio legis for 
which all these actions are accepted, but simply gave them the same ruling as Ḥajj. 
Likewise, they only accepted Ḥajj to be performed on behalf of others because of the 
statement of the Prophet, without which they might not have accepted it. As for the 
other group, they were mistaken in thinking that the acceptance of these actions had 
anything to do with money, and they were mistaken in not accepting actions like prayer 
and fasting. Here we have the same tool, qiyās, leading jurists to two different 
conclusions, one which was incorrect and one which was only correct by chance. In al-
Tirmidhī’s understanding, Ḥajj on behalf of others is accepted because it is like a debt 
owed to God, for the Qur’ān says: ‘Pilgrimage is a duty that men owe to God’ (Q 3:97). 
In fact, this ratio legis was clearly specified by the Prophet when he explained why Ḥajj 
can be performed on behalf of the dead, when he said in a well known ḥadīth: ‘If your 
father left a debt behind, would you not repay it on his behalf? Then fulfil the debt owed 
to God, for God has more right that debts to Him are fulfilled.’ The ratio legis was thus 
clearly stated by the Prophet himself for why Ḥajj is accepted on behalf of others, and 
yet the jurists did not even see it and chose instead to liken Ḥajj to charity, in that it can 
only be done by spending money. Had scholars returned the case of Ḥajj back to its 
origin, they would have seen that its origin is a debt owed to God, and can thus be 
fulfilled by others on behalf of the deceased.   167
 What al-Tirmidhī was doing in this example was not to look within prayer or 
fasting to find similarities to Ḥajj and charity, but to step back and gain a full 
conceptualisation of these acts. Each of them is an act of worship that has been 
prescribed by God, and its fulfilment is therefore a debt owed to God. Anything that is a 
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debt owed to God can be fulfilled by someone else on behalf of those who died and 
could not fulfil their own duties. Through this process, jurists would not even need to 
have any Qurʾānic or prophetic statement on Ḥajj or charity. Even if there was nothing 
known about offering Ḥajj or charity on behalf of the dead, a true mujtahid would have 
understood that these are acts of worship that have been prescribed, and are therefore 
debts owed to God. Therefore, anything still owed to God could be fulfilled by others. 
Let us look at another example. 
 It is agreed upon in Islamic law that if one who is fasting ate out of 
forgetfulness, his fast is not broken, as stated in a prophetic tradition. It is narrated, 
however, that Abū Ḥanīfa said, ‘If it were not for that tradition, I would have, by use of 
analogy, said that it broke the fast.’ Al-Tirmidhī stated that Abū Ḥanīfa here made an 
analogy based on comparison (mushākala). Abū Ḥanīfa compared fasting to prayer, 
which is nullified by speech or laughter even if out of forgetfulness, and Ḥajj which is 
nullified if one forgets and has intercourse with his partner, and other similar matters in 
which forgetfulness is not an excuse. Al-Tirmidhī stated that a real mujtahid would 
return this matter to its origin and rule that eating by mistake does not invalidate the 
fast, even if there was no prophetic tradition on the subject. They would rule so because 
fasting is an oath that the person takes upon himself for the sake of his Lord, while 
one’s sustenance has been divided by God from pre-eternity, and God promised in the 
Qur’ān to deliver it to His servants. In this case, al-Tirmidhī explains, the two promises 
might meet: the servant’s promise to keep his fast, and God’s pre-eternal promise to 
deliver a specific amount of food for the servant on the same day. In order to fulfil his 
promise, God makes the servant forget his own oath and then feeds the servant and 
gives him drink. This forgetfulness then, is from God Himself, and therefore does not 
break the fast. According to al-Tirmidhī, this would be known by the people of true 
ijtihād, the People of Wisdom, and is in agreement with the saying of the Prophet, 
‘Whoever forgets while fasting, and eats or drinks, let him continue his fast, for it was 
only because God fed him and gave him to drink.’  This is unlike speaking during 168
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prayer or intercourse during Ḥajj and fasting, as speech and intercourse are not things 
that God promised in the Qur’ān to deliver to His servants, and so the forgetfulness that 
led to them would have been from Satan. Satan would have had to work on a person for 
a sustained period to make him forget and speak during his prayer, or have intercourse 
during Ḥajj or whilst fasting. It is because of these workings of Satan that this worship 
becomes invalid.  Al-Tirmidhī continued to criticise the jurists, using Abū Ḥanīfa as 169
their representative, for saying that intercourse due to forgetfulness does not nullify the 
fast, as with food and drink. The jurists should not have extended the words of the 
tradition regarding eating or drinking to other matters such as intercourse. In the end, 
they neither relied on a tradition, nor were they successful in their analogy.  170
 In the above example, al-Tirmidhī’s ijtihād was to arrive at the following 
insight: what determines whether a mistake invalidates one’s act of worship is whether 
this mistake was caused by God or by Satan. He did not simply look at the fact that a 
mistake was made during an act of worship due to forgetfulness, in which case the act 
would be invalidated no matter what type of worship it was. Rather, he understood that 
the forgetfulness that leads to eating while fasting is caused by God in order to deliver 
to the servant the sustenance that was decreed for him from pre-eternity. Again, the 
process of ijtihād was not dependant on comparison to other cases, but on arriving at a 
true and complete understanding of each individual case on its own. 
 The final example we will look at is the act that begins the ritual prayer, which is 
to utter the phrase: ‘Allah is greater (than all else)’, known as the takbīr. Abū Ḥanīfa 
accepted other statements in which Allah is mentioned as replacements for the takbīr to 
begin the prayer, and his student al-Shaybānī followed him in that, but his other great 
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student Abū Yūsuf disagreed with his imam because of a tradition that states: ‘[The 
prayer] begins with the takbīr and ends with the taslīm.’ Al-Tirmidhī criticised Abū 
Ḥanīfa for his opinion, and explained at length why only the takbīr is accepted by the 
People of Wisdom. Al-Tirmidhī also criticised Abū Yūsuf for only leaving his teacher’s 
opinion due to the presence of a tradition on the matter, saying that if Abū Yūsuf was 
able to know the inward reality of the matter he would have disagreed with his teacher 
even if the tradition did not exist.  Al-Tirmidhī gave many other examples and 171
concluded that Abū Ḥanīfa ‘was from the people of outward knowledge, and did not 
possess the knowledge of the ahl al-bāṭin, as far as we can see.’   172
 It is clear that al-Tirmidhī’s ijtihād did involve a search for a ratio legis, but this 
was attained by gaining an insight into the nature of a situation, without recourse to 
analogical reasoning. The ratio legis was not a property of an act which linked it to a 
value judgement. To use the classic example of intoxicants, the ratio legis behind the 
prohibition of wine would not simply be that it is an intoxicant, but rather it would be 
the reason that intoxicants were prohibited in the first place. In the case of doing acts of 
worship on behalf of others, one would not look within the acts of worship to see if they 
shared certain properties such as the expenditure of wealth, but would look at the act as 
a whole and understand that it was a debt owed to God. Similarly, with acts that 
invalidate acts of worship, one would not simply look at the fact that the act was caused 
by forgetfulness, but would have to arrive at an understanding of why this forgetfulness 
took place. 
2.5 Comparative Fiqh 
  A statement attributed to the Prophet states, ‘My Companions are like the stars 
(nujūm), whomever of them you follow, you will be guided.’ This tradition implies a 
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multiplicity of correct paths to follow. However, al-Tirmidhī rejected the notion that any 
person who met the Prophet once or pledged allegiance to him or just saw him could be 
an imam of guidance for others. The word nujūm literally means objects that rise from a 
place. According to al-Tirmidhī’s definition, the nujūm are only those celestial objects 
that have maṭāliʿ (places of rising) through which they come to appear in the skies. This 
description, he says, only applies to Mercury, Mars, Saturn, Jupiter, and Venus. As for 
all other fixed celestial objects, they are kawākib, not nujūm. Similarly, among the 
Prophet’s Companions, those who had the necessary knowledge of the Sharīʿa 
combined with the necessary spiritual insight to be imams, were small in number like 
the number of the nujūm. It was only these Companions who had the right to practice 
ijtihād, and yet their ijtihād might have led them to different conclusions. People of 
taqlīd may choose any of them to follow, and will be rightly guided. As for the rest of 
the Companions, their light was a source of guidance for their own selves, but they were 
not imams or guides for others.  Among the Companions, al-Tirmidhī named seven 173
such figures who were of the Elect of God’s saints: Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, ʿAlī, 
Muʿādh ibn Jabal, Abū ʿUbayda, and Ibn Masʿūd. They were the muḥaddathūn and the 
ones who possessed authority in their generation.  This discussion informs us that al-174
Tirmidhī accepted different results from the ijtihād of the Elect, and that their results 
were all correct. This is remarkable because in al-Tirmidhī’s understanding this was not 
the case of an ijtihād process which had room for error, but a process based on certainty 
which could produce no mistakes. Therefore al-Tirmidhī seemed to accept that different 
opinions could be correct at one and the same time. The same understanding is 
displayed in practice, rather than stated, in al-Tirmidhī’s Ithbāt al-‘ilal. 
 Most of the chapters in Ithbāt al-‘ilal are dedicated to explaining parts of the 
Sharīʿa about which there is no disagreement. For example, they explain the wisdom 
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behind the ritual prayer as a whole, as well as the individual parts of the prayer such as 
standing, bowing down, prostrating on the floor, reciting the Qur’ān, facing the Qibla, 
etc. There are three chapters, however, in which disputed issues are mentioned. For each 
of these issues, al-Tirmidhī presented the opinions of different schools of jurisprudence, 
compared them, then chose what he thought was the stronger opinion. In the chapter on 
the ratio legis of the ritual ablution, al-Tirmidhī compared the Mālikī and Ḥanafī 
opinions on whether or not bleeding invalidated the state of ritual purity and gave 
preference to the Ḥanafī position. In the chapter on starting the prayer with takbīr, al-
Tirmidhī compared two opinions within the Ḥanafī school. On this issue, it was only 
Abū Ḥanīfa and his student al-Shaybānī who argued that one could begin the prayer 
with a statement other than, but similar to, ‘Allāhu akbar,’ such as ‘Allāhu aʿẓam’; Abū 
Ḥanīfa’s other great student, Abū Yūsuf, disagreed with Abū Ḥanīfa, and so al-Tirmidhī 
compared both opinions and sided with Abū Yūsuf. In the chapter on the ratio legis of 
reciting the Qur’ān during prayer, al-Tirmidhī preferred the opinion that those being led 
in prayer should recite silently to themselves as well, instead of just bringing to 
themselves the awareness of standing before God. Although these are the only three 
examples of comparative fiqh in this work, al-Tirmidhī’s approach to them is very 
significant. 
 The first and most obvious matter of note in al-Tirmidhī’s approach is that he 
compared the opinions of different schools and acted as an independent mujtahid. The 
second matter to note is al-Tirmidhī’s attitude toward Abū Ḥanīfa in this text as 
compared to al-Furūq. In al-Furūq, al-Tirmidhī described Abū Ḥanīfa’s position that 
the prayer could start with expressions other than the takbīr as ‘a reprehensible 
statement,’  and something that the people of true ijtihād would consider ‘blind 175
floundering.’  He also said that, as far as he could tell, Abū Ḥanīfa was not from the 176
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People of Wisdom and that ‘had he known the fault in his statement he would have 
stopped himself from saying it.’  By qualifying his judgement with the statement, ‘as 177
far as we can see,’ al-Tirmidhī had conceded the possibility that Abū Ḥanīfa might have 
possessed inspired knowledge of the law. In al-Tirmidhī’s treatment of the same 
question in Ithbāt al-‘ilal, however, he was not as certain that Abū Ḥanīfa would have 
changed his opinion. He wrote, ‘Had this ratio legis occurred to Abū Ḥanīfa, my belief 
is that he would have stopped himself from making that statement.’ More surprising, 
however, is the fact that he simply stated that ‘Abū Yūsuf’s opinion is stronger, 
according to us, than that of Abū Ḥanīfa, may Allah have mercy on them both.’  This 178
statement did not only give respect to Abū Ḥanīfa, but also implied that Abū Ḥanīfa’s 
view was still acceptable. Since we do not know the dates in which these works were 
written, we cannot say with certainty in which direction al-Tirmidhī’s views regarding 
Abū Ḥanīfa’s opinion progressed, but it seems more likely that they began with the 
harsher criticism and softened over time. There is evidence for this in the fact that he 
was reportedly exiled toward the end of his life because of writing Khatm al-awliyāʾ 
and Ithbāt al-ʿilal, which indicates that these were among his last works.   179
 The most important observation is al-Tirmidhī’s acceptance of opposing 
opinions as correct at the same time. Al-Tirmidhī had repeatedly stated that the Elect 
could see the origin of every act through the light of wisdom and therefore know its 
judgement with absolute certainty. In the examples above, however, we see him stating 
that one opinion is ‘more preferable’ than another, rather than using language such as 
‘correct’ and ‘incorrect.’ In discussing the case of whether bleeding invalidates the state 
of ritual purification we see him stating that the view of the Ḥanafīs was ‘more 
appropriate and more fitting (ashbah wa alyaq)’ than that of the Mālikīs. However, in 
this case al-Tirmidhī explicitly attributed both Mālikī and Ḥanafī positions to inspired 
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knowledge, explaining the hidden wisdom upon which he claimed their positions were 
based. When mentioning the Mālikīs he called them ‘the people of Medina,’ but the 
other position he attributed to ‘the people of fiqh among the people of Kūfa,’ as if to say 
that among the school of Kūfa, the Ḥanafīs, there were people who possessed true fiqh 
and those who did not. Al-Tirmidhī was comparing the positions of the people of true 
fiqh, i.e. the People of Wisdom, among the people of Medina and Kūfa, and attributing 
to them knowledge of the hidden wisdom of the Sharīʿa. It is because of this that he 
accepted both opinions, even though they were at odds with each other, and only 
preferred the judgement of the school of Kufa, i.e. the school of Abū Ḥanīfa, in that one 
matter as ‘more appropriate and more fitting.’  180
 Ithbāt al-ʿilal is the first work to attribute inspired knowledge to the positions of 
legal schools, and to accept their differences based on this regard. Although the 
examples used were few, this would lay the foundation for the comparative fiqh in Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Futūḥāt and al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Mīzān. In a similar case and equally significant, 
there is one instance in his work al-Ṣalātu wa-maqāṣiduhā, in which al-Tirmidhī 
compared at length the prayer of the Companion ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb to that of the 
Companion Saʿd ibn Muʿādh. Saʿd is reported to have stated that while in prayer he 
never thought of anything but God, whereas ʿUmar is reported to have stated that while 
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in prayer he would think of which commanders to appoint and which armies to send. 
Al-Tirmidhī allowed this for ʿUmar because he was one of the Elect who thought 
through God, and planned and appointed commanders and sent forth armies through 
God. He was a man of inner vision who was not veiled from God, and thinking of such 
things in prayer did not distract him from God. This only indicated ʿUmar’s superiority 
in that such matters did not distract him from God in his prayer. As for Saʿd, he was not 
a man of inner vision and therefore thinking of anything beside God in prayer would 
have been a deficiency in his prayer. Al-Tirmidhī concluded that the state of ʿUmar in 
prayer was that of the ‘spiritually strong’ while that of Saʿd was the state of the 
‘spiritually weaker.’  Al-Tirmidhī allowed certain matters in the ritual prayer of the 181
spiritually strong which would be considered a deficiency in the prayer of the spiritually 
weaker. We will see later how this idea was developed by Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī. 
  
2.5 The Role of the Elect As Traditionists 
 Before we conclude al-Tirmidhī’s discussion on fiqh and ijtihād, we must 
mention, albeit briefly, how he also gave authority to the Elect in the related field of 
traditions. Al-Tirmidhī, though a traditionist himself, had criticisms for the traditionists 
of his age, just as he had criticisms for jurists, mystics, and other groups. These 
criticisms have been enumerated in different studies.  What interests us here is the role 182
that he gave to the Elect in the field of traditions. Al-Tirmidhī held that prophetic 
traditions did not need to be transmitted in their exact wordings- and that the early 
generations did not in fact do so- as long as their meanings were preserved. However, he 
said, as traditions were passed down through generations, transmitters who were devoid 
of wisdom sometimes reversed certain phrases or words within a tradition, thus 
changing its meaning. He gave two examples of this, where he showed traditions that 
were transmitted with opposite meanings or a different pairing of similar terms, and 
explained, through inspired knowledge, which narrations were correct. One of these 
 Al-Tirmidhī, al-Ṣalāt, 59-64.181
 See Baraka, al-Ḥakīm, 1:77-84; al-Ḥusaynī, al-Maʿrifa, 79-81.182
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examples was a prophetic statement about the people of Yemen having ‘softer qulūb 
(sing. qalb) and more tender afʾida (sing. fuʾād).’ Qalb and fuʾād are two terms used for 
the heart, and al-Tirmidhī noted that many traditionists switched the two words. He 
argued that this was because they lacked the wisdom that would have enabled them to 
know that qalb in fact referred to the inner heart and fuʾād referred to the outer heart. 
Similarly, wisdom would have enabled them to understand why the inner heart could be 
described as soft, while the outer heart could become thinner and so could be described 
as more tender, and not the other way around.  ‘It was the People of Wisdom,’ he said, 183
‘that could distinguish between different narrations: which are true and which are 
faulty.’  184
2.6 Conclusion 
 Al-Tirmidhī, like many mystics and Sufis of his age, rejected rationalism in the 
legal and theological disciplines, and allied himself with the Traditionalist stance. 
However, as Baraka correctly noted, his stance against jurists was the same regardless 
of whether they were Rationalists or Traditionalists.  This is because al-Tirmidhī 185
believed that jurists who lacked inspired knowledge were simply incapable of ijtihād, 
and so his criticism was directed at all jurists who were not also saints. Al-Tirmidhī’s 
position was the same regarding Traditionists who might err in their transmissions if 
they lacked the light of wisdom that would ensure the correct understanding of what 
they transmitted. Based on his concept of sainthood and the the knowledge of the Elect, 
al-Tirmidhī argued that it was only the Elect who had the requisite ability to practice 
ijtihād. In order to demonstrate this, al-Tirmidhī gave several examples of faults in the 
analogical reasoning of the jurists, and stated that even when they were correct, they 
were correct only by chance. Al-Tirmidhī, unlike the Ẓāhirīs, did believe in the 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 4:120.183
 Al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 4:117-122. (Chapter on the Secret of Transmitting Traditions in their Meaning).184
 Baraka, al-Ḥakīm, 1:85.185
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existence of ratios for divine injunctions, but denied the ability of jurists to discover 
these ratios using rational methods. In his opinion, only the Elect could arrive at a 
proper understanding of the Sharīʿa through the light of wisdom which allowed them to 
trace back the origin of every injunction and every act to the realm of God’s decrees. 
This process of ‘ijtihād,’ which took place in the heart, allowed for a correct 
conceptualisation of every problem, after which the divine ruling on that problem 
became clear without any comparison with parallel textual cases. This process, however, 
could still lead to different results, which implied that there might be more than one 
correct approach to certain problems, though some were still superior to others. Toward 
the end of his life, al-Tirmidhī seems to have changed his position regarding Abū 
Ḥanīfa and possibly the founders of the other schools, in that he attributed some of their 
positions to inspired knowledge. This implied that there were saints who were worthy 
mujtahids among the early imams of the different legal schools. Now we will examine 
how al-Tirmidhī’s conception of sainthood and ijtihād were developed by Ibn ʿArabī. 
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Chapter 3: Ibn ʿArabī on Juristic Authority 
This chapter will examine Ibn ʿArabī’s main ideas on sainthood and how they 
influenced his jurisprudential thought. The chapter will begin by showing how Ibn 
ʿArabī developed al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s ideas on the subject. 
  Ibn ʿArabī was born in Murcia in Muslim Spain in the year 560/1165 and was 
then raised and educated in Seville. He learned with many scholars and Sufis in both 
Muslim Spain and North Africa before leaving Spain for Mecca in 590/1193. After the 
pilgrimage he spent time traveling between Egypt, Turkey and Iraq, before settling in 
Damascus for the last seventeen years of his life until his death in 638/1240.  186
 Ibn ʿArabī thought very highly of al-Tirmidhī, describing him as ‘the imam who 
possessed perfect mystical experience.’  In Khatm al-awliyāʾ al-Tirmidhī had included 187
a long list of questions as a challenge to those who claimed true sainthood.  Ibn ʿArabī 188
is the first person known to have responded to this challenge. At first Ibn ʿArabī 
dedicated a treatise to answering these questions concisely, entitled al-Jawāb al-
mustaqīm ʿammā saʾala ʿanhu al-Tirmidhī al-Ḥakīm (The reply to the questions of al-
Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī). Ibn ʿArabī later answered them again in more detail in chapter 
seventy-three of the Futūḥāt.  Earlier we have seen how al-Tirmidhī was the first to 189
speak of a ‘Seal of Sainthood’ and how his Khatm al-awliyāʾ left some uncertainty 
about whether the Seal of Sainthood was a single person or if it was a rank that could be 
achieved by many. Ibn ʿArabī developed al-Tirmidhī’s ideas, conceiving of three Seals. 
 More on Ibn ʿArabī’s education will be said later. For a detailed biography see Addas, Quest, and for a 186
concise biography see Addas, Voyage.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:39.187
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 20-9. It is clear that al-Tirmidhī had in mind the Elect and not saints of a 188
lesser ranking.
 Osman Yahya included the answers from al-Jawāb al-mustaqīm, and extracts of the lengthier answers 189
from the Futūḥāt, in his edition of al-Tirmidhī, Khatm al-awliyāʾ, 142-326.
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One was the ‘Seal of Children’ who would be the last human being to be born on Earth 
and who would be a saint. The second was the seal of sainthood in general, and that 
would be the Prophet ʿĪsā after his return to Earth, and the third, the ‘Seal of 
Muḥammadan Sainthood,’ who was Ibn ʿArabī himself.  Based on several dream 190
visions, Ibn ʿArabī was convinced that he was this Seal whom al-Tirmidhī had 
prophesied.  Furthermore, it seems that Ibn ʿArabī felt a strong affinity with this man 191
whom he believed had prophesied his coming, and with whom he shared the same first 
name and father’s name.  192
 Contemporary scholarship has named two major concepts that Ibn ʿArabī took 
from al-Tirmidhī. The first is the concept of a Seal of Sainthood.  The second is the 193
nature of the relationship between prophethood and sainthood, which has been best 
explained by Chodkiewicz, and is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Another important 194
concept, to which we will return when we discuss al-Shaʿrānī’s theory of the Scale of 
the Sharīʿa (Chapter Five, Section 5.5.3), is the importance of the letters of the 
alphabet.  The connection between al-Tirmidhī’s Seal of Sainthood and Ibn ʿArabī’s 195
Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood is of course very important, as Ibn ʿArabī’s belief that 
he was this Seal defined his very role and purpose. As we have seen in the Introduction, 
Ibn ʿArabī believed that as the perfect heir to Muḥammad his role was to preserve the 
Sharīʿa. However, I will argue here that Ibn ʿArabī benefitted more from al-Tirmidhī’s 
Seal of Sainthood in his conception of the highest category of saints which he called the 
afrād. This link between al-Tirmidhī’s Seal and Ibn ʿArabī’s afrād is arguably more 
significant than its link with Ibn ʿArabī’s Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood. While the 
 On these Seals see Chodkiewicz, Seal, 116-127.190
 On Ibn ʿArabī’s claims to this office see Chodkiewicz, Seal, 128-135.191
 Ibn ʿArabī called him samiyyunā wa ibn samī abīnā (he who shares our name, and whose father shares 192
our father’s name. See Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:69).
 Karamustafa, ‘Wilāya,’ 64; Abrahamov, Ibn al-ʿArabī, 89; Chodkiewicz, Seal, 116-7; Cornell, Realm, 205-6.193
 Chodkiewicz, Seal, 30, 47-59. See also McGregor, ‘Sanctity,’ 24. For the origins of these ideas in al-194
Tirmidhī see Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 83-4.
 Abrahamov, Ibn al-ʿArabī, 87.195
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Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood was a diachronic conception relating to a single figure 
in the history of mankind, the category of the afrād was a synchronic conception, 
meaning that this was a permanent category of saints. These afrād, in Ibn ʿArabī’s 
conception, were the greatest authorities on the Sharīʿa, and like himself, were entrusted 
with the role of its preservation. 
3.1 Ibn ʿArabī on the Elect 
  
 In the first chapter we have seen al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’s conception of the 
muḥaddathūn, who were the Elect among the saints. Ibn ʿArabī also spoke about the 
muḥaddathūn, adding that they were of two kinds. The first were addressed by God 
from behind a veil, for God had said in the Qurʾān that He either addressed humans 
through revelation (as with the Prophets), or from behind a veil (Q 42:51). In Ibn 
ʿArabī’s understanding this was like God’s address to Moses in the sacred valley and it 
was accessible to the muḥaddathūn. The second, lower type of Heavenly Speech came 
from angels, and varied according to the rank of its angelic source.  The function that 196
Ibn ʿArabī gave to this descent of Heavenly Speech was the same as with his 
predecessor: it was to give an increased understanding of the Sharīʿa. In Tanazzul al-
amlāk which was written in Mosul in 601/1204 soon after Ibn ʿArabī’s first stay in 
Mecca, Ibn ʿArabī focused on the secrets behind some of the minute details of the ritual 
ablutions and prayer.  The name of the latter work refers to the descent (tanazzulāt) of 197
the inspired understanding of these acts of worship upon the author’s heart via angels. 
Indeed, Ibn ʿArabī began many of his discussions in this work by saying, ‘The 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:50; 2:21.196
 It was published by in 2003 by Dār Ṣādir in Beirut under the name: Tanazzulāt al-amlāk fī ḥarakāt al-197
aflāk, and in 1961 in Cairo by Aḥmad Zakī ʿAṭiyya and Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Bāqī Surūr under the name Laṭāʾif al-
asrār; however it is known in the writings of Chodkiewicz, Addas and others as al-Tanazzulāt al-
mawṣiliyya. According to Chodkiewicz, the last ‘attested reading’ in Ibn ʿArabī’s presence was of this 
work on the 10th Rabīʾ al-awwal 638, a few weeks before his passing on the 28th Rabīʿ al-thānī (16th 
November, 1240). (Chodkiewicz, Seal, 7).
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trustworthy spirit (al-rūḥ al-amīn) came down upon my heart and said.’ The 
Trustworthy Spirit is a Qurʾānic name for the archangel Gabriel.  Ibn ʿArabī of course 198
knew that this would raise some objections so he dealt with it in his introduction, saying 
to the reader:  
Perhaps when you hear me say, ‘the trustworthy spirit came down upon my heart,’ 
you would reject it and say, ‘Is there revelation after the Messenger of God (peace 
and blessings be upon him)?’ Do not do so, may God protect us and protect you 
from the ‘revelation’ of every misguiding devil. It is but an expression referring to 
the angelic suggestion in general, and to Heavenly Speech in particular.  199
  Al-Tirmidhī had stated that the muḥaddathūn received a larger portion of 
prophethood than the average believer and saint. It was the descent of Heavenly Speech 
upon their hearts in the waking state that gave them at least one third of the total portion 
of prophethood. The Seal of Sainthood possessed the greatest possible share of 
prophethood among the saints, though al-Tirmidhī did not reveal how much his share of 
prophethood was (Chapter One, Section 1.3.2). Al-Tirmidhī had also stated that God 
had treasuries of gifts for the prophets, and different treasuries of gifts for the saints. 
The Seal, however, had an intermediary rank. His station was with the Elect, but his 
gifts came from the treasuries of the prophets, and so he was constantly traveling 
between the two stations. It was at this point of al-Tirmidhī’s discussion that his student 
 ‘Truly, it is the sending (tanzīl) of the Lord of the Worlds. The Trustworthy Spirit brought it down 198
(nazala bihī). Upon your heart, in order for you to be one of the warners.’ (26:192-4). The word tanzīl (a 
sending down, or revelation) is of the same root as tanazzul and munāzala which Ibn ʿArabī uses. 
 Ibn ʿArabī then proceeded to quote the tradition about the muḥaddathūn (Ibn ʿArabī, Tanazzul al-199
amlāk, 24-5). Ibn ʿArabī’s inclusion of this ‘objection’ by the reader was very clever, as it was the same 
question raised to the third righteous caliph ʿUthmān. According to this famous tradition, ʿUthmān had 
rebuked his visitor for having looked at the figure of a woman while on the way to his house. When 
asked if he received revelation, ʿUthman responded by quoting the Prophet who said, ‘Beware the 
clairvoyance of the believer for he sees with the light of God’ (al-Tirmidhī, Abū ʿĪsā, Sunan, 2:794). Ibn 
ʿArabī was therefore reminding the reader of ʿUthman’s clairvoyance, which appeared to others as 
revelation like that of the Messenger.
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asked him another question about this ṭabaqa (rank) of saints, indicating that al-
Tirmidhī’s Seal might not have been a single figure.  200
 In Ibn ʿArabī’s classification, the highest saints are known as the afrād (the 
solitary ones).  I will here put forth an argument that Ibn ʿArabī took al-Tirmidhī’s 201
descriptions of the Seal of Sainthood and fashioned from them his conception of the 
afrād. Ibn ʿArabī called this rank the afrād because the Divine Name which governed 
them was al-Fard (the Unique One).  Al-Tirmidhī had referred to the Seal as the 202
‘fard,’ whose allotment from God was His Singularity (fardiyya) (and therefore the 
Divine Name or quality of al-Fard). This Seal is the closest to Muḥammad whose 
allotment from God is His Oneness (waḥdāniyya).  The afrād were privileged to 203
occupy a station known as the Station of Proximity (maqām al-qurba).  This is the 204
highest possible station, which comes between prophethood and ṣiddīqiyya.  More 205
significantly, this was truly an intermediate stage between the two levels, in that it 
allowed those who reached it access to actual prophecy, though as witnesses and not 
recipients. If, as al-Tirmidhī had taught, the Heavenly Speech of the muḥaddathūn came 
from special treasuries for the saints unlike God’s divine revelation, then the only way 
for saints to have an even greater portion of prophethood is to share in the actual 
revelation given to the Messengers. Ibn ʿArabī wrote that direct external inspiration 
from Gabriel to men, which they would see and hear using their outward senses, ended 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 62.200
 On this rank see Chodkiewicz, Seal, 106-115. Ibn ʿArabī’s hierarchy of saints was very elaborate and 201
complex. Just before his responses to al-Tirmidhī’s questionnaire, Ibn ʿArabī enumerated at length 84 
classes of saints (Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:3-39).
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:199.202
 Al-Tirmidhī, Sīrat al-awliyāʾ, 129-130. The root f.r.d appears in other passages relating to the Seal of 203
Sainthood (38, 93, 109).
 Not to be confused with al-Tirmidhī’s maḥall al-qurba (Chapter One, Section 1.2)204
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:260-2.205
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with Muḥammad. It was forbidden after that for anyone to receive inspiration in this 
way, as that would technically constitute the descent of new revelation like that of the 
Messengers. God honoured the afrād, however, with an alternative. God, he stated, 
allowed these saints to see the manifest forms of Gabriel and Muḥammad as the former 
addressed the latter with the rulings of the Sharīʿa. Gabriel in turn would allow these 
saints to hear this address rather than veil it from them. 
Once this address is completed […such a saint] understands all the legal rulings 
concerning the Muḥammadan community which this address contained. The saint 
receives them just as the Muḥammadan form received it because of his presence 
with them… He returns to himself having understood the Spirit’s address to the 
form of Muḥammad, peace and blessings be upon him. He knows its authenticity 
by virtue of the knowledge of certainty, or rather by the eye of certainty. He takes 
for himself the legal ruling received by this prophet and puts it into practice... This 
then is a saint who heard it from the Spirit as it addressed the ḥaqīqa (spirit) of 
Muḥammad, peace and blessings be upon him, just as the Companions did, when 
Gabriel spoke to Muḥammad about Islām, Imān, and Iḥsān.  206
 Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of this superior mode of angelic inspiration is very 
different from al-Tirmidhī’s Heavenly Speech, for it was an access to the descent of 
actual revelation upon the Messenger. Though a novel conception, this was inspired by 
al-Tirmidhī’s own teachings on the Seal of Sainthood whose rank was that of a saint but 
who received gifts from the treasuries of the prophets. Therefore we could say that Ibn 
ʿArabī took what al-Tirmidhī had to say about the Seal of Sainthood, and transformed 
that into what he called the afrād. If indeed al-Tirmidhī’s Seal was a synchronic 
conception, then Ibn ʿArabī preserved that conception through the category of the afrād. 
However, Ibn ʿArabī then added a diachronic element with the Three Seals, of whom he 
was the Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood.  
 We have seen (Chapter Two, Section 2.5) how al-Tirmidhī compared the 
positions of two different schools of law and then held that both were correct, and 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:150.206
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explained how both different positions, though seemingly contradictory, were based on 
inspired knowledge.  In the 116th Chapter of the Futūḥāt, Ibn ʿArabī described the 207
Station of Proximity. He stated that when he arrived at this station he saw that the 
mujtahid scholars had been firmly established in this station without being aware of it. 
The divine inspiration for their different positions flowed to them from this station, and 
they were therefore all upon the truth in their different positions. He likened this to the 
pre-Islamic prophets who had different sacred laws (Q 5:48) and yet each was correct. 
However, these mujtahids were not gifted with spiritual unveiling (kashf), and so they 
were not aware that they were in the Station of Proximity, nor were they aware that their 
knowledge came to them from God. That is why they rejected each other’s positions as 
incorrect. It was only those mujtahid scholars who were also people of unveiling, who 
did not reject the positions of the others.  Ibn ʿArabī surprisingly therefore accorded 208
the mujtahid imams the highest spiritual rank possible. However he differentiated 
between those who had unveiling and knew that they possessed this rank and those who 
did not. Elsewhere in his treatment of the afrād Ibn ʿArabī specifically named Aḥmad 
ibn Ḥanbal as being one of the greatest to ever reach this rank.  Similarly Ibn ʿArabī 209
also quoted a story from al-Qushayrī’s classic treatise on Sufism, al-Risāla, where al-
Khaḍir taught one of the saints that al-Shāfiʿī was one of the Four Pillars (awtād).  In 210
Ibn ʿArabī’s hierarchy, these Four Pillars, are among the afrād.  Based on this 211
‘testimony from al-Khaḍir,’ Ibn ʿArabī argued that al-Shāfiʿī was one of the great 
knowers of the realities pertaining to the nature of the Sharīʿa.  212
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-‘ilal, 86-7.207
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:261-2.208
 ‘Among the aqṭāb of this station are ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal’ (Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 209
2:200).
 Al-Qushayrī, al-Risāla, 49. On al-Khaḍir see Sands, Ṣūfī Commentaries, 79-82.210
 Chodkiewicz, Seal, 107. See also Chapter 6: The Four Pillars (idem, 89-102).211
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3.2 Ibn ʿArabī’s Sufi Conception of Ijtihād 
 For Ibn ʿArabī, ijtihād (lit. the expenditure of effort) was the struggle to purify 
one’s heart in order to receive Heavenly Speech. After that, there was no need for the 
other type of ijtihād practiced by the jurists. He wrote, 
We do not say that ijtihād is what the scholars of the law (ʿulamāʾ al-rusūm) 
mentioned. Rather our definition of ijtihād is the expenditure of one’s utmost 
effort to attain the internal capacity (al-istiʿdād al-bāṭin) to receive the special 
descent (of divine inspiration into their hearts)… What will be cast into the heart 
of this mujtahid will be the divine ruling ‘as it really is,’ so that if the Messenger 
was alive, he would have given the same ruling….Therefore if a mujtahid was 
able to achieve this internal capacity, he would never err. In fact, he would not be 
doing ijtihād with regard to the ruling. Rather he would be transmitting that which 
he was able to receive of the truth that descended upon him.  213
For Ibn ʿArabī then, ijtihād was the struggle to become a saint. God said in the Qurʾān: 
‘Fear God and God will teach you (Q 2:282), and ‘If you fear God, He will provide you 
with higher discrimination’ (Q 8:29).  It is only if one failed in this ijtihād that he 214
needed to resort to the ijtihād of the scholars.  This recalls al-Tirmidhī’s counsel to his 215
readers in the introduction to Ithbāt al-ʿilal, to purify their hearts of their desires in 
order to receive the light of wisdom needed to understand the law, ‘the external aspect 
of it, and the internal aspect of it.’  In his response to al-Tirmidhī’s questionnaire in 216
the Futūḥāt, Ibn ʿArabī said, ‘[Al-Tirmidhī] had originally been a follower of the 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:271.213
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:162.214
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:271. Ibn ʿArabī’s views on this other ijtihād are the subject of the following 215
chapter.
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-ʿilal, 69. See also Chapter One, Section 1.3.3.216
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Ḥanafī school until he came to know the Law (directly) from the Lawgiver.’  Here we 217
see how Ibn ʿArabī portrayed al-Tirmidhī as being like himself, or from a chronological 
point of view, portrayed himself as being like al-Tirmidhī in their juristic methodology, 
if we can call it such. 
 We will see in the next chapter that Ibn ʿArabī rejected the use of analogical 
reasoning because he believed that every silence on the part of the Lawgiver was 
intentional. Those matters that were not addressed by the revealed sources were 
‘forgiven’ as a mercy from God, and there will be no reward or punishment attached to 
them. There was another reason, however, which was linked to his conception of 
sainthood. Ibn ʿArabī, held that the act of legislation through the process of ijtihād 
detracted from one’s state of servitude (ʿubūda) to God, because it was God who was 
the Lawgiver.  As Winkel wrote, 218
Ibn al-ʿArabī recognise[d] the dangers of extending, through analogy, explicit 
commands into realms of silence...To silence what was spoken and to vocalise 
what was silent is to assume Lordship. The [servant], in complete contrast, seeks 
to be utterly passive and receptive to Allah’s command, like the corpse in the 
washer’s hands.  219
For Ibn ʿArabī the ultimate goal of the Sufi was to distance himself from any remnants 
of lordship and to achieve perfect servitude. 
 We have seen (Chapter Two, Section 2.3) that beside the descent of Heavenly 
Speech, al-Tirmidhī also spoke of an active form of ijtihād, where one used the light of 
wisdom to arrive at a correct understanding of any problem. He called this siyāq: to 
drive a matter back to its origin in the realm of God’s decrees. Al-Tirmidhī chose this 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:115.217
 ‘Hold tight to close following (of the Prophet), you will be a servant, and do not originate (tabtadiʿ) a 218
new judgement in the realm of servanthood (i.e. the realm of obligations) and so become through that 
act a lord, for it is He who is the Originator (badīʿ), glory be to Him. Remain within the bounds of your 
own reality.’ (Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt 1: 696).
 Winkel, Living Law, 41-2.219
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word siyāq because it was an anagram of the word qiyās.  The same concept appears 220
throughout Ibn ʿArabī’s jurisprudential section of the Futūḥāt, but he called it iʿtibār.  221
This expression was used before him by the Andalusian Sufi Ibn Barrajān in his 
Qur’ānic exegesis when passing through the literal meaning of words to their esoteric 
interpretations.  In Ibn ʿArabī’s conception the wisdom behind the injunctions of the 222
Sharīʿa relate to the interior of the mukallaf. The outer prescriptions then, have an effect 
on one’s interior: 
The outer acts on the inner, but there is no prescribed matter for the inner which 
acts on the outer....The inner relates to the meanings and the outer to physical-
sensory acts. One moves from the physical-sensory to the meaning, and one does 
not move from the meaning to the sensory.   223
This move from the outward injunctions to their spiritual significance is like al-
Tirmidhī’s siyāq to the reality behind each injunction. The very word iʿtibār, comes 
from the root [ʿ.b.r.] which means to cross from one place to another, which is why Eric 
Winkel chose to translate it as the ‘crossover’ (i.e. from the outwardness to the 
inwardness).     224
 Throughout his treatment of jurisprudence in the Futūḥāt, Ibn ʿArabī, on a far 
greater scale than al-Tirmidhī before him, aimed to show the inner significance of the 
different rulings of the law, and of the differing juristic positions of the schools. This 
 We must remember that by ‘qiyās’ al-Tirmidhī meant ‘ijtihād,’ whereas he renamed analogical 220
reasoning mushākala.
 Without the context of al-Tirmidhī’s anagram, the word siyāq would not have been the most suitable 221
choice for Ibn ʿArabī.
 McAuley, Mystical Poetics, 65. Ibn ʿArabī did not think as highly of Ibn Barrajān as he did of al-222
Tirmidhī or benefit from him to the same extent. On the nature of Ibn Barrajān’s influence on Ibn ʿArabī 
see Abrahamov, Ibn al-ʿArabī, 135-7; Addas, Quest, 55.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:338. In this there is a rejection of antinomian mystics who might say that their 223
interior states can negate or change their outward worship. Here, it is only the outward that has an an 
effect on the inward, and not the other way around.
 See Winkel, Living Law, 42.224
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treatment of the five pillars and ritual purification formed an extended section of the 
Futūḥāt, which in Osman Yahya’s critical edition comes to 2,654 pages,  and in Aisha 225
Bewely’s translation comes to approximately 1,300 pages.  Winkel gave a description 226
of this section of the Futūḥāt: 
The text itself follows a standard format of fiqh books. The discussion is initiated 
by an enumeration of the differing positions held among the scholars of the legal 
discourse for each issue. Ibn al-ʿArabī only rarely identifies the different positions 
held with the scholars or schools which hold them. After he has enumerated the 
various positions held by the ulama [people of knowledge], he goes on to explore, 
through a process of metaphorical interiorisation, the inward realm corresponding 
to the various positions. Only in rare cases does he actually criticise a position. 
Instead, he explains the ‘secret’ (sirr) behind each position.   227
  
By looking at the beginning of several sections where the various positions on any 
subject are enumerated, I have found that Ibn ʿArabī used Ibn Rushd’s Bidāyat al-
mujtahid as the basis for his work. He used the Bidāya as his source for the different 
opinions of the schools, but removed the names of the figures to which the positions 
were attributed and was content with presenting the positions themselves. He changed 
Ibn Rushd’s wording only slightly. Ibn ʿArabī also did not discuss all the matters that 
Ibn Rushd discussed in his work, perhaps only choosing what he deemed to be the more 
important issues. It is noteworthy that Ibn ʿArabī did not use Ibn Ḥazm’s al-Muḥallā as 
the basis for his work. The main difference between the two works is that Ibn Rushd 
presented the different opinions and their evidences without attempting to ‘find the right 
answer’ whereas Ibn Ḥazm did argue for the correct answer on each matter. He may 
have wanted a text that gave him the different positions and their evidences and allowed 
 Based on the break down given by Winkel in Mysteries, 12.225
 She translated these sections into five different books for Kazi publications. See the series of books: 226
Ibn al-ʿArabī on the Mysteries of Purification and Prayer, Ibn al-ʿArabī on the Mysteries of Fasting, etc,.
 Winkel, Mysteries, 11.227
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him to make his own choices. This is a sign of Ibn ʿArabī’s independence of thought 
and his lack of loyalty to the Ẓāhirī school. 
 We have seen (Chapter One, Section 1.3.3) that al-Tirmidhī’s inspired 
explanations of the ratio legis behind the different parts of the law were many times 
inspired by the language and structure of the terms whose ratios he was explaining.  228
In fact, this is exemplified most clearly by his description of the reality of ‘real qiyās’ as 
‘siyāq.’ Ibn ʿArabī relied very heavily on this linguistic based crossover, as it featured in 
most of his discussions. 
 I will give two brief examples from Ibn ʿArabī’s jurisprudential discussions. The 
first will show how Ibn ʿArabī’s ratio legis often revolved around an insight or 
conceptualisation of the matter at hand as a whole, rather than an exploration of its 
parts. The second example will show how he, like al-Tirmidhī, explained the differences 
of opinions between different schools of law as being based on inspired knowledge. The 
example will also show Ibn ʿArabī’s language-based crossover.  
 The first example is concerned with whether or not women can lead men in the 
ritual prayer. Ibn ʿArabī’s answer is that the Prophet had stated that women could also 
reach perfection just like men could. Perfection, Ibn ʿArabī argued, meant leadership. 
Therefore, women may lead other men and women in prayer.  This ruling is not 229
arrived at by analogical reasoning but by arriving at an insight into the origin of the role 
of leadership, which is in perfection. The perfect lead those who are not. Once this is 
understood, and since it is known by way of a prophetic tradition that women could also 
attain to perfection, it becomes known that women could lead others in prayer.  
 The second example, which Winkel studied, is also related to the issue of 
leadership in prayer. On the issue of whether a prepubescent child [ṣabī] may lead 
 See also Khālid Zahrī (ed.) in al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-‘ilal, 48.228
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:447. I have simplified the argument slightly to avoid a longer discussion related 229
to Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of sainthood which is beyond the scope of this study. Ibn ʿArabī further added 
that there was no text in the revealed sources that could be used as evidence against women leading 
men in prayer. Ibn Ḥazm did not approve of women leading men in prayer (Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 81: 
135-6).
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others in prayer, Ibn ʿArabī cited three opinions: 1) those who rejected it completely, 2) 
those who accepted it completely, and 3) those who only accepted it for supererogatory 
prayers but not obligatory ones. For Ibn ʿArabī, the opinion objecting to the child’s 
leadership in prayer was based on the crossover from the word ṣabī (child), which 
comes from the root word [ṣ.b.ī] which means to incline to something out of desire. He 
wrote, 
 The crossover of the matter for that is, that one says, ‘So and so childishly tends 
[ṣ.b.ī.] to something’ when he inclines to it, and since the child inclines toward the 
property of Nature, and is swayed by his individual desires, he is called a child 
(ṣabī); meaning, he is inclined to his cravings. He is without maturity in respect to 
intellect, which is required for the prescription of the Law. Nature, in its standing, 
is without the intellect, so it is not correct for Nature to have priority, nor for the 
one who inclines to Nature to have priority...so in fact Nature has the position of 
the one behind, and indeed [the one who inclines to Nature] is behind, and the one 
who is behind shall not be a leader standing in front: it is the opposite of what the 
property of leadership is about. So the one who considered this crossover did not 
permit the leadership of the child even if he is a reciter. As for the one who 
considered the fact that he carries the Qurʾān within him (i.e. has memorised the 
Qurʾān), he understood the leadership to be that of the Qurʾān, not of the child...so 
he permitted the leadership of the child....And the one who saw the worship of a 
child to be a free-will worship - in the absence of a prescription of the Law 
requiring him to do it - and who saw that supererogatory prayers are a freely-
willed act of worship, he permitted the prayer of the child as the leader for 
supererogatory prayers, but not for the required prayer...  230
 In the above fashion, Ibn ʿArabī, over hundreds of pages relating to 
jurisprudence, mentioned the different positions held by the schools of law, and then 
 Based (with minor changes) on the translation by Winkel, Living Law, 23-4.230
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then ‘illuminat[ed] the “crossover” (from outward ritual to inward truth) involved in 
each case.’  231
3.3 The Role of the Elect 
 We have spoken at length about the role that al-Tirmidhī ascribed to the Elect, 
specifically that he viewed them as being ‘sent’ back from God in a general sense, to 
fulfil a specific function and to provide guidance to the people. They were to advise 
them, clarify the Sharīʿa for them, and encourage them to act upon it. Ibn ʿArabī 
understood the role of greatest saints in the same way. Much like al-Tirmidhī, Ibn 
ʿArabī conceived of the saint’s journey to God as a spiritual parallel of Muḥammad’s 
physical ascension above the seven heavens to the presence of God. After having 
reached the divine presence and acquired knowledge of God, the saints of God are ‘sent’ 
back to the world of men. Some saints are sent back in the specific sense of simply 
returning to a state in which they see the world of creation and interact with it, having 
now attained to true knowledge of God and of the world. These people are called the 
Knowers of God or gnostics (ʿarifūn). Other saints are sent back in a more general sense 
- the Tirmidhīan sense - meaning that they are sent to guide the people. Ibn ʿArabī 
called them the ‘scholars by way of spiritual inheritance’ (ʿulamāʾ bi-l-wirātha) in 
reference to the tradition that states, ‘the scholars are the inheritors of the prophets;’ he 
also simply called them ‘the people of knowledge’ (ʿulamāʾ) or the inheritors 
(wārithūn).  As Chodkiewicz noted, ‘Unlike the majority of authors, Ibn ʿArabī 232
generally puts ʿilm (knowledge), which is a divine attribute, and the ‘ālim…higher than 
 Winkel, Living Law, 24. Ibn ʿArabī wrote in the Futūḥāt of his desire, had God given him a long enough 231
life, to dedicate a large work to all legal questions, in which he would exhaust all that needs to be said 
about the rulings from the outward legal perspective, before delving into the inward rulings. He had to 
restrict himself in the Futūḥāt, however, to the basics of the five pillars, plus purification (Ibn ʿArabī, 
Futūḥāt, 1:334-5).
 Ibn ʿArabī, Risāla fī l-walāya, 25-8, as quoted by Chodkiewicz in Seal, 171.232
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maʿrifa (gnosis) and the ʿārif (the gnostic).’  Ibn ʿArabī saw himself as the supreme 233
heir of the Prophet Muḥammad and therefore the greatest of those inspired interpreters 
of the Sharīʿa that were sent to guide the people to it.  These afrād are those who 234
followed Muḥammad in the fullest sense as described in the Qurʾān, ‘Say (O 
Muḥammad): This is my way, I call to God with sure knowledge (baṣīra), I and those 
who follow me’ (Q 12:108). According to Ibn ʿArabī, 
 They preserve the correct Sharīʿa in which there is no doubt for their own selves 
and for those who follow them from this community….However they must hide 
their spiritual rank, and they must not correct the scholars regarding what they 
think is correct, even though they know it to be wrong. Rather they are like the 
mujtahid who may only judge on a matter according to what his evidence leads 
him to, and yet has no right to accuse those who made a different judgement of 
being wrong. This is because the Lawgiver has approved of that judgement with 
regard to [the mujtahid] who reached it.  235
 In this respect he differed from al-Tirmidhī who gave the Elect, as ‘those 
possessing authority,’ the final say on matters of jurisprudence (Chapter One, Section 
1.3.2). Likewise we have shown al-Tirmidhī’s criticism of traditionists who are not 
saints, and how they could make mistakes in narrating traditions because of not 
understanding the higher realities behind the prophetic statements (Chapter Two, 
Section 2.5). Al-Tirmidhī held that they may confuse terms that outwardly seemed 
similar, and therefore change the meaning or intent of the prophetic statement. ‘It was 
the People of Wisdom,’ he concluded, ‘that could distinguish between different 
 Chodkiewicz, Seal, 181. Chodkiewicz translates ʿālim as ‘wise man’ whereas literally it means ‘a man of 233
knowledge.’ Al-Tirmidhī gave several names to God’s Elect. Whereas in one work he called them the 
ʿārifūn (al-Mufarridīn, 57), in another work al-Tirmidhī presented the following ascending hierarchy: 
scholars (people of ʿilm), wise men (knowers of God’s decrees and apportionment), and knowers of God 
(ʿulamāʾ billāh) (Nawādir, 2:40).
 Perhaps with the exception of the Mahdī whose task ‘at the end of time, is to secure, by the sword, 234
the submission of the universe to the sacred Law whose inspired interpreter he is.’ (Chodkiewicz, Seal, 
137). We will speak more about the Mahdī as inspired interpreter of the Law below.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:151. In the next chapter we will see in more detail Ibn ʿArabī’s position on God’s 235
approval of the result of each mujtahid’s ijtihād for himself.
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narrations: which are true and which are faulty.’  For al-Tirmidhī, it was their 236
understanding of the terms in the traditions, an understanding only available to the 
saints, that gave them this authority. Ibn ʿArabī likewise gave the same authority in this 
field to the saints. He held that the saints could use their kashf (spiritual unveiling) to 
tell whether a tradition was authentic or not, regardless of what the traditionists have 
said about its chain of transmission. Ibn ʿArabī sometimes verified the authenticity of 
certain traditions through dreams,  and sometimes by waking visions of the Prophet 237
Muḥammad.  In some cases Ibn ʿArabī simply referred to having verified traditions by 238
way of unveiling.  As Chodkiewicz noted,  239
Ibn ʿArabī, who, even when an old man, never ceased to study the ḥadīth in the 
usual ways and knew everything there was to know about the traditions, says on 
several occasions that an ‘unveiling’ (kashf) is the only sure way of judging the 
validity of a particular remark attributed to the Prophet, and in so saying he 
challenges the doctrinal authority of the doctors of the Law.  240
 Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 4:117-122 (Chapter on the Secret of Transmitting Traditions in their Meaning).236
 Like a tradition narrated by al-Nasāʾī on the permissibility of circumbulating the Kaʿba at any time of 237
the day. Ibn ʿArabī, as with some previous traditionists, doubted its authenticity until he saw the 
Prophet in his dream telling him a similar statement. This confirmed to him the truthfulness of al-
Nasāʾī’s narration (Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:706).
 ‘There are saints who exchange words (ḥadīth) with the Prophet in the course of an unveiling, stand 238
with him in the world of unveiling and contemplation, and receive from him his words....Such a vision 
must take place in a state of wakefulness (yaqaẓa). The saint receives directly from the Prophet, who 
confirms for him the authenticity of certain ḥadīth whose transmission has been criticised.’ (Gril, 
‘Ḥadīth,' 60).
 See footnote above. It is also possible however that it is a more general type of general vision or 239
divine contemplation. For example, when referring to the canonical tradition that states, ‘God has 
created Adam in His image,’ he states, ‘In a version authenticated by unveiling (fī riwāya yuṣaḥḥiḥu-ḥā l-
kashf), even if it is not firmly established by the masters of transmission (asḥāb al-naql), it is said: “in the 
image of the All-Merciful.”’ Likewise for another tradition on the Companions of the Prophet meeting a 
long-lived disciple of Jesus, he wrote, ‘This ḥadīth, even if its way of transmission is criticised, is 
authenticated for us and for our fellows by unveiling (kashf)’ (Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,' 53).
 Chodkiewicz, Seal, 61.240
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 We therefore see that both Ibn ʿArabī and al-Tirmidhī had a different approach 
to normal traditionists, and gave the saints a way of authoritative and certain knowledge 
about the authenticity of traditions that was inaccessible to non-saints. 
3.4 Ibn ʿArabī on Traditions and the Traditionists 
 We have seen that Ibn ʿArabī aimed to reach a state of perfect servitude to God 
(‘ubūda).  This was through the negation of all attributes that were also shared with 241
God. According to Ibn ʿArabī, God honoured his messengers by calling them 
messengers and not awliyāʾ. That is because the term ‘messenger’ can only apply to 
man, not to God. The term walī, on the other hand, is also one of God’s Names (al-
Walī), and thus signified a contestation, to a degree, of God’s lordship. Thus the state of 
being a messenger increased one’s spiritual perfection. Since the line of messengers had 
come to end with Muḥammad, the only way left to achieve this perfection was to narrate 
prophetic traditions with their uninterrupted chains of transmission. The Prophet had 
opened this door for his followers when he entrusted them with the mission of 
conveying his words to others, saying, ‘Let the present transmit to the absent.’ By 
transmitting the Prophet’s words, one became a messenger of the messenger of God, 
and therefore ultimately shared in the quality of being a messenger of God. Therefore 
none can reach the highest stations of servitude to God except those who narrate 
prophetic traditions. The greatest honour, in the sight of Ibn ʿArabī, was the 
combination of being a muḥaddath and a muḥaddith (traditionist). Furthermore the term 
muḥaddath was preferable, for those who had that rank, than the term walī.  242
 Like al-Tirmidhī before him, Ibn ʿArabī studied the prophetic traditions 
extensively from many masters, but also like him, he was more famous as a Sufi. Ibn 
ʿArabī, however, has not received enough appreciation as a traditionist. Ibn ʿArabī 
 Ibn ʿArabī most likely took this term from al-Tirmidhī who used it to refer to pure servanthood (see 241
al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 110: ‘On the Difference Between ʿubūda and ʿibāda’).
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt 1:229.242
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began studying prophetic traditions at an early age, soon after he decided to devote 
himself to God, and attributed this decision to a set of visions that he had seen. He had 
grown up in a military family that was close to the Caliph, and was not in his youth 
interested in the religious disciplines.  After he turned to God - Ibn ʿArabī was 243
encouraged by a group of his companions to study books of jurisprudence. He then saw 
a dream in which he was in an open field and a group of armed men were trying to kill 
him. Ibn ʿArabī saw the Prophet Muḥammad on top of a small hill, and ran to the 
Prophet’s great embrace. The Prophet said to him, ‘My beloved, hold fast to me and you 
shall be safe,’ at which point all of his enemies vanished. ‘From that time,’ he wrote, ‘I 
busied myself with the writing of prophetic traditions.’  There is great significance in 244
this vision because it taught Ibn ʿArabī that spiritual perfection can only be attained by 
close following and imitation of the Prophet Muḥammad’s example.  This recalls the 245
dream that al-Tirmidhī wrote in his autobiography where he saw himself walking 
behind the Prophet Muḥammad, placing his feet exactly where the Prophet placed his 
feet in every step, walking so close behind him that he almost touched the Prophet’s 
back.  246
  In another vision, Ibn ʿArabī saw Mālik ibn Anas, the great traditionist after 
whom the Mālikī school of jurisprudence is named, and asked him what he should read. 
Mālik said to him, ‘Do you like to read the books of jurisprudence (raʾy)?’ At this point, 
Ibn ʿArabī saw a man who busied himself with books of jurisprudence, scavenging 
through a garbage dump and turning away from Mālik. Ibn ʿArabī said, ‘I fear that the 
books of jurisprudence would lead me to where they led this man.’ Mālik smiled and 
said, ‘You have spoken the truth! My son, busy yourself with writing traditions and 
 On his youth and how he turned to God see Addas, Voyage, 11-30.243
 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Mubashshirāt, 432.244
 See footnote above, and Addas, Voyage, 20-1.245
 Al-Tirmidhī, Budū shaʾn, 16.246
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acting upon them.’  This vision is highly significant because it reflects Ibn ʿArabī’s 247
reaction to the religious atmosphere of his time.  
 Ibn ʿArabī was born at the time that the Almohad dynasty was wresting Muslim 
Spain from Almoravid control, and Ibn ʿArabī’s father, having been a general of the 
Almoravid rulers, soon emigrated to Seville to continue his career in the service of the 
Almohads.  The Almoravids were staunch Mālikīs who gave precedence to the study 248
of Mālikī jurisprudence over the books of other schools and encouraged an atmosphere 
that led to the rise of dogmatically rigid Mālikī jurists.  Muslim Spain, of course, had 249
mainly been Mālikī for a long time even before Almoravid rule. The Almohads, on the 
other hand, would encourage the study of prophetic traditions in the Muslim West, while 
at the same time the Ayyubids and Seljuks would encourage it in the Muslim East.  An 250
emphasis on traditions was therefore beginning to rise in Ibn ʿArabī’s environment, but 
undoubtedly at such an early stage of Almohad rule the hold of Mālikism was still 
strong. In this vision, it was Mālik himself who taught Ibn ʿArabī to focus on traditions, 
not on books of jurisprudence, which in that context would undoubtedly have referred 
to Mālikī books of jurisprudence. We get another glimpse of this Mālikī hegemony in 
Ibn ʿArabī’s surroundings, and how he attributed his liberation from it to a dream 
vision, in his discussion of the ruling on the raising of hands at different movements of 
the prayer. In the Mālikī school, the hands are only raised at the initial glorification 
which signals the beginning of the prayer, but not raised again for the remainder of the 
prayer. Ibn ʿArabī, however, wrote that he was commanded by the Prophet Muḥammad 
himself in a dream vision to raise his hands at two other locations: when going down 
into the bowing position, and when raising back up from it again. He wrote,  
The people of our lands, in their entirety, do not hold this opinion, nor do we have 
anyone who does this, nor had I ever seen it. When I told my dream to 
 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Mubashshirāt, 432-3.247
 Addas, Voyage, 15.248
 Addas, Voyage, 13; Adang, ‘From Mālikism,’ 75.249
 Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,’ 47.250
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Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥājj, who was a traditionist, he narrated to me an 
authentic tradition from the Messenger of God (may God’s peace and blessings be 
upon him) stating the same, which was mentioned by Muslim; I later read it 
myself in Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ when I began to study the prophetic traditions. I saw 
later that there is even a narration by Ibn Wahb about Mālik ibn Anas holding the 
same opinion. Abū ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī also mentioned the same tradition and said, 
‘Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī acted upon this tradition and held this opinion.’  251
  
 In the quote above we again have Ibn ʿArabī claiming, through his dreams and 
his studies of the books of the traditionists, that the Mālikī school itself was many times 
at odds with the opinions of Mālik ibn Anas, which it claimed to follow. We see the 
hegemony of Mālikī thought on Muslim Spain, and we see Ibn ʿArabī breaking free 
from it, first based on visions that he had, and then based on his studies and his 
interaction with traditionists who themselves were affiliated with the Mālikī school.  252
We also see in this the importance of dreams on the development of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
personality and career, as with al-Tirmidhī whose autobiography consisted mainly of 
dream visions that he or his wife had for him. Finally, we see an example of the 
importance that Ibn ʿArabī placed on dream visions even for learning the Sharīʿa.  
 Ibn ʿArabī was not the only person in Muslim Spain in his time to oppose blind 
following of the Mālikī school of course, and in the next chapter we will look at the 
presence of the Ẓāhirī school there. Ibn ʿArabī mentioned a man called Ibrāhīm ibn 
Hammām al-Ishbīlī who dedicated himself to the study of traditions and to acting upon 
them, and according to Ibn ʿArabī, the jurists of his town rose up against him. Ibn 
ʿArabī would later, in Mecca, see a dream in which the Prophet lovingly embraced 
Ibrāhīm ibn Hammām, kissed him, and told him that he loved him.  Likewise Ibn 253
ʿArabī wrote in Kitāb al-mubashshirāt that these very same jurists who rose up against 
Ibrāhīm ibn Hammām were once discussing the ruling of a certain part of the 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:70. This once again shows Ibn ʿArabī’s attitude toward inspiration. The dream 251
was not treated as an independent source of knowledge but as a confirmation of a sunna that already 
existed. 
 Addas, Quest, 45.252
 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Mubashshirāt, 432.253
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Pilgrimage when someone showed them authentic traditions of the Prophet that they 
refused to follow. The jurists said, ‘the schools of law have now been settled, and this 
man wants to question them with these traditions!’ After this incident, writes Ibn ʿArabī, 
‘a righteous man’ saw in his dream that the jurists of his town had gathered together to 
bury the Prophet under the ground, and upon waking up, he inquired as to the cause of 
his vision until he was told of this incident.   254
 Ibn ʿArabī’s study of traditions was a lifelong one, which increased after he left 
Muslim Spain for the Muslim East,  especially upon his first stay in Mecca where he 255
spent much of his two years there ‘deepening his study of ḥadīth.’  In fact as Gril 256
noted, of all the sciences that Ibn ʿArabī studied, ‘it was to ḥadīth that he devoted most 
time and on which he wrote the most.’  As with al-Tirmidhī who greatly contributed 257
to the field of traditions with such works as Nawādir al-uṣūl and al-Manhiyyāt, Ibn 
ʿArabī made contributions to the field of traditions, the significance of which have been 
underestimated. 
3.4.1 Ibn ʿArabī’s Contribution to Field of Traditions 
 Ibn ʿArabī stayed in Tunis twice, once for almost a year in 590/1194 before 
returning to his home land, and again in 598/1201 after he left Muslim Spain for good, 
on the way to the Muslim East. In both visits his main concern was to stay with the Sufi 
shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Mahdāwī, one of the most famous disciples of the Sufi shaykh 
Abū Madyan, who was a major influence on Ibn ʿArabī.  In al-Mahdāwī’s house he 258
met the Andalusian scholar and Sufi Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad al-Ḥarīrī who had lived next 
door to him in Seville, and from whose brother Ibn ʿArabī had learned the Qur’ān as a 
 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Mubashshirāt, 431-2.254
 Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,’ 46.255
 Addas, Voyage, 103.256
 Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,’ 47. For a list of Ibn ʿArabī’s ḥadīth teachers see Addas, Quest, 97-100 and 312-14.257
 On these visits see Addas, Voyage, 52-3, 68; Quest, 114. On Ibn ʿArabī’s relationship with Abū Madyan 258
see Addas, ‘Abu Madyan,’ 163-180.
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child.  Al-Ḥarīrī told Ibn ʿArabī that he used to prefer Abū Ḥanīfa over the other 259
imams for his great mind and his sound juristic opinions (ḥusn raʾyihī) until he saw a 
vision in which he learned that ‘salvation is in following prophetic traditions.’ When Ibn 
ʿArabī arrived in Mecca, he related al-Ḥarīrī’s vision to the judge ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-
Azdī of Alexandria. This shows the great deal to which thoughts about this subject 
matter concerned him. Al-Azdī affirmed what al-Ḥarīrī had said, and related to him 
another story. He spoke of a righteous man who passed away, and was seen in a dream 
by another righteous man. The dead man was asked about what he saw in the afterlife, 
and he replied, 
I saw books being raised, and books being lowered. I asked about them, and I was 
told, ‘As for those that are raised, they are the books of traditions, and as for those 
that are being lowered, they are the books of jurisprudence- they will remain that 
way until their authors are questioned about them.’   260
It is not surprising, then, to see Ibn ʿArabī wishing to write books of tradition. We must 
note something here also: that in all the visions mentioned in Kitāb al-mubashshirāt, 
Ibn ʿArabī referred to books of jurisprudence as ‘kutub al-raʾy’, books of juristic 
opinion, a condescending term used by the early Traditionalists against the Rationalists. 
 It was in the year 600/1204 in Mecca, shortly after having heard the above-
mentioned vision, that Ibn ʿArabī began composing al-Maḥajja l-bayḍāʾ fī l-aḥkām al-
sharʿiyya.  This work followed the genre of aḥādīth al-aḥkām works, like the ones 261
written by the Traditionist-Jurisprudents (Chapter Two, Section 2.1). The surviving 
portion, which constituted the second volume, focused on ritual prayer and alone 
 On al-Ḥarīrī see Addas, Quest, 194-6.259
 Ibn ʿArabī, Kitāb al-mubashshirāt, 433.260
 On the date of this work’s composition see Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,’ 48 and al-Ghurāb, al-Fiqh, 6, n. 1. Al-Ghurāb 261
questioned this work’s attribution to Ibn ʿArabī, but other scholars affirmed that his authorship of the 
work cannot be disputed. It is listed among the Fihris and Ijāza in which Ibn ʿArabī listed his own 
writings, and the second volume was written in the shaykh’s own handwriting. Furthermore, the 
manuscript copy bears an ownership note by Ibn ʿArabī’s greatest disciple Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, 
confirming its authenticity.
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discussed 528 matters relating to prayer.  For each question, the book listed the 262
opinions of all the schools of law and other Sunni scholars, then presented the traditions 
that they relied upon, followed by a grading of the authenticity of these traditions and 
the reliability of the transmitters in their chains.  Had this work been completed it 263
would have been one of the most comprehensive works of this genre, and may have 
earned Ibn ʿArabī a place among the greatest scholars of traditions and jurisprudence. 
 Ibn ʿArabī also wrote abridgements of the three great ḥadīth collections Ṣaḥīḥ 
al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, and Sunan al-Tirmidhī, which are now lost.  He also wrote 264
al-Miṣbāḥ fī al-jamʿ bayn al-ṣiḥāḥ, which some scholars believe, based on the name, 
that it was ‘a synthesis of the six canonical collections.’  Ibn ʿArabī also wrote a 265
collection of 101 aḥādīth qudsiyya, non-Qurʾānic sayings of God stated by the Prophet 
Muḥammad. Stephen Hirtenstein stated that this was only the second oldest collection 
of this genre of traditions, and that it may have therefore contributed to the 
popularisation of this genre.  This in itself would be an important contribution to the 266
field of prophetic traditions. 
 Ibn ʿArabī’s greatest disciple and son-in-law Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī was 
described as a great traditionist himself,  and there is no doubt that Ibn ʿArabī would 267
have been one of the main - if not the main- influences on al-Qūnawī to pursue this field 
of study. We see al-Qūnawī likewise share Ibn ʿArabī’s attitude to juristic opinions and 
his strict adherence to traditions in his final will. In this will he wrote, ‘I enjoin them to 
wash my body in keeping with what is mentioned in the books of prophetic traditions, 
not in keeping with what is mentioned in the books of jurisprudence.’ Likewise in 
 This only surviving portion of the work has recently been stolen from the Yusuf Aga library.262
 Al-Ghurāb, al-Fiqh, 6, n.1; Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,’ 48.263
 Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,’ 47.264
 Hirtenstein and Notcutt in Ibn ʿArabī, Divine Sayings, 11.265
 Hirtenstein and Notcutt in Ibn ʿArabī, Divine Sayings, 1, 6.266
 Hirtenstein, ‘Image,’ 70.267
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keeping with the ḥadīth literature, and in opposition to later dispensation given by the 
jurists of the Ḥanafī school and others, he also requested that no structure be built over 
his grave.  268
3.5 Ibn ʿArabī on Close Following of the Prophet 
 Ibn ʿArabī’s jurisprudence, be it his theory or practice, was not only guided by 
traditions as opposed to the practice of the schools. Ibn ʿArabī was also gravely 
concerned with the issue of close following (mutābaʿa) of the Prophet Muḥammad’s 
model, and that did not always correspond to a simplistic division of traditions vs raʾy, 
but took on different dimensions as I will show. Ibn ʿArabī, as previously mentioned, 
held that the saints were heirs of the Prophet Muḥammad. Most saints, however, could 
not inherit the Muḥammadan state in its totality and only inherited from him a certain 
part of his spirituality which corresponded to what another prophet also inherited from 
Muḥammad. Some saints were therefore ʿīsawī (Jesus-like), others mūsawī (Moses-
like), etc.  Ibn ʿArabī considered himself not only a muḥammadī, but the Seal of all 269
the Muḥammadan Saints, meaning the last Muḥammadan saint and the most complete 
and perfect of them.  This idea of a Seal of the Saints, of course, he took from al-270
Tirmidhī. As the most complete heir of Muḥammad, Ibn ʿArabī undoubtedly was 
concerned with perfect imitation of the Muḥammadan model in a way that I will soon 
clarify. This concept was not unique to him, and is possibly the single most important 
theme in the teachings of his contemporary Shams al-Tabrīzī (fl. 640’s/1240’s), the 
famed shaykh of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 672/1273). Shams divided Sufis into 
Muḥammadan Sufis and non-Muḥammadan Sufis, and he criticised any Sufi practice 
that was not specifically done by the Prophet Muḥammad as being an innovation that 
belongs to followers of other prophets. For example Shams criticised the popular forty 
 Chittick, ‘Last will and testament,’ 43-58.268
 See Chodkiewicz, Seal, 74-88: Chapter Five: ‘The Heirs of the Prophets.’269
 See Chodkiewicz, Seal, 128-146: Chapter Nine: ’The Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood.’270
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day seclusion, which he said belonged to the followers of Moses whose appointed time 
with God in the desert was forty days.  Shams met Ibn ʿArabī in Damascus and 271
became very close and intimate with him.  It is not clear, however, who took the 272
emphasis on close following from whom, if indeed one of them took it from the other.  273
It is possible that Shams might have developed an intense emphasis on this concept and 
influenced Ibn ʿArabī. It is also possible that Shams took this concept from Ibn ʿArabī 
because he described him as someone who regularly claimed this close following of the 
Prophet, but then judged Ibn ʿArabī by his own criteria and found him lacking in it 
(according to his understanding).   274
 Shams described Ibn ʿArabī as ‘such an exalted scholar, who is more 
knowledgeable than me in every way.’  ‘He was a profound man,’ said Shams, ‘but he 275
was not in conformity [to the Muḥammadan paradigm].’ Someone protested, ‘[On the 
contrary,] he was the essence of conformity.’ Shams replied, ‘No, he did not 
conform.’  The response of people from Rumi’s circle in Konya, that Ibn ʿArabī was 276
 In reference to the Qurʾān (Q 2:51). See Chittick, Me & Rumi, 147. For his general teachings on 271
mutābaʿa see 68-88.
 Safi, ‘Two Oceans,’ 78.272
 This theme of close following of the Prophet became a highly popular topic in 7th-8th/13th-14th 273
century Anatolia, as part of the Mevlevi order’s attempt to establish itself there. The Mevlevi order, 
founded by Rūmī, was highly concerned with this concept which gave them a sense of superiority over 
other orders (see Safi, ‘Two Oceans,’ 86-7). However was this concept popular in the Muslim East when 
Shams and Ibn ʿArabī lived in Damascus, or was this a concept that was only introduced into Anatolia by 
Shams?
 Shams did not make clear where he found Ibn ʿArabī lacking in mutābaʿa, but it could have been with 274
regard to his complex metaphysical writings. Shams criticised those who spoke of complex 
metaphysical or cosmological teachings that the Prophet Muḥammad himself did not speak of and 
called for the simple ‘religion of old women’ (Chittick, Me & Rumi, 88-103).
 Omid Safi, ‘Two Oceans,’ 78.275
 Omid Safi, ‘Two Oceans,’ 81.276
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in fact the very personification of close following, is telling of the image that Ibn ʿArabī 
projected of himself in his teachings and practice.  277
 I will give an example of how the concern with close following influenced Ibn 
ʿArabī’s jurisprudential thought and practice using his treatment of the subject of the 
tarāwīḥ prayers, the extra prayers that Muslims pray in congregation during the nights 
of the month of Ramadan. The view held by the four Sunni schools is that the Prophet 
established the tarāwīḥ prayers as a sunna for his community. According to the 
narrations, the Prophet led his followers in this prayer for three nights in a row to teach 
them how to do it, and then returned to his daily routine of praying ten units of prayer 
by himself at his home. The Prophet expressed his fear that if he practiced this regularly 
with them, God would bring down a revelation changing the status of this prayer to an 
obligation. So the Prophet taught his Companions about this prayer by example, and 
then did not himself continue praying it, and nor did they. When ʿUmar became caliph 
he established this prayer, as it was no longer possible after the Prophet’s passing for a 
Divine revelation to come down and make this prayer obligatory. He appointed another 
Companion to lead the Muslim congregation and chose the number of twenty units of 
prayer, though the narrations indicate that ʿUmar himself did not partake of this prayer 
which he established for the rest of the Muslims. This prayer became well established, 
and although in the first two centuries there were variations on the number of units of 
this prayer (for example at the time of the Caliph ʿUmar II, it was twenty units in Mecca 
but thirty-six in Medina), eventually all four schools agreed on the number twenty until 
the modern day.   278
 In Ramadan Ibn ʿArabī chose to go against the majority of the scholars and to 
pray ten units of night prayers (qiyām al-layl) individually at home, in imitation of the 
Prophet, instead of the twenty-unit prayer in the mosque that was taught by the Prophet 
 Shams also said of Ibn ʿArabī’s perception of himself, ‘From time to time Shaykh Muḥammad [Ibn al-277
ʿArabī] would bow down in prayer, and prostrate himself, and would say: ‘I am the servant of the folk of 
the sacred law (Sharīʿa).’ But he did not conform [to the Muḥammadan paradigm]. (Safi, ‘Two Oceans,’ 
84).
 See for example the traditions in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 3:44-5, and the commentary of Ibn Ḥajar in Fatḥ al-278
Bārī, 4:25-4.
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for his community and formally instituted by ʿUmar. Ibn ʿArabī thus first declared that 
in his opinion, there was no set number of units to fulfil the supererogatory nightly 
prayers of Ramadan, ‘however, if one must follow someone then let him follow the 
Messenger of God in this.’ This, way, he stated, one could combine between doing 
supererogatory night prayers in Ramadan and between following of the Prophet’s 
example.  In this case, it was not a matter of following the traditions vs following of 279
the practice of the schools of law. Here we have a difference between two practices of 
the Prophet himself, one which he instituted for his followers, and one which the 
Prophet did himself due to the obligation that God had placed on him to perform prayers 
in the night (Q 17:79). It is unknown what number of units the Prophet prayed in his 
first two nights in the mosque, whether they were ten, twenty, or another number, and 
therefore in doing twenty units one could not be sure if he was following the Prophet, as 
it could have been a number chosen by ʿUmar and the rest of the Companions. Ibn 
ʿArabī was fully aware that the Prophet himself taught this prayer for his community, 
yet he chose to follow the Prophet’s actual personal practice (as did ʿUmar himself who 
did not partake in the tarāwīḥ) and in this he broke with the majority of the scholars.   280
 Similarly in Ibn ʿArabī’s discussion on reciting the Qurʾān while in a state of 
major impurity, he argued that in his belief the Qurʾān could be recited in any state, 
even during major ritual impurity, but that at the same time he disapproved of it, ‘in 
order to imitate the Messenger of God.’ This is especially so, Ibn ʿArabī, insists, for the 
heir who wants to ‘follow the one from whom he inherits.’  In this case, it seems Ibn 281
ʿArabī approved of this action for the general public, but disapproved of it for those 
who wanted to be true heirs of the Prophet such as himself. For a final example, there 
are several supplications that are attributed to the Prophet at the beginning of the ritual 
prayer, before the recitation of the Fātiḥa. The Mālikī school denied that any of them 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:495-7.279
 Ibn ʿArabī’s position is not to be confused with the contemporary Salafī position that the twenty-280
unit tarāwīḥ prayer is an unacceptable innovation in the religion. On a discussion of this position, see 
the response of Ṣāliḥ al-Jaʿfarī (d. 1979), imam of the Azhar Mosque, in al-Jaʿfarī, Dars al-Jumuʿa, 
2:188-91. On al-Jaʿfarī see Chapter Six, Section 6.5.3.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:367.281
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were obligatory or recommended and went directly to the Fātiḥa, but the Shāfiʿīs 
considered one of them, a supplication from the Qur’ān,  to be obligatory, whereas the 282
Ḥanafīs chose another supplication known as the tasbīḥ that was narrated in less 
prestigious collections.  Ibn Ḥazm chose the supplication of tasbīḥ and attributed that 283
position to Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī and many others among the early imams, declaring it a 
good sunna.  Ibn ʿArabī differed from all the schools above and chose a third 284
supplication narrated in the two most canonical collections.  He also stressed that none 285
of these supplications were obligatory and that he chose the one ‘narrated in the sunna’ 
for the sake of close following and not because it was obligatory. Furthermore, he 
argued that the Qur’ānic supplication chosen by the Shāfiʿī school was only narrated in 
the description of supererogatory night prayers, and therefore close following of the 
Prophet meant only reciting it in devotional night prayers and not in the five obligatory 
prayers.  Again this could be seen as a radical form of close following of the Prophet 286
in which Ibn ʿArabī disapproved of using a supplication at the beginning of the 
obligatory prayers which the narrations only mentioned in descriptions of the Prophet’s 
night prayers. Ibn ʿArabī here again refused to do any action that was not known to be 
the practice of the Prophet himself, and then he chose for the obligatory prayers the 
supplication that came from the most canonical traditions, going against the practice of 
the rest of the schools of law. These are just some examples demonstrating the role that 
the concept of close following of the Prophet, and the image that Ibn ʿArabī held of 
himself as a perfect inheritor of the Prophet, played in developing his jurisprudential 
opinions and practice. This was in turn based on Ibn ʿArabī’s typology of saints.  
 ‘I direct my face to the One who created the Heavens and the Earth’ (Q6:79).282
 On all these positions see Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, 1:131.283
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 3:13-14.284
 See Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, 1:131.285
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1: 412.286
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3.6 Conclusion 
 We have seen that Ibn ʿArabī studied the works of al-Tirmidhī and benefited 
from them greatly. He took al-Tirmidhī’s teachings on sainthood, especially the Elect 
among them, and built greatly on what his predecessor had written. Ibn ʿArabī agreed 
with al-Tirmidhī on the nature of the Heavenly Speech that descends upon the hearts of 
the muḥaddathūn, but also added a new superior modality. Likewise, he agreed with 
him in favouring an ijtihād based on piety and spiritual knowledge rather than 
analogical reasoning, but used similar, instead of the the same, terminology to describe 
his method. They both agreed on the authority of the Elect in the fields of jurisprudence 
and prophetic tradition, and that people should refer to the Elect for an authoritative 
answer on God’s actual ruling on any matter. In what we have seen above, there were 
some differences in terminology and sometimes in sophistication between Ibn ʿArabī 
and his predecessor, but the substance of their teachings remained the same. Ibn ʿArabī 
was a man of original thought, who did not simply imitate those who came before him, 
but rather, as the self-professed Seal of the Saints, always had something to add to what 
those before him had said or taught. Ibn ʿArabī’s spiritual dreams, as well as his 
understanding of the perfect state of ʿubūda led him to favour the study of prophetic 
traditions over the study of books of jurisprudence according to the schools of law. He 
authored several works on prophetic tradition and started an extensive work of aḥādīth 
al-aḥkām which he did not finish. Furthermore, Ibn ʿArabī’s typology of sainthood, and 
his belief that he was the perfect Muḥammadan saint, inspired in him the desire to 
emulate the Prophet’s every act, which in turn had an influence on his jurisprudential 
thought. We will now turn to examining Ibn ʿArabī’s legal methodology and its 
principles.  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Chapter 4: Ibn ʿArabī on Juristic Method: An Akbarī 
Madhhab? 
 In the previous chapter we looked at Ibn ʿArabī’s views on sainthood and the 
question of the authority of the saint in the field of jurisprudence. In this chapter we 
look directly at Ibn ʿArabī’s legal theory. In the previous chapter we saw how Ibn 
ʿArabī’s views on sainthood had a major impact on his jurisprudential thought, and we 
traced the origins of these views to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. However Ibn ʿArabī was also 
highly influenced by the Ẓāhirī school, and several studies count him among the 
Ẓāhirīs. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at a clearer picture of Ibn ʿArabī’s legal 
thought and his understanding of the Sharīʿa. The chapter will begin by investigating 
the nature of the relationship between Ibn ʿArabī and Ẓāhirī thought. This is important 
because Ibn ʿArabī’s thought was extremely similar to that of the Ẓāhirīs. However, 
only by comparing his thought to the Ẓāhirīs in detail and investigating the nature of the 
differences between them, can we understand whether Ibn ʿArabī took his views from 
the Ẓāhirī school or whether he used their writings as a tool to defend his own views. In 
this chapter I will argue that the differences between the legal methodologies of Ibn 
ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirīs reveal the difference in the guiding principle behind Ibn ʿArabī’s 
jurisprudential thought: mercy for God’s servants. This principle in turn is linked to Ibn 
ʿArabī’s views on sainthood and his role as the Seal of Muḥammadan Saints. 
 Several studies defended the claims that Ibn ʿArabī was or was not a Ẓāhirī, 
based on one or two main points of convergence or divergence. This chapter will begin 
by providing the first detailed comparison between the legal thought of Ibn ʿArabī and 
the Ẓāhirīs. After that, I will summarise some of the distinguishing features of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s legal thought which have been enumerated by Chodkiewicz and Addas, and 
studied by Eric Winkel.  In his study, Winkel provided examples and case studies of 287
two main interrelated themes: a) Ibn ʿArabī’s strict adherence to the text and how it 
 Chodkiewicz, Ocean, 54-7; Addas, Quest, 46-7; Voyage, 122-4; Winkel, Living Law.287
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produced a multiplicity of meanings, and b) his approval of the different positions of the 
different schools. However, this study will explain in greater detail Ibn ʿArabī’s 
nuanced position on analogical reasoning and ijtihād, which Winkel only briefly 
discussed, and will also highlight other aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s legal thought. Finally, 
after having studied the nature of the Ẓāhirī influence on Ibn ʿArabī, and the 
distinguishing features of his legal thought, I will investigate the influence of al-
Tirmidhī. We have seen how al-Tirmidhī influenced Ibn ʿArabī’s views on sainthood, 
which in turn influenced his views on jurisprudence. However, I will argue that Ibn 
ʿArabī may have also benefited directly from al-Tirmidhī’s jurisprudential writings. 
  
4.1 Was Ibn ʿArabī a Ẓāhirī? 
 Ibn ʿArabī has been, even since his own life time, associated with the Ẓāhirī 
school, and in particular the Western ‘branch’ of this school that was promoted in Spain 
by Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064).  For example the Andalusian scholar Ibn Musdī (d. 288
663/1265), who lived most of his life in the East, is quoted as stating that Ibn ʿArabī 
was Ẓāhirī.  289
Ibn ʿArabī himself wrote in his Dīwān, 
They ascribe me to (the school of) Ibn Ḥazm, but 
I am not of those who say, ‘Ibn Ḥazm said…’ 
No! Nor anyone else. What I do say is: 
The ‘clear text of the Book says..’, that is my knowledge 
Or ‘the Messenger said,’ or ‘the people have agreed- 
-on what I say,’ that is my judgement.  290
These words of Ibn ʿArabī himself testify to the fact that many of his contemporaries 
believed him to be a Ẓāhirī. As these lines show, Ibn ʿArabī himself rejected this 
 Meyer, ‘Theology and Sufism,’ 282.288
 Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 38-9.289
 Quoted by al-Ghurāb in al-Fiqh, 11.290
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ascription to Ibn Ḥazm. Several contemporary Ibn ʿArabī specialists have pointed this 
out,  but others replied that although Ibn ʿArabī may have denied imitating Ibn Ḥazm 291
or taking his opinions, this does not mean that he was not a follower of the methodology 
and principles of the Ẓāhirī school.  
4.1.1 Arguments that Ibn ʿArabī was a Ẓāhirī 
 The biographer and Shāfiʿī scholar Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) who met Ibn 
ʿArabī described him as a scholar who practiced ijtihād independently, without 
imitating previous authorities. The context of this mention was a discussion of the 
Almohad ruler Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr (r. 580-594/1184-1198) who called for the 
rejection of the positive law (furūʿ) that was worked out by the jurists, and demanded 
that legal verdicts (fatwas) only be given based on the Qur’ān and Sunna. Abū Yūsuf 
also demanded that scholars not imitate any previous imams and that they perform their 
own ijtihād based on the Qur’ān, prophetic traditions, consensus, and qiyās. Ibn 
Khallikān stated that among the scholars of the Muslim West who followed that way 
(ʿalā dhālik al-ṭarīq) and whom he met in the Muslim East, were Ibn ʿArabī as well as 
Abū l-Khaṭṭāb ibn Diḥya and his brother.   292
 Some studies understood from Ibn Khallikān’s description of these scholars that 
Ibn ʿArabī was a Ẓāhirī.  Yet Ibn Khallikān, whose same work included entries on 293
both Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī and Ibn Ḥazm, did not use the word ‘ẓāhir’ or Ẓāhirī in his 
description of these men, and his mention of qiyās should rule out the possibility that he 
perceived them as Ẓāhirīs. It is clear that according to Ibn Khallikān’s understanding, 
al-Manṣūr was a proponent of ijtihād against taqlīd but not specifically a Ẓāhirī, and 
believed these scholars to be examples of people ‘upon that way.’ Some medieval 
 Al-Ghurāb, ‘Ibn al-ʿArabī,’ 200; Chodkiewicz, Ocean, 55 ff.291
 Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, 7: 11.292
 Elmore, Islamic Sainthood, 44-5; al-Buḥṣalī, Ṭabaqāt, 155. Both independently seem to have omitted Ibn 293
Khallikān’s mention of qiyās when summarising his passage.
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historians did count these scholars among the followers of the Ẓāhirī school.  This 294
was particularly the case of al-Manṣūr himself, who was described by ʿAbd al-Wāḥid 
al-Marrākushī (d. after 621/1224) and Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233) as having publicly 
professed his allegiance to the Ẓāhirī school.  However even if some of these figures 295
were in fact Ẓāhirī, all we can take from this passage of Ibn Khallikān is that he 
understood Ibn ʿArabī to be a mujtahid and not necessarily a Ẓāhirī. 
 With regard to Ibn ʿArabī’s poetic lines in which he denied following Ibn Ḥazm, 
Camilla Adang argued that such statements were evidence that he adopted ‘one of the 
fundamental principles of Ẓāhirism: the outright rejection of taqlīd. Ibn Ḥazm himself 
would probably have applauded Ibn al-ʿArabī’s refusal to adopt him unquestioningly as 
an authority.’  According to Ibn al-Athīr, the followers of Ibn Ḥazm in the Muslim 296
West were known as the Ḥazmiyya,  perhaps not unlike the way that ardent followers 297
of Ibn Taymiyya would later be labelled - by fellow Ḥanbalīs - as Taymiyyūn. It is 
therefore very possible that Ibn ʿArabī simply wanted to make it clear that he did not 
imitate anyone and that he was not a ‘Ḥazmī,’ so to speak. 
 Similarly, if we look at the remaining lines from Ibn ʿArabī, we see that he only 
accepted the Qur’ān, the Sunna, and Consensus (‘the people have agreed’). These are 
are the only three sources acceptable to the Ẓāhirī school, and by stopping there Ibn 
ʿArabī was in full agreement with Ẓāhirī principles. As Tobey Meyer argued, this would 
make him ‘impeccably Zahirite, since Ẓāhirīsm expressly condemns the 
 For example, the Baghdādī historian Ibn al-Najjār (d. 643/1245) described the more famous of the Ibn 294
Diḥya brothers, Abū l-Khaṭṭāb ʿUmar, whom he met and had a strong aversion for, as a Ẓāhirī (see his 
Dhayl Ṭabaqāt Baghdād, 20:41). On him see also Adang, ‘Ẓāhirīs,’ 450-3. As for ʿUmar’s brother ʿUthmān, 
there does not seem to be an explicit indication that he was a Ẓāhirī. The contemporary author al-
Buḥṣalī in Ṭabaqāt ahl al-ẓāhir only included him on the basis of Ibn Khallikān’s passage, and none of the 
several medieval biographers whom he quoted mentioned that this Ibn Diḥya was a Ẓāhirī (see al-
Buḥṣalī, Ṭabaqāt, 156—8).
 Adang, ‘Ẓāhirīs,’ 415-6.295
 Adang, ‘Ẓāhirīs,’ 463.296
 Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 10:161-3.297
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superimposition of a legal theory on the God-given sources of religious law.’  As 298
Mayer also argued - and as is clear from those very lines- Ibn ʿArabī ‘adopted one of 
the cornerstones of Zahirite law, the rejection of analogical reasoning.’  To add to 299
Meyer’s argument, although Ibn ʿArabī did not clarify in those poetic lines what type of 
consensus he accepted as a source of law, we will see later from his other writings that 
he only accepted the consensus of the Prophet’s Companions, exactly like the Ẓāhirī 
school, in contradiction to the four other schools which accepted the consensus of all 
scholars in any one generation.  Therefore Adang and Meyer are correct in saying that 300
Ibn ʿArabī’s very lines in which he rejected being a follower of Ibn Ḥazm show him to 
be nothing but a Ẓāhirī. 
 There are further reasons why later scholars held that Ibn ʿArabī must have been 
a Ẓāhirī, which Mayer summed up in his argument: 
- Ibn ʿArabī’s veneration for Ibn Ḥazm, expressed in a dream that he saw of him, which 
he mentioned in his introduction to Ibn Ḥazm’s Ibṭāl al-qiyās (Refutation of 
Analogy),  Kitāb al-mubashshirāt,  and the Futūḥāt.  In this vision he saw the 301 302 303
Prophet embrace Ibn Ḥazm, and a light enveloped them both until the latter dissolved 
into the former and they became as one. 
- that he ‘engaged in depth with Ibn Ḥazm’s works,’ 
- and that he transmitted Ibn Ḥazm’s Ibṭāl al-qiyās and abridged his al-Muḥallā, which 
Mayer rightly argued are ‘surely sufficient evidence of dedication.’  304
 Mayer, ‘Theology and Sufism,’ 282.298
 Mayer, ‘Theology and Sufism,’ 282.299
 Or the consensus of the early scholars of Medina, as was the opinion of Mālik.300
 The version in Ibṭāl al-qiyās is the longest, and has been translated by Goldziher (Ẓāhirīs, 170-1).301
 Ibn ʿArabī, Kitāb al-mubashshirāt, 432; also translated by Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,' 65 n.50.302
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:519.303
 Mayer, ‘Theology and Sufism,’ 282.304
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4.1.2 Arguments that Ibn ʿArabī was not a Ẓāhirī 
In his large biographical dictionary Shadharāt al-dhahab, the Ḥanbalī Ibn al-ʿImād 
(1089/1679) quoted Ibn ʿArabī as saying in verse, 
The Merciful has prohibited to 
follow Mālik, Aḥmad, 
al-Nuʿmān and any other, so excuse me... 
I am not the one who says: ‘Ibn Ḥazm said,’  
No, ‘Aḥmad said,’ no too, 
and ‘Nuʿmān said’ - no...  305
‘This,’ wrote Ibn al-ʿImād ‘is a strong argument in favour of his absolute ijtihād (i.e. an 
ability to pronounce independent judgments on religious matters)... and if he was not a 
mujtahid, then there was no mujtahid in God’s creation.’  Several contemporary 306
specialists on Ibn ʿArabī contended that he was a fully independent mujtahid. 
Chodkiewicz may have been the first to propose that Ibn ʿArabī may have even founded 
his own school of jurisprudence, saying,  
He is a perfectly autonomous mujtahid - or, perhaps, the founder of a madhhab 
Akbarī, or an ‘Akbarī school of jurisprudence,’ which is, as shall be seen, the most 
irenic, the most conciliatory of all those that Islam has known.  307
 Arguments that Ibn ʿArabī was not a Ẓāhirī were based on two fronts: a) 
pointing out the differences in the positive law between Ibn ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirī 
school (mainly of Ibn Ḥazm in particular), and b) showing where they differed on 
principles of jurisprudence. Before we come to these two arguments however, it would 
be fruitful first to look at the other main argument presented above, and which was not 
 Knysh in ‘Ibn ʿArabī,’ 309, with edits to the translation.305
 Knysh, ‘Ibn ʿArabī,’ 309.306
 Chodkiewicz, Ocean, 55.307
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dealt with by the partisans of this group as far as I can tell, which is Ibn ʿArabī's 
dedication to the works and teachings of Ibn Ḥazm. This dedication does not mean that 
the former was a follower of the latter, and this possible objection deserves to be 
pointed out first. 
4.1.2.1 Ibn ʿArabī and the Works of Ibn Ḥazm 
 Ibn ʿArabī did study and receive licenses in the works of Ibn Ḥazm as Mayer 
noted. However, even the main transmitter of Ibn Ḥazm’s teachings, Shurayḥ al-
Ruʿaynī (d. 539/1144),  through whom Ibn Ḥazm’s teachings reached Ibn ʿArabī, 308
seems to have been a Mālikī rather than a Ẓāhirī.  This shows that dedication to the 309
teachings of Ibn Ḥazm does not necessitate following his school or methodology.  
 The great importance that Ibn ʿArabī attributed to Ibn Ḥazm can be summed up 
by the import of the dream that he had of him. In this dream, it was because of Ibn 
Ḥazm’s focus on traditions that he was embraced by the Prophet until he dissolved into 
him, and Ibn ʿArabī specifically mentioned that what he learned from this dream was 
the importance of following traditions.  As we recall from the previous chapter 310
(Chapter Three, Section 3.4), Ibn ʿArabī recorded several dreams that taught him to 
avoid books of the jurisprudence of the schools because of the influence of analogical 
reasoning and to focus on prophetic traditions. Ibn ʿArabī thus turned to Ibn Ḥazm as a 
source of tradition-based scholarship and as a source of arguments against the use of 
analogy. For example, one of the teachings that Ibn ʿArabī preserved from Ibn Ḥazm 
via Shurayḥ was Ibn Ḥazm’s collection of Divine Names based solely on authentic 
narrations.  Likewise, we must remember that the title of Ibn Ḥazm’s al-Muḥallā bil-311
āthār meant The (Book) Adorned with Narrations, meaning that it was mainly a source 
of tradition-based scholarship. We must also remember that abridging a work is not only 
 Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,’ 65. 308
 Adang, ‘Ẓāhirīs,’ 463.309
 Ibn ʿArabī, al-Mubashshirāt, 432; Addas, Quest, 42; Meyer, ‘Theology and Sufism,’ 282.310
 Gril, ‘Ḥadīth,’ 65.311
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a method of transmitting it but also an opportunity to remove what one may disagree 
with in a work; it is very possible that in abridging this work, Ibn ʿArabī intended to 
preserve what he agreed with in it and to remove some of what he disagreed with.   312
 Ibn ʿArabī began his education in Seville two to four years before the reign of 
al-Manṣūr (r. 580-594/1184-1198), immediately focusing on the study of prophetic 
traditions.  Adang found that the first three Almohad rulers before al-Manṣūr had 313
themselves been attached to the idea of following ‘the revealed sources (rather than 
non-revealed jurisprudence)’ yet they did not profess Ẓāhirism themselves, nor did they 
sponsor it by giving preferential treatment to Ẓāhirī scholars.  ‘The most that can be 314
said,’ she wrote, is that from the days of the movement’s founder, 
there was a tendency to emphasise the primacy of the revealed sources - the Koran 
and the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad - at the expense of manuals of 
jurisprudence (furūʿ) generated by the Mālikī school of law. By the same token, 
raʾy and taqlīd were rejected.  315
This undoubtedly would have led to many scholars adopting a preference for ḥadīth-
based jurisprudence. We have seen for example in the previous chapter that al-Ḥarīrī, a 
scholar and Sufi from Seville whom Ibn ʿArabī knew as a child, related to Ibn ʿArabi - 
upon their meeting in Tunis- a dream from which he learned the importance of ḥadīth-
based jurisprudence over raʾy. During the reign of al-Manṣūr, there was no noticeable 
increase in the number of Ẓāhirī scholars, though some Ẓāhirīs were appointed to the 
 The work is said to be extant in a single manuscript in Tunis (see Elmore, Islamic Sainthood, 42, n. 312
156).
 Addas dated the start of his studies to the year 578/1183 (Addas, Quest, 95). However, she elsewhere 313
stated that he possibly started earlier (Addas, Quest, 42). Evidence that he started earlier is that he 
seems to have received a written authorisation in absentia, by way of correspondence, from Abū Ṭāhir 
al-Silafī the very year that he died in Alexandria in 576/1180 (on this authorisation see See Hirtenstein 
and Notcutt in Ibn ʿArabī, Divine Sayings, 108; Knysh, Ibn ʿArabī, 287, n. 24 and n. 25).
 Adang, ‘Ẓāhirīs,’ 472.314
 Adang, ‘Ẓāhirīs,’ 414.315
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position of chief qādī.  There was, however, a marked increase in the number of 316
traditionists in Seville: according to Urvoy’s census, it jumped from fifty-seven names 
in the period 565-85/1170-1189, to seventy-eight names in the period 
585-610/1189-1213. It was a also time when the discipline of ḥadīth studies ‘became 
more and more closely linked with asceticism (zuhd) and Sufism.’  It was natural for 317
traditionists, whether they followed a school of law or practiced their own ijtihād, to 
benefit from the works of Ibn Ḥazm, as did Shurayḥ the Mālikī traditionist who played 
a major role in the spread of Ibn Ḥazm’s works. Shurayḥ lived and taught in Seville, and 
so did the descendants of Ibn Ḥazm who also spread their grandfather’s teachings. It is 
not surprising therefore that in terms of the geographical distribution of Ẓāhirī scholars, 
Seville had more Ẓāhirīs than any other city in al-Andalus.  This all meant that the 318
works of Ibn Ḥazm were easily at hand for others to benefit from, regardless of what 
school they followed. In short, it would have been natural for Ibn ʿArabī to study, 
benefit from, and be influenced by the works of Ibn Ḥazm in such an environment. With 
the importance that they both gave to ḥadīth-based jurisprudence, Ibn ʿArabī could have 
found in the works of Ibn Ḥazm the tools that he needed to build his own project. 
4.1.2.2 Differences in Positive Law 
  
 Among the evidence that was used to show Ibn ʿArabī's independence in his 
juristic opinions was the fact that he disagreed with the Ẓāhirī school in general, and Ibn 
Ḥazm in particular, on many opinions of positive law. Maḥmūd al-Ghurāb argued that 
Ibn ʿArabī in fact had a number of opinions which were unique to him, and that he 
should therefore be classified as an absolute mujtahid, ‘not a follower of authority 
 Adang, ‘Ẓāhirīs,’ 468-73.316
 Addas, Quest, 94.317
 Adang, ‘Ẓāhirīs,’ 469-470.318
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(muqallid), nor a follower belonging to any school (tābiʿ).’  By saying that he was not 319
a follower of any school, al-Ghurāb meant to reject the idea that Ibn ʿArabī could have 
been a mujtahid within the Ẓāhirī school, that is: independently investigating answers 
based on Ẓāhirī principles. Chodkiewicz provided some examples of these differences 
in Ocean Without a Shore.  In his anthology of Ibn ʿArabī’s jurisprudence which he 320
called al-Fiqh ‘ind al-shaykh al-akbar Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn al-ʿArabī, al-Ghurāb made 
sure to point out every difference between Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Ḥazm throughout the 
book, in order to show that Ibn ʿArabī did not follow the Ẓāhirī school. He likewise 
listed some of these differences between the two in his study, ‘Ibn al-ʿArabī Amidst 
Religions and Schools of Thought.’   321
 Comparing positive law (individual opinions) can only show us that Ibn ʿArabī 
was not an imitator of the opinions of earlier Ẓāhirīs. Al-Ghurāb’s compendium is full 
of footnotes showing differences of opinion between Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Ḥazm, but this 
does not discount the possibility that they both followed the same principles and came 
to different answers. For example, even early Ẓāhirīs in the Muslim East disagreed with 
some opinions of their imam Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī,  and so did Ibn Ḥazm.  It has already 322 323
been stated that a main principle of the Ẓāhirī school is that it does not permit blind 
imitation but that it encourages independent ijtihād, which means that two Ẓāhirīs could 
arrive at different answers to the same problem. Therefore this approach cannot prove 
that Ibn ʿArabī was not a Ẓāhirī. There is no reason then to repeat all the differences in 
positive law between Ibn ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirīs. 
 There is one curious case that does deserve mentioning, however, which al-
Ghurāb failed to appreciate and comment on. It is the case of the definition of illness 
 Al-Ghurāb, ‘Ibn al-ʿArabī,’ 201.319
 Chodkiewicz, Ocean, 149, n. 65.320
 Al-Ghurāb, ‘Ibn al-ʿArabī,’ 200.321
 One example is provided by Gleave in Islam and Literalism, 149.322
 One example is provided in Section 4.2.3 regarding the washing of feet in ablutions.323
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that permits the breaking of the fast in Ramadan (as stated in Q 2:185). On this issue, 
the four main schools of thought and the vast majority of the scholars agreed that the 
illness must cause hardship and pain to the person if it is to permit his breaking of the 
fast.  However, people of the literal persuasion such as the Ẓāhirīs and the famed 324
traditionist al-Bukhārī argued that anything that is called an ‘illness’ in the language, no 
matter how trivial, allows the breaking of the fast. Al-Qurṭubī upheld this view in his 
jurisprudence-oriented Qur’ānic commentary, and attributed it to the prestigious scholar 
among the generation of the Successors, Ibn Sīrīn.  Ibn ʿArabī also upheld this view. 325
However, rather than simply stating that this was his opinion (madhhab) as he usually 
did, he said, ‘and this is also the opinion (madhhab) of Rabīʿa ibn Abī ʿAbd al-
Raḥmān.’  This is none other than the famed early proponent of raʾy in Medina, who 326
became known simply as Rabīʿat al-Raʾy: ‘Rabīʿa famed for considered opinion’ (d. c. 
136/753).  Although Ibn ʿArabī’s position here was a very literalist one and coincided 327
with the Ẓāhirī school, he chose instead to attribute the position to a proponent of the 
very opposite school of thought. He could have not ascribed it to a prior figure, for he 
usually only stated that such and such opinion existed, or he could have ascribed it to 
any of the illustrious predecessors who held this opinion before him. However, he chose 
to ascribe it to Rabīʿat al-Raʾy, and one wonders where he even came across Rabīʿa’s 
opinion on this issue.  Perhaps Ibn ʿArabī, since his methodology on this matter was 328
purely based on a literalist understanding of the text, wanted to once again distance 
 Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ, 2: 276.324
 Al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ, 2:276-7.325
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:613; al-Ghurāb, al-Fiqh, 313.326
 I took this translation of his title from Abd-Allah, Mālik, 9.327
 In this case, as with all other cases, it is very clear that Ibn ʿArabī used Ibn Rushd’s Bidāya for 328
presenting the different juristic issues and then the different opinions on each issue. I have stated in 
the previous chapter that he relied on the Bidāya in this way throughout his jurisprudential section of 
the Futūḥāt (Cf. Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, 2:57-9). However for this particular position Ibn Rushd did not 
ascribe it to any school or authority, neither Rabīʿa nor anyone else (Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, 2:59).
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himself from any perception that he might be a Ẓāhirī, and therefore chose to name 
Rabīʿa instead. 
4.1.2.3 Differences in Principles of Jurisprudence  
  
 None of those who attempted to show that Ibn ʿArabī created his own unique 
methodology or school of jurisprudence made a sustained or organised effort to 
compare the principles of Ibn ʿArabī with those of the Ẓāhirī school in general or the 
principles of Ibn Ḥazm in particular. Chodkiewicz,  Addas,  and Winkel  stressed 329 330 331
the fact that while the Ẓāhirī school rejected the use of qiyās categorically, Ibn ʿArabī 
did reject it, but at one and the same time accepted its use by others and criticised those 
who did not allow others to use it (e.g. the Ẓāhirīs). They likewise argued that Ibn 
ʿArabī’s methodology led to a lenient and merciful understanding of the law in which 
the sources of the law (the Qur’ān and Sunna) carried within their very texts multiple 
meanings that were all intended by God as different acceptable answers or options. 
Furthermore, because of the multiplicity of opinions among different schools, Ibn 
ʿArabī rejected the condition made by scholars that people were to be restricted to 
following only one school, and he instead allowed the layperson to pick and choose 
whatever opinions were more suitable or easier for him to practice from among the 
positions of the different schools. Finally, they said, Ibn ʿArabī rejected qiyās because it 
entailed a filling of the silences that God had left on purpose in the law as a mercy for 
His servants, and argued that whatever the law was silent on had the status of original 
licitness.  Beside the major difference regarding Ibn ʿArabī’s position on the 332
acceptability of qiyās, these authors did not seem to investigate what the Ẓāhirī school 
had to say on these same issues. 
 Chodkiewicz, Ocean, 54-7.329
 Addas, Voyage, 122-4.330
 Winkel, Living Law, 28-98.331
 More accurately his position is that there is no ruling, which in practical terms was as if they were 332
permissible (see Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:258).
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 To the arguments made by the three authors above, al-Ghurāb added a few more. 
First, he argued that while Ibn ʿArabī seemed to agree with the Ẓāhirīs in rejecting 
qiyās, it was only for one reason: to preserve the status of original licitness on 
everything not strictly mentioned, and to therefore preserve the leniency and ease of the 
law. Because this was the only reason, Ibn ʿArabī could at the same time accept the 
position of those who did use qiyās, and identified the legal excuse for their position.  333
Here al-Ghurāb was arguing that while Ibn ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirīs seemed to agree on 
the rejection of qiyās as a source of law, the reasons behind their agreement were in fact 
different. We will return to this useful insight when discussing Ibn ʿArabī’s position on 
qiyās in depth.  
 Al-Ghurāb further listed two more differences in juristic principles. First, that 
the Ẓāhirī school argued that if the narrators in the chain of a tradition were all 
trustworthy, then the report, even if it comes from a single authority (khabar al-wāḥid), 
gives certain knowledge, while Ibn ʿArabī, like the majority opinion, held that it only 
produced a likely probability (ẓann) but not certain knowledge.  Second, al-Ghurāb 334
believed that Ibn ʿArabī rejected literal meaning as being a weak evidence, while 
implying that the Ẓāhirīs believed it to be a strong evidence.  This second difference 335
that al-Ghurāb claimed is a misunderstanding of the word mafhūm, which al-Ghurāb 
thought referred to the literal meaning of a text, whereas Ibn ʿArabī was using it in its 
technical meaning in jurisprudence, the mafhūm al-khiṭāb. Ibn ʿArabī was in fact 
agreeing with the Ẓāhirī school on this issue which will be discussed below. Therefore, 
al-Ghurāb essentially added only one difference in principles between Ibn ʿArabī and 
the Ẓāhirīs, though it is an important one as we will see, and also pointed to the 
 Al-Ghurāb, ‘Ibn al-ʿArabī,’ 200; al-Fiqh, 8.333
 Al-Ghurāb, ‘Ibn al-ʿArabī,’ 200;  al-Fiqh, 8. On the levels of certainty attributed to the authenticity of 334
traditions by the traditionists, and the implications of this in jurisprudence, see Brown, ‘Did the 
Prophet Say It,’ 259-285.
 Al-Ghurāb, ‘Ibn al-ʿArabī,’ 200;  al-Fiqh, 8. Al-Ghurāb, in both works, gave a wrong reference for Ibn 335
ʿArabī’s statement on this issue in the Futūḥāt: it should be 2:149, not 4:289 as he wrote.
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importance of distinguishing between the reasons that both Ibn ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirīs 
rejected qiyās as a source of law.  
 Aron Zysow briefly discussed Ibn ʿArabī in his classic Ph.D. dissertation The 
Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory. As this 
work remained unpublished from 1984 until 2013, and was mostly of concern to 
students of uṣūl al-fiqh, it has not been noticed in Akbarī studies.  Zysow categorised 
the schools of law based on epistemological grounds, classifying them into two broad 
groups: those madhhabs, like the four surviving Sunni schools, that allowed for 
probability, and those, like the Ẓāhirīs and the Twelver Shīʿīs, who demanded certainty. 
Zysow used Ibn ʿArabī’s position on the  khabar al-wāḥid to show how he differed 
from the Ẓāhirīs. He noted that in their demand for certainty, those Ẓāhirīs like Dāwūd 
and Ibn Ḥazm who accepted the khabar al-wāḥid claimed that it was a source of certain 
knowledge. On the other hand, the Ẓāhirīs who rejected this claim, rejected the use of 
the khabar al-wāḥid altogether.  Zysow concluded that Ibn ʿArabī had a ‘very 336
personal legal theory’ which was ‘only a part of an all-encompassing mystical 
system,’  but did not attempt to investigate it much further.  However, his approach 337 338
points the way to the key to understanding Ibn ʿArabī’s  legal system, which is to search 
for an underlying reason that may explain all the differences between Ibn ʿArabī’s 
principles of jurisprudence and those of the Ẓāhirī school. Therefore we cannot proceed 
without first investigating properly the main principles of jurisprudence in the Ẓāhirī 
school, something that previous Akbarī studies have not done, in order to compare that 
school’s principles to those of Ibn ʿArabī. 
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 280-1.336
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 281.337
 Zysow did also point out some of the other differences mentioned above. His brief treatment of the 338
subject, though only a small part of his epilogue, surpasses that of the other scholars mentioned (see 
Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 280-2).
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4.1.3 The Principles of the Ẓāhirī School of Law 
 In his study titled The History and the Doctrine of the Ẓāhirī Maddhab, Amr 
Osman showed that in the 4th/10th century, the Ẓāhirī school was often referred to as 
the Dāwūdī madhhab, and more followers of that school were given the nisba al-
Dāwūdī rather than al-Ẓāhirī. The latter term gradually became more popular until it 
came to dominate after Ibn Ḥazm.  Even still, Dāwūd himself seems to have been 339
known as al-Ẓāhirī from the middle of the fourth century,  and his group were 340
identified as the ahl al-ẓāhir.  However, there has been a great misunderstanding 341
about the meaning of their principle of following the ẓāhir, and a long line of 
contemporary scholars have made the assumption that it meant being ‘literalist’ without 
proper investigation into the origins of the name.  342
 In his study, Osman was able to clearly show that ẓāhir did not mean ‘literal,’ 
and that such a translation for the word is completely unacceptable. He advocated 
instead the term ‘textual.’  He also showed that the word ẓāhir was not used in legal or 343
exegetical works to mean ‘literal’ in the 3rd/9th century in which Dāwūd lived.  344
Osman attempted, unconvincingly, to argue that in al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla, the word ẓāhir 
referred to the general or unrestricted (ʿāmm) application of a term, as opposed to a 
limiting of the scope of a term (takhṣīṣ) based on external evidence.  He then 345
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 70, 87, 104.339
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 23.340
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 102.341
 See Osman, History and Doctrine, 226.342
 See Osman, History and Doctrine, 8, 226-7. ‘Literal meaning’ itself could have different definitions 343
according to different scholars, linguists, or philosophers. In Islam and Literalism, Gleave devotes a 
chapter to investigating what literal meaning meant for Ibn Ḥazm (146-174).
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 163-95.344
 Gleave also analysed al-Shāfiʿī’s use of the term ẓāhir in Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 94-112. He was 345
also unconvinced of Osman’s equation of the terms ẓāhir and ʿāmm (Ibid, 101, n. 18).
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attempted to say that this was the most likely meaning of the word ẓāhir for Dāwūd 
himself.  Robert Gleave, in Islam and Literalism, expressed his doubts about Osman’s 346
argument for a ʿāmm: ẓāhir relationship being ‘one of identity, or even close 
proximity.’  He proposed instead that Dāwūd ‘quite likely’ intended by the term ẓāhir 347
the ‘apparent, first blush meaning informed by “normal” Arabic usage.’  348
 There is another explanation for the word ẓāhir in the context of the ahl al-ẓāhir 
of the 3rd/9th century, which incorporates Osman’s explanation as part of a bigger 
understanding. This explanation was summed up by Osman himself when presenting the 
main ideas of the early Ẓāhirīs: 
Adhering to what a text says seems to be the pillar of the madhhab here, and this 
adherence requires that we do not draw conclusions about anything a legal 
statement does not explicitly refer to (which leads to the rejection of both qiyās 
and dalīl al-khiṭāb), and that we take terms, commands, and prohibitions to 
indicate unrestrictedness and obligation.  349
This summary of the main ‘pillar’ of the Ẓāhirī school seems to me the most likely 
explanation of the term Ẓāhirī itself. It refers to what could be taken from the text 
directly and which is not arrived at by way of analysis as with meanings alluded to, or 
inferred from, the text (dalīl al-khiṭāb). As Osman wrote, ‘Ibn Ḥazm declares that all the 
Ẓāhirī scholars held that every statement tells us only what it says and does not indicate 
anything beyond that. It may be for this reason that all Ẓahirīs agreed on the rejection of 
dalīl al-khiṭāb.’  The main types of textual inference are mafhūm al-muwāfaqa (the a 350
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 163-95.346
 Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 148, n.13.347
 Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 147, n. 7.348
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 100.349
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 98.350
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fortiori argument) and mafhūm al-mukhālafa (the a contrario argument).  As for the 351
mafhūm al-muwāfaqa argument, the majority of jurists classify it as a type of non-
analogical qiyās,  while the mafhūm al-mukhālafa could be seen as the opposite of 352
qiyās. Zysow quoted the modern German jurist Paul Oertman, 
Legal science has at all times provided two opposite tendencies for establishing 
new rules: analogy and the argument a contrario…it is always possible to reason 
both ways, that is to say, either since a and b are expressly regulated by the law, 
but c is not, the law does not wish c to be treated in the same manner as a and b; 
or to say, since the law has regulated a and b in a definite manner, one may 
conclude that it intended the similar case c to be handled in the same manner.  353
 The main types of dalīl al-khiṭāb then, were either classified by the majority of 
jurists as a type of qiyās, or understood to compete with qiyās. The rejection of qiyās is 
one of the main pillars of Ẓāhirī thought, if not the main one. Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī was also 
known, paradoxically, as Dāwūd al-Qiyāsī because of the extent to which he engaged in 
debates against qiyās.  As Osman observed, ‘Rejection of qiyās was presented by 354
many medieval and modern scholars as the main doctrine of Ẓāhirism.’  For Ibn 355
Ḥazm, both qiyās and taqlīd were to be ‘unconditionally and categorically rejected by 
 On this see Hallaq, History, 58; Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 53-5.351
 Hallaq, History, 96-9; ‘Non-Analogical Arguments,’ 289-296. The mafhūm al-muwāfaqa was considered a 352
type of qiyās jalī (perspicuous qiyās). See Ibid. Some scholars thought that Dāwūd accepted perspicuous 
qiyās, but Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī who had access to one of Dāwūd’s own treatises, found in it that Dāwūd in 
fact rejected all kinds of qiyās (al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 2:290; Osman, History and Doctrine, 20).
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 103. Zysow thus explained the Ḥanafī rejection of the mafhūm al-353
mukhālafa as stemming from their attachment to analogy (ibid.). For an explanation of mafhūm al-
mukhālafa see Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 100-1.
 Adang, ‘Beginnings,’ 118.354
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 104.355
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any scholar who [was] to qualify as Ẓāhirī.’  According to Ibn al-Nadīm, Dāwūd 356
wrote a work dedicated to the rejection of qiyās entitled Ibṭāl al-qiyās, and likewise a 
work entitled Kitāb al-khuṣūṣ wa-l-ʿumūm on the issue of taking terms according to 
their general and unrestricted meaning.  This theme was discussed by Dāwūd’s son 357
Muḥammad in his own manual of jurisprudence.  According to Ibn Ḥazm, all Ẓāhirīs 358
are in agreement that ‘every term is to be interpreted in its widest extent unless it is 
restricted by a valid indicator (dalīl),’  and that commands and prohibitions are 359
likewise to be understood as obligation that demands immediate fulfilment.   360
 From all of the evidence above, it seems that the terms ‘Ẓāhirī’ and ahl al-ẓāhir 
referred to the insistence of Dāwūd and his followers on stopping at the meanings that 
texts stated, and to not understand them figuratively either by restricting the usage of a 
term without an evidence for doing so, nor taking an imperative statement to be 
anything other than an obligation. Ẓāhir is what is stated in the text, and does not need 
any kind of inference.  Therefore, if the word ẓāhir as used by the early Ẓāhirīs were to 
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 99.356
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 22.357
 Stewart, ‘Muḥammad ibn Dāʾūd,’ 127.358
 The words quoted are those of Osman in History and Doctrine, 410. According to the majority (Shāfiʿīs, 359
Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs), the application of general terms to everything included in them is only 
speculative, due to the possibility of the existence of a specifier, or the possibility of taʾwīl. The Ḥanafīs 
on the other hand, like the Ẓāhirīs, consider its application definitive (Kamali, Principles, 148; Abū Zahra, 
Ibn Ḥazm, 295; Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 94).
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 97-8, 100; Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 173. Many Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs and 360
Shāfiʿīs held a position of hesitation on whether the primary meaning of the imperative form signifies 
obligation, recommendation, or permission. That is, they required external evidence to support one of 
the possible meanings. The Ḥanbalīs as well as many jurists and theologians from other schools argued 
for obligation (Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 64).  Furthermore, Abū Zahra noted that although a great 
number of jurists share the basic Ẓāhirī view, they accept a wider range of indicators that could change 
the interpretation of the commands and prohibitions to the realm of recommendation or permissibility. 
The Ẓāhirīs on the other hand only accept evidence from revealed texts or a consensus of the 
Companions. Therefore in principle the Ẓāhirīs appear to be in agreement with a great number of 
jurists from different schools, but a big difference appears in the positive law, where many more textual 
commands are considered to mean obligation, which other schools understand to be recommendations 
(see Abū Zahra, Ibn Ḥazm, 296-302).
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be explained by another term, I propose that it is what Shāfiʿī jurists (and those who 
followed them) came to term the manṭūq: that which is expressed, rather than the 
mafhūm, that which is inferred.  That is, the ẓāhir is in the texts, it can be pointed at 361
and seen with the eye (and hence it is ẓāhir, apparent). The reason why this would have 
been a very likely point of constant debate is because inferred meanings were seen as 
another type of qiyās, or at least something very similar to qiyās, that needed to equally 
be rejected and debated (thus Dāwūd’s appellation as al-Ẓāhirī and al-Qiyāsī). 
Ultimately, because this meaning of Ẓāhirī would have included the rejection of qiyās 
within it, it was the name that was used more. This simple explanation encompasses the 
meaning that Osman attempted to equate to ẓāhir (the ʿāmm) with Dāwūd’s insistence 
that commands meant obligation and his rejection of dalīl al-khiṭāb as well as qiyās.  
 Now that we have dealt with the main pillars of Ẓāhirī thought, we will clarify 
the principles of the school further by listing its main principles. Even within the school 
there are differences of opinion on certain principles.  Osman searched through Ibn 362
Ḥazm’s al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām for all the principles of jurisprudence which Ibn 
Ḥazm stated that all Ẓāhirīs are agreed upon, to which I will add one more. These will 
be useful for making a quick comparison with Ibn ʿArabī in order to ascertain the extent 
to which he matched this criteria made by Ibn Ḥazm, whose works were the source of 
Ẓāhirī influence on Ibn ʿArabī. These principles are:  363
1) The rejection of taqlīd. Ibn ʿArabī agreed with this.  364
 The manṭūq is defined as ‘that which a vocable indicates at the point of expression,’ and its opposite, 361
that which is not expressed at the point of expression, is the mafhūm. (See Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 
53, quoting Ibn al-Ḥājib; al-Subkī, Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ, 22; Kamali, Principles, 177-9).
 Osman found that Ibn Ḥazm criticised other Ẓāhirī scholars on some of their positions with regards 362
to the principles of jurisprudence, but never criticised Dāwūd himself (see Osman, History and Doctrine, 
95).
 They are listed, though not in the same order, in Osman, History and Doctrine, 97-9.363
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:373; 2:165. Also in his Qur’ānic commentary Ījāz al-bayān when discussing verse 364
2:170, as quoted by al-Ghurāb in al-Fiqh, 66-7.
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2) Legal texts are the only sound basis of legal rulings. Ibn ʿArabī agreed.  365
3) The rejection of qiyās. Ibn ʿArabī agreed on this, but also allowed others to use it 
which is completely unacceptable to Ẓāhirīs. This will be dealt with in more depth 
below. 
4) The rejection of dalīl al-khiṭāb and the insistence that statements only meant what 
they stated without the use of any inference. Ibn ʿArabī agreed, but his position was 
not as strong and categorical as the Ẓāhirīs, stating that argument based on the 
mafhūm (implied or inferred meaning) of a text is a weak evidence because it is not 
right in every case.  366
5) Terms are to be interpreted according to their general and unrestricted meaning 
unless there is evidence otherwise. Ibn ʿArabī seems to have agreed with this.  367
6) Commands and prohibitions indicate absolute obligation (wujūb) unless a revealed 
text or consensus stated otherwise. Ibn ʿArabī agreed.  368
7) Prophetic actions are not obligatory, only statements of command indicate 
obligation. Ibn ʿArabī agreed.  369
8) The only acceptable consensus is that of the Companions. Ibn ʿArabī agreed.  370
9) No divine prescription is tied to any ratio legis in any way. Ibn Hazm declared that 
Dāwūd and all of his followers believe this, while some other rejectors of analogy do 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2: 162.365
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:149. The word mafhūm literally means ‘what is understood’ from a text. In its 366
technical meaning in jurisprudence, however, it means linguistic implication or textual inference as 
discussed above. Al-Ghurāb understood the word mafhūm in this passage by its literal, non-technical 
meaning ‘what is understood’ and equated that to ‘literal meaning.’ He said that according to Ibn ʿArabī, 
‘consideration of the only the literal meaning (mafhūm) as evidence (dalāla) is weak, for it cannot 
reliably be true in every case’ (Al-Ghurāb, ‘Ibn al-ʿArabī,’ 200). Al-Ghurāb therefore used this statement 
of Ibn ʿArabī as evidence that he was not a Ẓāhirī when in fact the passage, to the contrary, shows that 
Ibn ʿArabī agreed with the Ẓāhirīs on this issue.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:164. See above, p. 108 n. 357.367
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:164. See above, p. 108 n. 358.368
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2: 165.369
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2: 162.370
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not.  We have already seen that al-Tirmidhī was of those rejectors of analogy who 371
did believe that each divine prescription had a ratio legis and dedicated books to 
explaining the ratios of divine acts of worship. Ibn ʿArabī affirmed the existence of 
ratios for divine prescriptions and his position was closer to that of al-Tirmidhī than 
the Ẓāhirīs. He would therefore be excluded from the followers of Dāwūd by Ibn 
Ḥazm’s criterion.  
 Another principle of central importance to Ibn Ḥazm and Dāwūd is the status of 
a khabar al-wāḥid (a tradition transmitted by single authorities).  Acting upon the 372
import of such traditions is agreed upon by the vast majority of Muslim jurists. Only in 
the early centuries of Islam were there some, mostly Muʿtazilīs, who rejected acting 
upon them.  Dāwūd is reported to have vehemently debated a scholar who rejected 373
acting upon these traditions in Baghdad, and the people in the mosque supported Dāwūd 
and pelted his opponent with stones.  However, it seems that Dāwūd stood out from 374
the majority of the scholars in arguing that such traditions, as long as their narrators 
were all trustworthy, were not only good enough as a basis for action, but were sources 
of certain knowledge.  According to the list by Ibn al-Nadīm, Dāwūd wrote two works 375
on this subject: Kitāb al-khabar al-wāḥid and Kitāb al-khabar al-mūjib lil-ʿilm (a 
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 9: 76-7. This important principle was not listed by Osman. Principles 2-6 and 9 371
would constitute the ‘ẓāhirism’ of the school.
 In reality the khabar al-wāḥid (plural akhbār al-āḥād), are reports that are not mutawātir, even if 372
transmitted by multiple authorities (on these terms see Lucas, ‘Legal Principles,’ 293, n. 12).
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 25-6, 31.373
 Al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir, 1:111.374
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 29-30. Ibn Ḥazm attributed this position to Dāwūd and two of his 375
contemporaries: al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857) and al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī al-Karābīsī (d. 245/859) (Ibn 
Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 1:119). It is worth noting that all of these figures were closely connected. Al-Muḥāsibī 
was a teacher of al-Junayd who was, like Dāwūd, a close student of Abū Thawr. Al-Junayd himself is 
counted among Dāwūd’s teachers (Osman, History and Doctrine, 29-30). Al-Karābīsī was a very close 
associate of Abū Thawr and may have also been a teacher of Dāwūd (Osman, History and Doctrine, 32-4). 
Ibn Ḥazm also noted that one scholar ascribed this view to Mālik ibn Anas as well (Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 
1:119).
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treatise on the traditions that provide certain knowledge).  This was also the position 376
of Ibn Ḥazm.  377
 On this issue of the khabar al-wāḥid, which distinguished Dāwūd and Ibn Ḥazm 
from the majority of jurists, Ibn ʿArabī disagreed with them. Like the majority, Ibn 
ʿArabī accepted such traditions as a basis for action but not of certain knowledge.  It 378
is interesting that there was an early group of Ẓāhirīs influenced by Muʿtazilī thought 
who rejected the use of the khabar al-wāḥid completely, despite Dāwūd’s position.  As 379
Zysow noted, the Ẓāhirīs, because of their insistence on certainty, either accepted the 
use of the khabar al-wāḥid and held that it provided certain knowledge, or rejected its 
use because they denied that it provided certain knowledge. Ibn ʿArabī acted upon them 
while accepting that they did not provide certain knowledge, which made him different 
from both groups of Ẓāhirīs.   380
 This disagreement led to another difference in methodology. For Ibn Ḥazm, if 
there seemed to be a contradiction between an authentic khabar al-wāḥid and the 
Qurʾān, both remained equal and a way had to be found to reconcile the two.  For Ibn 381
ʿArabī on the other hand, the tradition is dropped because it only gave ẓann (a strong 
likelihood of truth) whereas the Qurʾānic verse gave certain knowledge.  382
 Osman, History and Doctrine, 22; Stewart, ‘Muḥammad ibn Dāʾūd,’ 132.376
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 1:119. Abū Zahra understood from Ibn Ḥazm that he believed the khabar al-wāḥid 377
produced certain but not immediate knowledge, unlike the mutawātir tradition which produced 
immediate knowledge (Abū Zahra, Ibn Ḥazm, 262).
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:162-4. 378
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 30-31. As Zysow noted, Ibn Ḥazm avoided mentioning this group of 379
Ẓāhirīs (see Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 31; Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 1:113-4). However, Ibn Ḥazm’s 
knowledge of this group would explain why he did not claim the universal agreement of the ahl al-ẓāhir 
on this issue, despite its centrality to his and Dāwūd’s systems. 
 Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 30-31, 280-1.380
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 1:72; al-Iḥkām, 2:21.381
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:163.382
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 With regards to a scenario where two texts of equal strength (such as two 
Qurʾānic verses or two authentic traditions),  both Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Ḥazm agreed on 383
a number of ways to attempt to reconcile and use both pieces of evidence. However, 
they disagreed on the very last resort when all other attempts to reconcile the two have 
failed and only one text was to be chosen. For Ibn Ḥazm, the final solution was to act 
upon the evidence that went against the original state of things. For example, if there 
was a tradition against drinking while standing and another stating that the Prophet 
drank while standing, one knows that the original state of things is that there was no 
prohibition on drinking while standing. It becomes certain therefore that the tradition 
prohibiting drinking while standing was introduced by the Lawgiver. What is not certain 
is whether this addition was later abrogated and the original status brought back to 
normal. To be on the safe side, Ibn Ḥazm argued that one must follow the certain 
knowledge which is arrived at by going contrary to the original state of things. Another 
example he gave was the contradictory reports regarding a man’s need for ablutions 
upon touching his genitalia. Ibn Ḥazm argued that the original state of things was that 
humans did not perform a ritual ablution upon touching their private parts, therefore the 
one thing we can be certain of is that the instruction to do so was added by the 
Lawgiver. If we have no information about which tradition was acted upon first, then 
we cannot prove that things returned to their original status, and we must act upon the 
certain knowledge provided by the tradition that went contrary to the original nature.  384
Ibn ʿArabī’s solution was radically different: in such cases, it is the easiest option that 
should be acted upon, because it is supported by a host of Qurʾānic verses and prophetic 
traditions about the ease of the Islamic religion and God’s wish for ease for His 
servants, not hardship. If both options are easy, that means that the believer has a choice 
in the matter, and could act upon whichever of the two verses or traditions that he 
 Or in the case of Ibn Ḥazm, even a Qurʾānic verse vs. an authentic prophetic tradition.383
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 2:30-3.384
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wished.  Therefore, contrary to Ibn Ḥazm, Ibn ʿArabī chose the opinion that a man’s 385
touching of his genitalia did not necessitate a new ablution.   386
 We have seen that Ibn ʿArabī agreed with the Ẓāhirī school on the vast majority 
of their core principles, those principles upon which all Ẓāhirī scholars were in 
agreement according to Ibn Ḥazm. However, he disagreed with them on the role and 
status of traditions that were narrated on the authority of single transmitters. While Ibn 
Ḥazm did not state that all Ẓāhirīs agreed on this issue, this issue was nonetheless of 
major importance to both Dāwūd and Ibn Ḥazm and set them apart from other scholars. 
More significantly still, one of the main two pillars of Ẓāhirism was the categorical 
rejection of qiyās, and while Ibn ʿArabī agreed with them in rejecting it, he at the same 
time allowed its use by others and criticised the Ẓāhirīs for attacking those who used it. 
This is a major difference that would almost definitely disqualify Ibn ʿArabī from being 
considered a Ẓāhirī by Ibn Ḥazm and Dāwūd. This unique position will be explained in 
detail below. 
 Perhaps a more significant difference between Ibn ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirīs is the 
reason behind their choice of principles. As Zysow, Osman, Gleave, and others showed 
in their studies, the basis for the principles adopted by the Ẓāhirīs was the desire to 
remove all probability in the formulation of the law. Their insistence that all general 
words are to be taken as unrestricted, that all commands are obligatory, that nothing is 
inferred from the text that is not clearly stated, their insistence that an authentic 
prophetic tradition gave certain and not probable knowledge, and their rules on 
linguistic interpretation, were all because they believed that the law had no place for 
probability.  Ibn ʿArabī was not concerned as much with certainty as the Ẓāhirīs were. 387
We saw this with his belief on the khabar al-wāḥid, and we saw how in the case of 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:163.385
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:355.386
 See Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 2-3; Osman, History and Doctrine, 197-8, 224-5. For Ibn Ḥazm’s Ẓāhirī 387
methodology of linguistic interpretation see Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 172-3. For Ibn Ḥazm’s Ẓāhirī 
methodology of ḥadīth acceptance see Abū Zahra, Ibn Ḥazm, 258-269; Sabra, ‘Ibn Ḥazm’s Ẓāhirism,’ Part 
1, 14-15.
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contrary reports he did not look for absolute certainty like Ibn Ḥazm but argued that the 
easier option was to be chosen as a last resort, and if both were equally easy, that one 
had free choice between different options. Though, like the Ẓāhirīs, he also believed 
that ultimately there was only one answer that was true in the sight of God, he also held 
that God himself gave a stamp of approval to the different answers arrived at by 
different scholars based on their efforts and exertion, and he did not demand that only 
one answer be given. Perhaps that is because for Ibn ʿArabī, like al-Tirmidhī before 
him, certainty was only achievable by way of divine inspiration and spiritual visions. 
This all shows that while Ibn ʿArabī shared with the Ẓāhirī school their main principles, 
he did not share with them the reason for which they adopted their principles, and 
therefore his entire legal philosophy and understanding was different to theirs. His 
acceptance of a multiplicity of acceptable opinions, and of the use of qiyās by those who 
believed in it, would have been anathema to the Ẓāhirīs. It is therefore necessary to go 
beneath the outward similarities and examine the roots of Ibn ʿArabī’s choice of 
principles and his understanding of the law, and this is what we now come to. 
4.2 Ibn ʿArabī’s Principles of Jurisprudence 
 We have shown that Ibn ʿArabī agreed with Ibn Ḥazm and the Ẓāhirīs on the 
main principles of jurisprudence, that is: the acceptable sources and methodology for 
ijtihād. However, Ibn ʿArabī differed with Ibn Ḥazm even on the things with which he 
agreed with him, meaning that he might have agreed with him on the rejection of qiyās, 
for example, but not on the reason why it was to be rejected, or the extent to which it 
may be rejected. He likewise may have agreed with him on following the ẓāhir of the 
Qurʾān and Sunna, and yet he had a different reason and methodology to that of Ibn 
Ḥazm for doing so, leading to radically different results, as we will show. 
 115
4.2.1 His Position on Ijtihād and Analogical Reasoning 
 We will now examine Ibn ʿArabī’s position on ijtihād in general, before coming 
to his view on qiyās in particular. The Prophet Muḥammad is reported to have said, 
‘When a judge exercises ijtihād and gives a right judgement, he will have two rewards, 
but if he errs in his judgement, he will still have earned one reward.’  We will look at 388
Ibn ʿArabī’s position regarding two key matters related to this tradition: First, is every 
mujtahid correct or not, and second, what does the process of ijtihād entail? 
  According to the vast majority of jurists, this tradition indicates that there is one 
correct answer in the sight of God, and that all others are wrong, but that the mujtahid is 
rewarded for his effort even if he is mistaken. However, many theologians among the 
Ashʿarī school like al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935) himself, al-Bāqillānī (d. 402/1013) and al-
Ghazālī, as well as some prominent Muʿtazilīs, held that every mujtahid is correct.  389
They based this view on the idea that there is not one correct answer in the sight of God 
before the process of ijtihād, and that after the process of ijtihād, every result becomes a 
correct answer.  Ibn ʿArabī believed that there was ultimately only one correct answer 390
in the sight of God. However, since God Himself allowed ijtihād as the tradition states, 
then that meant that He gave His stamp of approval (iqrār) to its results, whether they 
be right or wrong. Therefore the end result of one’s ijtihād is correct because it happens 
to arrive at God’s particular judgement on the matter, or it is correct because God has 
approved it. This judgement is protected by the principles (uṣūl) and rules (qawāʿid) of 
 Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, 3:1019.388
 On infallibilism see Zysow, ‘Ḥanafī,’ 239-247; Economy of Certainty, 262-78; Kamali, Principles, 486-489. 389
Zysow noted that ‘The Sufi work al-Taʿarruf li-madhhab ahl al-taṣawwuf  of Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī (d. c. 
380/990) would appear to endorse infallibilim,’ but that, because he claimed Sufis nonetheless followed 
the ‘more cautious and conservative course’ in any matter of scholarly dispute, his position is ‘not 
easily reconciled with true infallibilism.’ (Zysow, ‘Ḥanafī,’ 241 n. 23; al-Kalābādhī, al-Taʿarruf, 84). Al-
Kalābādhī’s words also indicate that he did not believe in adherence to a single school of law.
Al-Luh, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 465-469.390
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the Sharīʿa and it is widely accepted that rulers may not annul it.  That is why, Ibn 391
ʿArabī says, ‘the scholars have said that every mujtahid is correct.’ In his understanding, 
this statement meant that the mujtahid ‘either arrived at the actual divine judgement on 
the matter, or arrived at the judgement which God approved and established for him if 
he could not find the divinely chosen judgement and missed it.’  392
 The second question we come to now is what the word ijtihād meant to Ibn 
ʿArabī and what it entailed as a process. The majority of Sunni scholars advocated the 
use of ijtihād, or the expenditure of effort, in finding value judgments for actions not 
mentioned in the divinely revealed sources. They used as evidence the tradition of 
Muʿādh ibn Jabal, the Companion who was sent to Yemen, where he stated that if he did 
not find the answer to a problem he was adjudicating in the teachings of the Qurʾān or 
the Prophet, he would use his ijtihād to find an answer. The Prophet is stated to have 
been pleased with this answer. Although the chain for this tradition is broken, it was 
widely accepted by Sunni scholars as proof of ijtihād in general and qiyās in 
particular.  Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, his son Muḥammad and their followers, however, 393
rejected this tradition because of the fault with its chain of transmission. They also 
argued that even if the tradition were to be sound, ijtihād would have meant to exert 
more effort into finding the answer in the revealed sources.  Ibn Ḥazm would later 394
repeat the same arguments in his writings and expand upon them.  The Ẓāhirīs 395
redefined ijtihād therefore to mean the expenditure of effort into finding the answer for 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:169. The reason that scholars did not allow the result of a judge’s ijtihād to be 391
annulled is not because it is always correct, but because this could lead to an endless series of 
annulments on a single issue, leading to confusion and mistrust of judge’s rulings. See al-Luh, Uṣūl al-
fiqh, 468.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:165.392
 See Kamali, Principles, 288, 474.393
 Stewart, ‘Muḥammad ibn Dāʾūd,’ 155.394
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 6:35.395
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any problem in the revealed sources,  not the expenditure of effort into finding an 396
answer using tools such as qiyās. Ibn ʿArabī, approved of both interpretations of the 
word ijtihād while giving preference to the Ẓāhirī one. He did this by applying the 
principle of God’s approval of a person’s ijtihād not only to positive law, but also to the 
principles of jurisprudence themselves. In other words, the very principles of 
jurisprudence are arrived at by way of ijtihād, and therefore God has given His approval 
for any set of juristic principles arrived at by man, such as the acceptance or rejection of 
qiyās for example. He wrote,  
[The Prophet] did not single out the corollaries in ijtihād and leave out the 
principles. Rather, he spoke in general terms. Therefore those who hold that he 
meant only the corollaries and not the principles, that is a result of their own 
ijtihād, and likewise is the case for those who hold that the expression was 
general. Both will be rewarded for their ijtihād.  397
Here we see Ibn ʿArabī taking the position that the judgement on ijtihād is the same for 
both principles and corollaries, and combining it with the position that all results of 
ijtihād are acceptable, to arrive at the conclusion that all positions on principles of 
jurisprudence arrived at by way of ijtihād are correct. By holding this position, Ibn 
ʿArabī could approve of both interpretations of the word ijtihād, and therefore approve 
at one and the same time of the methodologies of those who approved of qiyās and 
those he did not. Ibn ʿArabī himself gave preference to the Ẓāhirī position, but by 
adopting this stance on ijtihād with regard to principles of jurisprudence, he gave 
himself a position above that of the Ẓāhirīs and their detractors. Therefore while his 
own methodology was very similar to that of the Ẓāhirīs, it would not be correct to 
 As for Consensus, it is not seen as something outside these two sources because it is taken to be an 396
indication of an existence of a Sunna that was known to all the Companions and yet did not reach the 
later generations by way of narration.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:477.397
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classify him as a Ẓāhirī because he also approved of a position completely at odds with 
that of the Ẓāhirī school. 
 Ibn ʿArabī agreed with the Ẓāhirīs that ijtihād was not to create new law but to 
seek the evidence from the Qurʾān, Sunna, Consensus, or an understanding of the texts 
acceptable to the language of the Arabs that gives a ruling on a matter. He argued that 
there is nothing for which there is no answer in the Qurʾān and Sunna, for the religion 
has been perfected as the Qurʾān stated in 5:3, and perfection does not accept any 
increase.  At the same time, he argued that for those who could not find the answer to 398
everything in the revealed sources, it was acceptable for them to use analogy. This is 
because analogy is a type of speculative thought or rational inquiry (naẓar ʿaqlī), and 
many verses of the Qurʾān commanded the listeners to use rational inquiry to establish 
first His existence, second His oneness, and third the truthfulness of His Messenger. If 
these very cornerstones of the religion are established and strengthened by way of 
rational inquiry, then how could it not be acceptable in the case of something 
comparatively minor to this, such as an individual point of law. Therefore it is rational 
inquiry itself which proves analogical reasoning to be a source of law in times of 
necessity, in which a matter on which the law remained silent is compared with another 
which was addressed by the sources. This is because of a ratio legis that both matters 
share, which is likely to have been the intent of the Lawgiver.  He concluded, 399
According to me, whoever says that those who approve of analogical reasoning 
are wrong, or says that a mujtahid is wrong, whether in a particular corollary or a 
principle, has shown bad manners with the Lawgiver. This is because the 
Lawgiver has approved of his judgment, and the Lawgiver does not approve of 
falsehood, so it must be truth. Therefore the only error ascribed to [the one who 
accepts analogical reasoning] is in not finding the evidence that his opponents 
hold for not accepting it. Therefore even if it was wrong in and of itself, the 
Lawgiver made it an act of worship for him (because his ijtihād led him to accept 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3: 69, 502. Here we see Ibn ʿArabī accepting any understanding of the text that is 398
approved by the language of the Arabs as proof, a principle which we will address below.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:163.399
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it as a source of law), and the Lawgiver may choose whatever He wishes as a way 
of being worshipped by His servants (i.e. even acting upon something wrong like 
analogical reasoning). This is a way which is uniquely ours, as far as we know. 
We reject analogical reasoning for ourselves but approve of it for those whose 
ijtihād led them to accept it, because the Lawgiver established it (i.e. the result of 
his ijtihād). Therefore if he who opposes it  was fair he would remain quiet and 400
not argue on this matter, for it is too obvious to be argued about.  401
 Ibn ʿArabī argued that God, out of His mercy, kept all actions originally 
judgement-free, and only revealed judgments based on a core of necessary instructions, 
and based on what people asked about. The Prophet therefore many times warned his 
followers about asking too many questions, fearing that new instructions might be 
revealed due to their curiosity that they would then not be able to act upon.  Just as the 402
Prophet disliked (kariha) being asked questions, likewise God - and His Messenger’s - 
ruling on the creation of new laws is that it is makrūh (disliked); this is because it leads 
to an increase in legal obligations. When something is disliked in the law, that means 
that one will not be punished for doing it as with something impermissible (ḥarām), and 
yet those who avoid it will be rewarded for doing so.  For Ibn ʿArabī, therefore, 403
abstaining from the use of analogy is rewarded by God. On the other hand, those who 
believe in using it will still be rewarded for their efforts and for their use of analogy, 
especially if they based their analogy on a clear ratio legis that was most likely sought 
by the Lawgiver.  The use of ijtihād to make new laws, then, though it is makrūh, 404
becomes at the same time an act of worship that is rewarded, whether the results are 
correct or erroneous! Those who err receive one reward and those who are correct 
 I.e. analogical reasoning. However it is possible that Ibn ʿArabī means here he who disagrees with his 400
own position.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:163.401
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:164-5.402
 See the section by Kamali, Principles, 424-8.403
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:165.404
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receive double. God, as the Lawgiver, can make an act of worship for His servants out 
of anything that He wishes, even something that is makrūh, and He did so with ijtihād 
and the use of analogy.  
 Ibn ʿArabī found a parallel for this position in religious vows (nadhr), where one 
may make a vow such as ‘If God gives me such and such then I will do such and such 
act of worship or charity.’ According to Ibn ʿArabī, the Prophet disliked these vows 
because they are an additional obligation that mankind are adding to themselves, but at 
the same time made the fulfilment of these vows an obligation, which means that 
fulfilling them is rewarded and not fulfilling them is blameworthy and punishable.  405
For Ibn ʿArabī, then, the use of analogy in ijtihād leads to the earning of reward, but not 
as much as the reward of abstaining from it altogether.  At the very same time, Ibn 406
ʿArabī saw in God’s approval of men’s additions to the law a great honour. This 
seemingly contradictory position will now be explained. 
 The act of ijtihād for Ibn ʿArabī is a great honour that God bestowed upon the 
nation of Muḥammad, for lawgiving is originally an act of the prophets and messengers. 
In allowing the men of Muḥammad’s community to do ijtihād, God was in fact giving 
them a share of the role of prophethood - without calling it thus. In effect then, those 
who do ijtihād are like the prophets but they cannot be called prophets, and in any case 
it is known that the lawgiving of the prophets was not based on ijtihād. The fact 
remains, however, that mujtahids are in a sense acting like prophets when they make 
new laws. The mujtahids are the heirs of the messengers in lawgiving, and the evidences 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:230.405
 ‘Your reward in abstaining from establishing a new sunna is far greater than the reward that you 406
would get for establishing a new sunna (including the reward of all those who act upon it until the Day 
of Judgement), for the Prophet - peace and blessings be upon him - disliked the increase of obligations 
upon his nation. He disliked for them to ask too many questions out of fear that something would be 
revealed about it that they would not be able to bear, and whoever establishes a new sunna establishes 
a new obligation. The Prophet would have been the most suitable to establish that, but he left it to 
make things easier. That is why we say: following the Prophet in abstaining (from the establishing of a 
new sunna) is greater in reward than in making one.’ (Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:457). See also Futūḥāt, 1:696 
and 2:188.
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that they gather take the place of the revelation that came down upon the prophets, and 
the differences in rulings of different mujtahids is similar to the differences in laws 
between different prophets; however that does not equate them in any other way to the 
prophets and messengers.  Furthermore, every mujtahid is correct just as every 407
prophet is maʿṣūm (protected from error).  This is an honour that God gave this 408
community so that its scholars can be raised on the Day of Resurrection in the ranks of 
the prophets and messengers, not in the ranks of other nations, with no one ahead of 
them except the Prophet Muḥammad himself.  The Prophet had said, ‘The scholars are 409
the inheritors of the prophets’ and had also said, ‘Whoever establishes a good practice 
(sunna ḥasana) will have its reward and the reward of those who act upon it.’ The 
Prophet, therefore, had given his stamp of approval on the injunctions that result from 
the scholars’ ijtihād and istiḥsān (what they deem to be good), meaning that every 
ijtihād is correct.  We see here how Ibn ʿArabī linked the type of ijtihād known as 410
istiḥsān with the tradition about establishing new practices. Ibn ʿArabī therefore called 
the judgements in the revealed sources nubuwwa aṣliyya (original prophecy), and the 
judgements added by scholars by way of ijtihād, nubuwwa firʿiyya (derivative 
prophecy). This is presumably because it was God who allowed scholars to bring new 
laws like the Prophets, and because these laws were derived from the original laws 
brought by the Prophets and built upon them. However, having said this, Ibn ʿArabī 
counselled his reader to strive to only follow original prophecy, and to never go beyond 
what is in the original sources, in order to be a perfect follower of Muḥammad 
himself.  He wrote, 411
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:545; 2: 252. 407
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:400. This does not mean that mujtahids are protected from error like Prophets. 408
It only means to show a parallel between the two.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:400.409
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:168-9.410
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:169.411
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Every mujtahid is bound to what his ijtihād led him to, but he may not accuse 
those who disagree with him of being in error...  We must never criticise the 412
ruling of a mujtahid because it is the Sharīʿa itself, being God’s judgement, that 
approved of [the mujtahid’s] judgement, so it becomes the law of God by God’s 
approval of it, and this is a matter in which the people of all the schools of law fall 
into the realm of the prohibited...  413
 Ibn ʿArabī, however, did not tolerate a scholar’s use of opinion or analogy where 
a text has already spoken on an issue. He wrote, ‘If the revealed text appears to him, and 
he leaves it in favour of his own opinion [ra’y] or what he claims to be perspicuous 
analogy, there is no excuse for him before God, and he is blameworthy.’  As we have 414
stated, Ibn ʿArabī believed that the position that rejected the use of analogical reasoning 
was stronger. ‘God is not absent-minded; His silences are not omissions. It is not for 
man to fill in the “voids” in Revelation,’ as Addas summarised his position succinctly.  415
In an illuminating passage that will clarify for us his position further, he wrote, 
I asked the Messenger of God peace be upon him in a dream vision about the 
woman that is divorced three times in one pronouncement, and that is that (the 
husband) says to her: ‘You are divorced three times.’ He peace be upon him said 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:523.412
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:348. In other words the followers of all schools fall into the sin of rejecting the 413
opinions of others which God Himself approved of.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1: 499. Obvious analogy (as Kamali translates ‘qiyās jalī’), or ‘perspicuous qiyās’ as 414
Hallaq translates it, was considered the strongest type of analogy which was accepted by many of those 
who rejected qiyās on principle. It thus represented the most valid or authoritative form of qiyās (See 
Hallaq, History, 102-3, 105; Kamali, Principles, 286.). Ibn ʿArabī was referring to those scholars who 
rejected prophetic traditions based on what they claimed to be obvious (and therefore undeniable) 
analogy from a Qurʾānic text which would mean that a tradition stating the contrary must necessarily 
be wrong. For him, they are wrong in thinking that such an analogy is obvious, and must hold tightly to 
the ḥadīth, even if it seemed obvious by way of reason that they should not.
 Addas, Voyage, 123. The Ẓāhirīs also rejected qiyās because the Qurʾān, in verse 4:59, instructed those 415
in dispute to return their affairs to God and His messenger if they had faith, which, after the latter’s 
passing, was understood to refer to the Qurʾān and Sunna; according to them, then, to solve a dispute 
by analogy or anything outside the Qurʾān and Sunna is invalid and amounts to the creation of new law 
that God did not permit.
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to me: ‘It is three (divorces) as he said, and she is not lawful for him again until 
she (first) marries (and then divorces) a different husband.’ So I said to him: ‘Oh 
Messenger of God, there are among the people of knowledge those who hold that 
it is only counted as one divorce.’ So he said: ‘Those have judged according to 
what has reached them,  and are correct.’ So I understood from this that the 416
judgment of every mujtahid is approved, and that every mujtahid is correct. So I 
said to him: ‘Oh Messenger of God, I only want in this matter what you yourself 
would rule if you were asked about it, and what you would do if such an incident 
happened to you.’ So he said to me: ‘It is three (divorces) as (the husband) said, 
she is not allowed to him until she (first) marries (and then divorces) another 
husband.’  417
 For Ibn ʿArabī, it is wrong to reject the opinions of others, whether in principles 
or corollaries. It is ijtihād that leads some scholars to approve of analogy and others to 
reject it, and the ijtihād of both is correct for themselves. It is therefore not permissible 
for the rejectors of analogy to forbid its practitioners from using it, just as it is not 
permissible for the practitioners of analogy to forbid the Ẓāhirīs from rejecting it.  For 418
Ibn ʿArabī, the truly correct answer is the one that the Prophet would have chosen in his 
own lifetime. Likewise, it is the answer that the Mahdī would rule with when he 
emerges, as he will abolish the schools of law and keep only the ‘pure religion.’  This 419
one true answer on every issue is the one that would be chosen by the solitary ones 
among the nation (the afrād) who succeed in preparing themselves spiritually for the 
descent of the true answers upon their hearts, and indeed it is a mark by which they are 
recognised that they never disagree amongst each other on any judgement.  Ibn ʿArabī 420
of course ascribed to himself this type of ijtihād, saying that ‘though the Lawgiver has 
approved of the mujtahid’s judgement, even if he is wrong, yet the people of this way 
 Of evidence or narrations.416
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:552.417
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:472.418
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:337, 327.419
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:271.420
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(ṭarīqa) only take what the Messenger of God himself has judged.’  It should however 421
be pointed out that in the beginning of the same passage he said that he took ‘many’ of 
Muḥammad’s judgements in this way, indicating that he did not claim to take all of the 
Sharīʿa’s judgements by way of inspiration. This would accord with Ibn ʿArabī’s 
hesitant tone on the authenticity of several prophetic traditions or on the correct answer 
to some questions: he is not afraid to show that he does not have the absolute answer on 
every issue.  He similarly stated that the Mahdī will be veiled from the answers to 422
some questions too, at which point he will treat them as if they were in the realm of the 
‘permissible’ because God will protect him (make him maʿṣūm) from the use of raʾy 
and analogy.  This contrasts with the more confident tone of al-Tirmidhī who never 423
hesitated on any matter, and who seems to suggest that there is no room for doubt for 
those who can penetrate through the veils. 
 Despite his repeated discussions of analogical reasoning, Ibn ʿArabī rarely 
discussed the issue of the existence of ratios for the divine prescriptions. Unlike the 
Ẓāhirīs for whom this matter was strongly linked to their rejection of analogical 
reasoning, and who strongly attacked and rejected the existence of ratios, Ibn ʿArabī 
only rarely discussed this matter, and when he did, he took the opposite position of 
accepting their existence.  Like al-Tirmidhī before him, Ibn ʿArabī explained the 424
wisdom (ḥikma) behind the different acts of worship at length. When discussing one act 
of worship that scholars deemed to be a pure act of worship without a known reason, 
Ibn ʿArabī gave the wisdom behind this act. However, he then proceeded to approve of 
the fact that scholars, because they lacked divine unveiling, deemed many acts of 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:224-5.421
 For example, in Kitāb al-Mubashshirāt, Ibn ʿArabī mentions asking the Prophet in a dream about the 422
meaning of the word qurʾ in the Qurʾān which some schools understood to refer to the menstrual period 
and others to its opposite: the period of purification between periods. Ibn ʿArabī received a hint but not 
a direct answer as to the correct answer. (Ibn ʿArabī, al-Mubashshirāt, 435).
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:337.423
 For the Ẓāhirī rejection of ratios, see Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 8:76-128.424
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worship to be acts of pure servitude without a ratio legis. He held that ratios did exist 
and were intended by the Lawgiver and yet at the same time did not bring about the 
existence of the divine injunctions. For him, to disassociate the injunctions of God from 
ratios was more befitting of God’s sublimity and transcendence, because it was to 
disassociate God’s actions from causes (al-ʿilal ghayr muʾaththira fī ījād al-ḥukm maʿ 
wujūd al-ʿilla wa kawnahā maqṣūda wa hādhā aqwā fī tanzīh al-janāb al-ilāhī).  Ibn 425
ʿArabī therefore was more concerned with the theological implications of ratios, rather 
than their jurisprudential implications. 
 This extended treatment of Ibn ʿArabī’s understanding of ijtihād, particularly 
with regard to analogy (as well as istiḥsān and the establishment of new practices), 
clearly shows that Ibn ʿArabī was by no means a Ẓāhirī, and explains for us how he was 
able to approve of all the different opinions of the schools throughout his jurisprudential 
discussions in the Futūḥāt. 
4.2.2 Divine Mercy and the Law 
 We have seen how Ibn ʿArabī disapproved of the addition of new laws in 
jurisprudence like the Ẓāhirīs. However we also saw that in principle he found that there 
was a great honour in the legislative function that God gave mujtahids. Ibn ʿArabī made 
it clear that unlike the Ẓāhirīs who completely rejected the use of analogy in principle as 
a source of legislation, he only rejected it because he feared it would increase the 
number of legal obligations upon the believers. He said, ‘We only stayed away from 
accepting qiyās ourselves because it leads to an increase in legal rulings, and we 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:685. He elsewhere stated that the ratios could be known for some prescriptions 425
and not known for others, implying that they did exist for all prescriptions but were not necessarily 
known (Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:267). See also the section where Ibn ʿArabī explained the pro-qiyās 
argument (Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:163).
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understood from the Lawgiver that he wanted to lighten the burden of this 
community.’  The Qurʾān had said: 426
You who believe, do not ask about matters which, if made known to you, would 
make things difficult for you - if you ask about them while the Qurʾān is being 
revealed, they will be made plain to you - for God pardons them (i.e. has absolved 
you of any obligation regarding them). God is most forgiving and forbearing 
(5:101)  
According to early Qurʾān commentators such as al-Ṭabarī, quoting Ibn ʿAbbās and 
Abū Hurayra, this verse was revealed when the Prophet told his people that the 
Pilgrimage has been made an obligatory act, at which point a man stood up to ask if it is 
to be done every year. The Prophet is reported to have replied,  
Had I said ‘yes’ it would have become obligatory upon you to do so, and you 
would not have been able to fulfil this obligation. Leave me as long as I leave 
you… If I instruct you to do something then fulfil as much of it as you are capable 
of, and if I forbid you from something then stay away from it.  427
Similarly the Prophet’s cousin Ibn ʿAbbās said, 
God sent His Messenger and sent down His Book in which He declared what is 
lawful and what is unlawful. Therefore what He made lawful is lawful and what 
He made unlawful is unlawful, and what He remained silent about has been 
pardoned.  428
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:165.426
 Al-Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-bayān, 11: 104-9; Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 2:975.427
 See Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 8:28. This is narrated by Abū Dāwūd in his Sunan and is regarded as 428
authentic. Other narrations attribute similar statements to the Prophet himself. Of these, the one with 
the soundest chain, according to Ibn Rajab, is that narrated by al-Bazzār in his Musnad and al-Ḥākim in 
al-Mustadrak: ‘What God made lawful is lawful and what He made unlawful is unlawful, and what He 
remained silent about has been pardoned, so accept from God His pardon, for God would not forget a 
single thing.’ Another narration popularised by Sharaf al-Dīn al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) in his famous 
collection of forty traditions, was narrated by al-Dāraquṭnī: ‘God has given you obligations, so do not 
neglect them; drawn limits, so do not transgress them; prohibited some things, so do not violate them; 
and remained silent on some things as a mercy for you, not out of forgetfulness, so do not investigate 
them.’  On these narrations and similar statements attributed to prominent scholars among the 
generation of the Followers, see Ibn Rajab, Jāmiʿ, 2: 149-152.
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 Based on such texts and others, Ibn ʿArabī rejected analogical reasoning and 
other forms of ijtihād that led to an increase in the obligations upon man. As we have 
seen, he argued that mujtahids were bound to follow the opinion that their ijtihād or 
analogy led them to, but argued that others were not bound to follow anything but the 
Qurʾān and Sunna.  People had the option of whether or not they wished to follow 429
what scholars added by way of analogical reasoning. If they followed someone’s ijtihād, 
then they were following a law approved by God for that person, and yet this remained 
a questionable matter. It is better to follow only what is in the texts for God only 
commanded the people to ask ‘the people of the Remembrance’ (21:7), and that meant 
the experts on the Qurʾān and the experts on the Sunna.  Furthermore, how could God 430
make an act of worship for people out of the product of someone else’s reasoning? Acts 
of worship can only come from the Qurʾān and Sunna.  For Ibn ʿArabī therefore, 431
people would only be taken to account on the Day of Judgement according to what was 
in the Qurʾān and Sunna, and would not be questioned about anything added by the 
jurists based on analogy. 
 For Ibn ʿArabī, as we have shown, ijtihād was the search for the answer to a 
question within the Qurʾān and Sunna, and therefore the role of the scholars and muftis 
was simply to transmit the evidence from the Qurʾān, Sunna, or Consensus (of the 
Companions) to the questioner. The imitation of scholars was only acceptable when the 
scholar or muftī stated that his answer is the ruling of God and His Messenger as proven 
by one of the three above sources, but if he stated that the ruling was based on his 
opinion or reasoning, then it became impermissible for a person to follow it.  432
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:472; 4:305.429
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:230. The ‘Remembrance’ meaning the Qurʾān, and by extension, the Sunna.430
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:373.431
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:373; 2:165. Also from Ibn ʿArabī’s commentary on verse 2:170 in Ījāz al-bayān, as 432
quoted by al-Ghurāb in al-Fiqh, 66-7.
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 According to Ibn ʿArabī, like Ibn Ḥazm before him, a layman may not be bound 
to following a single school of jurisprudence, but must search for the scholar who will 
tell him that he is providing the judgement of God and His Messenger, regardless of 
what school this scholar follows. He gave this advice to the layperson, 
I warn you that you must not bind yourself to following a single school, but must 
act upon God’s commandment, for He has commanded you to ‘ask the people of 
the Remembrance if you do not know,’ (21:7) and the people of the Remembrance 
are the experts on the Qurʾān and Sunna, for the ‘Remembrance’ is the Qurʾān as 
stated in the Qurʾān. You must seek the removal of difficulty (rafʿ al-ḥaraj) in 
your matter if possible, for God said, ‘He has imposed nothing difficult on you in 
matters of religion’ (22:78) and the Prophet said ‘The religion is about ease.’ So 
ask about the easier option (rukhṣa) in the matter until you find it, and when you 
find it, act upon it.....If you want to take the harder option (ʿazāʾim) in your 
matters do so, but only in what applies to yourself (and not others), and know that 
the removal of hardship is the sunna.  433
 At the same time, even though God’s mercy meant that no one was obliged to 
follow the additions of the scholars, Ibn ʿArabī, found another type of mercy in their 
additions. He argued that the learned opinions and istiḥsān of the scholars provided 
people with more opinions to choose from. Thus in people only being taken to account 
for what is in the revealed texts is a mercy, but in God’s acceptance of other peoples’ 
ijtihād for themselves and whoever wished to follow them, there was a different mercy. 
This allowed people to seek the easiest option in any school of thought. The jurists, 
however, deprived the people of this mercy by restricting them to following a single 
school of jurisprudence and by barring them from searching for easier solutions in other 
schools, fearing that this would amount to playing with the religion. For Ibn ʿArabī, 
God had approved of the ijtihād of every mujtahid, and made it part of the Sharīʿa, 
therefore those who wished to seek their solutions in other schools have evidence to do 
so in this, for they are following something from the Sharīʿa. It is those who forbid 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:491.433
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people from going beyond a single school of jurisprudence who have no evidence for 
this position of theirs, except their unfounded fears. Furthermore, the founders of the 
schools never commanded anyone to follow only them and not any other, and those who 
now forbid people from doing so were not independent mujtahids like the founding 
imams, by their own admission, and therefore they have no right to make such 
statements.  He wrote, 434
Out of divergence in legal questions God has made both a mercy for His servants 
and a widening [ittisāʿ] of what He has prescribed for them to do. But the jurists 
of our times have restricted and forbidden, for those who follow them, what the 
Sacred Law had widened for them. They say to one who belongs to their school, if 
he is a Ḥanafī, for example: ‘Do not go looking for al-Shāfiʿī’s dispensation in 
this problem that you have.’ And so on for each of them. That is one of the gravest 
calamities and one of the heaviest constraints in the matter of religion. Now God 
said that ‘He has imposed nothing difficult on you in matters of religion’ [Quran 
22:78]. The law has affirmed the validity of the status of him who makes a 
personal effort (ijtihād) for himself or for those who follow him. But the jurists of 
our time have forbidden this, maintaining that it leads to making light of religion. 
This, from them, is the height of ignorance!  435
For Ibn ʿArabī, the muqallid (imitator) is muṭlaq (has absolute freedom) to choose what 
he wishes out of the different opinions of the mujtahids. Jurists usually used the term 
muṭlaq for the independent mujtahids like the four imams, who followed no one, and 
restricted everyone else to following a school. Ibn ʿArabī instead cleverly called the 
imitators muṭlaq for being free to move freely from one school to another seeking the 
easy option, whereas it is the mujtahid who was muqayyad (restricted) by his evidence 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:392.434
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:392. I made use of Chodkiewicz’ translation in Ocean, 56, with minor 435
improvements.
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and the result of his ijtihād.  Ibn ʿArabī even went as far as to accuse those who thus 436
restricted God’s Sharīʿa and made things difficult for the Muslims as having left the 
religion.  For Ibn ʿArabī, God is merciful and so placed a mercy even in the act of the 437
jurists who transgressed His mercy by adding to His laws.  
 Ibn ʿArabī was not the first to hold this opinion, for it was held before him by 
Ibn Abī Hurayra (d. 345/956), the Baghdadī judge who became the ultimate authority of 
his age in the Shāfiʿī school.  The majority of scholars, on the other hand, claimed that 438
one who sought the easier option on every matter was a fāsiq (a man of 
disobedience).  Like Ibn ʿArabī after him, Ibn Abī Hurayra stated that there was no 439
legal basis for forbidding people from seeking the lenient options in every school. He 
argued that they should in fact seek the easiest option because the Prophet had wanted 
ease for God’s servants in their obligations.  Despite the eminence of Ibn Abī Hurayra, 440
however, the Mālikī traditionist - and close friend of Ibn Ḥazm - Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr of 
Cordoba (d. 464/1071) could claim a century later that there was a consensus among 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:142. This could be seen as a natural consequence of the doctrine of infallibilism, 436
and was accepted by some jurists. However, other infallibilists like al-Ghazālī sought to restrict this 
freedom by requiring the layperson to follow the scholar that he regards as the most learned (see 
Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 274-5).
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:79.437
 Al-Luh, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 479. On Ibn Abī Hurayra see al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 15:428; Melchert, Formation, 105.438
 The origin of this fear may stem from the early period of Islam in which no ‘orthodoxy’ had yet been 439
established and the scholars of different regions in the Islamic world had not yet come to implement 
many traditions that would later become universally accepted. Because of that situation, Ibn Ḥanbal 
said that ‘He who acts upon the opinion of the people of Kufa on the (permissibility) of date-wine, and 
the opinion of the people of Medina on the (permissibility) of listening to music (samāʿ), and the people 
of Mecca on the (permissibility) of temporary marriages, would be a fāsiq’ (Al-Zarkashī, al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ, 
8:382; al-Shawkānī, Irshād, 2:253). Ibn Ḥanbal is not known, however, to have limited anyone to 
following his opinions only or one particular school, and one could see how by the time of Ibn Abī 
Hurayra his fear was no longer an issue. In fact, some Ḥanbalīs claim that Ibn Ḥanbal himself held the 
same opinion as Ibn ʿArabī, and that he said to one of his associates, ‘Do not force people to follow your 
opinion (madhhab) for that would cause them difficulty. Let them seek the easier options provided by 
the opinions of others’ (al-Shawkānī, Irshād, 2:252).
 Al-Luh, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 479. 440
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scholars on the impermissibility of seeking the easier options from the different 
schools.  As Addas noted, 441
If, to those who interpreted the Law for the ‘mass of the believers’ he 
recommended leniency, for himself and for those who wanted to follow in his 
footsteps he would not permit recourse to facilitating solutions, even completely 
legitimate ones. Mercy towards others, steadfast rigour toward himself: these are 
the defining poles of Ibn ʿArabī’s ethics.  442
 Addas correctly attributed Ibn ʿArabī’s position on the permissibility, even the 
desirability, of the layman seeking the easiest opinions from among the different schools 
to his self-image as the perfect heir of the Prophet Muḥammad.  Ibn ʿArabī wrote, 443
‘God has created me a mercy, and made me an inheritor of mercy from the one to whom 
it was said, ‘We did not send you but as a mercy to all the worlds’ (21:107).  However, 444
Ibn ʿArabī ‘in no case should be seen as espousing laxism of any kind: Ibn ʿArabī - and 
this cannot be repeated often enough - would not tolerate any transgression of the 
 A-Luh, Uṣūl al-fiqh, 479. As for laymen not being bound to a school of law and seeking a fatwā from 441
the nearest muftī regardless of his school - provided that they were not seeking dispensations-, it would 
come to be an acceptable opinion among a number of leading medieval scholars from all four schools. 
The earliest medieval scholar that we have found to hold this opinion was Sharaf al-Dīn al-Nawawī (d. 
676/1277), who was seven years old when Ibn ʿArabī passed away. Al-Nawawī is one of the two main 
authorities in the Shāfiʿī school. He accepted that laymen get fatwas from whomever they wanted, 
regardless of the school followed by the muftī, and explained that those who restricted laymen to one 
school only did so out of fear that they would simply seek the muftī with the easiest opinion for each 
matter. This was based on the idea that laymen cannot be said to have a madhhab in the sense of a 
methodology that they believed was the most correct, and only scholars must, out of intellectual 
honesty, bind themselves to a single methodology, (see al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, vol. 11, 117). For the 
names of subsequent scholars who held this opinion, see al-Sanūsī, Īqāẓ al-wasnān, 94-8.
 Addas, Voyage, 124. This very principle seems to have been repeated by the Indian scholar Fakhr al-442
Dīn al-Zarrādī (d. 748/1347), one of the chief disciples of Niẓām al-Dīn Awliyāʾ (d. 725/1325). In a work 
on ḥadīth he wrote, ‘They (the Sufis) act upon the most precautionary madhhab (on each issue) and do 
not accept to follow a particular madhhab, as some of them said, ‘the Sufi has no madhhab.’ They hold 
firmly to the tradition that states, ‘Disagreement among my community is a source of leeway in the 
religion.’ If disagreement is leeway, then choosing a single madhhab is restriction.’ (Al-Zarkalī, al-Aʿlām, 
5:137).
 Addas, Voyage,, 124.443
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:163.444
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Law.’  Likewise, Ibn ʿArabī did not simply accept every lenient position. For 445
example, he very strongly rejected the practice of combining two prayers during travel 
within the time period of one of those two prayers, which is the practice of the majority 
(the Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs). Ibn ʿArabī took the side of the Ḥanafīs and 
Ẓāhirīs for whom the only acceptable method of combining prayers was to pray the 
Ẓuhr prayer for instance at the very end of its time and then pray the ʿAṣr at the very 
beginning of its time, and that is certainly a much more difficult opinion to follow. Ibn 
ʿArabī did not find sufficiently strong and clear evidence to move something as 
important as prayer outside of its prescribed time, stating that those who dared do so 
‘had not even smelled the scent of knowledge.’   446
4.2.3 Ibn ʿArabī’s Literalism 
 Among the most notable aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to jurisprudence is the 
amount of analysis that he gave to the Qurʾānic text, and his understanding of how the 
Qurʾānic text is to be approached and understood. Addas wrote, 
The Qurʾān, and then the ḥadīth, are the two scriptural sources of Islamic 
jurisprudence. The ‘way of reading’ the Holy Book consequently plays a 
fundamental role in the interpretation of the Law and in the way the Law is 
applied.....Ibn ʿArabī places great emphasis on the form of divine discourse. ‘It is 
not in vain,’ he says, ‘that God discards one word in preference for another.’ The 
occurrence, but also the absence or repetition, of a word, even the simplest of 
particles, cannot be called fortuitous when it is the Eternal Who is expressing 
Himself...This way of reading might be considered literal; but it is not at all 
unequivocal. The more it adheres to the sacred text, the richer the exegesis is in 
interpretations, provided nothing is excluded from what the divine grammar 
includes.  447
 Addas, Voyage, 124.445
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:471-2.446
 Addas, Voyage, 122-3.447
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 The reason that rigorous adherence to the text produces a richer exegesis is 
because, for Ibn ʿArabī, God is fully aware of all the meanings that the words He chose 
may carry, and therefore any possible interpretation of those words, provided they are 
fully in line with correct linguistic and grammatical understanding, must be correct in 
the sight of God. As Winkel stressed, however, in the case of the Qurʾān this refers to 
the Arabic language as it used to be understood ‘before and during the period of the 
Qur’an’s descent, so that a word in the Qurʾān means only what it meant to the people 
who were the revelation’s first audience.’  Ibn ʿArabī wrote, 448
As far as the Word of God is concerned, when it is revealed in the language of a 
certain people, and when those who speak this language differ as to what God 
meant by a certain word or group of words due to the variety of possible meanings 
of the words, each of them - however different their interpretations may be - 
effectively comprises what God meant, provided that the interpretation does not 
deviate from the accepted meanings of the language in question. God knows all 
these meanings, and there is none that is not the expression of what He meant to 
say to this specific person. But if the individual in question deviates from accepted 
meanings in the language, then neither understanding nor knowledge has been 
revealed.  449
 For Ibn ʿArabī, the key is to be able to know all the different meanings (or faces) 
of the divine Word. He who possesses this knowledge is he who has been given 
‘wisdom and decisive speech’ (Q 38:20), meaning that they have the ‘faculty of 
distinguishing among all these faces.’  Rigorous fidelity to the letter, then, ‘does not 450
exclude but, on the contrary, it implies a multiplicity of interpretations.’  Winkel 451
reiterates, 
 Winkel, Mysteries, 3.448
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:25, as quoted by Chodkiewicz in Ocean, 30.449
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:25, as quoted by Chodkiewicz in Ocean, 30.450
 Chodkiewicz, Ocean, 30.451
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The consequence of closer readings of the revelation, of more grammatically 
aware and precise readings, of increased attention to the tiniest details of the 
revelation in its original language is, ironically, a discovery of a polysemantic and 
multifaceted text.  452
 In the chapter which he titled ‘The Polysemantic Qurʾān’ in his book on Ibn 
ʿArabī’s approach to the Law, Winkel made a detailed study of a case of jurisprudence 
where Ibn ʿArabī’s approach led him to accept more than one possible answer based on 
the Qurʾānic text. For the verse detailing the acts of ritual ablution (Q 5:6), Winkel 
showed how scholars understood the last part of the verse to either mean that feet are to 
be wiped or washed during ablutions. These understandings were based on different 
canonical recitations of the Qurʾān and different grammatical understandings of each of 
the different recitations. While the majority of scholars either defended the wiping or 
the washing position, Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī and al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) took the position that 
both understandings were equally valid and that either choice would therefore fulfil the 
requirement.  This was also the position of Ibn ʿArabī.  It should be added here that 453 454
this approach is based on the Ẓāhirī principle which states, ‘If a word occurs equally 
with two or more meanings in the language it is not permissible to restrict it to one 
meaning except on the basis of a text or consensus.’  However, it is likely that in 455
practice this principle was not applied by the Ẓāhirīs as often as Ibn ʿArabī may have 
applied it. For example, though Dāwūd reportedly accepted choice in this matter, Ibn 
Ḥazm argued that grammar only allowed for one understanding of the verse in question, 
which was wiping, but that an authentic tradition came to abrogate that and make 
 Winkel, Living Law, 65.452
 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, 1:22. Winkel’s text contains a contradiction on the position of Dāwūd. At one point 453
he attributes to him the position of choice between wiping and washing, and at another point he 
attributes to him the opposite position of the necessity of combining both (see Winkel, Living Law, 70, 
79). This is probably due to Winkel’s use of different sources. Ibn Rushd’s text, which as I have shown 
was Ibn ʿArabī’s source for the different positions, understood Dāwūd’s position to be of choice, 
whereas al-Rāzī, whose tafsīr Winkel also used, understood Dāwūd’s position to be the combination of 
both.
 Winkel, Living Law, 79.454
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Nubdha, 23. I used the translation in Sabra, ‘Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism,’ part 2, 312.455
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washing obligatory instead.  Ibn Ḥazm’s use of this interpretive principle in the 456
Muḥallā suggests that it was part of the calculation of how many particulars an 
injunction applied to, but did not produce a choice in how an injunction is applied. For 
example, regarding the tradition that states that there is no alms-tax on anything that is 
‘dūn’ five awsuq (a measure) of dates and ḥabb (wheat and barley), Ibn Ḥazm argued 
that the word ‘dūn’ meant both ‘less than’ and ‘other than.’ He agreed therefore with the 
general understanding that the alms-tax was not obligatory on agricultural produce of 
less than five awsuq, but also added another meaning which is that the alms-tax was not 
obligatory on any agricultural produce other than dates, barley and wheat.  Thus Ibn 457
Ḥazm used this principle to reduce or extend the number of particulars covered by 
injunctions, but does not seem to have used it to accept the possibility of choice in any 
matter.  This is also confirmed by Ibn Dāwūd’s rejection of the possibility that two 458
mujtahids who arrived at different opinions could both be correct at the same time.  459
 Furthermore, this approach of Ibn ʿArabī did not seem to apply only to the 
scholars. He seemed to suggest that anyone reading the Qurʾān, as long as he 
understands an utterance in it according to a meaning carried by that utterance, and 
known to the people of that language to be associated with that utterance, then he is a 
true exegete; however, he who explains an utterance of the Qurʾān based on his own 
opinion, by which he meant a meaning for that utterance unknown to the people of that 
language and not associated by them with that meaning, has committed an act of 
disbelief. That is because the Qurʾān is an ocean without shore, and God knew all the 
possible meanings of every utterance He revealed, and He knew that His servants had 
different capabilities of understanding those utterances, and therefore only tasked them 
with what they could understand from His address. Whenever someone understood a 
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 2:39-40.456
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 4:25.457
 For a different example on the meaning of ‘muḥṣan’ women see al-Iḥkām, 3:129.458
 See the passage from Ibn Dāwūd’s al-Wuṣūl in Stewart, ‘Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd,’ 157.459
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verse to mean something, then that meaning is what was intended by this verse for that 
person who found this meaning. This, however, applied only to the Qurʾān and other 
revealed texts in which God, as the speaker, was aware of all the possible meanings of 
His speech.  460
4.2.4 Everything is in the Qurʾān 
 According to Ibn ʿArabī, the Qurʾān contained within it the answer to 
everything, and that for him was another reason why the use of analogy was not needed. 
One of the classic examples used to demonstrate analogy is the verse prohibiting people 
from uttering the slightest expression of displeasure at their parents or to rebuke them, 
and to speak to them with respect instead (17:23). Jurists used this verse as a prime 
example of where analogy is used, particularly the a priori type of analogy, to reach the 
conclusion that one may not do something worse, such as hitting their parents.  Ibn 461
ʿArabī, however, argued that recourse to analogy is not needed for anyone possessing 
understanding (fiqh) in the religion, because the very same verse of the Qurʾān also 
instructs the believers to treat their parents with kindness. Those with understanding 
know that this general instruction of treating parents with kindness inherently contains 
within it the prohibition of hitting them, and therefore they do not need to make an 
analogy between hitting and disrespectful speech. The religion has been completed and 
everything is in the Qurʾān and Sunna, sometimes in the form of general instructions 
(mujmal) from which specific teachings can be extracted.  462
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:567. By revealed texts he meant other scriptures and khabar ilāhī, also known as 460
ḥadīth qudsī.
 See Kamali, Principles, 284-5.461
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt 1:371.462
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4.3 How Much Did Ibn ʿArabī Take from al-Tirmidhī in Fiqh? 
 Ibn ʿArabī was an independent thinker, as he very proudly repeated again and 
again in poetic form. He claimed that he, al-Tirmidhī before him, and those like them, 
took the law from the Lawgiver, and not from anyone else, though for Ibn ʿArabī this 
was qualified as applying to a great deal of matters and not the entirety of the Law. We 
have seen how his approach to comparative fiqh did not have a precedent except in the 
works of al-Tirmidhī before him. However, is this in itself evidence that Ibn ʿArabī took 
this approach from al-Tirmidhī, or borrowed anything from his works that dealt with 
jurisprudence? 
 We know how far Ibn ʿArabī was influenced by al-Tirmidhī’s Khatm al-awliyāʾ 
and we can safely assume that he had access to the popular Nawādir al-uṣūl, al-
Tirmidhī’s largest work. We also know that Ibn ʿArabī took from this work a 
supplication to be recited at the end of every prayer.  This supplication, which we will 463
return to later (Chapter Six: Section 6.2.1) is not found in any of the known ḥadīth 
collections except this work.  One evidence of Ibn ʿArabī’s study of his works is in 464
the following statement from Ibn ʿArabī’s response to al-Tirmidhī’s questionnaire, ‘[Al-
Tirmidhī] had originally been a follower of the Ḥanafī school until he came to know the 
Law (directly) from the Lawgiver.’  The first half of this statement shows a general 465
knowledge of al-Tirmidhī’s biography, which is better than Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 
771/1370) for example who counted him among the Shāfiʿīs.  The second part of the 466
statement indicates a study of al-Tirmidhī’s fiqh positions, based on which Ibn ʿArabī 
could conclude that al-Tirmidhī ceased to follow the school of Abū Ḥanīfa, or any other 
school for that matter. Another example from the Futūḥāt is Ibn ʿArabī’s discussion on 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4: 497.463
 Al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 3:267.464
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:115.465
 Al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya, 2:245-6.466
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the prostrations of forgetfulness (sujūd al-sahw) which is done at the end of the prayer 
to make up for having done a mistake out of forgetfulness in the prayer. Ibn ʿArabī 
wrote, 
It is recommended (yustaḥabb) for every worshipper to perform the two 
prostrations of forgetfulness after every prayer, for mankind will almost always be 
absent minded, if even for a single moment, that he is in his prayer.... that is the 
position (madhhab) of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī.  467
Al-Tirmidhī discussed the benefit of this practice in one of his smallest works, Kitāb al-
iḥtiyāṭāt, where he attributed this practice to the Prophet’s young cousin Ibn ʿAbbās; it 
is a work that dealt with simple practices to be done every day.  This tells us that Ibn 468
ʿArabī had access to many of al-Tirmidhī’s works, even this small one which was 
certainly not one of his more famous or important works, and that he was concerned 
with benefitting from him even on small matters of practice.  
 It is unlikely for a manuscript as small as Kitāb al-iḥtiyāṭāt to have reached Ibn 
ʿArabī on its own, and it very likely reached him among a collection of al-Tirmidhī’s 
works. This Kitāb al-iḥtiyāṭāt, for example, is found in a collection of al-Tirmidhī’s 
works by a Cordoban scholar who died in Aleppo in 544/1149,  and included other 469
works like al-Manhiyyāt, al-Ṣalātu wa-maqāṣiduhā, al-Ḥajj wa-asrāruh, and most 
importantly al-Furūq, which the copyist described as al-Tirmidhī’s ‘greatest work.’  470
We do know that al-Tirmidhī’s works were available and well-received in Syria during 
the time he stayed there. For example, a Syrian contemporary of Ibn ʿArabī who died in 
Aleppo in the first half of the 7th/13th century (and therefore the same period in which 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:485.467
 Al-Tirmidhī, Al-iḥtiyāṭāt, 76.468
 ʿAlī ibn Sulaymān al-Shāqūrī (d. 544/1150). This Shāfiʿī jurist and a traditionist was invited to teach 469
in Aleppo and spent his last years there teaching in the Ibn al-ʿAjamī Madrasa. He copied for himself a 
collection of twelve works of al-Tirmidhī. See the editor’s introduction to al-Tirmidhī, al-Iḥtiyāṭāt, 54-7).
 See the description of the manuscript of al-Iḥtiyāṭāt in al-Tirmidhī, al-Iḥtiyāṭāt, 54.470
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Ibn ʿArabī died in Damscus), was a well-known copyist of al-Tirmidhī’s works. 
Hibatullāh ibn Abī Jarād was a scholar who was born into a family of religious judges, 
and having declined the post himself, became a preacher at Aleppo’s main mosque. He 
was known as a pious ascetic but became famous for his calligraphy and manuscript 
copying. According to his contemporary historian Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (d. 626/1299), ‘He 
was wholly consumed by the love of the works of Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī 
al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī. He collected most of his works and wrote some of them with his 
handwriting.’ Ibn Abī Jarād copied several collections of al-Tirmidhī’s writings, which 
are now in different manuscript collections in the world’s libraries, and made individual 
copies of al-Furūq in which al-Tirmidhī made his most sustained and detailed critique 
of analogical reasoning.  471
 In al-Tirmidhī’s works, at least those that have been printed and to which we 
have had access, he usually limited himself to discussing matters of jurisprudence that 
are at the core of the acts of worship and about which there was no disagreement. Ibn 
ʿArabī, therefore, would not have found many juristic opinions to take from him. A 
comparison between what we do know of al-Tirmidhī’s opinions on disputed matters, 
and those of Ibn ʿArabī, shows a match in all but one matter. For example, al-Tirmidhī 
in his earlier works strongly rebuked those who allow the beginning of prayer with 
anything but the phrase ‘Allāhu akbar,’ though in his later work Ithbāt al-ʿilal seemed 
to suggest that in the end it is acceptable, but that the other opinion is better.  472
Similarly, Ibn ʿArabī criticised this opinion at length saying that it entailed going 
against the Sunna of the Prophet, however he all but rejected the opinion outright, 
simply concluding that ‘our madhhab is that following the Sunna is better.’  473
Surprisingly, Ibn Ḥazm on this issue listed several possible substitutes for ‘Allāhu 
akbar,’ attributing this position not only to Abū Ḥanīfa but also to al-Shāfiʿī and to 
 Al-Juyūshī (ed.) in al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 52-3.471
 As discussed in the section on al-Tirmidhī.472
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1 :412.473
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Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (and therefore the Ẓāhirī school).  On the matter of the one being led 474
in prayer reciting the Qurʾān silently, they both preferred that the Fātiḥa and another 
portion of the Qurʾān is recited, which goes against the Ḥanafī opinion that nothing at 
all is to be recited behind an imam in any prayer, and the Ẓāhirī school which only 
allowed the recitation of the Fātiḥa for the one being led in prayer.  On the sitting 475
(jalsa) in the middle of a four-cycle prayer, both agreed that it was not an obligatory 
part of the prayer and gave similar reasons as to why it was placed there,  and likewise 476
they both agreed that only one set of circumbulations around the Kaʿba was obligatory 
in Ḥajj, the other two being sunna.  The only difference we know of on a 477
jurisprudential matter is on what substances break one’s state of ritual purification if 
they come out of the body. The Ḥanafī school argued that what mattered was the 
substance only, and not how it came out or from where, whereas the Mālikīs argued that 
all three (the substance, the way it came out, and where it came out from) must be taken 
into consideration; other schools had positions in between.  Al-Tirmidhī stated that the 478
school of the Kūfans (the Ḥanafī school) was ‘more befitting,’  whereas Ibn ʿArabī’s 479
position coincided with that of the Mālikīs.  It is true that this is the very same 480
discussion by al-Tirmidhī which we have stated showed all the hallmarks of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s thought, but this is not evidence that Ibn ʿArabī did not in fact read this 
passage. It is very possible for Ibn ʿArabī to have been influenced by al-Tirmidhī’s 
approach in this passage, without following him in the results, especially since al-
Tirmidhī himself believed that both positions were based on inspired knowledge. Ibn 
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 2:263. In fact al-Shāfiʿī only accepted one alternative to ‘Allāhu akbar,’ which is 474
‘Allāh huwa l-akbar.’
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-ʿilal, 102; Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:413, 420; 3:173; Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 2:266-7.475
 Al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 382-4; Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:438-9.476
 Al-Tirmidhī, al-Furūq, 382-4; Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:708.477
 Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, 1:40.478
 Al-Tirmidhī, Ithbāt al-ʿilal, 87.479
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:354.480
 141
ʿArabī certainly venerated Ibn Ḥazm for being a great muḥaddith (with an i), and took 
many principles from him because of his ḥadīth-based approach, but also disagreed with 
him on many others. Similarly, Ibn ʿArabī no doubt venerated al-Tirmidhī even more 
than Ibn Ḥazm for being a great muḥaddath (with an a), yet he would have no problem 
disagreeing with him or showing his independence of thought, as he did not believe that 
the muḥaddathūn received the answer to every question in the way he (i.e. Ibn ʿArabī) 
described. We must remember that Ibn ʿArabī had also attributed all the varying 
opinions of the four imams to the descent of inspiration into their hearts in the Station of 
Proximity, and yet ultimately believed that one position was preferable to the others.  
 Ibn ʿArabī’s explanations of the ‘crossover to the inward’ on the vast majority - 
if not all - of the matters he discussed, were on a far ‘higher’ level than al-Tirmidhī’s 
explanations. Al-Tirmidhī’s inspiration-based explanations were usually simple, Ibn 
ʿArabī’s were often very difficult to understand. Al-Shaʿrānī would later do the same 
with Ibn ʿArabī: he took from him the same approach, but his explanations were on a 
far simpler level than those of Ibn ʿArabī, and he stated that he kept it on a ‘simple 
level’ on purpose, indicating that he could have given different explanations based on a 
higher level of realities. The scholars took from each other’s approach, but their 
applications differed based on their different mindsets, intellectual capabilities, or 
intended audience. The fact that they took from each other, however, remains certain.   481
  
4.4 Ibn ʿArabī and the Law: A Summary 
  Having discussed the most relevant parts of Ibn ʿArabī’s theory, especially those 
that show the influence of al-Tirmidhī and Ibn Ḥazm and those that will influence al-
Shaʿrānī, Ibn Idrīs and other figures as we will soon show, we will now summarise the 
general principles of Ibn ʿArabī’s approach to the Law. 
 The question remains whether or not Ibn ʿArabī had studied this particular work of al-Tirmidhī, 481
Ithbāt al-ʿilal, but I believe that he must have, based on the undeniable similarity in approach, and 
because it is usually believed to be the other main work, beside Khatm al-awliyāʾ, that got al-Tirmidhī in 
trouble, and would have therefore been of prime interest for Ibn ʿArabī to read.
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1) The Main sources of the law are the Book, the Sunna, and the Consensus of the 
Prophet’s Companions only, the latter being indicative of a Sunna known to them, as 
all jurists agreed. The consensus of later scholars was not accepted by Ibn ʿArabī.  482
2) Ijtihād is the inward spiritual preparation that allows one to receive the correct 
answer from the Prophet. Text-based ijtihād is to find the answer to a problem inside 
the Qurʾān, Sunna, and Consensus of the Companions. The answer to every problem 
can be found in these sources, and there is no need for recourse to reasoning, analogy, 
deduction, istiḥsān, or any other form of ijtihād. 
3) The original value judgement of God for any issue on which God and His Messenger 
remained silent is divine pardon, meaning that they have the status of no-judgement, 
to be treated as if they are permissible. 
4) The Lawgiver has approved of the ijtihād of every mujtahid. However, its result is 
only binding on the mujtahid himself. One of the main issues on which scholars did 
ijtihād was on the principle of whether or not analogy may be used. Therefore, both 
the users of analogy and those who reject it are correct, but the true answer in the 
sight of God is the rejection of analogy. 
5) In the differences of scholars there is a mercy, providing Muslims with more options. 
This mercy must not be restricted by the demand upon Muslims to remain within the 
boundaries of a single school. The Akbarī madhhab embraces all madhhabs, and 
gives a justification for each opinion based on its inward secret, its crossover to the 
interior of man. Claud Addas succinctly summarised Ibn ʿArabī’s position: ‘As soon 
as the Divine Law leaves the field open to a number of solutions, none of these, and 
certainly not the easiest, has a right to be discarded, “God imposes upon a soul only 
that which it can bear” (Q 2:286); Divine Law is strict, but it is not rigid.’  483
 On Ibn ʿArabī’s discussions of Consensus see Futūḥāt, 1:333, 726; 2:162, 164; 4: 75.482
 Addas, Voyage, 123-4.483
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4.4.1 Did Ibn ʿArabī Have His Own Madhhab? 
 Ibn ʿArabī provided a list of his own preferences in terms of principles of 
jurisprudence in Chapter 88 of his Futūḥāt: ‘On Knowing the Secrets of the Principles 
of the Law’s Judgements.’  In it he covered his preferences on the major principles of 484
jurisprudence, covering the following topics: 
1) The sources themselves 
2) Consensus 
3) The rules of interpreting the sources 
4) Conflicts of evidence 
5) How to understand commands, prohibitions, and the actions of the Prophet (i.e. what 
is their value judgement) 
6) Abrogation 
7) Analogy 
8) The authority of a Companion’s fatwā  485
9) The revealed laws of previous nations 
10) Ijtihād and taqlīd for scholars and for the layperson 
11) Value Judgements   486
12) Seeking easier options and moving between schools 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt 2:162-5.484
 Legal theoreticians discuss as part of the principles of the law, the amount of weight that is carried 485
by a Companion’s fatwā. Ibn ʿArabī discussed one half of that problem: the scenario of a contradiction 
between a Qurʾānic verse or an authentic ḥadīth on one hand, and the fatwā of a Companion on the 
other. The other half of the problem, however, no longer existed in his theory: in the absence of a text 
from the Qurʾān or Sunna, does the fatwā of a single Companion carry more weight or the opinion of a 
later imam of a school? Ibn ʿArabī did not answer this question, but, by the principles of his 
jurisprudence, he did not need to because there was no need for an answer on something that the two 
main sources remained silent about. As for those who believed otherwise, then their ijtihād on the 
weight of a Companion’s fatwā would be correct for themselves, and likewise would be the end result of 
their ijtihād of course!
 Here Ibn ʿArabī covers some matters relating to the states of those addressed by the value 486
judgements or divine rules (the maḥkūm fīh) and their legal capacity (ahliyya), as well as the time 
delineated by the Lawgiver for each act. (Cf. Kamali, Principles, 445-453).
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 All of these matters he discussed in several places throughout the Futūḥāt, 
adding further detail. It could be said therefore that Ibn ʿArabī had his own complete set 
of principles, a full madhhab. As with the case of Ibn Ḥazm and the Ẓāhirīs in general, 
it remains questionable whether one could say they had a madhhab in the sense of a 
school. It might be more accurate to call the principles of Ẓāhirism a methodology, 
because the ahl al-ẓāhir also rejected taqlīd and considered themselves to be 
independent mujtahids.  Ibn ʿArabī could be considered an independent or even 487
original Ẓāhirī in that he made changes to the list of principles espoused by Ibn Ḥazm. 
However, since he disagreed with the Ẓāhirī school on their main philosophy of the law, 
and only made use of their texts so far as what they contained agreed with his own 
theory and aims, it would be more accurate to say that he had his own independent 
method which benefitted greatly from the Ẓāhirī school. If, however, we can establish 
that there were subsequent scholars who were influenced by Ibn ʿArabī, who accepted 
all his principles and worshiped according to his preferences, then we would be justified 
in saying that there was an Akbarī school, even if it had small numbers of followers. 
Our prime example for this will be the Sufi shaykh and revivalist scholar Aḥmad ibn 
Idrīs and the movements that were influenced by his teachings (Chapter Six). 
  
4.5 Ibn ʿArabī’s Influence on al-Suyūṭī 
 As the roots of Ibn ʿArabī’s jurisprudential thought had not been previously fully 
investigated, the influence of his jurisprudential thought has not been studied at all. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to look at all the important figures whose legal thought 
might have been influenced by Ibn ʿArabī. However, one figure deserves mention 
because he was also a teacher of al-Shaʿrānī who will be the subject of the next chapter: 
 See Sabra, ‘Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism,’ part 1, 22; Abū Zahra, Ibn Ḥazm, 242. As Abū Zahra noted, the 487
Ẓāhirīs did not consider themselves to be followers of a madhhab. This is certainly true with regards to 
Ibn Ḥazm whose expressions about the ahl-ẓāhir and what they had in common and what they did not 
all have in common gave the sense of a group of scholars who agreed on certain basic principles.
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the self-proclaimed ‘Reviver of the Tenth Century,’ Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 
911/1505).  This polymath whose works numbered in the range of five hundred, and 488
who left classic works in several different fields, wrote a defence of Ibn ʿArabī called 
Tanbiʾat al-ghabī fī tabriʾat Ibn al-ʿArabī (Alerting the Dimwitted Concerning Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Vindication). Al-Suyūṭī also received an authorisation in the devotional litany 
of Ibn ʿArabī known as al-Dawr al-aʿlā, through a chain of scholars going back to Ibn 
ʿArabī himself. Al-Suyūṭī passed on this litany with its authorisation to other scholars, 
until it reached ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulsī, one of the most devoted exponents of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings.  489
  Al-Suyūṭī wrote a small treatise called Tanwīr al-ḥalak, in which he defended 
the possibility of waking visions of the Prophet. Although this idea certainly existed 
before Ibn ʿArabī, he may have been the first to speak of it at length in his Futūḥāt.  490
More significantly, al-Suyūṭī claimed, privately to his innermost circle, that he regularly 
studied traditions with the Prophet in the waking. Al-Shaʿrānī wrote in his al-Mīzān al-
kubrā, ‘I saw in Shaykh Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī’s own handwriting a letter preserved with 
his companion Shaykh ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Shādhilī, to someone who had asked his 
intercession with Sultan Qaytbay. Its text is as follows: 
Know my brother that I have been united with the Messenger of God (peace be 
upon him) until now, seventy-five times in which I both saw him and spoke to 
him, in a waking state. And if it were not for my fear that I will be veiled from 
him - peace be upon him - if I approached the rulers, I would have entered the 
Citadel and interceded for you with the Sultan. But I am a man among the 
servants of his ḥadīth - peace be upon him - and I need him to show me which of 
 This claim was approved by several later scholars such as Mulla ʿAlī al-Qārī in Mirqāt al-mafātīḥ, 1:321.488
 See the study by Taji-Farouki in Ibn ʿArabī, A Prayer, 20-1, 27. On al-Nābulsī’s devotion to Ibn ʿArabī 489
see idem,36.
 Likewise, Mark Sedgwick, in his study of the ṭarīqa muḥammadiyya movements which emphasised the 490
importance of such visions and stressed their importance as a goal on the spiritual path, began with Ibn 
ʿArabī as the first to fully develop and formalise pre-existing views about the Prophet such as this 
(Sedgwick, Saints & Sons, 29).
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the traditions that the traditionists, using their methodology, have deemed to have 
a weak chain of transmission are actually authentic. That is undoubtedly of greater 
benefit than assisting you, my brother.’  491
 This idea of asking the Prophet in waking visions about the authenticity of 
traditions attributed to him is of course first found, and repeated often, in the Futūḥāt as 
we have shown. The same companion of al-Suyūṭī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Shādhilī, wrote a 
larger treatise called al-Kawākib al-zāhira, which started with the same subject of 
waking visions of the Prophet and continued to cover perhaps every major issue that 
was debated about Sufism.  This claim by al-Suyūṭī is highly significant considering 492
his importance in the field of traditions: his popular ḥadīth collection al-Jāmiʾ al-ṣaghīr 
and his Alfiyya poem on ḥadīth sciences are alone sufficient to show his lasting 
influence.  Furthermore, al-Suyūṭī claimed to be a full mujtahid, and authored a book 493
defending the existence of ijtihād and rejecting the idea that there were no mujtahids 
left.  It need not be stated of course, based on what we saw of Ibn ʿArabī’s treatment 494
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:55.491
 See in the bibliography under ʿAbd al-Qādir ibn Mughayzil al-Shādhilī.492
 Al-Suyūṭī’s written output is astonishing. Among them are: al-Jāmiʾ al-kabīr (aka Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ), a 493
great collection gathering together 80,000 prophetic traditions. It is believed that he intended to collect 
in it all the different traditions scattered in all the different collection; al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr, a choice 
selection of 10,031 traditions from the Jāmiʾ al-kabīr, to which he later added another 4496 in al-Ziyāda 
(The Addition); al-Durr al-manthūr, the most comprehensive work of ḥadīth-based tafsīr of the Qurʾān, 
and which Mulla ʿAli al-Qārī described as having revived the science of ḥadīth-based tafsīr; the Alfiyya, a 
1000-line poem on the science of ḥadīth; a commentary on the Muwaṭṭaʾ of Imam Mālik; a commentary 
on Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim; a commentary on Sunan Ibn Māja; a commentary on Sunan al-Nasāʾī; a grammatical 
analysis of traditions in the Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal; a work on the narrators in the chains of the 
Muwaṭṭaʾ; a work on fabricated traditions; and a work on the occasions behind the different traditions.
 Al-Suyūṭī differentiated between being a fully independent mujtahid and achieving the rank of an 494
absolute mujtahid. He claimed for himself the rank of absolute ijtihād (al-ijtihād al-muṭlaq) but denied 
that he was independent (mustaqill). This meant that he did not have his own set of principles, but that 
he was convinced by the principles and methodology of al-Shāfiʿī and followed him in applying them. 
See al-Suyūṭī, al-Radd, 112-3, 116.  See also Hallaq, ‘Gate of Ijtihād,’ 27-8. Al-Shaʿrānī defended al-Suyūṭī’s 
claims to ijtihād at length in the biography he wrote of him in al-Tabaqat al-ṣughrā, following it with a 
discussion on his miraculous waking visions of the Prophet (al-Tabaqat al-sughraā, 17-27. See also 
Sartain’s study, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī.
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of ijtihād and qiyās, that Ibn ʿArabī did not believe that the era of ijtihād was over 
either. He had written in the Futūḥāt,  
[The jurists] believe that the age of the people of ijtihād has ended and that there 
is no mujtahid left on the earth, and that God will never bring into existence 
someone with the rank of ijtihād after the imams. As for him who claims Divine 
inspiration of the legal judgements, they consider him to be a madman with a 
corrupt imagination.  495
   
 Al-Suyūṭī also wrote a treatise on a tradition of central importance to Ibn ʿArabī, 
‘He who knows himself knows his Lord,’  which he concluded with the explanation of 496
Ibn ʿArabī’s most famous disciple al-Qūnawī.  It is clear that many of al-Suyūṭī’s 497
treatises were centred around very prominent themes in the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī, but 
we cannot be certain that al-Suyūṭī’s work on ijtihād, for example, was inspired by Ibn 
ʿArabī. Other than his treatise in defence of Ibn ʿArabī, it is understandable that al-
Suyūṭī would not quote the highly controversial figure. 
 Al-Shaʿrānī met al-Suyūṭī when he first moved to Cairo, and recited traditions to 
him to gain an authorisation from him. One month later, he attended his funeral. He was 
thus able to count al-Suyūṭī as one of his teachers, one whose works he studied 
carefully.  This now brings us to ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī himself, perhaps the 498
greatest figure in spreading and popularising the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī, at least in the 
Arab world. 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:336.495
 Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge, 344-6.496
 Al-Suyūṭī, al-Ḥāwī, 2:291.497
 See the biography in al-Tabaqāt al-ṣughrā; it is the first biography in the book. In it he writes, ‘I saw 498
the shaykh [al-Suyūṭī] once (in a dream vision) with many keys. He gave them to me and said, “these 
are the keys to all my knowledges so take them”’ (al-Ṭabaqāt al-ṣughrā, 27). This indicates to us that al-
Shaʿrānī would have studied his works in depth. In fact, in Laṭāʾif al-minan, al-Shaʿrānī mentioned 
having read al-Suyūṭī’s al-Durr al-manthūr, his ḥadīth-based Qurʾānic exegesis which in modern prints 
takes up eight volumes, a full three times! (Al-Shaʿrānī, Laṭāʾif al-minan, 85).
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4.6 Conclusion 
 We have shown that Ibn ʿArabī had his own unique approach to jurisprudence, 
which as an independent methodology could possibly be called the Akbarī madhhab as 
some have called it. Though it shared much with the Ẓāhirī school, and indeed benefited 
greatly from it, Ibn ʿArabī’s approach could not truly be described as Ẓāhirī. Ibn ʿArabī 
had his own reasons for adopting many of the key positions of the Ẓāhirī school that 
were very different from the reasons that led the Ẓāhirīs to adopt their own positions. 
Furthermore, the rejection of qiyās, one of the two main cornerstones of Ẓāhirī thought, 
was not unique to them and was also a key feature of the juristic thought of al-Ḥakīm 
al-Tirmidhī and other Sufis. 
 I have argued that it is in the differences between Ibn ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirīs that 
the guiding principles behind their legal thought emerge. The Ẓāhirī legal methodology 
was built around the desire for certainty in every detail of the law. They rejected the use 
of rational tools like analogical reasoning, and rejected the possibility that the intellect 
could discover with certainty the ratios behind God’s injunctions. They also held that a 
khabar al-wāḥid tradition provided certainty. When two texts of equal strength 
contradicted each other and they did not know which one abrogated the other, they 
chose the tradition that they knew with certainty had at first been implemented by the 
fact that it went against free human norms. 
  Based on his concept of sainthood, Ibn ʿArabī believed that certain knowledge 
was possible to the saints who are granted a divinely-inspired understanding of the 
Sharīʿa and also have the ability to verify the authenticity of prophetic traditions 
(Chapter Three, Section 3.3). Therefore he did not search for certainty in chains of 
transmission, and held that the khabar al-wāḥid did not provide certain knowledge. If 
two texts of equal strength contradicted each other and there was no way to know which 
one abrogated the other, his position was that the easier option should be chosen 
(Section 4.1.3). Ibn ʿArabī’s discussions on analogical reasoning were not linked to the 
discoverability of ratios, the existence of which he did not deny. He rejected analogical 
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reasoning on the basis that it increased the number of commands and prohibitions that 
people had to follow. He did accept analogical reasoning on the condition that people 
were not forced to follow the results of this process (Section 4.2.2). Ibn ʿArabī argued 
that the founders of the schools of law were divinely-inspired saints whose positions 
were all correct (Chapter Three, Section 3.1), that God gave his stamp of approval to the 
result of any ijtihād (4.2.2), and that the Qurʾān itself carried within its text a 
multiplicity of divinely-intended meanings, according to people’s different intellectual 
capacities (Section 4.2.3). Ibn ʿArabī urged laymen to freely seek from all schools the 
positions that caused them the least hardship (Section 4.2.2). Therefore, Ibn ʿArabī 
agreed with the Ẓāhirīs where their principles led to ease, which is the rejection of 
additions to the divinely-revealed commands and prohibitions and the rejection of 
confining laypeople to the opinions of a single school. 
 As for the principles in which Ibn ʿArabī did adopt the Ẓāhirī stance, it was also 
because of his desire for ease for people, and his belief in God’s mercy. He rejected the 
idea that people had to follow the opinions of a single school of law. More importantly, 
he rejected analogical reasoning because God, with His mercy, had pardoned all that 
was not explicitly stated in the revealed sources. Adam Sabra showed that because 
Ẓāhirism restricted the scope of the Sharīʿa to that which is clearly stated in the revealed 
sources, it left people with ‘considerable latitude…Since God has not assigned a ruling 
to many things, human beings are free to choose.’  He therefore concluded that there 499
is an inherent ‘liberalism’ in the Ẓāhirī methodology.  Camilla Adang has produced a 500
number of studies of Ibn Ḥazm’s opinions on matters such as homosexuality,  501
women’s visibility in social and religious gatherings,  and interaction with non-502
Muslims,  all of which show him to be less restrictive than his opponents from the 503
 Sabra, ‘Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism,’ Part 1, 20.499
 Sabra, ‘Ibn Ḥazm’s Literalism,’ Part 1, 23 n. 22.500
 Adang, ‘Ibn Ḥazm on Homosexuality,’ 30.501
 Adang, ‘Women’s Access to Public Space,’ 90.502
 Adang, ‘Ibn Ḥazm’s Critique,’ 2, 8.503
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other schools. Ibn ʿArabī chose those principles of the Ẓāhirī school that preserved 
people’s right to act freely outside the limited set of divine prescriptions, and rejected 
those that placed certainty - which could be attained through sainthood - above leniency. 
 We can therefore say that the Akbarī legal system was primarily based on the 
desire for mercy for God’s servants, in keeping with Ibn ʿArabī’s belief that he was the 
perfect inheritor of Muḥammad who was sent as a mercy to the worlds. This system 
combined elements of al-Tirmidhī’s concept of sainthood and Ibn Ḥazm’s Ẓāhirism. 
After having clarified the principles of Ibn ʿArabī’s methodology and having 
investigated their origins, we will in the next two chapters study two examples of major 
figures who followed and applied Ibn ʿArabī’s legal thought. 
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Chapter 5: Ibn ʿArabī’s Influence on ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-
Shaʿrānī 
 ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī was a highly respected and successful author in his 
own lifetime and emerged as the most prominent Egyptian writer of the 16th century.  504
His manuals on Sufism and his hagiographies of the saints are very popular in the 
Muslim world, and his works on the Sharīʿa came to play a central role in debates on 
ijtihād and revival in the 19th century, as we will see (Chapter Six, Section 6.6). A 
recent study by Leila Hudson found that al-Shaʿrānī’s works were the most widely 
disseminated books in late Ottoman Syria, the prints themselves coming from Cairo.  505
Contemporary scholarship knows him first and foremost as a populariser of the works 
of Ibn ʿArabī through a number of his works, especially al-Kibrīt al-aḥmar, a very 
concise abridgement of the Futūḥat, and al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, a very large work 
that aimed to defend Ibn ʿArabī’s orthodoxy by showing the compatibility of his 
theological dogma with that of Ashʿarī theologians.  However, Ibn ʿArabī’s influence 506
pervades most of al-Shaʿrānī’s works, especially the two works on jurisprudence with 
which we are mainly concerned in this chapter: Kashf al-ghumma ʿan jamīʿ al-umma 
(The Removal of the Fog from the Whole Community) and al-Mīzān al-kubrā (The Great 
Scale).  
 Al-Mīzān al-kubrā is the most popular of al-Shaʿrānī’s works on jurisprudence, 
and possibly the most influential of all his works.  In their recent studies on al-Mīzān, 507
 Winter, Egyptian Society, 130, 162.504
 Hudson, ‘Reading al-Shaʿrānī,’ 45.505
 On this work see Johnson, ‘Unerring Balance,’ Parts 1 and 2.506
 Hudson, ‘Reading al-Shaʿrānī,’ 45. Hudson found that al-Mīzān al-kubrā was the most widely read of al-507
Shaʿrānī’s works in the period she studied in late Ottoman Damascus.
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however, contemporary scholars, namely Samuela Pagani and Knut S. Vikør, have not 
appreciated the true extent of Ibn ʿArabī’s influence and have instead named al-
Shaʿrānī’s main teacher ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ as the main source of the work’s ideas.  508
Pagani held that al-Shaʿrānī’s earlier work, Kashf al-ghumma was more faithful to Ibn 
ʿArabī’s teachings in that it separated the revealed law from the ijtihād of the scholars 
and the schools that emerged out of them, allowing the layperson to do without the 
latter. In his later work al-Mīzān, however, she argued that al-Shaʿrānī parted ways with 
Ibn ʿArabī and aimed to re-establish the authority of the schools and to ‘bring Ibn 
ʿArabī’s spiritual hermeneutics of the revelation into line with the “age of taqlīd,”’  In 509
doing so, she was supporting the views of those contemporary scholars who held that 
al-Mīzān was a conservative work that was in line with the general Sunni view of the 
schools of law against those who saw the Mīzān as a reformist work aimed at unifying 
the schools.  Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, in contrast, saw al-Mīzān as a radical departure 510
from the views of his age, and interpreted it as a work that was ultimately aimed at 
supporting pragmatic eclecticism, that is, the ability of the layperson to treat the 
opinions of all the schools of law as correct and to simply choose opinions based on 
pragmatic reasons, crossing school boundaries as much as they wished. He agreed with 
Pagani on al-Shaʿrānī’s ‘valorisation of taqlīd,’  but emphasised that this was not the 511
standard taqlīd of the opinions of a single school of law in which there was a limited 
ability to cross school boundaries. Instead, he correctly showed that taqlīd here was 
simply the ability to follow the opinions of any of the scholars of the schools of law. 
Ibrahim also gave more weight to the influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings on the Mīzān. 
Ibrahim wrote, 
 Vikør, ‘Shaykh as Mujtahid,’ 364-5; Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilāf,’ 180.508
 Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilāf,’ 177, 203-8.509
 Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilāf,’ 193-4.510
 Ibrahim, ‘Al-Shaʿrānī’s Response,’ 114.511
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[Al-Shaʿrānī’s] concern about the practice of laypeople echoes Ibn ʿArabī’s 
brief condemnation, in al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, of the purists’ rejection of 
pragmatic school boundary-crossing, which they regard as manipulation of 
religion. What al-Shaʿrānī does is develop Ibn ʿArabī’s views into a theory of 
the function of legal pluralism.  512
However, Ibrahim explained al-Mīzān as being mainly driven by a rejection of Ottoman 
Ḥanafisation.  While this may have been a factor, I will argue that certain teachings of 513
Ibn ʿArabī were once again behind the authorship of the work. 
 This chapter will show that both al-Mīzān and Kashf al-ghumma reflected 
different aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching. The first represented his rejection of 
analogical reasoning and scholar’s additions to the law, while the second reflected his 
approval of them, as long as they did not impose limitations upon the laypeople. The 
aim in each work, however, was the same: to preserve the mercy and ease that Ibn 
ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī insisted was integral to the law. I will argue that al-Shaʿrānī 
found that both approaches, though they appear at odds with one another, achieved the 
same goals. I will further demonstrate that the extent of the influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
ideas on al-Mīzān was far greater than has been pointed out in previous studies, partly 
because al-Shaʿrānī may not have wished to reveal the true extent of this borrowing in a 
work aimed at scholars of the law, many of whom may have been suspicious of Ibn 
ʿArabī. 
  
5.1 Al-Shaʿrānī’s Dedication to Ibn ʿArabī 
 Al-Shaʿrānī was wholly and singularly dedicated to the writings of Ibn ʿArabī. 
His study of the latter’s works, and his writings on him, began in his youth, and were to 
continue until the end of his life. In the year 965/1558, eight years before his death, al-
Shaʿrānī wrote one of his most important works, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, the full title of 
 Ibrahim, ‘al-Shaʿrānī’s Response,’ 132.512
 Ibrahim, ‘al-Shaʿrānī’s Response,’ 139.513
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which means The Satisfying Answers on Behalf of the Imams of Jurists and the Sufis. He 
dedicated one of its ten chapters to a defence of the ‘Shaykh al-Akbar,’ while also 
quoting him heavily throughout the rest of the work. A year before that he had written 
the last of his works which focused purely on Ibn ʿArabī, a treatise in his defence titled 
al-qawl al-mubīn fi-l-radd ʿan al-shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn (The Clear Speech in Defence of 
Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn), in which he explained some of the more problematic statements 
in the Futūḥat.  His other works include his abridgement of the Futūḥāt which he 514
called Lawāqiḥ al-anwār (The Fecundating Lights), and the more popular abridgement 
of the abridgement, al-Kibrīt al-aḥmar (The Red Sulphur that Clarifies the Teachings of 
the Shaykh al-Akbar).  He also wrote al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir fī bayān ʿaqāʾid al-515
akābir (The Rubies and Jewels that Clarify the Beliefs of the Great Saints), which as we 
have said is a very large work dedicated to defending Ibn ʿArabī’s creed;  and Ṣawāṭiʿ 516
al-anwār al-qudsiyya (The Shining Pure Lights from the Beginnings of the Chapters of 
the Futūḥāt al-makkiyya), a collection of the poetic lines with which Ibn ʿArabī began 
the hundreds of chapters of his magnum opus.  Likewise he wrote a treatise on the 517
different branches of knowledge that Ibn ʿArabī revealed in his works, calling it Tanbīh 
al-aghbiyāʾ ʿalā qaṭratin min baḥr ʿulūm al-awliyāʾ (Alerting the Dimwitted to a Drop 
from the Ocean of the Knowledge of the Saints).  Among al-Shaʿrānī’s works in which 518
he relied most heavily on the Futūḥāt are two works of creed, the largest of which 
aimed to explain anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Qurʾān using almost 
 According to the work’s editor Muḥammad Naṣṣār, this was the last of al-Shaʿrānī’s works that were 514
dedicated to Ibn ʿArabī and which he wrote in 964/1557, nine years before his death.
 The original abridgement is being prepared for publication by Muḥammad Naṣṣār.515
 He wrote al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir in 955/1548, nine years before al-Qawl al-mubīn.516
 See the editor’s introduction to al-Shaʿrānī, Al-Qawl al-mubīn, 3, 7.517
 Al-Shaʿrānī mentioned it in his introduction to al-Kibrīt al-aḥmar, 8.518
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exclusively passages from the Futūḥat, and the smaller work being one for which the 
Futūḥāt was one of its six main sources.  There are potentially several other works 519
that relied almost exclusively on Ibn ʿArabī’s works, and the writings of the Shaykh al-
Akbar pervade the majority of al-Shaʿrānī’s writings. Once we look at some of his 
earlier writings concerning jurisprudence, we can understand that al-Shaʿrānī truly spent 
the majority of his life reading and rereading the Futūḥāt in order to extract the relevant 
quotes that he needed for his works on different topics. I will now come to the influence 
of Ibn ʿArabī’s jurisprudential writings on those of al-Shaʿrānī and the close connection 
between them. 
5.1.1 Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī’s Works of Jurisprudence 
  Al-Shaʿrānī was a voracious reader, who listed an impressive list of the books 
that he studied under the great scholars of his age, and those that he read on his own, 
focusing in particular on those to do with Qurʾānic studies, prophetic traditions, and 
jurisprudence. He likewise had a passion for finding rare manuscripts and had a scholar 
who could help him locate what he sought from Cairo’s treasuries, boasting that he was 
able to find an ancient work of tafsīr that al-Suyūṭī before him had searched twenty 
years for, but was unable to find. His admirer and contemporary, Shihāb al-Dīn al-
Ḥanbalī al-Futūḥī praised him as ‘someone who has read books whose names I am not 
even aware of’ and that, had he wished, he could have claimed as his own without 
anyone knowing otherwise.  Al-Shaʿrānī would write comments and footnotes to the 520
works that he read, or sometimes abridgements, and in the case of the ancient tafsīr 
work mentioned above, he extracted from it all its prophetic traditions in a separate 
 The largest one is al-Qawāʿid al-kashfiyya al-muwaḍḍiḥa li-maʿānī al-ṣifāt al-ilāhiyya, and the smaller one 519
is al-Mīzān al-dharriyya al-mubayyina li-ʿaqāʾid al-firqa al-ʿaliyya. This last work deserves attention by 
scholars, especially because one of its manuscripts indicates that it was regularly taught and explained 
by the Akbarī ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulsī.
 See Al-Shaʿrānī, Laṭāʾif al-minan, 82-91.520
 156
treatise to use in such works as Kashf al-ghumma.  More importantly for us, he also 521
studied closely the works of Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Ḥazm from a legalistic point of view. 
Al-Shaʿrānī wrote that he studied Ibn Ḥazm’s entire al-Muḥallā, in ‘thirty massive 
volumes,’ three times, and its abridgement by Ibn ʿArabī once.  We cannot know the 522
number of times that he must have read Ibn ʿArabī’s Futūḥāt (though it is undoubtedly a 
great number of times), but in his introduction to its minor abridgement al-Kibrīt al-
aḥmar, he urged jurists to study the full Futūḥāt to discover in it ‘secrets concerning the 
ways of derivation [of the legal rules]’ and ‘sound ratios of which they were not 
previously aware.’    523
 Al-Shaʿrānī further developed his expertise in the sciences of jurisprudence and 
its principles through authorship. Among his works on jurisprudence he made a 
compendium of the fatwas of more than ten great scholars, most of whom were Shāfiʿī, 
a copy of which he says was taken to West Africa.  He also wrote an abridgement and 524
study of the great Mudawwana in Mālikī fiqh, highlighting all the matters where Mālik 
disagreed with the rest of the imams.  In the field of legal maxims (al-qawāʿid al-525
fiqhiyya) he made an abridgement of al-Zarkashī’s famed work on the subject, as well 
as a compendium of five books.  In the field of Uṣūl al-Fiqh he wrote Minhāj al-526
wuṣūl, in which he abridged, combined, and commented upon two different 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:7.521
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Laṭāʾif al-minan, 82.522
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Kibrīt al-aḥmar, 5-6.523
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Laṭāʾif al-minan, 88.524
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:72.525
 The compendium included the work of al-Zarkashī and two by Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (see al-Shaʿrānī, 526
Laṭāʾif al-minan, 88, 92).
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commentaries on the classic Jamʿ al-jawāmiʿ of Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 771/1370).  527
Al-Shaʿrānī also composed what he described as a very large discussing all the 
necessary sciences and tools that a mujtahid needed to extract rulings from the Qurʾān 
and Sunna.  He likewise referred in his writings to a book dedicated to the question of 528
the permissibility of the use of analogical reasoning. Based on what he said of this book, 
we know that he discussed in it Ibn ʿArabī’s reasons for the rejection of qiyās, as well as 
his approval of it as a share of law-giving that was left by God for the scholars of the 
Muḥammadan nation in order to honour them.  He likewise composed a work to show 529
that all four imams criticised the use of raʾy,  and another work on the evidences for 530
the schools of the imams.  These works came at an early stage in al-Shaʿrānī’s life, 531
and show us not only the extent of his accomplishment, but also reveal to us that he 
reflected carefully on the writings of Ibn ʿArabī and brought some of Ibn ʿArabī's ideas 
to bear on his own legal thought and his legalistic writings.  
 However, the greatest of al-Shaʿrānī’s legal writings came after this formative 
period of study. These were three works, each highlighting and focusing on one of three 
key ideas of Ibn ʿArabī: 1) the problem of religious authority, which he dealt with in 
Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 2) the rejection of the additions of the scholars to the law, which he 
dealt with in Kashf al-ghumma, and 3) the acceptance of the ijtihād of the scholars, 
which he dealt with in al-Mīzān. Before that, however, we must quickly speak of 
another work by al-Shaʿrānī that he was inspired to write because of the Futūḥāt, which 
is a collection of traditions called al-Badr al-munīr. 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Laṭāʾif al-minan, 92. This work has very recently been published by Dār al-Fatḥ in 527
Amman, Jordan.
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:16.528
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Durar al-manthūra, 94. The book on qiyās was titled Al-Iqtibās fī maʿrifat aḥkām al-qiyās.529
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 40. This work has recently been published by Dār al-Fatḥ in 530
Amman, Jordan.
 Titled al-Manhaj al-mubīn fī bayān adillat madhāhib al-mujtahidīn. See al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 531
40.
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5.1.2 Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī’s Work on Traditions 
 We saw in the chapter on Ibn ʿArabī that he stressed, via his writings and the 
dreams that he wrote of, the importance of ḥadīth books, and criticised works of 
jurisprudence that went beyond being simple ḥadīth al-aḥkām works. In al-Futūḥāt he 
wrote, 
[The Prophet] said, ‘May God show mercy to him who hears my speech, 
memorises it, and transmits it as he heard it.’ This means letter by letter.... This is 
only done by those who transmit revelation: the Qurʾān reciters and the 
traditionists... Jurists or those who transmit traditions by its meaning....have no 
share or portion of this [mercy].   532
Ibn ʿArabī continued to say that whoever narrated prophetic traditions is a messenger of 
the Messenger of God, which ultimately makes him a messenger of God. Therefore, the 
traditionists and Qurʾān reciters will be honoured to stand among the Messengers of 
God on the Day of Judgement.  Al-Shaʿrānī longed to share in this honour that Ibn 533
ʿArabī described. Therefore, in the year 944/1538 he composed a book on traditions 
which he called al-Badr al-munīr fī gharīb aḥādīth al-bashīr al-nadhīr, which clarified 
the source of 2,300 traditions that were often quoted but whose sources and authenticity 
were not well known. Beside the need that he felt for this work, al-Shaʿrānī wrote that 
he composed it because, 
The messenger of the Messenger is a messenger (of God), and so on until the Day 
of Judgement, as alluded to by the Messenger of God (may God bless him) when 
he said, ‘May God show mercy to him who hears my speech, memorises it, and 
transmits it as he heard it.’ This means letter by letter. The traditionists thus won 
the Messenger of God’s supplication of mercy for mercy...but those who are not 
traditionists will not receive from this supplication of mercy except as much as 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:229.532
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:229.533
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they narrate of the Sunna, not of their own understanding or opinion, so 
understand this!   534
 The paraphrasing from the Futūḥāt is clear, and this is but one more indication 
of Ibn ʿArabī’s influence on al-Shaʿrānī’s written output. We now turn to al-Shaʿrānī’s 
works on jurisprudence, the first of which was concerned with the question of religious 
authority. 
5.2 The Question of Authority  
 In the year 933/1527 al-Shaʿrānī wrote Irshād al-ṭālibīn ilā marātib al-ʿulamāʾ 
al-ʿāmilīn (Guiding the Seekers to the Ranks of the Scholars Who Act Upon Their 
Knowledge)  which he said he summarised from the works of the greatest gnostics 535
(ʿārifīn).  By those gnostics, however, al-Shaʿrānī mostly meant Ibn ʿArabī. As the 536
book’s editor Mahdī ʿArār showed, the vast majority of the book is simply quotations 
from Ibn ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt, while the other sections are based on the teachings of al-
Shaʿrānī’s main spiritual guide ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ al-Burullusī (d. 953/1533). In this 
work, al-Shaʿrānī took the jurists and judges to task for the fault of not acting upon their 
knowledge and described the damage that this in turn did to wider society, the laypeople 
in particular. In this work, al-Shaʿrānī aimed to strip the authority of the law from the 
hands of the jurists and place it in the hands of the Sufis, like al-Tirmidhī before him.  
 The title of this work is telling: it insinuated that the majority of the scholars, 
especially those who criticised the Sufis, did not act upon their knowledge. The purpose 
of the book, as its author said, was ‘to show the greatness of the Sharīʿa (by revealing 
many of its secrets), to show that those (jurists) who are ignorant of the different 
spiritual states of the saints are even more ignorant of the states of the Prophet and his 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Badr al-munīr, 4.534
 He mentions the date at the end of the work. Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 200.535
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 65. 536
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Sharīʿa, and ‘out of compassion for some of our jurist brothers’ who wrongly believe 
that the Sufis are ignorant of the rulings of the religion.  In other words, the book was 537
a display of the wondrous sciences of the Sufis, being those who who acted upon their 
knowledge, in order to show the jurists, who did not, their ignorance of the Sharīʿa 
which they considered their domain. He criticised them for thinking that they are 
superior to the Sufis and complained that their supposed knowledge only led them to 
acting haughtily in front of the common people.   538
 Irshād al-ṭālibīn aimed to display the intimate knowledge that Sufis were 
granted by God of every facet of the divine law as gifts from God (ʿulūm wahbiyya) by 
virtue of them being the inheritors of the prophets. These secrets cover everything from 
how the divine scriptures were revealed, to the wisdom behind the sending of the 
messengers with divine decrees, to the secret behind all the divine commandments. It 
also listed the manners of the real scholars who act upon their knowledge and thereby 
become gnostics. He explained - like Ibn ʿArabī did - that there were yet other secrets of 
the law that were revealed by virtue of scholars acting upon their knowledge (ʿulūm 
kasbiyya),  but by making this distinction clear and then focusing on the first kind of 539
secrets, al-Shaʿrānī was trying to prove once again that the jurists had no claim to being 
the inheritors of the prophets, and that it is the Sufis who shared in this rank with the 
traditionists. 
 In this work al-Shaʿrānī also criticised the jurists on their works of jurisprudence 
and some of their juristic practices. On their personal lives, al-Shaʿrānī criticised the 
majority of the jurists for their love of wealth, which he argued veiled them from being 
able to understand the Qur’ān and Sunna without need of explanation as the Sufis are 
able to. The jurists required explanations by the words of faulty humans whose limited 
understanding stripped these original sources of their vastness and richness. This led 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 84.537
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 74, 191-198.538
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 79-80. This is one of the main topics of Ibn ʿArabī’s Tanazzul al-amlāk.539
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them to a limited and rigid understanding of the law that made the lives of the common 
people who followed them very difficult.  540
 Al-Shaʿrānī also criticised the jurists for occupying all their time with 
interpreting each others’ words: what can be understood from every author’s word or 
sentence directly, and what is implied or could be extracted from his phrasing. This 
distanced them from the infallible and pure Sharīʿa and from understanding its secrets, 
and they thus wasted their lives by greatly increasing the time required to gain 
understanding of the religion. What the Qur’ān and Sunna stated clearly was enough for 
the Muslims, and the job of the scholar was simply to transmit it without additions.  A 541
related issue that Shaʿrānī criticised is that jurists then took what was understood from 
the writings of authors of jurisprudential works or commentaries and attributed the 
import of their sayings to the school of law to which the authors belonged. The jurists 
all imitated each other and built upon each other’s writings and opinions, resulting in 
books as large as twenty volumes, when the sayings of the original imam of that school, 
if collected from these twenty volumes, would not add up to a single volume. All of that 
extra work - including legal tricks (ḥiyal) that were created to circumvent certain 
injunctions of the law - were then attributed to that school or to the imam of that school. 
However, al-Shaʿrānī argued that nothing may be attributed to an imam unless he 
himself said it and did not retract that opinion until his death.  542
 The final and most important criticism of jurists that concerns us here is that 
their opinions were only based on ẓann (probability) and not on certainty. Despite the 
fact that their opinions were mere conjecture, they still argued and debated with each 
other, ‘so upon what basis does one say to the other: leave your conjecture for my 
conjecture?’  As for the people of certainty, they are the gnostics who saw the truth by 543
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 158.540
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 164.541
Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 183. This point will be repeated again by al-Shaʿrānī in Kashf al-ghumma, 542
1:6.
Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 171.543
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way of unveiling (kashf) and divine teaching (al-taʿrīf al-ilāhī) - an expression used 
often by Ibn ʿArabī - and this direct spiritual vision of the truth keeps them bound to the 
Sharīʿa. Such people therefore do not debate each other because there is no 
disagreement between them.  These gnostics may give fatwas and answer people’s 544
questions on the law because they had certainty and were not swayed by the love of 
fame or authority. Their opinions are always in agreement with the prophetic traditions. 
As for the lower-ranking jurists who imitate a school’s opinions without knowing their 
bases in the Qurʾān and Sunna, they must be cautious about giving fatwas ‘especially if 
others can do that for them.’ Al-Shaʿrānī mentioned a prophetic tradition which said that 
rule is not given to those who seek it,  clearly implying that the jurists who loved 545
wealth and fame, did not deserve to have authority over the people.  
 In words that recall the tone of Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī wrote that the scholars 
who added a single ruling to the religion will be asked about it on the Day of Judgment 
and will regret adding something that the prophet refrained from commanding out of 
mercy for his community.  Al-Shaʿrānī divided the opinions of the scholars into three 546
types: 1) opinions that are in agreement with what is clearly stated in the Sunna, in 
which case what is being followed is the Sunna, and the scholar is simply relating what 
it says; 2) opinions that go against the clear statements of the Sunna, in which they are 
to be rejected and the Sunna is to be followed; and 3) opinions in which there is no 
apparent agreement or disagreement with the Sunna, and leaving them or acting upon 
them are equal unless they tend toward safety such as the opinion forbidding the use of 
marijuana or other substances that cause sedation without intoxicating; in such cases it 
is better to act upon them even if not clearly stated in the Sharīʿa.  547
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 171, 181.544
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 181.545
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 164-167. The last argument that the additions of the scholars only add 546
further restrictions on the lives of Muslims, that the scholars who made such additions will regret them 
on the Day of Judgment, and that that Muslims will not be blamed by God if they left acting upon 
anything not clearly stated in the Qur’ān and Sunna, is also in the preface to Kashf al-ghumma, 1:11-12.
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 164-5.547
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 Among the interesting features of this work is a long list of the names of 
sciences that are revealed to the gnostics. Al-Shaʿrānī hoped that any jurist who read 
that list would have to admit that they did not have the knowledge that Sufis had of the 
law. This list was inspired by al-Tirmidhī’s questionnaire in Khatm al-awliyāʾ which 
was a challenge to all those who claimed sainthood. It similarly recalls Ibn ʿArabī’s use 
of symbolic language in Tanazzul al-amlāk to frustrate those jurists who had no inspired 
knowledge. 
 The main purpose of this work, as we have seen, was to say that authority in 
matters of the Sharīʿa belongs to the saints, not the jurists. The book, as we have seen, 
used Ibn ʿArabī as its main source, but in its focus on the issue of authority it was more 
similar to al-Tirmidhī’s writings. There is in fact a possible reference to al-Tirmidhī in 
this work, as al-Shaʿrānī differed with Ibn ʿArabī on the issue of narrating prophetic 
traditions by their meaning instead of verbatim,  and stated that the people of 548
‘verification’ stated clearly that it is permissible for knowers of God to narrate traditions 
by meaning and not in their exact wording. It is most likely that al-Shaʿrānī here was 
referring to al-Tirmidhī who dedicated a chapter to this point in Nawādir al-uṣūl.  Al-549
Shaʿrānī wrote in al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya that al-Tirmidhī was promised in a miraculous 
vision that his books will resurface at the end of time to revive the law, which indicates 
the care and attention that his extant works would have received by al-Shaʿrānī.  We 550
now come to Kashf al-ghumma, where al-Shaʿrānī acted upon the ideas in Irshād al-
ṭālibīn and sought to strip religious authority from the jurists. 
 For Ibn ʿArabī’s position see Futūḥāt, 1:403.548
 Al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 4:117-122.549
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 255.550
 164
5.3 The Removal of the Fog 
  
At around the age of thirty-three, in the year 936/1530, al-Shaʿrānī wrote Kashf al-
ghumma ʿan jamīʿ al-umma (The Removal of Fog from the Whole Community). The fog 
that the title referred to as being a blight upon the entire Muslim community is the 
confusion created by the jurists. He said in the preface to the work that the laypeople, 
such as the craftsmen, tradesmen, and Sufi-aspirants (fuqarāʾ) were confused by the 
jurists of the different schools telling them that they should follow only one school of 
jurisprudence, that it should be their own school only, and that worship according to the 
other schools was invalid. Furthermore, these jurists rarely quoted the Qur’ān and 
Sunna and busied themselves instead with analysing the utterances of their predecessors 
and trying to extract new meanings from them, thus loading them with meanings that 
they may not have originally carried and creating new judgments out of them, then 
falsely attributing these judgments to the founders of these schools. This meant that if 
the common people tried to learn from the jurists, they would be wasting their precious 
time and would not be able to know if the jurists’ opinions had any evidence from the 
Qurʾān and Sunna.  In order to solve their predicament, he wrote them this work, 551
essentially an aḥādīth al-aḥkām work meant to be a replacement for jurists altogether. 
Al-Shaʿrānī followed Ibn ʿArabī in only accepting the traditionists, and not the jurists, 
as inheritors of the prophets. He further inferred from the Prophet’s statement, ‘and 
conveys [what I say] as he heard it’ a rejection of any additions to - or deductions from- 
the law as it came from the Prophet.  552
 He thus compiled a fiqh book without any fiqh - in other words a work of 
aḥādīth al-aḥkām which contained only sayings of the Prophet and his Companions. 
However, this work was different from the standard works of this genre in many 
respects. Firstly, it was different in that al-Shaʿrānī relied on the narrations used in the 
works of the early imams of fiqh, rather than the major collections of canonical 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:5-6.551
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:11.552
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traditions. He neither attributed the traditions to any sources nor did he investigate the 
authenticity of these traditions, stating that their use by the early imams was enough 
proof of their authenticity. He also refrained from commenting on the narrations or 
explaining them, stating that the understandings of scholars only limited the vastness 
and richness of the injunctions of the Qur’ān and Sunna, from which each was to take 
according to their own understanding. By leaving the Prophet’s words as they are, he 
left ‘the door of comprehension open to every one who sees or hears, from among the 
greatest of the gnostics to the rest of the creation, so that each understands according to 
the clarity or rust of the mirror of their hearts, and acts upon what they understood.’  553
Similarly, in his works al-Baḥr al-mawrūd and al-Durar al-manthūra, al-Shaʿrānī 
repeated that God only expected His servants to act upon that which they themselves 
understood, not the understanding of others, and that they therefore did not need to refer 
to scholars regarding the comprehension of a Qurʾānic verse or prophetic tradition.  554
Thus for al-Shaʿrānī, everything revolved around acting upon one’s knowledge as an 
obedient servant of God, and not upon having the knowledge without acting upon it.  555
It seems that for al-Shaʿrānī, what mattered most was the spirit of the law as a vehicle 
for man’s obedience to his Lord, not the particulars of it. 
 The introduction to Kashf al-ghumma makes it clear that it is based on the idea 
that people will not be responsible on the Day of Judgement for anything other than 
what is strictly stated in the Qurʾān and Sunna. He wrote in a passage which was clearly 
taken from the Futūḥāt that the Mahdī will come with the ‘pure religion’ and will only 
give judgments of lawful and unlawful as the Prophet would have done if he were alive, 
thereby bringing an end to all the added rulings that the mujtahids derived. The 
imitators of the scholars who will exist in his time will only follow him out of fear of 
his power, and will be at enmity with him inwardly for going against what their schools 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:8-9.553
 Cf. Ibn ʿArabī (Chapter Four, Section 4.2.3).554
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Al-Baḥr al-mawrūd, 71-2; al-Durar al-manthūra, 36.555
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say, not thinking that anyone could surpass their imams in knowledge. Al-Shaʿrānī then 
used this to support his work saying,  
From what we have said, everyone who is fair will know the correctness of what 
we intended in writing this book and that, if it was obligatory for the community 
to follow what was derived by the mujtahids as it was obligatory to follow the 
clear statements of the Sunna, the Mahdī would not put an end to [acting upon 
their derivations] when he emerges.  556
 Al-Shaʿrānī refrained from preferring one out of two seemingly contradictory 
statements or from saying that one abrogates another. He decided that it is not proper 
propriety (adab) toward the Prophet to use one tradition to abrogate another, as was the 
habit of the jurists who, when they saw two conflicting prophetic traditions, would 
attempt to discover which one came later in time in order to say that it abrogated the 
earlier tradition. He said that no one may abrogate the sayings of the Prophet but the 
Prophet himself in clear statements he made like ‘I had previously forbidden you from 
visiting graves but do visit them.’ As for two apparently contradictory statements by the 
Prophet in which there is no clear statement of abrogation, scholars have no right to 
abrogate one of them: it is bad adab.   557
 Al-Shaʿrānī explained the apparent contradiction between traditions through the 
idea that would become the basis for his Scale (mīzān). It is that the Sharīʿa does not 
create difficulty or constriction for mankind, but is expansive and accommodating, and 
therefore provides different value judgments or rulings for every case, based on the 
different circumstances and needs of the people. Every matter can have two rulings, the 
more stringent ruling (tashdīd/ʿazīma), which is the optimal course of action that is to 
be followed by those who have the ability to follow it, and the more lenient ruling 
(takhfīf/rukhṣa) for those who do not have the ability to do the former. There can also be 
different shades of stringency or leniency, allowing for multiple value judgements or 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:11.556
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:8.557
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rulings for every issue or practice. Hence, if there was a seeming contradiction between 
two prophetic traditions, the differences could be solved by applying their rulings to 
Shaʿrānī’s ‘Scale’ (mīzān) of stringency and leniency: one of the traditions is then 
understood to give the more stringent option, and the other gives the more lenient 
option.  He therefore advised those who used Kashf al-ghumma, if they were faced 558
with two different reports, to give preference to the tradition that tended toward 
precaution, rather than the one that tended toward leniency.   559
 I will explain this Scale in more detail when looking at the work dedicated to it, 
al-Mīzān al-kubrā, and will show its origin in the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī. It suffices 
here to say that this work was based on Ibn ʿArabī’s idea of mercy and ease for the 
people, and that no one was expected to act upon any derivations of the law by the 
scholars, nor upon the scholars’ understanding of the sources. The laypeople were given 
a manual to consult, giving them the relevant Qurʾānic or prophetic guidance on the 
issues they faced, and if they found traditions giving different answers then they were 
free to choose which to follow. Like Pagani noted, it gave emphasis ‘to the opposition 
between revealed (or inspired) law and legal reasoning’ as did Ibn ʿArabī.  560
 A question that arises is what drove al-Shaʿrānī to compose this work, and who 
were the jurists who made life difficult for the laypeople. Ibrahim believed that the 
jurists in question were purists who convinced some laypeople that they must seek ‘the 
truth,’ that is, ‘to seek textual sources directly, rather than rely on juristic views.’  He 561
defined purists as those who ‘supported school boundary-crossing, but only on 
evidential grounds.’  He therefore understood these laypeople to have ‘embraced [the 562
purists’] aversion to scholasticism and advocacy of textualism.’  However, I believe 563
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1: 5, 12-13.558
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:5.559
 Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilaf,’ 205.560
 Ibrahim, ‘al-Shaʿrānī’s Response,’ 130.561
 Ibrahim, ‘al-Shaʿrānī’s Response,’ 126.562
 Ibrahim, ‘al-Shaʿrānī’s Response,’ 130.563
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this is a misunderstanding. The laypeople who complained to al-Shaʿrānī were only 
motivated to seek the textual sources directly because of the dilemma that the jurists 
created for them. This motivation was of a secondary nature, sought as a solution to the 
situation caused by the jurists. It is very clear from al-Shaʿrānī’s portrayal of the 
situation that the jurists in question were those that Ibrahim called supporters of 
tamadhhub, and not those he classified as purists. Supporters of tamadhhub, were, as 
Ibrahim described them, ‘proponents of abiding by one school only in all 
transactions.’  Supporters of tamadhhub, who were by far the dominant force at the 564
time, believed that ultimately the truth lay with one opinion on any issue in the sight of 
God, but had a pluralistic understanding that ultimately this correct opinion was only 
known to God, and that everyone was rewarded for their ijtihād. They therefore 
believed that the followers of all schools were rightly guided, and that it was better for 
everyone to remain within the boundaries of a single school, out of fear that they might 
pick and choose opinions from the different schools based on their whims and desires. 
However, the problem, as al-Shaʿrānī portrayed it in al-Mīzān al-kubrā, was that these 
same scholars who professed this pluralistic understanding with their tongues, ‘did not 
believe it in their hearts,’ and in fact believed that only their school of law was correct 
on all issues, and that the positions of the other schools were incorrect.  This was the 565
situation as al-Shaʿrānī repeated again and again in al-Mīzān, and certainly the situation 
was no different when he wrote Kashf al-ghumma. The scholars did not change their 
position in those years between the writing of Kashf al-ghumma and al-Mīzān. Instead, 
al-Shaʿrānī changed his strategy in responding to the same problem. 
 The situation as al-Shaʿrānī described it in his introduction to Kashf al-ghumma, 
is that the scholars from each school were teaching that the truth lay with them, and that 
worship according to the other schools was invalid because they were wrong. It is only 
when the laypeople saw the supporters of each school saying that worship was only 
 Ibrahim, ‘al-Shaʿrānī’s Response,’ 126.564
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:11.565
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valid according to their school, and everyone else was wrong, that they became 
confused and worried that their worship was invalid. Therefore, they sought the textual 
sources as a way of being assured that their worship was valid.  These laypeople, 566
because of their need to earn a living or to spend their time in worship, could not afford 
to become scholars in order to evaluate the different positions as purists would have 
wished of them. Instead, their request, as portrayed by al-Shaʿrānī, or at least his 
solution for them, was a work that simply disposed of any scholastic output, and 
provided them with the prophetic traditions relevant for every issue, because it was only 
what was directly revealed in the Qurʾān and traditions that they would be asked about, 
and because no one was compelled to act upon the ijtihād of the jurists.  This was not 567
the attitude of the purists but instead reflected the attitude of the Ẓāhirīs and Ibn ʿArabī. 
Therefore, the situation paints a picture of intense rivalry between the scholars of the 
schools, driving the laypeople into confusion about the validity of their acts of worship. 
This was the source of the difficulty, the ‘fog,’ that drove al-Shaʿrānī to author Kashf al-
ghumma. We now come to al-Mīzān, where al-Shaʿrānī chose to highlight a very 
different aspect of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought: his approval of the ijtihād of the scholars and 
their schools. 
  
5.4 The Theory of the Scale 
It was only in his old age, at around the year 963/1556, that al-Shaʿrānī brought to 
light the theory of the Scale to which he had briefly alluded thirty years earlier in Kashf 
al-ghumma. He began with al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya (The Scale of al-Khaḍir), also 
known as al-Mīzān al-ṣughrā (The Minor Scale). In this work al-Shaʿrānī told the story 
of how he was taught this Scale by al-Khaḍir, who told him that he never taught it to 
anyone else before him. He then dedicated a brief section in description of al-Khaḍir’s 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:5-6.566
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:6-7.567
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rank (an intermediary rank between prophets and saints). After that he expounded 
briefly on the Scale and what it meant to have two levels of stringency on most matters, 
and argued for the correctness of all the schools of law. In the last third, al-Shaʿrānī 
decided to prove his Scale by going through examples of differences of opinion between 
the jurists and how they could all be explained by weighing them according to his Scale 
of stringency and leniency. He therefore chose a large selection of matters from the 
questions of ritual purity and prayer and explained them. 
Al-Shaʿrānī finally authored his al-Mīzān al-kubrā: The Major Scale. This work 
built on its smaller predecessor, but completed the task of discussing all the major 
questions of jurisprudence, making it a complete fiqh work. By mentioning the different 
rulings of the schools of law for each matter of fiqh, this work became a comprehensive 
work on comparative fiqh. It was of course more than that because it not only compared 
the different opinions of the schools but analysed them and attempted to explain the 
differences between schools based on his theory of the two levels of the Scale of the 
Law: stringency and leniency. It is clear from the introduction to this final work that al-
Shaʿrānī had discussed his ideas at length with his students, as well as with those who 
opposed his idea. His introduction was therefore much longer and provided clarification 
of the idea of the Scale. In it he responded to several misunderstandings of its concepts, 
usage, evidences, and ramifications. We will now look at the main theory behind this 
work and why it was written. 
5.4.1 The Two Levels 
 The main idea behind the Scale is that the law is not rigid, and that it allows for 
differences of opinions in order to suit people of different circumstances and abilities. 
There were different prophetic traditions that seemed contradictory because they were 
addressed to people of different circumstances or abilities. The Sharīʿa as a whole 
encompassed the entire body of Qurʾānic injunctions and traditions, as if it were a 
garment that was woven from the Qurʾānic verses and all the different traditions used 
by the different schools. If one tradition or evidence was rejected, then it is as if that 
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garment lost one of its threads. The Sharīʿa also embraced the ijtihād of the mujtahids, 
which was approved by the Sharīʿa and became added to it. The different opinions of 
the imams were also based on the different circumstances of the people and therefore 
represented different levels of stringency and leniency. The different traditions and the 
different opinions of the imams could all be explained as representing varying levels of 
stringency and leniency, all of which were part of the Sharīʿa.  568
 In Kashf al-ghumma, al-Shaʿrānī had criticised the followers of the different 
schools of law for ‘seeing with only one eye,’ that is, thinking that the Sharīʿa had only 
one level in which only one position on any one matter could be correct, rather than 
different levels of stringency and leniency. Because of this, if the imam they followed 
chose one judgment, whether it be a stringent or lenient one, they called it ‘his 
madhhab’ as if it is the only judgment that he accepted, and they asked the rest of the 
Muslim world to follow that opinion only and reject all others.  In al-Mīzān he added 569
that everyone who was honest about his imam would agree that had the imam been 
presented with the situation of a person of different circumstance, who was unable to 
follow the stringent judgment that imam had chosen he would have told him to follow 
the more lenient judgment that was chosen by a different imam; this then would have 
been the imam’s ‘madhhab’.  Al-Shaʿrānī therefore criticised the followers of 570
different schools for telling people in some circumstances that there was no way out of 
their problem in their own school and that the solution lay in another, forcing them to 
cross school boundaries out of necessity, which was in theory not looked upon 
favourably.  Instead, he argued that the scholars of the different schools should realise 571
that each person must necessarily be in a state in which he can either follow the more 
stringent or more lenient judgement, and must give him the judgment that suits him 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:35; al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 25.568
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:13.569
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 20.570
 This referral of people from a muftī or judge of one school to another, was not infrequent. See 571
Rapoport’s ‘Legal Diversity,’ 220-1.
 172
regardless of whether it was chosen by their own particular imam or not.  For al-572
Shaʿrānī, limiting people to one school of law meant removing its expansive nature and 
forcing people into following opinions that might not suit them in certain circumstances. 
He wrote, ‘The one with experiential knowledge of this Scale sees all the schools of the 
mujtahid imams and the opinions of their followers as part of one Sharīʿa for one person 
that comes in two degrees. Whoever acts upon either of its degrees is correct.’  573
 This is like the idea we saw expressed by Ibn ʿArabī in which all the different 
opinions of the imams formed one larger whole picture, giving the layperson free reign 
to choose what they wished from all the schools and opinions. Vikør summed up this 
idea of al-Shaʿrānī: 
His view was that all madhhabs must be taken into account as if they were one 
large madhhab. The views of the…schools formed the external limits of this 
unified system, setting the ‘stricter’ and ‘more lenient’ boundaries for what a 
Muslim was allowed to do. Within these limits, among the statements presented 
by the schools, each Muslim could determine his conduct freely, taking one 
position in one context and another in another.  574
5.4.2 The Fishing Net 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, quoting his teacher ʿAlī Al-Khawwāṣ, claimed that the founding 
imams of the schools were among the greatest of God’s saints, and therefore they must 
have had direct waking access to the Prophet just as his own teachers and other great 
Sufis are believed to have had. The imams had all of their opinions approved by the 
Prophet before putting them in their books or teaching them to their students. The 
imams used their spiritual unveiling and knowledge of the secrets of the Sharīʿa to take 
the different ranks and capabilities of the Muslims into consideration. In other words, 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:13.572
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:15.573
 Vikør, ‘Shaykh as Mujtahid,’ 371. Vikør said that the external limits were formed by the views of the 574
four schools, but in fact, they included also the known opinions of other schools now extinct and the 
great scholars of the early generations.
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some of the imams purposefully chose one judgement for the sake of the weaker 
Muslims, and left the more stringent judgements for other imams to choose. Their rules 
were therefore based on knowledge of the ḥaqīqa, and were all correct.  But the 575
imams themselves did not provide the answers to every ruling of jurisprudence, and 
those had to be worked out by their students and followers who came after them, and 
who did not necessarily have the same level of gnosis. Therefore al-Shaʿrānī’s claim of 
the correctness of the rulings of all the main schools of law was backed by another 
important principle of jurisprudence that comes from Ibn ʿArabī, and that is God’s 
approval of the result of each mujtahid’s ijtihād. 
 Ibn ʿArabī justified the positions of the scholars through the Divine stamp of 
approval: there is a prophetic statement accepting the ijtihād of every mujtahid. Al-
Shaʿrānī, however, wanted to explain how the ijtihād of every mujtahid could be 
correct, beyond the simple approval of the lawgiver. Al-Shaʿrānī explained that there is 
an original ‘source of the Sharīʿa’ (‘ayn al-Sharīʿa) from which the original imams 
derived their opinions, and their opinions were necessarily correct because they came 
from this source of the law. Those who reached the requisite level of spiritual progress 
and unveiling could witness this ‘source’ first hand, experientially, and discover where 
every mujtahid took their opinions from in that original source, and see with certainty 
how they were all correct.  As for the additions that were developed by the followers 576
of these imams, their positions were correct because they were built on the original 
positions of the imams and were connected to them, which meant that the ‘light of the 
Sharīʿa’ ran through them.  577
 One of the unique features of al-Mīzān al-kubrā is a series of drawn illustrations 
that al-Shaʿrānī included to explain his ideas. Perhaps the most important illustration 
was that of the fisherman’s net, which aimed to illustrate and explain the connection of 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:54-5.575
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:27-9.576
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:44.577
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the positions of the scholars to the ʿayn al-Sharīʿa. In this image, there is a large circle 
or ring at the top, representing the ‘source of the Sharīʿa.’ The first row of little rings 
attached to the large one represents the opinions of the earliest imams, based directly on 
this source of the Sharīʿa. The second wider row of rings is connected to the first row, 
and then another wider row connects to that, producing a long succession of rows 
getting wider and wider, representing the deductions of successive generations of 
scholars, each building on the work of their predecessors. The very fact that each 
generation’s deductions built upon the ones that came before them meant that they were 
connected to the original source of the Sharīʿa and stemmed from it, and therefore could 
not possibly be incorrect.  He did caution however that if jurists affiliated with a 578
school of one of the imams went against that school’s principles to come up with an 
ijtihād that went against the Qurʾān, Sunna or Consensus, then he was not truly a 
follower of that imam but of his own desires, and his ijtihād was to be rejected.  In his 579
previous work al-Mīzān al-ṣughrā, al-Shaʿrānī’s expression was clearer,  
Whoever witnesses [the connection of the opinions of the scholars to the source of 
the Sharīʿa] accepts the truth of all the opinions of the scholars who follow the 
imams, as long as they do not go against their texts and their principles, or against 
a consensus, for whoever does that is not a follower of any of the imams, but a 
follower of Satan. Therefore when we refer to the followers of the imams in this 
Scale, we refer to those whose speech falls under their principles.  580
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:62.578
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:5.579
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 7.580
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Top illustration: The equality of all the schools of law, the four that are extant, and the rest 
which are extinct, because they are all equally connected to the Source of the Sharīʿa. 
Bottom illustration: The Fisherman’s Net. The ring at the top represents the Source of the 
Sharīʿa. The next set of rings represent the positions of the imams of the schools, and each 
subsequent set represents the positions of the scholars who came after them. This serves to show 
that the positions of the scholars were necessarily connected to the original Source of the 
Sharīʿa and were therefore correct.  581
 Note: I took these illustrations from a print of the Mīzān different than the one I referenced 581
throughout the chapter, because in this edition both illustrations that I wanted were on the same page. 
They were taken from al-Shaʿrānī, Kitāb al-mīzān, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿUmayra, 1:194. See also al-
Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:61-2.
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5.4.3 What is the ‘Source of the Sharīʿa?’ 
 One of the core ideas in al-Shaʿrānī’s theory is that all of the opinions of the 
imams go back to ʿayn al-sharīʿa, and that the saints can reach a stage where they come 
to witness this ʿayn al-sharīʿa and see with their own eyes how the imams took their 
opinions from it, and how they were therefore all correct. Different interpretations have 
been offered to explain this phrase. The word ʿayn could mean source or spring, or 
could mean the very essence of a thing. Radtke understood it to mean ‘the very source 
of the sharīʿa - i.e. the Prophet Muḥammad.’  This does not however match the 582
gender that is used throughout for this source, and even though al-Shaʿrānī did claim 
that the imams all had waking visions of the Prophet, it is clear that what he meant was 
something different. Pagani understood ʿayn in its meaning of essence, and explained it 
to possibly mean ‘the sharīʿa itself’ or ‘the sharīʿa is it really is,’ comparing al-
Shaʿrānī’s usage to another expression by al-Khawwāṣ where he uses the word ‘ayn in a 
similar sense.  In other words, it is the original Sharīʿa as God and His Prophet 583
intended it, before the approved additions of the scholars. This is similar to the 
argument put forth by Ḥassan al-Qaṣṣāb, who wrote a thesis evaluating the Scale as a 
coherent theory from the perspective of uṣūl al-fiqh. Al-Qaṣṣāb argued that the 
expression referred to what was left as mujmal or not clarified explicitly in the Qurʾān 
and Sunna.  That is because al-Shaʿrānī stated that the role of the Prophet was to 584
clarify what was not clear in the Qurʾān, and the job of the imams was to clarify what 
was not clear in the statements of the Prophet, and the job of their followers was to 
clarify what was not clear in the statements of the imams and so on. In other words, in 
al-Qaṣṣāb’s understanding, the opinions of the imams come from the ʿayn al-sharīʿa 
 Radtke et al., Exoteric, 16.582
 Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilaf,’ 195.583
 On ‘mujmal’ texts and their interpretation see Kamali, Principles, 135-8; Hallaq, History, 43-4.584
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because they were clarifications of the Sharīʿa, being the Qurʾān and Sunna, and so they 
could not be separate from it.  If that was what al-Shaʿrānī meant, however, he could 585
have simply called it the mujmal. Furthermore, unlike Pagani or al-Qaṣṣāb’s 
understanding, al-Shaʿrānī’s descriptions of this ʿayn al-sharīʿa make it clear that he 
was referring to something that could be witnessed and experienced spiritually, what he 
called in the very beginning of his book a ‘mashhad’ or scene, of the connections of the 
opinions of the imams to the ʿayn al-sharīʿa. Al-Shaʿrānī’s descriptions suggested that 
one could ‘see’ the connections in a sensory way. In more than one place in his work, 
including the passage that will be quoted below, he referred to this ʿayn as ‘ayn al-
Sharīʿa al-kubrā: the great or large ʿayn of the Sharīʿa. This phrase rules out the 
possibility that ‘ayn al-Sharīʿa could refer to the very essence of the Sharīʿa. 
 I will propose that the answer lies in a single passage in al-Mīzān itself, which 
makes it clear that he took his concept of ʿayn al-sharīʿa from the Futūḥāt. Al-Shaʿrānī 
wrote, 
Shaykh Muḥyī al-Dīn said in the seventy-third chapter of the Futūḥāt: ‘…when 
the servant reaches the knowledge of God, “where there is no goal beyond God,” 
there he will see by way of unveiling and certainty the presences (ḥaḍarāt) of the 
divine names, and will see the connection of all the opinions of the scholars to the 
presence of the names. All differences of opinions among the schools of the 
mujtahids will be removed for him, because he will witness the connection of all 
their opinions to the presence of the names and attributes (of God) - not a single 
one of their opinions goes outside of their presence.’ This is like what we have 
said earlier about the ‘ayn al-Sharīʿa al-kubrā.  586
Here al-Shaʿrānī stated that the knower of God will reach a station where he sees the 
origin of the opinions of the mujtahids in the presence of God’s names, and then 
 See al-Qaṣṣāb, Naẓariyyat al-mīzān, 51-4. 585
 Al-Sh’arani, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:39.586
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explicitly equated it to his description of the ‘ayn al-Sharīʿa. This passage is not an 
exact quote from the Fūtūḥāt but rather an explanation or elaboration based on al-
Shaʿrānī’s understanding. Though the concept of the ‘presences of the divine names’ is 
a major theme in the Futūḥāt, it was not directly mentioned in the actual passage that al-
Shaʿrānī referred to.  The passage referred to comes from Ibn ʿArabī’s responses to al-587
Tirmidhī’s questionnaire, in which Ibn ʿArabī discussed the prophetic statement ‘there 
is no goal beyond God.’ There he discussed a spiritual station where the seeker realises 
that acting upon the strict rules of the law (ʿaẓīma) is equal to acting upon divinely-
granted concessions (rukhṣa) because God is found in both. He continued, 
It is similar to when a seeker travels the path as a Ḥanbalī or Ḥanafī, limiting 
himself to a single school through which he worships God and does not believe in 
going against it. Arriving at this mashhad then leads him to worship according to 
all the schools without differentiating between them.  588
Al-Shaʿrānī understood this mashhad to refer to the connection of every judgement and 
property to the divine names of God, an idea repeated often in the Futūḥāt.  This in 589
turn is similar to the belief of al-Tirmidhī who had stated in his works ʿIlm al-awliyāʾ 
and Taḥṣīl naẓāʾir al-Qurʾān that all knowledge stems from the names of God: God’s 
ordering of the universe, His judgements, and what He made permissible or forbade, all 
emerged from the names. The sciences of the names, in turn, could be found in the 
letters of the alphabet.  Ibn ʿArabī made explicit reference to this idea of al-Tirmidhī 590
in his Futūḥāt when he discussed the secrets of the letters of the alphabet. He wrote, 
 On the ‘presences of the names’ see Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge, 4-6.587
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:43.588
 See Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:39, 508.589
 This passage from Kitāb ʿilm al-awliyāʾ has been translated by Radtke and O’Kane as part of an 590
appendix to Concept, 223-5. See also the passage I translated from Ṭaḥṣīl naẓāʾir al-Qurʾān in Chapter 1 
(Section 1.3.3).
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‘this science [i.e. of the letters] is called the science of the saints, and it is through it that 
the essences of all created things appear....That is why al-Tirmidhī considered it to be 
the science of the saints (ʿilm al-awliyāʾ).’  591
 Therefore, I propose that by ʿayn al-Sharīʿa, al-Shaʿrānī referred to the names of 
God, from which all divine judgements emerge, an idea that he took from Ibn ʿArabī, 
who in turn took it from al-Tirmidhī. The difference however is that Ibn ʿArabī had 
stated that the imams, though they were in the Station of Proximity, did not necessarily 
know this, and were not necessarily aware of the divine origin of their inspiration 
(Chapter Three, Section 3.1). Al-Shaʿrānī’s rewording of the passage, however, suggests 
a process akin to al-Tirmidhī’s siyāq where the saints actively used their insight to 
penetrate to the realm of God’s decrees, and from there to the realm of God’s names, 
and found the answer they sought (Chapter Two, Section 2.3). In al-Shaʿrānī’s 
conception, then, the imams purposefully chose their opinions based on unveiling 
(kashf) as he stated elsewhere in the Mīzān.  592
5.5 The Reasons for Writing al-Mīzān 
 Al-Shaʿrānī had hoped that Kashf al-ghumma would suffice laypeople in their 
affairs. Ibn ʿArabī had stated that the Mahdī would appear at the end of time with the 
pure Sharīʿa without the derivations of the schools. Al-Shaʿrānī claims to have heard a 
heavenly voice telling him that Kashf al-ghumma will remain until the time of the 
Mahdī, so that the Mahdī’s followers and companions could use it and not have to refer 
to him for the majority of their religious questions.  Almost thirty years after Kashf al-593
ghumma, at the age of sixty, al-Shaʿrānī authored al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, which was 
soon followed by al-Mīzān al-kubrā. The theory of the Scale existed from the time of 
Kashf al-ghumma as it appears in its introduction, but was not explained there fully. At 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:190.591
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:54.592
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Kashf al-ghumma, 1:10.593
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the end of al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, al-Shaʿrānī wrote that for thirty-two years he had 
been hinting at this theory but had not divulged it out of fear that it would not be 
understood. However, as he approached old age and death was not far off, he feared that 
he was religiously and morally responsible for sharing this Scale, hoping that one day, 
perhaps after his death, people would act upon it. He saw in this work a way to increase 
the respectful etiquette due to the imams and those who imitated them, and to defend 
them from those who objected to them or the evidence they used.   594
 Al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya was a small work, concerned mainly with the theory of 
the Scale, and only included a single chapter in which the theory was applied and 
demonstrated over issues of ritual purity and prayer. Al-Shaʿrānī’s main concern was to 
show that there are no contradictions in the Sharīʿa and to create mutual understanding 
and unity between the followers of the different schools of law within Sunni Islam. The 
general Sunni belief is that all the imams of the schools and their followers are rightly-
guided, but al-Shaʿrānī was troubled by the attitude of the followers of the schools, the 
jurists and their imitators, who did not seem to truly believe this, and who acted as if 
acts of worship and transactions done according to schools other than their own were 
invalid. His aim then, as he repeated again and again, was to make the internal belief of 
these jurists and their followers match the statements that they proclaimed with their 
tongues, so that they refrained from attacking the imams, jurists, and followers of other 
schools.  Al-Shaʿrānī was particularly troubled by the enmity shown by jurists of other 595
schools to Abū Ḥanīfa and his school, and dedicated long sections in both mīzans to 
defending him and his opinions.  We could say, based on al-Shaʿrānī’s own wording, 596
that the theoretical part of this work was aimed mostly at jurists and students of 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 78-9.594
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 8.595
 See for example al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 54-76. If one of the main purposes of al-Shaʿrānī’s Scale was to 596
defend the validity of other schools in the face of Ottoman Ḥanafisation as A.F. Ibrahim argued, he 
might not have gone to such length to defend the school of Abū Ḥanīfa or argue that among the schools 
it would last the longest and would continuously gain strength until the end of time (al-Shaʿrānī, al-
Mīzān al-kubrā, 89).
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jurisprudence (ṭalabat al-ʿilm),  whereas the practical demonstration was also of 597
interest to his own disciples (al-ikhwān).  However, what was the reason for then 598
vastly expanding both the theoretical and practical parts of the work in a new 
endeavour: al-Mīzān al-kubrā? 
 It is clear that the introduction (theoretical part) of al-Mīzān al-kubrā was the 
result of discussions of its earlier counterpart in al-Mīzān al-ṣughrā, and that al-
Shaʿrānī felt the need to defend and explain himself better for its intended audience, 
who were jurists and students of knowledge. In this work, however, the theoretical 
section, even though it was far larger than its earlier counterpart, became only an 
introduction to the far longer practical demonstration of the theory across topics of 
jurisprudence usually covered in jurisprudential manuals. This was a reverse of the al-
Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya in which the theory of the Scale was the main work, and the 
practical demonstration only an appendix. Al-Shaʿrānī stated that the earlier work, with 
its examples from questions of ritual purity and prayer, was not enough, and that he 
needed to go through the entire range of jurisprudential matters so that his readers could 
feel a sense of certainty at the correctness of any major opinion they follow.  It is clear 599
that this practical part of the Scale, being the comparison, explanation, and defence of 
the opinions of the different schools, was now meant for the Muslim community at 
large, and no longer just for scholars and students of jurisprudence.   
 The question to ask is why al-Shaʿrānī’s final approach was to offer the general 
Muslim community a guide to understanding and applying the opinions of the schools 
as one whole body of law to choose from, rather than his earlier approach of simply 
offering them prophetic traditions instead. It is possible that, despite al-Shaʿrānī’s 
assurances that everyone would only be taken to account according to their own 
understanding of the revealed sources, his readers were not very confident in their own 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 13.597
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya, 79-80.598
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:56.599
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understanding of the texts, and preferred the understanding offered by the imams and 
scholars. Secondly, while Kashf al-ghumma offered many different traditions of the 
Prophet and his Companions which might seem contradictory, and the reader was left to 
choose an opinion that suited them, the Scale offered them an explanation of why there 
were different traditions, and which of them would be preferable for those who could do 
both. Third, it would have reassured the layperson that his acts of worship were valid, 
whether he stopped at the Qurʾān and Sunna, or chose to follow one of the schools. 
However, the most likely reason is that the approach in Kashf al-ghumma, with its 
rejection of the entire enterprise of the schools and their scholars, was seen as too 
radical at that time, in the ‘age of taqlīd,’ and would not have been a very successful or 
appealing approach. Therefore, I will argue that the switch from Kashf al-ghumma to al-
Mīzān was a change of strategy, based on what would have been a more acceptable and 
successful method to reach the same goals in the age in which al-Shaʿrānī lived. This 
point will become clearer in the sections below. 
  
5.5.1 The Established Order 
 Pagani stated that al-Shaʿrānī’s acceptance of the differences of opinion among 
the schools of law in al-Mīzān was a departure from the thought of Ibn ʿArabī because 
it ‘entails the acceptance of the authority of the community and of the scholars who 
represent it.’  Ibn ʿArabī, however, did not intend to reject the authority of the 600
scholars altogether. Although al-Tirmidhī may have rejected the authority of the 
scholars simply out of the principle that they were unqualified for ijtihād, Ibn ʿArabī 
approved of their ijtihād on the basis that God honoured them by allowing it. He only 
rejected their authority when it removed the mercy from the law. If, however, they did 
not force people to remain within one school, or did not force people to follow their 
added derivations, then he did not question their authority or their place in the 
 Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilāf,’ 205.600
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community. As Addas stressed, Ibn ʿArabī’s independence of thought did not mean ‘that 
he reject[ed] the legacy of the masters who preceded him. On the contrary, he was in 
complete solidarity with them.’  The case is similar with al-Shaʿrānī. The Mīzān 601
approved of the authority of the scholars and approved of the laws that they derived, but 
it gave the reader the ability to look at a host of juristic opinions and make their own 
informed decisions without having to obey the scholars if they told them to remain 
within the boundaries of one school. The Mīzān approved of the scholars’ work and yet 
at the same time gave freedom to laypeople. It allowed them to remain within a school 
if they so wished, and in fact praised that as a good act,  and assured them that, 602
contrary to what preachers from other schools told them, their worship was valid.  
 The best way to see what al-Shaʿrānī’s motives were and what the 
implementation of his ideas meant in practice in his time and age, is to look not only at 
the arguments of the book itself, but to look at other works that described his actual 
practice as a religious authority and Sufi shaykh. One of the most important and most 
popular of these works is al-Baḥr al-mawrūd, a collection of principles that al-Shaʿrānī 
lived by as a Sufi guide.  In it he wrote, 603
We took an oath not to restrict any of the laypeople among the Muslims to follow 
one particular school only, not using any of the others, unless that was easy for 
them. If that was hard for them, we accept every action they do as long as they 
remain within the fence of a mujtahid among the mujtahids. This is out of fear of 
the supplication of the Messenger of God applying to us in his saying: ‘Oh God, 
he who makes things difficult for my nation, make things difficult for him!’ No 
 Addas, Voyage, 4.601
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:25.602
 The continued importance given to this work over the years is indicated by the fact that the main 603
manuscript upon which the modern editor relied was made into a religious endowment at a Damascene 
institute of learning by the city’s most celebrated ḥadīth scholar in recent memory, Badr al-Dīn al-
Ḥasanī (d. 1935) (See the editor’s introduction to al-Shaʿrānī, al-Baḥr al-mawrūd, 26). ‘Badr al-Dīn al-
Ḥasanī was considered by many the leading ḥadīth scholar of his time in Damascus...His style of life and 
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one makes things more difficult for them than he who judges that their worship 
and dealings and marriage contracts are void because of things not stated clearly 
by the Sharīʿa, nor agreed upon by the imams, and commands them to follow only 
one school, though there are no prophetic traditions to show that the other schools 
are false. [Following a school] is a matter of: ‘but if anyone does good of his own 
accord, it is better for him’ (2:184)..... 
  It is not correct for the laypeople to follow only one school, nor could they even 
imagine doing that, and the laypeople have always, in every age, (simply) prayed 
and fasted with the (other) Muslims, and none of the imams ever told them that 
their worship is invalid, out of mercy for them. However this restriction has 
become dominant even with the popular preachers, who have made the people 
lose hope in their Lord’s mercy. I have seen some of them say to the people: ‘All 
of your acts of worship are void because you do not follow a particular school, 
and if your worship is void, then it is as if you have not prayed, and if you have 
not prayed, then you are from the wood of the Hellfire.’ This made things very 
difficult for the women and the laypeople, and had I not gone to save them, they 
would have perished out of hopelessness.  604
 In their assessments of al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Mīzān, Vikør and Pagani believed that it 
was al-Shaʿrānī’s teacher ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ who was the source of the main ideas in 
it.  Pagani held that al-Shaʿrānī was more faithful to Ibn ʿArabī in Kashf al-ghumma, 605
in which he emphasised the opposition between revealed law and legal reasoning, 
whereas in al-Mīzān he gave prominence to the acceptance of difference of opinion and 
‘blur[red] the boundaries between revelation and humanly constructed fiqh’ which 
meant that it ran ‘directly counter to Ibn ʿArabī’s intention.’  Ibn ʿArabī’s intention, 606
however, was mercy, and he was willing to accept the humanly constructed fiqh as a 
source of mercy and expansion for the Muslims, as it provided them with a plethora of 
options to choose from. He only criticised it when it was accompanied by the scholars’ 
insistence on limiting people to one school. This is a subtle point that is easy to miss 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Al-Baḥr al-mawrūd, 223. I have not seen any contemporary scholar refer to this key 604
passage.
 Vikør, ‘Shaykh as Mujtahid,’ 365; Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilāf,’ 180.605
 Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilāf,’ 205-6.606
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because Ibn ʿArabī only mentioned it once. Pagani herself said that al-Mīzān ‘made it 
possible to return to the original mildness of the law,’ by preserving all the different 
opinions in it as correct options,  and this mildness was precisely Ibn ʿArabī’s 607
intention, which was the basis for both his acceptance and rejection of the ijtihād of the 
schools. 
 Al-Shaʿrānī’s works in general reveal a very powerful and genuine concern for 
the wellbeing of his fellow Muslims. What is remarkable, however, is that throughout 
the majority of his works, especially those dealing with etiquettes and courtesy, he 
showed great respect and veneration for laypeople based on their different virtues. For 
example, al-Shaʿrānī held that anyone who practiced a beneficial trade, no mater how 
menial, was more beneficial to the community, and therefore in some respects superior, 
to the Sufis and scholars who dedicated all their time to worship or study and depended 
on alms for a living. Similarly, in the upperclass and the wealthy he saw refined 
manners worthy of being emulated.  Like his role model Ibn ʿArabī, al-Shaʿrānī was 608
concerned with being an inheritor of the mercy of the Prophet Muḥammad to all 
creation. In his autobiography Laṭāʾif al-minan, which he composed toward the end of 
his life,  al-Shaʿrānī praised God for having protected him from criticising the 609
opinions of others when he was studying jurisprudence in his youth, and guiding him to 
accept a multiplicity of opinions. He then quoted Ibn ʿArabī as stating that the 
multiplicity of schools and mujtahids was a mercy from God, allowing a person to move 
from one school to another whenever they were faced by constriction or difficulty, but 
that scholars took this mercy away by forcing people to remain within one school.  610
Because Kashf al-ghumma was too radical a solution in al-Shaʿrānī’s time, and might 
 Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilāf,’ 194.607
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not have received the approval of the majority of the scholars, al-Shaʿrānī likely sought 
to re-establish the mercy in the law by the opposite approach, that of al-Mīzān. 
 It should be noted here that al-Shaʿrānī had his own zāwiya which gave him the 
ability to be independent. In his time, leadership of religious institutions in Cairo such 
as madrasas and even the zāwiyas of the Sufis was given to learned scholars from one 
of the madhhabs, usually the Shāfiʿī.  Al-Shaʿrānī’s zāwiya however was a highly 611
prosperous institution, one of the wealthiest four zāwiyas in Egypt by his own estimate. 
‘His revenue-producing property included an island, whole villages with farms, ships, 
mills and shops. All these were exempt from tolls, taxes, or customs.’  This meant that 612
al-Shaʿrānī did not need to represent one of the schools of law. Furthermore he believed 
that a Sufi shaykh should be able to provide his students all the education that they 
needed so that they did not need to study elsewhere. Al-Shaʿrānī ensured that his 
students learned several branches of religious knowledge in his zāwiya, including 
jurisprudence.  He wrote guides to his students on what they needed to learn in every 613
branch of knowledge,  and even wrote a book on the basics of Arabic grammar for 614
them so that they would not learn grammar from the books of the grammarians.  Al-615
Shaʿrānī furthermore had the support of highly distinguished representatives of all four 
schools of jurisprudence, who were themselves attached to Sufi masters, and who 
venerated him for his piety and exceptional learning. Some of them, like Shihāb al-Dīn 
al-Futūḥī al-Ḥanbalī, were also admirers of al-Shaʿrānī’s Sufi master al-Khawwāṣ.  616
These scholars wrote authorisations in support of each of his major works that he 
 Winter, Society and Religion, 220.611
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attached at the end of these works.  Al-Shaʿrānī even attached seven authorisations 617
from representatives of all four schools to the end of Kashf al-ghumma,  and when he 618
was attacked for claiming to be an independent mujtahid, several prominent scholars 
came to his defence.   619
5.6 The Influence of Ibn ʿArabī 
 One reason that Pagani and Vikør thought that al-Shaʿrānī differed from Ibn 
ʿArabī was that al-Shaʿrānī insisted that the mujtahid imams could never be wrong and 
that ‘none of the opinions of the imams is the result of human reasoning, even if they 
seem to be based on qiyās. Thus, while paying lip-service to the Ẓāhirī rejection of 
qiyās, he voids the principle of its effectiveness.’  This, for Pagani, is an indication of 620
incoherence, but because al-Shaʿrānī was not a mujtahid, she said, he did not need to be 
coherent.  Pagani here again confused two different arguments of al-Shaʿrānī. He 621
argued that the ijtihād of the founding imams could never be wrong because they built 
their law upon spiritual realities (ḥaqīqa) and because of their direct contact with the 
Prophet. The imams, however, did not give the answer to everything in the law, and 
their followers continued the job after them. We have shown above how he accepted the 
ijtihād of their followers based on the Akbarī principle that the Prophet approved of the 
ijtihād of the mujtahids, and based on the idea that any ijtihād that was built on the 
original law and the sayings of the imams was, by virtue of its connection to them, 
correct. 
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 Al-Shaʿrānī’s defence of the imams therefore did not diverge from Ibn ʿArabī’s 
position, who, as we have shown, said that the imams never made mistakes. The only 
difference is that Ibn ʿArabī said that some of the mujtahid imams did not have kashf 
and were not aware that their opinions and those of others were divinely inspired, 
whereas in al-Shaʿrānī’s conception, the imams all had kashf and they all knew that 
their opinions could not be wrong because they received them in waking visions from 
the Prophet. Ibn ʿArabī’s position on the imams themselves was only mentioned once in 
the Futūḥāt and perhaps that is why it has been overlooked so far.  622
 Al-Shaʿrānī then, took the idea of waking visions of the Prophet as a source of 
law, which was popularised by none other than Ibn ʿArabī, and applied it to the 
founding imams even though Ibn ʿArabī himself did not. Al-Shaʿrānī’s source for this 
change of modality in terms of the imams’ ijtihād is the logic provided by al-Khawwāṣ: 
if Sufis like himself and other famed saints could meet the Prophet in the waking state 
and ask him about legal matters, then surely the mujtahid imams, who were of the 
highest rank of sainthood, could do the same. The implication, therefore, remained the 
same: the imams cannot be wrong. Only the modality was different, because in al-
Shaʿrānī’s conception, the imams knew that they were not wrong and consciously chose 
their opinions based on kashf and on the understanding that there will be different 
schools with their own sets of opinions, whereas in Ibn ʿArabī’s conception, they did 
not necessarily know that they were right and they therefore might have doubts about 
their own opinions and would criticise the opinions of others. 
5.6.1 The Extent of the Influence of the Futūḥāt on al-Mīzān 
 Having established that al-Shaʿrānī’s al-Mīzān did not truly diverge from the 
Futūḥāt, I now wish to show the extent to which it was actually based on it. It is true 
that al-Shaʿrānī referred to his teacher Al-Khawwāṣ by name more than Ibn ʿArabī in 
 Al-Shaʿrānī’s ‘free summary’ of this passage was mentioned in Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 282. As 622
stated earlier, this PhD dissertation in uṣūl al-fiqh was not referred to in Akbarī studies.
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his introduction to al-Mīzān. However, it seems that al-Shaʿrānī sometimes purposefully 
omitted the name of Ibn ʿArabī from the texts with which he addressed and criticised 
jurists in particular. In Irshād al-ṭālibīn, for example, a vast majority of the texts came 
from the Futūḥāt without mention of Ibn ʿArabī, as we have indicated earlier. Of course 
in Islamic scholarship it is acceptable to take entire passages from other scholars 
without naming the source, but that is not only what al-Shaʿrānī did. For example, in 
pages 75-6 of Irshād al-ṭālibīn, al-Shaʿrānī quoted a passage from the Futūḥāt without 
attribution, in a way that made the passage appear as his own. Following these passages 
he wished to support his statements by saying, ‘and our shaykh - may God be pleased 
with him - used to say...’ before quoting two entire pages from the same section in the 
Futūḥāt. The phrasing would make the reader assume that he meant al-Khawwāṣ who 
had been mentioned previously in the book, when Ibn ʿArabī had not, but that is not the 
case.  Al-Shaʿrānī did the same repeatedly in al-Mīzān.  623
 After al-Shaʿrānī described his theory of the Scale, he posed a hypothetical 
question by a reader, on whether he has seen any support for his Scale in the writings of 
previous scholars, ‘in accepting that the speech of the imams could be attributed to 
being based on two different situations, and that they all go back to the Sharīʿa.’ Al-
Shaʿrānī answered in the affirmative, paraphrasing Ibn ʿArabī in the Futūḥāt (vol. 2, 
43).  The first scholar whom he quoted to support his theory was therefore Ibn 624
ʿArabī.  Al-Shaʿrānī also incorporated many passages from the Futūḥāt without 625
attribution, like Ibn ʿArabī’s criticism of the need for analogy in the religion, and the 
sufficiency of the Qurʾān, using the same examples.  In other cases, however, he 626
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purposefully hid the source of his examples. In one section he said that the different 
value judgements came from different celestial sources: the obligatory came from the 
Calamus, the recommended from the Tablet, the forbidden from the Throne, the disliked 
from the Chair, and the permissible from the Lote-Tree. This passage came from the 
Futūḥāt, and al-Shaʿrānī had spoken about it at length in al-Yawāqīt wa-l-jawāhir, 
where he of course attributed it to Ibn ʿArabī. In Irshād al-ṭālibīn, however, being a 
book directed at jurists, and in which he wished to display the knowledge of the saints, 
he did not give a source for the passage,  and in al-Mīzān he attributed it to the 627
‘consensus of the people of authentic unveiling.’   628
 In a later discussion where al-Shaʿrānī discussed the connection of all the 
scholars to a single source, and how those who fully implement the law will arrive at 
witnessing this source and will no longer adhere to a single school, al-Shaʿrānī named 
Ibn ʿArabī as his source, but paraphrased the passage he used.  Following that he said, 629
‘I heard my master ʿAlī al-Khawwāṣ - may God have mercy on him- say,’ before 
quoting another key passage from the Futūḥāt; this passage, al-Shaʿrānī wrote, ‘is a 
great testimony to the Scale because it shows the correctness of both opinions: is every 
mujtahid correct or not?’  Furthermore this passage is of such complexity that he 630
would have needed to copy it from the Futūḥāt and could not have attributed it wrongly 
to al-Khawwāṣ based on memory. On the very following page of al-Mīzān, al-Shaʿrānī 
openly quoted from the Futūḥāt, but then followed it by another lengthy paraphrase 
from the Futūḥāt which he prefaced by saying, ‘I heard one of the people of unveiling 
say....’  Therefore it is clear that al-Shaʿrānī did not wish to show the extent of his 631
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Irshād al-ṭālibīn, 66-7. See the footnotes by D. ʿArār, and the source being Futūḥāt, 1:438.627
 Al-Sh’arani, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:37.628
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:39. This passage from the 73rd chapter of the Futūḥāt was quoted 629
above.
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:40. The passage is from Futūḥāt, 2:43. 630
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 1:40. The passage is from Futūḥāt, 3:400.631
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reliance on a single source, especially one as suspect, in the eyes of many jurists, as Ibn 
ʿArabī. 
5.6.2 Al-Khawwāṣ and Ibn ʿArabī 
 Pagani, who believed al-Khawwāṣ to be the main source behind al-Mīzān, stated 
that although he was illiterate and therefore unable to read Ibn ʿArabī, ‘often spoke like 
him.’  Beside the possibility that Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings had reached al-Khawwāṣ 632
through his own masters, the main reason for the similarity in the content of their 
teaching is probably because al-Shaʿrānī would sometimes discuss what he read in Ibn 
ʿArabī’s works with his master.  His master’s explanations and confirmations would 633
have been the source for the passages in al-Mīzān which so often seemed to repeat what 
Ibn ʿArabī said in different words. Furthermore, al-Shaʿrānī did not quote his master 
verbatim. As he stated in Durar al-ghawwāṣ, a book in which he collected many of his 
master’s answers to questions he posed to him, al-Khawwāṣ did not possess the tools to 
express difficult concepts in technical terms, and al-Shaʿrānī therefore took what he 
understood from his master’s teachings and put it in his own words.  The influence of 634
Ibn ʿArabī’s writings on al-Shaʿrānī’s thought, therefore, would have influenced his 
presentation of his immediate master’s teachings. 
5.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have shown the extent of the influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings 
on al-Shaʿrānī’s thought in general, and his theory of the Scale in particular. I have 
argued that al-Mīzān al-kubrā was not a divergence from al-Shaʿrānī’s earlier writings, 
or from the teachings of Ibn ʿArabī, but that it was just as faithful to Ibn ʿArabī’s 
teachings as Kashf al-ghumma. Both works, though seemingly very different, 
 Pagani, ‘Meaning of Ikhtilāf,’ 180.632
 See for one example, al-Shaʿrānī, Durar al-ghawwāṣ, 14.633
 Al-Shaʿrānī, Durar al-ghawwāṣ, 5.634
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highlighted different aspects of the thought of Ibn ʿArabī. One highlighted the rejection 
of the derivations of the scholars, and one highlighted their acceptance. Even in the case 
of the latter approach, however, the option to ignore the derivations was still present. 
The Scale aimed to restore the mercy in the law by allowing Muslims to treat all the 
schools of jurisprudence as one all-encompassing school, or rather to treat the Sharīʿa as 
the sum of the all the schools, giving the Muslims the freedom to choose the options 
that suited their different circumstances and abilities, should they wish to follow the 
opinions of the scholars.  
 In practice, this did not amount to a return to the authority of the scholars 
because it allowed the Muslim to freely choose which opinions he wanted rather than 
abiding by the schools of law, and to use the book as a practical guide instead of 
referring to the scholars. The theory of the Scale was the result and culmination of 
decades of careful study and reflection upon the principles of law that Ibn ʿArabī 
scattered throughout his Futūḥāt. Al-Mīzān al-kubrā in fact was a more complete 
representation of Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas and was therefore more faithful to his teachings 
than Kashf al-ghumma. While Kashf al-ghumma only displayed one part of his aims, the 
rejection of the need to follow the derivations of the scholars, al-Mīzān al-kubrā kept 
this aspect while also showing the acceptability of acting upon these derivations as long 
as they were presented together as one whole. Ibn ʿArabī of course not only approved of 
the different opinions of the imams but gave a spiritual or inspired justification for all 
their different opinions and derivations over hundreds of pages. Al-Shaʿrānī did exactly 
the same, except that his explanations and justifications were at a far simpler level of 
understanding, and more accessible to the layperson. Therefore in practical terms, the 
bulk of the Mīzān mirrored the fiqh section of the Futūḥāt, which showed the inspired 
reasoning behind the different positions of the schools. It is easy to forget this fact when 
one focuses on the theoretical preface of the Mīzān and Ibn ʿArabī’s jurisprudential 
discussions. What was novel about al-Shaʿrānī’s work, however, was the gradation of 
these opinions into different levels of stringency. By making these ideas more accessible 
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to the layperson, one could argue that al-Mīzān al-kubrā was able to achieve Ibn 




Chapter 6: Aḥmad ibn Idrīs and the Implementation of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s Jurisprudence in the 19th Century 
 It would be difficult to know how many Sufis and scholars followed the 
jurisprudential thought of Ibn ʿArabī when it came to their own private worship, 
regardless of the school to which they might have officially been affiliated to.  In the 635
nineteenth century, however, we have a remarkable phenomenon in which the 
jurisprudential thought of Ibn ʿArabī was implemented and followed on a large scale by 
the different Sufi ṭuruq and scholars that constituted the Idrīsī tradition. It was perhaps 
the first time that the madhhab of Ibn ʿArabī, as a set of principles of jurisprudence and 
positive law, became ‘alive’ as a school. So far, however, all scholarship has attributed 
these teachings to the direct ijtihād of the eponymous founder of the Idrīsī tradition, 
Aḥmad ibn Idrīs (d. 1837), and overlooked the influence of Ibn ʿArabī. This is because 
Ibn Idrīs was a highly accomplished scholar, a master of Islamic disciplines such as 
ḥadīth and Qurʾānic exegesis, who proclaimed himself to be a fully independent 
mujtahid. Ibn Idrīs was also treated as an inspired authority by his students, and did not 
feel the need to cite any previous authorities. Ibn Idrīs’ biographer O’Fahey wrote, 
What is striking is how rarely he ever cites any previous authorities; in his lectures 
Ibn Idrīs interprets the Qurʾān and Sunna ‘straight’ on his own authority. For him, 
ijtihād was a real and living process, not an abstract ideal. In his lectures, there are 
occasional references to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, al-Ghazālī, al-Shādhilī, but there 
are as many references to poets (usually unnamed) when a few lines seem to 
express well what he wishes to say…  
 It was not uncommon throughout Muslim history for scholars to take official positions as judges or 635
muftis in one school, due to state sponsorship or other reasons, even though their own personal 
convictions and private worship were according to another. 
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Thus, Ibn Idrīs seems not only to have claimed the right to and to have exercised 
absolute (muṭlaq) ijtihād, but to have deliberately defied the sad judgement of Ibn 
Khaldūn, ‘The person who would claim independent judgement nowadays would 
be frustrated and have no adherents.’  636
 Ibn Idrīs certainly did interpret the Qurʾān and Sunna ‘straight’ on his own authority as 
O’Fahey put it, and he did so frequently, and he had all the intellectual tools and 
qualifications needed to do so. However, when it came to Ibn Idrīs’ most important 
teachings on jurisprudence, and the very ideas behind his own claim to ijtihād in the 
first place, I will demonstrate in this chapter that, for the most part, Ibn Idrīs was 
applying and popularising the opinions and principles of Ibn ʿArabī. 
6.1 The Life of Aḥmad ibn Idrīs: An Overview 
 Aḥmad ibn Idrīs was a nineteenth century Moroccan Sufi and scholar who spent 
more than thirty years preaching in the Ḥijāz, mostly in Mecca, where he acquired great 
fame and attracted a great deal of outstanding and highly influential students. In the 
estimation of Itzchak Weismann, Ibn Idrīs was one of ‘the two most outstanding 
religious reformers of the premodern era of Islam.’  John Voll summed up the range of 637
the achievements of the Idrīsī tradition, 
The achievement of Aḥmad ibn Idrīs was not the establishment of a single mass 
movement for revitalising Islam. What he did accomplish was to lay the 
foundations for an important revivalist tradition in Islam. The Idrīsi tradition gave 
birth to leaders of holy wars, men who established religious states, and a number 
of important centralised tariqas. It was an important feature of the Islamic world in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its success was such that observers at 
the end of the nineteenth century felt that it was the source of much of the Islamic 
dynamism of the time.  638
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 199.636
 The other being Shaykh Khālid of the Naqshbandiyya (Weismann, Taste of Modernity, 2).637
 J.O. Voll, ‘A History of the Khatmiyyah Tariqah in the Sudan.’ PhD. thesis, Harvard 1969, 103. As 638
quoted by O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 19-20.
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The life of Ibn Idrīs has been studied extensively by now, so we will only concern 
ourselves with those aspects of his life that directly relate to the subject at hand before 
we come to his teachings.   639
 Aḥmad ibn Idrīs was born in Morocco in 1750 to a family of prophetic descent, 
and memorised the Qur’ān and several Islamic texts before going to Fez at the age of 
twenty to study at the Qarawiyyīn, one of the Muslim world’s leading centres of 
religious learning. At that time, reforms had been instituted by the sultan Mūlāy 
Muḥammad (r. 1757-1789) which were in some ways similar to those of the Almohad 
sultans at the time of Ibn ʿArabī. This sultan encouraged a focus on Qurʾānic exegesis, 
canonical collections of prophetic traditions, and early works of jurisprudence, rather 
than the short codified compendia of law (mukhtaṣars) that had become popular since 
the 7th/13th century.  One of Ibn Idrīs’ main teachers at the Qarawiyyīn was the great 640
traditionist Ibn Sūda, described by the Egyptian historian al-Jabartī as ‘the crescent of 
the Muslim West,’ who authored a major commentary on Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, and was 
‘one of the most influential scholars of his day in Morocco, both politically and 
intellectually.’  Ibn Sūda taught Ibn Idrīs the six canonical collections of prophetic 641
traditions, as well as other texts on the science of ḥadīth.  These reforms gave Ibn 642
Idrīs the opportunity to master the ḥadīth sciences and the science of Qurʾānic exegesis 
 For more on the life and teachings of Ibn Idrīs see O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 27-106; Sedgwick, Saints & 639
Sons, 9-26; Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 100-118; Bang, Idrīsī State, 35-55; Dajani, Reassurance, 1-15; Thomassen 
and Radtke, Letters, 1-7; al-Jaʿfarī, al-Muntaqā al-nafīs, 13-92; Yaḥyā, Madrasat Aḥmad ibn Idrīs, 41-255.
 For more on the nature of these reforms see Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 36-9. The sultan did not 640
encourage full independent ijtihād and declared his loyalty to the Mālikī school in jurisprudence. He did 
oppose the blind imitation of the Mālikī school, however, encouraging a limited form of ijtihād: ijtihād 
bil-fatwā (Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 38). This simply meant that muftis were encouraged to evaluate the 
different positions within the Mālikī school and give their preference based on the circumstance, rather 
than abiding by the ‘preferred’ or standard opinion of the school at all times. These moderate reforms 
are a far cry from the type of ijtihād that Ibn Idrīs would call for, but they provided Ibn Idrīs with the 
necessary tools, resources, and skills to engage directly with the revealed sources and early works of 
law, which would allow him to practice his independent ijtihād.
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 35-6.641
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 36.642
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for which his lessons became famous. Ibn Idrīs excelled as a student and became a 
teacher in Fez himself in the 1780’s and 1790’s. 
 These policies of Mūlāy Muḥammad may have prepared the way for Ibn Idrīs’ 
exposure to Ibn ʿArabī, whose teachings he took from his Sufi teachers in Fez. Ibn 
Idrīs’ teachings on ijtihād, however, went far beyond the conservative Moroccan 
reforms. For example, Ibn Idrīs’ disciple Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Sanūsī (d. 1859) had 
studied in the same milieu as that of Ibn Idrīs in Fez, underwent a similar education, and 
shared at least one teacher with him, Ibn Kīrān (d. 1812), and yet he was shocked when 
he was confronted with the teachings of Ibn Idrīs. Al-Sanūsī first met Ibn Idrīs in 
Mecca. He wrote, ‘I did not accept him for not following the schools of law. I said to 
myself, “He is a Khārijī!”’ It was only after repeated dream visions of the Prophet that 
al-Sanūsī came to accept Ibn Idrīs as a spiritual authority and submitted himself to him 
as his disciple.  Regarding the similar education that Ibn Idrīs and al-Sanūsī received, 643
Vikør wrote, 
It is significant that the milieus in which Ibn Idrīs and al-Sanūsī moved in Fez 
were similar. The same names occur, albeit at one link removed in the chain of 
teachers. Thus what may be said of al-Sanūsī’s studies must to a large degree also 
be said of Ibn Idrīs; with the proviso that he left twenty years earlier and that he 
was older when he left than al-Sanūsī was.  644
  We will now look at Ibn Idrīs’ Sufi teachers and his links to Ibn ʿArabī. While 
studying at the Qarawiyyīn, Ibn Idrīs learned Sufism from a different set of teachers 
than his teachers of the Sharīʿa. His main spiritual guide was ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Tāzī 
(d. 1792 or 1798) with whom he spent four years until al-Tāzī’s death. He was 
considered a master in two ancient Sufi paths: the Shādhiliyya and the Naqshbandiyya, 
as well as a third new spiritual path, the Khaḍiriyya, that began with his own teacher, 
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 134-5, with some modifications to the translation. Unfortunately O’Fahey 643
did not understand al-Sanūsī’s statement ‘hādhā khārijī’ (meaning, ‘This man is a Khārijī!’) and 
translated it instead as ‘This is foreign (strange)’. 
 Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 103.644
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ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dabbāgh (d. 1132/1720). Ibn Idrīs took all three of these paths from 
al-Tāzī,  as well as others including the Ḥātimiyya of Ibn ʿArabī, all of which he 645
passed on to al-Sanūsī.  646
 The Naqshbandī and Ḥātimī paths that Ibn Idrīs took from al-Tāzī connected 
him to Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Qushāshī (d. 1071/1661), a highly influential Sufi and scholar in 
Medina who left behind a long-lasting legacy. Though famous as a Naqshbandī master, 
al-Qushāshī was also known as the foremost expounder of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings in the 
Ḥijāz, a role that was continued by his student Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī (d. 1101/1689).  For 647
Ibn Idrīs, however, the most important chain that al-Tāzī gave to him was that of al-
Tāzī’s teacher ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dabbāgh (d. 1132/1719) because of its short chain. This 
path was called the Khaḍiriyya because al-Dabbāgh claimed to have received it from al-
Khaḍir, who was, in the words of Ibn Idrīs, ‘the most complete of the solitary ones (al-
fard al-jāmiʿ).’  As stated in Chapter Three (Section 3.1), Ibn ʿArabī had called the 648
spiritual station of the afrād the maqām al-qurba; he also wrote that when he arrived at 
this spiritual station he was told that al-Khaḍir was with him in this station.  649
 Al-Dabbāgh had another disciple by the name of Aḥmad ibn al-Mubārak al-
Lamaṭī who was a highly accomplished Moroccan scholar.  This scholar wrote down 650
the teachings of his unlettered spiritual master in al-Ibrīz, which would become one of 
the most popular Sufi works ever written. Al-Lamaṭī often supplemented al-Dabbāgh’s 
teachings with the writings of al-Tirmidhī, Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī.  According to 651
al-Lamaṭī, al-Dabbāgh could verify the authenticity of prophetic traditions based on his 
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 53.645
 See al-Sanūsī, al-Manhal, 48; al-Salsabīl, 45-6.646
 On these two figures and their role in spreading the teachings and works of Ibn ʿArabī, see Taji-647
Farouki in Ibn ʿArabī, A Prayer, 32-5.
 From the letter of Ibn Idrīs to his disciple al-Mirghanī, in Thomassen and Radtke, Letters, 64.648
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:261-2.649
 See the testimonies of local biographers and chroniclers on al-Lamaṭī in O’Kane and Radtke (ed.), in 650
Pure Gold, xi.
 On the sources used by al-Lamaṭī in al-Ibrīz see Radtke, ‘Ibrīziana,’ 129-156.651
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spiritual unveiling, because he could see a light that would accompany the words of a 
true prophetic statement as it came out of the mouth of the speaker. Al-Lamaṭī dedicated 
a chapter of his book to the traditions whose meanings he asked al-Dabbāgh to solve, 
including a list of traditions whose authenticity he asked his master to verify.  Among 652
al-Dabbāgh’s teachings is that a saint who has received spiritual illumination will 
always know right from wrong and is not bound to any school of law. This, according to 
al-Lamaṭī, in words reminiscent of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings, is because they are 
constantly in the presence of the Prophet and in a state of spiritual witnessing of God, so 
that they know what God and His Messenger intended in the obligations that they made. 
Even if all the schools of law vanished from the earth, such a saint would be able to 
revive the Sharīʿa, but it is only the most perfect saints at the very top of the hierarchy, 
who know the Sharīʿa in its entirety.  Thanks to the scholarship of al-Lamaṭī, Ibn Idrīs 653
could have the teachings of his spiritual guide al-Dabbāgh side by side with those of al-
Tirmidhī, Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī in one work.  654
 After the death of al-Tāzī and then a subsequent shaykh, Ibn Idrīs described 
meeting with the Prophet Muḥammad and al-Khaḍir in a waking vision. In this vision 
Ibn Idrīs was given his own litanies to form the basis of his own spiritual way.  In the 655
year 1799, at the age of forty-nine, Ibn Idrīs arrived in Mecca, intending to spend the 
rest of his life in the two holy sanctuaries. He spent almost thirty years there, teaching 
mostly in Mecca but also in Medina and al-Ṭā’if. 
 Ibn Idrīs attracted a great following in Mecca and taught a circle of some of the 
Muslim world’s greatest scholars and Sufis who would change the face of the Muslim 
world and its history. Chief among them is Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Sanūsī, Muḥammad 
ʿUthmān al-Mirghanī (d. 1852) and Ibrāhīm al-Rashīd (d. 1874), whose ṭuruq, being 
 It is in fact the first chapter in the book after the author’s introduction to his master.652
 Al-Lamaṭī, al-Ibrīz, 325-6.653
 That Ibn Idrīs studied this work is clear from a passage recorded from one of his lessons, in which Ibn 654
Idrīs repeated al-Lamaṭī’s list of what he believed were among the three greatest afflictions to happen 
to the ummah. Compare Ibn Idrīs, al-ʿIqd al-nafīs, 28-29 with al-Lamaṭī, al-Ibrīz, 395-8.
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 48.655
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extensions of that of Ibn Idrīs, attracted huge followings and left a great impact on the 
Muslim world.  
 In Mecca, Ibn Idrīs’ teachings against taqlīd and his claim to absolute ijtihād 
aroused the anger of many scholars. The local Meccan scholars attempted to test Ibn 
Idrīs but he proved himself as both a mujtahid as well as an expert traditionist.  In a 656
final attempt, the scholars asked the great Egyptian scholar and Sufi, Aḥmad al-Ṣāwī (d. 
1825), who had come on pilgrimage, to debate him. Al-Ṣāwī lost the debate to Ibn Idrīs 
and even requested initiation into Ibn Idrīs’ path!  657
 In 1827, Ibn Idrīs moved to the Yemen where he spent the last ten years of his 
life, having left al-Sanūsī as his representative in Mecca.  He was well-received by the 658
scholars of Yemen and the chief judge of Ṣanʿā’, Muḥammad al-Shawkānī (d. 1834), 
‘lavished praise on him and advised people to obtain as much of his learning as 
possible.’  Although they never met, they had corresponded with each other by mail. 659
Ibn Idrīs finally settled in Ṣabyā, where he would be buried. A great number of students 
from the Sudan, East Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula’s Red Sea coast flocked towards 
him.  660
 Ṣabyā was in the area of ʿAsīr, then part of the Yemen but today part of Saudi 
Arabia. The influx of Sufis to the Yemen aroused the anger of the local Wahhābī 
scholars of ʿAsīr who set up a debate with Ibn Idrīs, which was recorded by one of his 
students. One of the central topics of debate was around the Wahhābī scholars’ 
accusation that Ibn Idrīs adhered to the ‘creed’ of Ibn ʿArabī.  As O’Fahey noted, the 661
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 77.656
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 14-15, 77.657
 Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 184.658
 ʿĀkish, Munāẓara, 153; O’Fahey, ‘Enigmatic Imam,’ 207.659
 ʿĀkish, Munāẓara, 146-7.660
 ʿĀkish, Munāẓara, 159.661
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arguments made by Ibn Idrīs in defence of Ibn ʿArabī were similar to the arguments of 
al-Shaʿrānī.   662
 The Yemeni Mufti ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Sulaymān al-Ahdal (d. 1835), who 
became Ibn Idrīs’ disciple, wrote that both the elect and the laymen benefitted greatly 
from the arrival of Ibn Idrīs in Yemen because they saw in his worship and in his 
dealings a model of perfect following of the Prophet. ‘This is especially apparent in the 
prayer for he….prays in the most perfect way as described in the authentic prophetic 
traditions.’  Al-Ahdal was pointing to the fact that Ibn Idrīs’ prayer did not conform to 663
any single school of law and matched instead the traditions in the most canonical 
collections of traditions. What al-Ahdal himself might not have known, however, was 
that Ibn Idrīs built his complete description of prayer, not by combing through the 
books of traditions and deciding on the most authentic narrations, but by combing 
through the Futūḥāt and following Ibn ʿArabī’s preferences to the letter. I will show this 
in a detailed comparison of their jurisprudence. Before we come to this, however, we 
must first examine the influence of Ibn ʿArabī on the thought and practice of Ibn Idrīs 
in general. 
6.2 Ibn Idrīs as Heir to Ibn ʿArabī 
 We have seen how the Wahhābī scholars of ʿAsīr accused Ibn Idrīs of being a 
follower of Ibn ʿArabī, and how Ibn Idrīs defended Ibn ʿArabī in those debates. The 
reason behind this accusation is that after Ibn Idrīs finished his daily teaching sessions, 
his closest students would hold their own gathering in which they studied together Ibn 
ʿArabī’s most controversial work Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam (The Bezels of Wisdom), as well as Ibn 
al-Fāriḍ’s poem al-Tāʾiyya with its commentary by Dāwūd al-Qaysarī (d. ca. 748/1347), 
a direct spiritual descendant of Ibn ʿArabī. These sessions were attended by a jurist who 
did not approve of what he heard and sent a complaint to the local ruler. It should be 
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 104.662
 Al-Jaʿfarī, al-Muntaqa l-nafīs, 32-3.663
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noted that O’Fahey misunderstood the relevant passages to mean that it was Ibn Idrīs 
himself who led this final session of each day, teaching his innermost circle these works 
from the school of Ibn ʿArabī, a mistake that was followed by subsequent authors and 
translators.  Although Ibn Idrīs did not himself teach in those sessions, he did instruct 664
his disciples to study Ibn ʿArabī’s work. We are informed of Ibn Idrīs’ recommended 
curriculum for his disciples in a letter written by al-Sanūsī. In terms of the Sharīʿa, Ibn 
Idrīs’ instructions were to study several collections of prophetic traditions, especially 
those pertaining to jurisprudential matters, ‘for it is not permissible for anyone to 
embark upon anything without knowing God’s ruling on the matter and its proof.’  665
Recommended were Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, the Muwaṭṭa’ of Mālik, Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī’s 
Bulūgh al-Marām, a work of the aḥādīth al-aḥkām genre, and Ibn Abī Zayd’s Risāla in 
Mālikī jurisprudence, which was recommended for its high content of prophetic 
traditions. In terms of Sufism, seven treatises were recommended, three of which were 
those of Ibn ʿArabī: a collection of aphorisms, Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam, and the Futūḥāt.  666
 It seems likely that Ibn Idrīs was considered by his students to be an heir to Ibn 
ʿArabī, or even to have surpassed him. The great exponent of Akbarī doctrine in 
Medina, Ṣafī al-Dīn al-Qushāshī, to whom Ibn Idrīs was connected through al-Tāzī, 
had argued that the Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood was not a station reserved for a 
single person, Ibn ʿArabī himself, but a spiritual rank that remained accessible until the 
end of time, with one man reaching it for every epoch. Al-Qushāshī himself laid claim 
to having reached that station.  Al-Shaʿrānī had also claimed that there was a Seal for 667
 See O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 94; Thomassen and Radtke, Letters, 3; as well as the translation of the 664
text in question by Radtke et al. in Exoteric, 179-183. When carefully read, the passages clearly show that 
those sessions were those of Ibn Idrīs’ innermost circle studying amongst each other, without Ibn Idrīs 
himself. See ʿĀkish, Munāẓara, 147-150.
 Al-Jaʿfarī, Aʿṭār, 110.665
 Al-Jaʿfarī, Aʿṭār, 110. The aphorisms of Ibn ʿArabī, al-Ḥikam al-ḥātimiyya, also known as al-Ḥikma al-666
ḥātimiyya, is not to be confused with al-Ḥikam al-ʿAṭāʾiyya which were also part of the seven 
recommended works.
 Al-Qushāshī, al-Ṣimṭ al-majīd, 183..667
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every epoch.  It is most likely that the disciples of Ibn Idrīs believed that their master 668
was among those who followed Ibn ʿArabī in attaining that rank. Ibn Idrīs never 
claimed such a rank for himself, but he quoted one of his own students who had 
reportedly asked the Prophet in a dream about the rank of his teacher. The Prophet had 
replied, ‘My son Aḥmad is a quṭb unlike any other quṭb, a ghawth unlike any other 
ghawth, a fard unlike any other fard... above them all and a source for them all.’   669
 Regarding their views of their teacher, al-Sanūsī described him in one letter as 
khātimat al-ʿārifīn al-aqṭāb al-ʿiẓām (the seal of the great poles and knowers of God).  670
He also wrote of a vision he saw in which one of the great saints from the preceding 
generation, Muḥammad al-Sammān, told him that none of the greatest of the saints in 
the history of the Muslim nation, neither Abū Yazīd, Sahl al-Tustarī, ʿAbd al-Qādir al-
Jīlānī, nor Ibn ʿArabī al-Ḥātimī, reached anything even near the status of Ibn Idrīs.  671
In a more revealing comparison by al-Mirghanī, the student wrote that his master 
‘surpassed al-Shaykh al-Akbar Ibn ʿArabī in knowledge and its subtleties, and 
surpassed al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī in what he received of speech that was sent to him.’  672
This last remark is of great importance in showing us that, in the eyes of his disciples, 
Ibn Idrīs was a continuation of these two figures in particular: al-Tirmidhī and Ibn 
ʿArabī. Ibn Idrīs was not only seen as a continuation of these two figures but as having 
surpassed each of them in what they were most known for: Ibn ʿArabī in the spiritual 
realities he spoke of, and al-Tirmidhī in Heavenly Speech.   673
 Among the greatest reflections of Ibn Idrīs’ mastery of Ibn ʿArabī’s doctrine are 
his litanies (awrād) and his fourteen formulas of invoking blessings upon the Prophet 
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 54-5; al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, 326.668
 Ibrāhīm al-Rashid, ‘Uqūd al-Durar, in al-Jaʿfarī, Aʿṭār, 28.669
 From a letter by al-Sanūsī in al-Jaʿfarī, Aʿṭār, 111. This indicates that al-Sanūsī may have viewed his 670
teacher as the seal of sainthood in their epoch.
 Al-Jaʿfarī, al-Muntaqa l-nafīs, 41.671
 Al-Jaʿfarī, al-Muntaqa l-nafīs, 39.672
 Al-Tirmidhī was probably associated with Heavenly Speech because he was the first to describe it in 673
detail (see Chapter One, Section 1.3).
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(ṣalawāt). O’Fahey, who attempted to downplay the importance that Ibn Idrīs gave to 
the ‘mystical philosophy of Ibn al-ʿArabī and the issue of waḥdat al-wujūd,’ 
commented that Ibn Idrīs’ invocations of blessings upon the Prophet and the 
commentaries that were subsequently written on them ‘imply an acceptance of Ibn al-
ʿArabī’s theosophy.’  Vikør on the other hand rejected any such downplay of the 674
importance of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings to Ibn Idrīs, reminding us that Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam was 
‘on the list of recommended reading for the students.’  In fact, the litanies and ṣalawāt 675
of Ibn Idrīs displayed not only an acceptance, but a mastery of Akbarī doctrine, which 
is why Akbarī experts were required to unlock them. 
 The Egyptian Muḥammad al-Hajrasī (d. 1910), a student of Ibn Idrīs’ close 
disciple al-Rashīd, wrote a large commentary on the same fourteen ṣalawāt in which he 
claimed to clarify the meaning of waḥdat al-wujūd in a way that both the elite and the 
layperson could understand, show its conformity to the law, and also explained the most 
problematic passages in the Futūḥāt al-makkiyya and the Fuṣūṣ. Al-Hajrasī called this 
Akbarī commentary on Ibn Idrīs’ ṣalawāt: al-Futūḥāt al-Madaniyya al-Hajrasiyya.  676
Upon his return to Egypt, the Ottoman Commissioner Aḥmad Mukhtār al-Ghāzī Pasha, 
who was in the words of O’Fahey an ‘Ibn Idrīs enthusiast,’ urged al-Hajrasī to write a 
more accessible abridgement of the original which became al-Jawhar al-nafīs fī ṣalawāt 
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 209. Likewise Levtzion believed that ‘Rejection of Ibn ʿArabī’s teaching, 674
particularly wahdat al-wujud, is counted among the characteristics of the reformist Sharīʿa-oriented 
ṭuruq,’ (Levtzion, ‘Sharīʿa-oriented Sufi Ṭuruq ’ 382). This idea can no longer hold weight, with al-
Qushāshī, al-Kūrānī, Ibn Idrīs, al-Sanūsī and others being dedicated teachers of his theological writings. 
Similarly, early Tijānī writers like al-ʿArabī al-Sāyiḥ who systematised the thought of Aḥmad al-Tijānī, 
relied heavily on Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī in their works. Levtzion also claimed that ‘Ibn ʿArabī’s 
mysticism engendered religious tolerance among Sufis who lived in mixed societies and blurred 
meaningful lines between religions,’ (383). Addas, however, showed that this was not the case and that 
Ibn ʿArabī’s ‘ecumenism was strictly subordinate to respect of the Law’ which, ‘when it comes to 
maintaining the territorial integrity of dar al-islam...calls for firmness and rigour.’ (See Addas, Voyage, 
119-20).
 Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 271.675
 Al-Hajrasī, al-Jawhar al-nafīs, 14. 676
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Ibn Idrīs.  Shaykh Muḥammad al-Dandarāwī (d. 1911), the main deputy and successor 677
of al-Rashīd, asked the Damascene scholar Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Bīṭār (d. 1910) to write a 
more accessible commentary on the fourteen ṣalawāt than that of al-Hajrasī. The reason 
al-Dandarāwī chose al-Bīṭār is because he was known for his ‘proficiency in al-Shaykh 
al-Akbar’s teaching,’ and ‘was a prolific author, primarily of commentaries on the 
works of Ibn ʿArabī and his school.’  Incidentally, another great scholar of the Bīṭār 678
family before him, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Bīṭār (d. 1916), was also asked, this time by his 
own brother, to explain a statement of Ibn Idrīs, which he did, ‘demonstrating his 
proficiency in the Akbarī teaching.’  This Bīṭār had learned and mastered Ibn ʿArabī’s 679
doctrine at the hands of ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī (d. 1883), whose teachings will be 
briefly discussed at the end of this chapter. The devotional literature of Ibn Idrīs was 
therefore seen as a distillation of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings by several later Sufis. 
 For Ibn ʿArabī, the higher realities that he taught were never separate from the 
laws of the Sharīʿa, as his crossover from the law to its inward realities shows time and 
time again throughout his jurisprudential discussions in the Futūḥāt.  Therefore much 680
of Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings on Ḥaqīqa can be found in his discussions on Sharīʿa. I have 
found that Ibn Idrīs had studied Ibn ʿArabī’s inspired explanations of the Law to the 
point of mastery, and this will be the first step to discovering the extent to which he 
knew, and applied, the Akbarī school of jurisprudence. However, before we come to 
this, we will first look at some spiritual practices of Ibn ʿArabī that Ibn Idris 
incorporated into his own ṭarīqa. 
 Al-Hajrasī, al-Jawhar al-nafīs, 14; O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 167-9. The original al-Futūḥāt al-Madaniyya is 677
now lost.
 Weismann, Taste of Modernity, 255-6. Weismann noted that though he was a prolific author, this 678
commentary was his only printed treatise. More recently, Farīd al-Mizyadī printed large extracts from 
one of this author’s treatises in footnotes to Najm al-Dīn Kubrā’s great esoteric commentary on the 
Qurʾān (see bibliography). The extracts reveal his great mastery of Akbarī thought and also quote Ibn 
Idrīs’s Akbarī teachings too.
 Weismann, Taste of Modernity, 210; Al-Bīṭār, Ḥilyat al-bashar, 1:873-881.679
 ‘The Sharīʿa is itself the Ḥaqīqa’ Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:564.680
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6.2.1 Practices that Ibn Idrīs took from Ibn ʿArabī 
 Ibn Idrīs took many of Ibn ʿArabī’s counsels and recommendations and turned 
them into cornerstones of his spiritual path. Among them is a supplication for the 
multiplication of the rewards of good deeds, which came from a tradition narrated by al-
Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī in Nawādir al-uṣūl.  Ibn ʿArabī had recommended this practice in 681
his list of important counsels in the Futūḥāt.  Ibn Idrīs, who knew that it originally 682
came from Nawādir al-uṣūl,  valued this supplication to such an extent that he urged 683
his followers to begin every good action, whether verbal or physical, with this 
supplication, so that the rewards of all of their actions are multiplied. He also 
incorporated it into his litanies so that his students start their daily devotions with it, and 
called it ‘The Opening of the Litanies.’  According to Addas, there are only two 684
supererogatory practices that we know for certain Ibn ʿArabī prescribed for his disciples 
on the path. One of them which is found in many of Ibn ʿArabī’s works including the 
counsels in the Futūḥāt, is that the statement, ‘There is none worthy of being worshiped 
save God,’ be recited 70,000 times in order to ‘purchase one’s soul from God’ and 
protect oneself from the Hellfire.  Ibn Idrīs made this practice one of the ‘foundations’ 685
of his path, meaning that it is one of the first acts that the disciple must do after taking 
his path.  686
 A third practice that Ibn Idrīs took from Ibn ʿArabī is a special supplication that 
Ibn ʿArabī created out of the Prophet’s ṣalāt al-istikhāra prayer in which one prays a 
two-cycle prayer and after finishing it recites the Prophet’s supplication asking for 
 Al-Tirmidhī, Nawādir, 3:267.681
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:497.682
 He mentioned its source in one of his lessons, as recorded by a student. (Tafsīr Manuscript, 14).683
 Al-Idrīsi, Risālat al-awrād al-Idrīsiyya, 15.684
 Addas, Quest, 271.685
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-asās, 13; O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 207.686
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guidance on a particular issue. Ibn ʿArabī took the Prophet’s supplication and fashioned 
out of it a more general supplication for guidance to all good things. In the words of al-
Shaʿrānī, Ibn ʿArabī ‘made a sunna’ out of doing this every day in the forenoon.  Ibn 687
Idrīs recommended this practice of Ibn ʿArabī to his followers.   688
 Finally, one could say that the most distinctive feature of Ibn Idrīs’ path also has 
its origin in Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings. Ibn Idrīs claimed to have placed his disciples in the 
care of the Prophet. As a result, they would receive their spiritual growth directly from 
the Prophet without an intermediary, which is why he called his path the ṭarīqa 
muḥammadiyya. The disciples were directed to nurture this connection with the Prophet 
with the hope of achieving waking visions of him and receiving direct instructions from 
him.  Ibn Idrīs’ disciple al-Sanūsī described the path and its method in these words, 689
‘The ṭarīqa muḥammadiyya is based on the close following of the Sunna…and on 
occupying oneself with the invocation of blessings upon the Prophet at all times.’  690
What was distinctive about Ibn Idrīs was his portrayal of the Prophet as the shaykh for 
those who took his path and his minimisation of his own role. However, the goals of the 
path and the methods for reaching those goals were not new. Sedgwick traced the 
origins of this concept back to Ibn ʿArabī who strongly recommended, 
a constant dhikr of blessing the Prophet...mentioning a saintly blacksmith in 
Seville to whom the Prophet ‘appeared’ and, it seems, remained visible, as a result 
of this dhikr. He added that ‘whatever is revealed to the one who does this dhikr…
is true and immune from error, for nothing comes to him except through the 
Messenger.’  691
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Ajwiba al-marḍiyya, 173. I could not locate it in the Futūḥāt, so it might come from 687
another of Ibn ʿArabī’s works.
 Ibn Idrīs, al-Nafaḥāt al-kubrā, 54.688
 Dajani, Reassurance, 13-14; Thomassen and Radtke, Letters, 3; Sedgwick, Saints & Sons, 12-14.689
 Dajānī, al-Ḥaraka l-sanūsiyya, 152.690
 Sedgwick, Saints & Sons, 29-30.691
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6.3 Ibn Idrīs’ Study of the Jurisprudential Sections of the Futūḥāt 
Perform your ablutions with the water of the unseen, if you possess the secret 
or else perform tayammum with the highland and rocks 
And place before you an imam, in front of whom you had stood 
and pray the Fajr prayer at the beginning of its time 
That is the prayer of those who know their Lord 
so if you are from them, then let the sea flow onto the land (barr). 
 Ibn Idrīs was asked by his students to explain these cryptic lines usually 
attributed to al-Junayd al-Baghdadī, but sometimes attributed to Ibn ʿArabī instead.  A 692
study of Ibn Idrīs’ explanations of these cryptic lines about the spiritual path, clothed in 
words related to prayer, reveals that he unlocked their meanings using the inward 
crossovers used by Ibn ʿArabī for the same words in his treatment of the fiqh of prayer. 
 According to Ibn Idrīs, to have the secret is to have reached the connection with 
God mentioned in the prophetic tradition, in which God becomes one’s sight with which 
he sees, one’s hearing with which he hears, one’s hand with which he strikes and one’s 
foot with which he walks. Those who have reached this level are told to purify 
themselves with the divine effulgence (tajallī), for the ‘water of the unseen’ refers to life 
through God. God is ultimately the unseen, for He is the most important of all that is 
unseen. Water means life because God’s effulgence upon it is with His name al-Muhyī, 
the bringer to life, which makes water a source of all life. The wisdom behind ablutions 
with water is to give life force to one’s bodily organs through the life-giving force in 
water, so that the organs feel energetic enough to perform the prayers and stand before 
God.  Those who do not have this station must seek it, for tayammum means ‘to seek’ 693
as in Qurʾānic usage (Q 2:267), and they should seek it through the highlands (ṣaʿīd), a 
 The Moroccan Sufi Ibn ʿAjība (d. 1809) also wrote a commentary on these lines (see bibliography). 692
Ibn Idrīs’ commentary was published by the Imam of the Azhar Mosque Ṣāliḥ al-Jaʿfarī (d. 1979) who 
added his own didactic super-commentary for inspiring spiritual aspirants, and called the work al-
Maʿānī al-raqīqa ʿalā l-durar al-daqīqa.
 Al-Jaʿfarī, al-Maʿānī al-raqīqa, 4, 33.693
 209
term that comes from ṣuʿud: to ascend. The highland here refers to the human body, 
which needs to ascend through the performance of supererogatory acts in order to reach 
that station in which God becomes one’s sight and seeing, etc. The key here is the 
determination in seeking the station (qaṣd), which is taken from the tayammum, and the 
other tool to help one reach the goal is the rock, which symbolises unwavering 
determination and patience.   694
 The source of this understanding is Ibn ʿArabī’s discussions in the Futūḥāt of 
the need for intention before acts of ablution or tayammum. Water, he says, is the secret 
of life, and gives life on its own without the need for intention; it in itself is a spirit 
(rūḥ) to the bodily organs and gives them life. Earth and rock, however, have a much 
weaker life force in them, which needs to be strengthened and given a spirit through 
intention. Therefore, in the case of ablutions with water, one needs only to intend the act 
of purification, without thinking about the water. However, in the case of earth and rock, 
the Qurʾān tells people to seek the earth, meaning to intend not only purification 
through the act, but also by giving intention to the usage of the earth itself in order to 
infuse it with life. The key is in the tayammum, here meaning the force given in seeking 
the earth as a source of purification, a force that gives soul to the earth in order to be 
able to purify and energise the limbs.  695
 In the second half of the third line, the poem instructs the knowers of God to mix 
the land (al-barr) with the sea. For Ibn Idrīs, al-barr is an allusion to God whose name 
is al-Barr (the Beneficent, the doer of good), and the sea refers to water. The Qurʾān 
states that every living thing was made from water (Q 21:30). Ibn Idrīs comments, 
 Al-Jaʿfarī, al-Maʿānī al-raqīqa, 61, 69.694
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:332. Al-Shaʿrānī likewise took this understanding of the life-giving and 695
energising ‘secret’ of ablutions and used it to guide his inspired explanations of the jurisprudence of 
purification throughout his treatment of this subject in many of his works, such as al-Mīzān and al-Fatḥ 
al-mubīn fī jumlatin min asrār al-dīn.
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There is nothing in this universe that is not alive. The tradition states, ‘Every 
thing, whether moist or dry, that is reached by the muadhin’s voice, will bear 
witness on his behalf.’ Is there anything in the universe that is not moist or dry? 
Can anything bear witness if it does not possess knowledge? Can there be 
knowledge without life? What he is saying is: Do not see things as independent of 
the Real, but witness the whole universe instead as Divine Names. The Real, 
whom he called al-Barr, also has as His names: The First and the Last, the 
Apparent and the Hidden. So do not witness anything then, but Him!  696
  
 This passage is based on the very same discussion in which Ibn ʿArabī discussed 
the need for intention, only a few lines below. In it he quoted the Qurʾānic verses, ‘We 
have made from water every living thing’, and ‘everything glorifies Him in praise’ (Q 
17:44). Then he commented, ‘Only a living thing can make glorification.’  In another 697
passage elsewhere in the Futūḥāt where Ibn ʿArabī wanted to prove this point at length, 
he said, 
According to the people of unveiling, every natural material body contains a spirit, 
for God - glorious and majestic is He - says, ‘Everything glorifies Him in praise’ 
and the Messenger of God - may God bless him and grant him peace - said, ‘Every 
thing, whether moist or dry, that is reached by the muadhin’s voice will bear 
witness on his behalf.’  698
  These two passages, from different volumes of the Futūḥāt, indicate that Ibn 
Idrīs had them both in mind as he explained to his students the last part of the poem. It 
gives an indication of the level to which Ibn Idrīs learned, memorised, and internalised 
the secrets of the law in Ibn ʿArabī’s discussions. I will now give a detailed comparison 
between the individual juristic opinions of Ibn Idrīs - which both his followers and 
contemporary scholars alike assumed to be the product of his own ijtihād - and those of 
Ibn ʿArabī. 
 Al-Jaʿfarī, al-Maʿānī al-raqīqa, 155.696
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:332.697
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:38.698
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6.3.1 The Akbarī School in Practice: The Case of Aḥmad ibn Idrīs 
 Ibn Idrīs taught his disciples to follow the example of the Prophet ‘footstep after 
footstep.’  He was also highly concerned with reviving oft-neglected practices of the 699
Prophet Muḥammad,  which is why his students gave him the title ‘Reviver of the 700
Sunna.’  It was mainly for the sake of achieving this perfect following of the Prophet 701
that Ibn Idrīs did not restrict himself to following the opinions of a single school of law, 
but rather practiced his ijtihād in order to follow as closely as possible the Prophet’s 
example. Ibn Idrīs claimed the ability to practice independent ijtihād, and he 
undoubtedly did so. However, all of Ibn Idrīs’ judgements have been attributed to his 
independent ijtihād, which is not the case.  While I agree that Ibn Idrīs would not have 702
followed the opinions of any predecessors uncritically, I will demonstrate the extent to 
which Ibn Idrīs took from the Futūḥāt of Ibn ʿArabī. As a firm believer in Ibn ʿArabī, it 
would have been natural for Ibn Idrīs to consult Ibn ʿArabī’s opinions in jurisprudential 
matters as part of his ijtihād process; after all, Ibn ʿArabī believed that he was the 
perfect heir to the Prophet and that his juristic opinions were divinely inspired. To 
demonstrate this influence, I will now examine all the juristic opinions in which Ibn 
Idrīs is known to have differed from either all four schools of law, or the majority of 
them, and compare those opinions to Ibn ʿArabī’s own preferences in the Futūḥāt. 
1) The Pre-Maghrib Supererogatory Prayer. 
 Al-Jaʿfarī, ʿAbd al-Ghanī, al-Kanz al-tharī, 110.699
 Dajani, Reassurance, 6-7.700
 Al-Sanūsī, al-Musalsalāt al-ʿashr, 13.701
 Thomassen and Radtke, Letters, 12; O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 199, and others.702
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* Mālikīs and Ḥanafīs: disliked (makrūh), because the timeframe for the Sunset prayer 
is the shortest among the five, and it is feared that the performance of this prayer will 
delay it beyond its time. 
* Ḥanbalīs: permissible (mubāḥ), neither encouraged nor discouraged. 
* Shāfiʿīs and Ẓāhirīs: non-emphasised sunna (sunna ghayr muʾakkada), meaning that 
one is not expected to perform it regularly, as the Prophet himself and his Companions 
were not understood to have prayed it regularly.   703
* Ibn Idrīs: sunna. Ibn Idrīs did not specify whether this was an emphasised or non-
emphasised sunna. However, Ibn Idrīs considered this a very important sunna which 
was neglected and forgotten by the followers of all four schools, and saw himself as a 
reviver of this practice. Ibn Idrīs included a prophetic tradition recommending the 
performance of this prayer in his small collection of 208 traditions called Rūḥ al-
sunna (the Spirit of the Sunna), in which he aimed to distill the main spirit of the 
Prophet’s way.  This tradition is of course not one of the most important ones, nor 704
does it convey a major Islamic principle, but Ibn Idrīs chose to include it in order to 
revive this practice, as he did with other small practices about which he placed 
traditions in this collection. In practice, however, Ibn Idrīs seemed to take the 
importance of this prayer to an extreme by elongating it. This issue was one of the 
eight main complaints that the Wahhābī jurists of ʿAsīr sent to the ruler of ʿAsīr 
against Ibn Idrīs, stating that he prolonged this prayer so much that the Sunset Prayer 
was being prayed very close to the Night Prayer.  During the actual debate, Ibn 705
Idrīs’ main adversary brought up this point again. Ibn Idrīs replied that this prayer ‘is 
a sunna which people have abandoned...Simply because the people have abandoned 
[it] does not mean that we must abandon [it]....Disapproval should be directed against 
someone who denies that [it has] the status of a sunna, and not against someone who 
 Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 2:21-4.703
 Ibn Idrīs, Rūḥ al-sunna, 97.704
 ‘Ākish, Munāẓara, 147.705
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performs [it].’  Ibn Idrīs thus reversed the charge against his opponent whose 706
Ḥanbalī school did not even confer upon this prayer the status of sunna. Ibn Idrīs did 
not, however, explain why he prolonged this prayer. The secret to that is in the 
emphasis given to the importance of this prayer by Ibn ʿArabī in the Futūḥāt. 
 In the Futūḥāt, Ibn ʿArabī described this prayer’s importance as being equal to 
the two-cycle prayer before the Fajr Prayer, which, by agreement of the scholars, was 
the most important of all the sunna muʾakkada prayers, and was described by the 
Prophet as being ‘worth more than the world and all that is in it.’  Furthermore, Ibn 707
ʿArabī stated that no one prays this prayer regularly except he who exercises prudence 
in his religion. Ibn ʿArabī proceeded to say, 
 ‘[It is] a sunna that has been forgotten and neglected. In our age I have not seen 
among the jurists anyone who prays it regularly other than our companion Zayn 
al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Ibrāhīm al-Shāfiʿī al-Kurdī, may God grant him success to keep 
to it. In [it] there is an amount of reward known only to God, for God has a special 
effulgence between every obligatory prayer and the adhān that precedes it, so 
whoever prays to Him with intimate discourse at that time will be given something 
very great.  708
2) Praying in Footwear.  
Another sunna that Ibn Idrīs wanted to revive was praying in one’s footwear rather 
than barefooted, seeing it as an important adornment for the prayer. Ibn Idrīs 
addressed this issue repeatedly in three separate passages of al-ʿIqd al-nafīs, giving it 
great importance.  Praying in one’s footwear is recommended in Ibn ʿArabī’s 709
chapter of counsels in the Futūḥāt.  710
 ‘Ākish, Munāẓara, 201.706
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 2:19.707
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:491-2.708
 Ibn Idrīs, al-ʿIqd al-nafīs, 81-2, 167, 261. 709
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 4:500.710
 214
3) Fasting in the second half of Shaʿbān. 
The Prophet is known to have fasted more in the month of Shaʿbān than in any other 
month except Ramadan, and this became a popular practice for the Muslims. 
However ,there is a tradition that states, ‘After Shaʿbān reaches its middle, do not fast.’ 
Ibn Idrīs was asked to explain the meaning of this tradition. He explained that the 
Prophet said it out of fear that if all the Muslims fasted in the days leading up to 
Ramadan, a Qurʾānic revelation might make it into an obligation. He compared it to the 
Prophet showing the Muslims the sunna of the tarawīh prayers for two or three days 
only and then not coming out to lead them in it again out of fear that it would become 
obligatory.  After the death of the Prophet, however, this fear was no longer there, and 711
it was acceptable again to fast in the second half of Shaʿbān. Ibn Idrīs quoted other 
traditions of the Prophet showing that it is permissible to be fasting in the last days of 
Shaʿbān, just before Ramadan, as evidence of his position. Ibn Idrīs then concluded his 
discussion with the opinion of Ibn ʿArabī who wished to reconcile all the traditions. He 
said, ‘Among the scholars there are those who, out of prudence, forbade fasting on the 
day of the 16th day only, among them Muhyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī, and that is correct, so 
that the tradition in question does not become abrogated entirely.’  I am not aware of 712
anyone beside Ibn ʿArabī who came up with such a compromise. 
4) Breaking the Fast when Traveling. 
* Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs: recommended to keep the fast provided the travel does 
not cause much hardship, based on their interpretation of verse 2:184 ‘to fast is better 
for you.’ 
* Ḥanbalīs: sunna to break the fast, disliked to fast while traveling. They claimed that 
the above verse referred to the days of fasting that were obligatory before the fasting 
of Ramadan was revealed to replace them, and that in the verse mentioning the fast of 
 See the discussion on this in Chapter Three, Section 3.3.711
 Ibn Idrīs, al-ʿIqd al-nafīs, 214-5. See Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:649.712
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Ramadan, the words ‘to fast is better for you’ were not repeated. Furthermore, many 
traditions criticise fasting during travel. 
* Ẓāhirīs: obligatory to break the fast, forbidden to fast while traveling more than one 
mile.   713
* Al-Awzāʿī: held a middle opinion, stating that it is superior to break the fast, without 
stating that it was disliked to do otherwise.  714
* Ibn Idrīs: His response to the question on this matter is similar to the Ḥanbalī 
opinion,  however he refrained from giving a judgement, instead giving the exact 715
response that Ibn ʿArabī gave in his Futūḥāt. In the Futūḥāt Ibn ʿArabī wrote,  
As for the traveler, his fasting, whether in Ramadan or outside of it, is not an act 
of piety, and if it is not an act of piety, then the least that it could be is that it is like 
not doing anything at all. Or it could be the opposite of piety, which is impiety, 
and I do not say that, but I do deny it being an act of piety.  716
 Ibn Idrīs’ response is essentially the same, ‘[The Prophet] said: “It is not from 
piety to fast on a journey.” If it is not piety, then it is not obedience.’  Furthermore, Ibn 717
ʿArabī, unlike the four other schools and Ibn Ḥazm, took the literalist view that 
anything that is called ‘travel’ in the language calls for breaking the fast in Ramadan.  718
The followers of Ibn Idrīs, the Khatmiyya and Sanūsiyya in particular, were criticised 
for also breaking the fast during anything defined as ‘travel’ in Ramadan, no matter how 
short or easy the journey was.  719
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 4:384.713
 Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān, 2:22.714
 Thomassen and Radtke failed to take note of the Ḥanbalī position when they stated that on this 715
issue, ‘he is clearly in disagreement with the established views of the schools of fiqh.’ (Letters, 12).
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:612-3.716
 Thohmassen and Radtke, Letters, 40.717
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:713. Ibn Ḥazm defined travel as a distance of more than one mile, as mentioned 718
above.
 Vikør, Sufi and Saint, 245, 257.719
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5) Gaps of silence left by the imam in the prayer. 
* Mālikīs: no gaps of silence in the prayer. 
* Ḥanafīs: one gap of silence before the commencement of recitation, for silent 
supplications. 
* Shāfiʿīs: add a second gap of silence between the Fātiḥa and the other portion of the 
Qurʾān, so that worshippers behind the imam have a chance to recite the Fātiḥa for 
themselves. 
* Ḥanbalīs and Ẓāhirīs: add a second gap at the end of all recitation, before going down 
into bowing. 
* Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Idrīs: all three gaps.  720
6) The Witr Prayer. 
* Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs, Ḥanbalīs, and Ẓāhirīs: sunna. 
* Ḥanafīs, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Ibn ʿArabī, and Ibn Idrīs: obligatory.  721
7) The ‘Prostration of Recitation’ at certain verses when read outside the Prayer. 
* The four schools: requires a state of ritual ablution. 
* Ẓāhirīs, Ibn ʿArabī, and Ibn Idrīs: ritual purity is not a condition for this prostration, 
citing the tradition about the Companion Ibn ʿUmar doing it without ritual purity.  722
Ibn Idrīs chose the tradition about Ibn ʿUmar for his collection Rūḥ al-sunna.  It is 723
one of the very few traditions in that collection which are not statements of the 
Prophet himself, or about him. It is clear that Ibn Idrīs was very concerned with this 
practice and therefore included this tradition in his collection. 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:412; Ibn Idrīs, Sharḥ al-ṣudūr, 16, 22-23, 26.720
 For the five schools see Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 2:3-7. For Ibn Idrīs see Ibn Idrīs, al-ʿIqd al-nafīs, 177. For 721
Ibn ʿArabī see Futūḥāt, 1:394, 488. For al-Tirmidhī see al-Tirmidhī, al-Ṣalātu wa-maqāṣiduhā, 141.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:516.722
 Ibn Idrīs, Rūḥ al-sunna, 235.723
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8) Formula of taʿawwudh (the seeking of refuge from Satan) in prayer. 
* Mālikīs: disapprove of it in prayer. 
* Other schools and Ẓāhirīs: recite the standard formula. 
* Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Idrīs: recite an extended formula.   724
9) The optional qunūt supplication in prayer. 
* Ḥanbalīs: in the Witr Prayer. No authentic timing narrated for it. 
* Ḥanafīs: in the Witr Prayer, silently, before the rukūʿ. 
* Mālikīs: in the Fajr Prayer, silently, before the rukūʿ. 
* Shāfiʿīs: in the Fajr Prayer, loudly, after the rukūʿ. 
* Ibn Ḥazm: in all obligatory prayers, after the rukūʿ.  725
* Ibn ʿArabī: did not mention in which prayers or its timing. However, he stated that the 
supplication itself which was narrated for the Witr qunūt is well established, whereas 
the supplication narrated for the Fajr prayer is not authentically established. Therefore, 
those who do qunūt in the Fajr prayer should make any supplication that they wish 
instead.   726
* Ibn Idrīs: did qunūt in both Witr and Fajr prayers, silently or loudly, either before or 
after rukūʿ. He most often did it before the rukūʿ like the Mālikī school, yet loudly 
like the Shāfiʿīs. Ibn Idrīs used the prophetic supplication for the Witr qunūt only. He 
did not recite the qunūt supplication narrated for the Fajr prayer, which the Mālikīs 
 Ibn Idrīs, al-Nafaḥat al-kubrā, 9; Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:421. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 2:278.724
 For Ibn Ḥazm and the previous schools see Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 3:54-61.725
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:435.726
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recited, and instead used one of his own Idrīsi supplications.  This is in accord with 727
the advice of Ibn ʿArabī. 
6) Descending into sujūd. 
* Ḥanafīs, Shāfiʿīs, Ḥanbalīs: knees before hands. 
* Mālikīs, Ẓāhirīs, Ibn ʿArabī, and Ibn Idrīs: hands before knees.  728
7) Women imams leading men and women in prayer. 
* The four schools and Ibn Ḥazm: forbidden.  729
* Ibn ʿArabī: permissible.   730
* Ibn Idrīs: his position on this is not known, however some students of Ibn Idrīs 
including al-Mirghanī and/or his followers were accused of holding that it is 
permissible.  731
8) Holding the Friday Prayer in more than one mosque in the same city. 
* Four schools: not permissible, except in cases of necessity. 
* Ẓāhirīs, Ibn ʿArabī, and Ibn Idrīs: permissible without conditions.  732
 
 Descriptions of Ibn Idrīs’ qunūt were written down in detail by his students. See al-Idrīsī, Risālat al-727
awrād al-Idrīsiyya, 8-11.
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 3:44-5; Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:440; Ibn Idrīs, al-ʿIqd al-nafīs, 276-7.728
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 3: 81, 135-6.729
 See Chapter Three, Section 3.5 above; Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:447. This view is attributed to Abū Thawr, 730
the teacher of Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, and al-Muzanī (d. 264/877) - both of whom were students of al-Shāfiʿī - 
as well as al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) (see al-ʿAẓīmābādī, ʿAwn al-maʿbūd, 2:225-8). Some Ḥanbalīs also allowed 
it in Tarawīh prayers, with the condition that the woman leads from behind the rows of the men (see 
lbn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 2:146).
 See the complaint sent to the Shaykh of the Azhar Ḥasan al-ʿAṭṭār (d. 1250/1835) by a man from 731
Sudan about al-Mirghanī and his followers in Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 244-5. See also al-Samannūdī, 
Saʿādat al-dārayn, 2:441.
 For the four schools and the Ẓāhirīs see Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 3:257-8; al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, 732
1:248-9. For Ibn ʿArabī see Futūḥāt, 1:461. However, Ibn ʿArabī stresses that it is preferable to pray in a 
single mosque. For Ibn Idrīs, see Thomassen and Radtke, Letters, 36. 
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9) Recitation of the basmala (bism Allāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm) as part of the Fātiḥa in 
the prayer.  
* Mālikīs: disliked. The more canonical traditions state that the Prophet was not heard 
reciting it out loud, and began with ‘al-ḥamdulillāh,’ therefore the Mālikīs do not 
allow its recitation in the prayer at all, not even silently. 
* Ḥanbalīs and Ḥanafīs: preferable but not obligatory. It should be done silently 
whether the recitation is silent or loud, because of the traditions that the Prophet was 
not heard reciting it. 
* Shāfiʿīs: obligatory. The basmala is an integral part of the Fātiḥa and since the prayer 
is invalid without the Fātiḥa, the prayer is invalid without the basmala. It is to be 
recited loudly in loud recitations and silently in silent recitations.  733
* Ibn Ḥazm: Those who recite using a canonical Qurʾānic recitation that counts the 
basmala as part of the Fātiḥa and the rest of the sūras, must recite it or their prayer is 
invalid. Those who recite using canonical recitations which do not count the basmala 
as part of the Fātiḥa and the rest of the sūras, but rather as a separator between the 
sūras, are free to recite it or not.   734
* Ibn ʿArabī: reciting the Fātiḥa is more correct, and should be given preference ‘for it 
is part of the Qurʾān, according to the ʿulamā billāh (those who know through Allah).’ 
However, the ijtihād of those who do not think the basmala is part of the Fātiḥa will 
still be accepted by God.  In another discussion, his argument is as follows: God 735
said in the Qurʾān, ‘Recite as much of the Qurʾān as is easy for you’ (Q 73:20), so it is 
obligatory to recite what is easy to. God later clarified that ‘what is easy for you’ is the 
Fātiḥa. Hence, if it is easy for one to recite the basmala as part of the Fātiḥa, then one 
 For the four schools see Ibn Rushd, Bidāya, 1:132; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, 1:346-7.733
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, 2:283.734
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 3:478-9. For Ibn ʿArabī the ʿulamā billāh are higher than the ʿārifūn billah, for they 735
are the ones who are ‘sent’ by God to guide the Muslims. They are the muḥaddathūn. See Chapter Three, 
Section 3.1.1.
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should, but if it is not easy to recite the basmala then the obligation is lifted. Reciting 
the basmala is therefore better than leaving it.  By this logic, even though Ibn ʿArabī 736
seems to accept the possibility of not reciting the basmala, he indicates that as long as 
it is easy to do so, it should be recited (i.e. it is an obligation). Practically speaking, it 
is difficult to conceive of a situation where the recitation of the basmala would be 
difficult.  
* Ibn Idris: obligatory. This is one of the most interesting examples of Ibn Idrīs’ 
following of Ibn ʿArabī’s juristic preferences. Ibn Idrīs defended this position 
vehemently in more than one treatise, which is the only position we are aware of in 
which he did not follow the opinion that is backed by the more authentic prophetic 
traditions. In doing so, he displayed his vast knowledge of traditions and his mastery 
of jurisprudence to defend his position, and was not simply imitating Ibn ʿArabī.  737
His disciple Muḥammad al-Majdhūb (d. 1831) likewise argued for this position in his 
works, and had to rebut the criticism that the traditions he used for his claims came 
from weaker traditions in less prestigious collections.  Hofheinz argued that ‘in and 738
of itself, a purely Traditionist method could also have led to a different interpretation. 
Al-Majdhūb’s interpretation therefore may have been influenced by his implicit 
preference for the Shāfiʿī view.’  Hofheinz argued that perhaps al-Majdhūb was 739
inclined to the Shāfiʿī school because of the scholarly milieu in Medina where he 
learned and taught for eight years.  He did, however, in another study, acknowledge 740
the correspondence between his opinions and those of Ibn Idrīs, at least on the two 
questions in which we know the opinions of both.  Al-Majdhūb, for example, 741
rejected the consensus of the community, which was approved by the Shāfiʿī school 
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 1:413.736
 See Ibn Idrīs, Sharḥ al-ṣudūr, 20-22; al-Nafaḥāt al-kubrā, 9; al-ʿIqd al-nafīs, 265.737
 Hofheinz, ‘Transcending the Madhhab,’ 236.738
 Hofheinz, ‘Transcending the Madhhab,’ 236.739
 Hofheinz, ‘Transcending the Madhhab,’ 242.740
 Hofheinz, Internalizing Islam, 330.741
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like the others, and only accepted the consensus of the Companions.  This shows 742
that al-Majdhūb’s positions did not stem from an inclination to the Shāfiʿī school but 
from the influence of Ibn Idrīs which ultimately derives from the teachings of Ibn 
ʿArabī. Ibn Idrīs’ disciple al-Sanūsī likewise discussed the issue of the basmala at 
length in several treatises. Al-Sanūsī’s main concern was to convince the Mālikīs that 
the basmala was part of the Fātiḥa because they were the ones who rejected its 
recitation in prayer. His ultimate aim was to prove that the basmala must be recited in 
prayer, and yet he also made extensive use of the same type of argument as Ibn 
Ḥazm.  743
 It is therefore my contention that it was from the Futūḥāt that Ibn Idrīs and his 
followers took the importance of the basmala. One should also remember that, while the 
scholarly milieu in Medina at the time of al-Majdhūb might have had a strong Shāfiʿī 
bias, it was also to a large extent influenced by the lasting legacy of Ibn ʿArabī’s 
greatest propagators of that era, al-Qushāshī and his students, to whom the majority of 
the Medinan scholars of the time were very closely connected.  Similarly, Hofheinz 744
attributed al-Majdhūb’s ‘recourse to extrasensory perception,’ i.e. meaning visions of 
the Prophet, in supporting his jurisprudential views, ‘as merely an extreme form of his 
overall attempt to bypass the intermediate authorities of scholastic tradition when 
turning to the original normative sources - God’s word and the example of His last 
Prophet.’  However, it is simply a natural product of his study of Akbarī teachings 745
under Ibn Idrīs. 
6.3.2 Ibn Idrīs and Inspired Explanations 
  
 Hofheinz, ‘Transcending the Madhhab,’ 242, n. 47.742
 Al-Sanūsī, Shifāʾ al-ṣadr, 32-43. For an overview of his arguments, see Vikør, Sufi and Scholar 223-6, 248, 743
256, 258. For further reading see also Vikør, ‘Opening the Mālikī school.’
 See Voll, ‘Muḥammad Hayya al-Sindi and Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab,’ and ‘idem., ‘Ḥadīth 744
Scholars and Tariqahs;’ Nafi, ‘Tasawwuf and Reform;’ Taji-Farouki in Ibn ʿArabī, A Prayer, 32-5.
 Hofheinz, ‘Transcending the Madhhab,’ 244.745
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 Like his intellectual predecessors, Ibn Idrīs partook in the ‘ijtihād’ of the 
knowers of God, that is, he based some of his opinions on explanations that were not 
based on analogical reasoning but rather on spiritual realities. One such example of Ibn 
Idrīs using an inspired explanation, is when he was asked about the lawfulness of 
leaning a teaching tablet upon which verses of the Qurʾān were written, against a wall. 
Ibn Idrīs replied, 
There is no objection to this. Indeed, the tablet upon which the Qurʾān is written 
has its origin from the earth. The earth has its origin from the water. The water has 
its origin from the Light of our liege-lord Muḥammad, may God bless him and 
grant him peace. The Light of Muḥammad, may God bless him and grant him 
peace, has its origin from the Light of God, High and Mighty. Therefore, the 
origin of everything is pure. Thus there is no disrespect (to the Qurʾan) in that, and 
likewise is the case with hanging the tablet on the wall, and likewise is the case 
with (leaning or hanging) the Qurʾān itself (muṣḥaf).  746
Here we see Ibn Idrīs practising ijtihād in a style similar to his predecessors al-
Tirmidhī, al-Shaʿrānī, and Ibn ʿArabī. Furthermore, his explanation relied on the 
concept of the the Muḥammadan Reality (ḥaqīqa Muḥammadiyya) and the Light of 
Muḥammad (nūr Muḥammadī), which was a central theme in the teachings of Ibn 
ʿArabī.  747
6.3.3 Conclusion  
 When one compares Ibn Idrīs’ juristic opinions with those of the four schools 
that existed in his time, one finds that some of his opinions agreed only with the Ḥanafī 
school, while others agreed only with the Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, or Ḥanbalī schools. Other 
opinions agreed only with the Ẓāhirī school, while some were different from all of the 
above. However, one finds that in every case his opinions matched those of Ibn ʿArabī. 
 Thomassen and Radtke, Letters, 18. I translated this passage myself rather than using the editors’ 746
translation (cf. ibid, 19-12).
 For Ibn ʿArabī see Chodkiewicz, Seal, 60-73.747
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This does not mean that Ibn Idrīs was simply copying from the Futūḥat, but that he was 
generally convinced that Ibn ʿArabī’s positions were more correct than the others. In 
Ibn Idrīs’ treatment of the fiqh of prayer, for example, he delved into far more depth 
than Ibn ʿArabī on certain questions to defend his positions, displaying his vast 
knowledge of the ḥadīth literature.  He often discussed in detail matters that Ibn 748
ʿArabī simply never discussed or mentioned, for Ibn ʿArabī did not deal with every 
conceivable issue in the Futūḥāt.  Furthermore, Ibn Idrīs, as a revivalist, saw different 749
issues in his time and society that he needed to address, and different forgotten practices 
to revive, which Ibn ʿArabī did not address in his writings. What we can establish 
without a doubt, however, is that Ibn Idrīs is at least one example of someone applying 
and practicing the ‘Akbarī madhhab.’ 
6.4 The Teachings of Ibn Idrīs on Ijtihād 
 Now that we have brought to light the extent of the influence of Ibn ʿArabī on 
the jurisprudential thought and practice of Ibn Idrīs, we can understand better Ibn Idrīs’ 
teachings on ijtihād, scholarly authority, and the schools of law. While many reform 
movements in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were influenced by growing 
European power or by secular nationalism, O’Fahey and Sedgwick both noted that Ibn 
Idrīs’ revivalism was influenced by neither. In the words of O’Fahey, it was the result of 
an ‘internal dynamic for change,’ not a threat from the West,  and as Sedgwick noted, 750
 See for example Ibn Idrīs, Sharḥ al-ṣudūr, which is a work on the description of prayer. Likewise his 748
defence of the position that the hands should go down before the knees when descending for sujūd, in 
Ibn Idrīs, al-ʿIqd al-nafīs, 276-7.
 For examples of Ibn Idrīs’ ijtihād on several issues not discussed by Ibn ʿArabī, see the list of matters 749
discussed by Ibn Idrīs in his letters to Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz in Thomassen and Radtke, Letters, 12-13. Of these 
ten matters, only the last two in the list were discussed by Ibn ʿArabī (holding Friday Prayers in more 
than one mosque, and fasting during travel, both of which are discussed in section 6.3.1).
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 5.750
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unlike Salafism, it did not owe anything to European thought. In fact, both scholars 
characterised Ibn Idrīs as having completely ignored the West.  751
 There was of course ample reason for Ibn Idrīs and his students to turn against 
madhhabism. Ibn Idris regularly spoke against the factionalism that resulted from 
fanatical devotion to the schools of law, both in Mecca, Medina, and elsewhere. He 
described the followers of the schools as acting like different factions that accused each 
other of misguidance.  Hofheinz described one incident that happened in Mecca in 752
1814, which was witnessed by al-Majdhūb and most likely his teacher Ibn Idrīs too.  753
Ottoman troops retook Mecca from the house of Saʿūd, and the Ottomans attempted to 
re-establish their dominance by removing the Shāfiʿī judge and replacing him with a 
Ḥanafī one. This caused the locals to boycott the official Friday prayers and petition to 
remove the Ḥanafī judge which resulted in a deadlock that lasted for some time.  Such 754
incidents were but reminders of the divisions that school factionalism sometimes 
caused. Al-Majdhūb, who had mastered the four schools of jurisprudence, himself wrote 
a treatise on ‘the need to transcend the divisions of the legal schools and to follow only 
the example of the Prophet.’  755
 Madhhab factionalism as well as the influence of Ibn ʿArabī both were 
contributing factors in shaping Ibn Idrīs’ stance on ijtihād. Another factor was his desire 
to emulate the Prophet’s example as perfectly as possible, which was a very important 
principle of his Sufi path, and also the natural outcome of an intense love that he had for 
the Prophet, and an intense desire to be united with him and see him. The path he taught 
was about complete dedication to the Prophet, to think about him with every glance and 
every breath. This would have reinforced the desire of Ibn Idrīs to follow the teachings 
 Sedgwick, Saints & Sons, 12-13; O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 5.751
 ʿĀkish, Munāẓara, 172.752
 Ibn Idrīs left that same year for Upper Egypt, but it is likely that he did so after the incident. On his 753
trips to Upper Egypt and the timing of Muḥammad Ali Pasha’s control of Mecca, see O’Fahey, Enigmatic 
Saint, 53-4.
 Hofheinz, ‘Transcending the Madhhab,’ 247.754
 Hofheinz, ‘Transcending the Madhhab,’ 234.755
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of Ibn ʿArabī who had proclaimed himself to be the Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood 
and the greatest heir to the Prophet in all his actions and states, and therefore the perfect 
mirror through which to follow the Prophet closely.  
 Ibn Idrīs wrote a treatise entitled Risālat al-radd ʿalā ahl al-raʾy (Refutation of 
the Rationalists), by which he meant, just like with Ibn ʿArabī’s usage, the schools of 
jurisprudence.  We will look at the main themes of this treatise and the main sources 756
of influence on it. As we have done with al-Tirmidhī, Ibn ʿArabī and al-Shaʿrānī, we 
will divide our discussion into the two main themes of juristic authority and juristic 
methodology. 
6.4.1 Juristic Authority 
 In his study of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, E. Peskes correctly noted that 
the main concern of Ibn Idrīs - like that of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb - was with the 
opposition ‘between fiqh (the doctrinal authority of the legal schools) on one hand, and 
the Qurʾān and the Sunna on the other.’  It is this opposition that Ibn ʿArabī had 757
stressed in his account of several dream visions in Kitāb al-mubashshirāt and in many 
passages in the Futūḥāt. Similarly, al-Shaʿrānī stressed this opposition in Irshād al-
ṭālibīn and Kashf al-ghumma, limiting the role of scholars to simply transmitting the 
revealed sources and not adding anything to them.  758
 Ibn ʿArabī saw the addition of new laws to the revealed law as an assumption of 
lordship (Chapter Three, Section 3.2). Ibn Idrīs argued the same, ‘Whoever brings forth 
a new judgement along with God has brought forth lordship, and anyone who follows 
 Except the Ẓāhirīs, if they are counted as a school and not a methodology.756
 As quoted by Radtke et al. in Exoteric, 14. Radtke et al. also agreed with this judgement.757
 On Ibn ʿArabī refer to Chapter Three, Section 3.2; Chapter Four, Sections 4.1.2.1 and 4.2.2. On Al-758
Shaʿrānī see Chapter Five, Sections 5.3 and 5.4, as well as the final comparison of both figures in section 
5.6.1.
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his authority in this regard has accepted him as a lord apart from God.’  In another 759
passage, he held that the statement often used by scholars to present their opinions ‘we 
say that..’ is a statement befitting only of God. Even worse are those who create 
hypothetical questions and then answer them, alternating between the creation of a 
question, which is servanthood, and then providing the answer, which is lordship. ‘His 
saying, “If I ask,” - that is the saying of a servant. As for his saying, “We (would) say...” 
- that is the response of the lord, because judgement belongs only to God; ‘Verily, 
judgement is only for God’ (Q 12:40).’  The role of a scholar according to Ibn Idrīs, 760
then, is only to say, ‘God said,’ or ‘God’s Messenger said.’  761
 Ibn Idrīs quoted a story used by al-Shaʿrānī in which a poet was singing in the 
court of an Abbasid king when a man told him that Mālik forbade singing. The poet 
replied, ‘Is Mālik allowed to make lawful or unlawful matters in God’s religion 
according to his opinion? By God, even the Messenger of God - peace be upon him - 
could only make things lawful or unlawful through Divine revelation!’ This poet, Ibn 
Idrīs declared, was ‘more zealous on behalf of God’s religion and His law’ than the 
jurists.  Like Ibn ʿArabī, Ibn Idrīs often repeated in his treatise that the original status 762
of acts in the Sharīʿa was divine pardon (i.e. no judgement). The silence of the Sharīʿa 
on any given act was intentional - a divine mercy. As Sedgwick put it, ’To attempt to fill 
a silence deliberately left by God [is] to abrogate one of His mercies.’  763
 These arguments were made by Ibn ʿArabī before him, but Ibn Idrīs furnished 
them with more textual evidence. The Prophet had said, ‘the scholars of my nation are 
like the prophets of the Children of Israel.’ The earlier prophets, of course, did not use 
any opinion or analogy, their only knowledge was the revelation, as God said, ‘Verily, 
We have sent down the Torah which contains right guidance and light; on the basis of it 
the prophets pass judgement’ (Q 5:44). The ‘madhhab of real scholars,’ therefore, is 
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 54.759
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 67.760
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 52.761
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 59-60; Al-Shaʿrānī, al-Mīzān al-kubrā, vol. 1, 69.762
 Sedgwick, Saints & Sons, 15. See Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 65-6, 77.763
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divine revelation, they do not add anything to it. The Prophet also said, ‘The scholars 
are the inheritors of the prophets.’ The Prophet called them inheritors, and inheritors 
only take their share of what is left for them, and prophets do not bequeath anything but 
divine revelation. If an inheritor takes something other than what the Sharīʿa has 
apportioned for him from the bequeathed legacy, then he is not an inheritor but a sinful 
usurper. This tradition, Ibn Idrīs states, should scare any scholar from stating their own 
opinion, lest they become sinful usurpers of what does not belong to them.  Ibn Idrīs 764
denied the scholars any authority other than the transmission of the revealed sources and 
the identification of the relevant text for each problem. He said that individual piety was 
the key to discovering the answer to every problem in the revealed sources. This brings 
us to Ibn Idrīs’ view on juristic method. 
6.4.2 Juristic Method 
 Just like Ibn ʿArabī, Ibn Idrīs believed there were two ways of doing ijtihād. The 
optimal ijtihād was an internal spiritual striving, and external ijtihād was to seek the 
answer in the revealed sources. For Ibn ʿArabī, the aim of internal spiritual striving was 
to receive Heavenly Speech or inspiration during waking visions of the Prophet, which 
would provide the answer to one’s question. Ibn Idrīs, as we have seen above, also 
believed in waking visions of the Prophet as the ultimate source of guidance. However, 
this was something that he taught his own disciples, but kept outside of his Risālat al-
radd, in which he focused instead on taqwā.   765
 In Risālat al-radd Ibn Idrīs argued that everything was in the Qurʾān and Sunna, 
and that what distinguished one scholar from another was their ability to find the answer 
to everything in these sources. Countless are those who have memorised the Qurʾān and 
a great number of traditions but do not know the answer to a question. When they are 
given the answer from the Qurʾān or from a tradition which they already know, they are 
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 61-2.764
 See Ibn Idrīs’ letter to Makkī ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz for example in Thomassen and Radtke, Letters, 40.765
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surprised, as if that verse was only revealed at that moment, or that tradition only 
uttered by the Prophet at that moment. They would say to themselves, ‘How many times 
did I pass over the answer to this problem and read it, without realising!’ The key to 
extracting everything from the Qurʾān and Sunna is pious fear of God (taqwā), and in 
practical terms that means acting upon one’s knowledge of their religious obligations. 
‘Whoever acts upon that which he knows,’ the Prophet had said, ‘then God will 
bequeath to him knowledge of what he does not know.’ He who does not act upon what 
he knows will be veiled from the answers even though they lie in what he has 
memorised, like a donkey carrying books.  The Prophet’s cousin Ibn ʿAbbās said, 766
‘Were I to lose a camel shackle, I would find it again in the Book of God.’  Ibn Idrīs 767
wrote, 
The long and short of it is this: there is no matter two persons could disagree 
about, though it be the weight of a mustard seed, for which God has not placed a 
judgement in His Book and the Sunna of His Prophet... He who knows this knows 
it, and he who is ignorant of it is ignorant of it….’ God said, ‘If you fear God, He 
will make for you a distinguishing faculty’ and God would never break His 
promise! Whoever, then, does not find within himself such a faculty has not 
attained real piety and merely thinks that he is pious.  768
Radtke et al. called this an ‘individualistic form of pious radicalism,’  because it 769
pushes the person to reach the answers that they seek from God by means of increasing 
their piety. If we look in the Futūḥāt we find that Ibn ʿArabī had said the same before 
him: 
Scholars have disagreed about analogy. Some accept it as evidence...and others do 
not, and that is my position. God said, ‘Fear God and God will teach you’ (Q 
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 49-50.766
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 49.767
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 49, 55.768
 Radtke et al., Exoteric, x.769
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2:282), and ‘If you fear God, He will make for you a distinguishing faculty’ (Q 
8:29).  770
 Here we must ask: what did Ibn Idrīs mean by the criterion or ability to find the 
answers in the revealed sources? As Vikør noted, it may refer ‘to an esoteric knowledge 
that goes beyond what men can read directly from the texts of the Revelation’ or simply 
the ability to distinguish right and wrong from a direct reading of the revealed sources 
without human interpretation. Vikør argued for the second understanding, that ‘Ibn Idrīs 
does not, as Shaʿrānī does, give saints or holy people any advantage in this respect; he 
clearly states that such knowledge as is required is potentially open to anyone.’  771
However, it seems likely that Ibn Idrīs understood different degrees of piety to lead to 
different abilities of understanding of the revealed sources, including the miraculous. In 
his debate with the Wahhābī scholars of ʿAsīr, Ibn Idrīs defended the idea of extracting 
knowledge from the Qurʾān’s bāṭin, for those who reach pure faith and ‘complete 
knowledge of God’ (kamāl al-ʿirfān), those who fear God and are therefore taught by 
God.  Ibn Idrīs was seen as having excelled his peers and his students in the ability to 772
extract knowledge from the revealed sources directly, though he gave his students the 
tools to do so themselves. The Yemeni judge al-ʿĀkish wrote, 
Among the things I took from him is the knowledge of jurisprudence according to 
the earliest generations such as the four imams and the other founders of the 
schools who extracted it from the prophetic traditions and Qurʾānic verses. In that 
regard he was the greatest wonder, the like of which has never been heard of in the 
East or West! He was never asked about a novel issue without answering 
immediately—as if it was obvious— with a clear text from the Book or the Sunna, 
in a way that no one but him could have been guided to. Many would search to see 
whether anyone else had been guided to that or not, and no one has been found 
who even came close to this.  773
 Ibn ʿArabī, Futūḥāt, 2:162.770
 Vikør, ‘Shaykh as Mujtahid,’ 373-4.771
 ʿĀkish, Munāẓara, 163-4.772
 al-Jaʿfarī, al‐Muntaqā al‐nafīs, 38; Dajani, Reassurance, 10.773
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 With regard to his teachings on external ijtihād, Ibn Idrīs had guidance for the 
jurists and the laypeople. For the jurists, ijtihād was the effort to search for the answer 
within the revealed texts, no more. For the laypeople, it was to practice informed 
following of the scholars (ittibāʾ), rather than blind following (taqlīd), and it meant 
asking scholars or muftis for a judgement from the revealed sources only. If the scholar 
could not provide an answer directly from the revealed sources, but relied on analogical 
reasoning or other unapproved methods, they were to find another scholar who could.  774
This was, as we have seen before, the position of Ibn ʿArabī and the Ẓāhirī school 
before him. 
6.4.3 Conclusion
 It is clear that Risālat al-radd was inspired by the works of Ibn ʿArabī, though 
no scholar has made this link before. Radtke et al. linked the work to the ‘Sufi pietistic 
tradition.’  They noted the similarity between Ibn Idrīs and al-Tirmidhī in their 775
rejection of the authority of jurists and the validity of their rationalistic methods.  776
After al-Tirmidhī they jumped to al-Shaʿrānī, and yet did not find much in common 
between al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn Idrīs beside the issue of waking visions of the Prophet. 
They noted that in any case, Ibn Idrīs kept this belief out of his treatise in which the 
‘esoteric aspects of the ṭarīqa muḥammadiyya are toned down by the less provocative 
demand for taqwā.’  The main idea of al-Shaʿrānī as they presented it, was the 777
validity of all schools.  This would suggest opposing conclusions by Ibn Idrīs and al-778
Shaʿrānī: one rejected the schools and one defended them. In Chapter Five (Section 
 Ibn Idrīs, Risālat al-radd, 52.774
 Radtke et al., Exoteric, 15.775
 Radtke et al., Exoteric, 15.776
 Radtke et al., Exoteric, 19.777
 Radtke et al., Exoteric, 18.778
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5.6), I showed that both opposing positions in fact come from Ibn ʿArabī’s Futūḥāt, and 
that Ibn ʿArabī’s major concern was achieving mercy and ease for the laypeople, via 
either approach. Al-Shaʿrānī, as a dedicated follower of Ibn ʿArabī, expressed both 
approaches in different writings. In his earlier writings such as Irshād al-ṭālibīn and 
Kashf al-ghumma, he rejected the schools, whereas in later writings such as the al-
Mīzān al-khaḍiriyya and al-Mīzān al-kubrā, he defended them. I argued that in both 
cases al-Shaʿrānī was more concerned with the end goal of preserving the original 
mercy of the law. Similarly, it is clear that Ibn Idrīs also took his inspiration from Ibn 
ʿArabī and that he too was highly concerned with the issue of mercy, advocating a 
position where all the silences in the Sharīʿa were the result of divine mercy. In doing 
so, Ibn Idrīs even took a story from al-Shaʿrānī to help make his point. Therefore, I 
argue that there is in fact a strong connection between both authors in that they were 
both highly devoted followers of Ibn ʿArabī and drew their inspiration from his works, 
and that they both aimed to achieve the same goal that Ibn ʿArabī intended to achieve. 
Ultimately, however, Ibn Idrīs chose Ibn ʿArabī’s ideal scenario where the silences of 
the law are not filled by the scholars of the schools. Al-Shaʿrānī’s final works settled for 
Ibn ʿArabī’s second-best scenario: if the schools were to make their additions to the law, 
then their additions should not be binding upon anyone but should be taken as a whole, 
providing different options for the layperson to choose from, becoming once again a 
source of mercy. Of course al-Shaʿrānī himself quoted Ibn ʿArabī’s Futūḥāt in saying 
that the Mahdī who will emerge at the end of time will do away with the schools and act 
upon the original and pure Sharīʿa. He also wrote, as I have likewise shown, that a 
heavenly voice promised him that Kashf al-ghumma would be used as a reference work 
in the time of the Mahdī. Therefore, the position of Ibn Idrīs was in line with al-
Shaʿrānī’s predictions on the end times. 
6.5 Influence 
The influence of Ibn Idrīs was far reaching, and difficult to fully assess. O’Fahey wrote, 
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Ibn Idrīs was a spiritual genius who sat for thirty years at the centre of the Muslim 
world; he gathered around him like-minded figures, some to become famous, 
some to remain anonymous. The ramifications of his influence beyond the major 
students are still largely uncharted. Nor can that influence be neatly described 
within a pattern of silsila, sanad, shaykhly authority, and the like.  779
We will briefly look at some of the lasting influence of Ibn Idris’ teachings on ijtihād, 
through his followers and their writings. 
6.5.1 Al-Sanūsī’s Waking the Sleeper 
 Among Ibn Idrīs’ disciples, the most distinguished in terms of scholarship and 
ḥadīth mastery was Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Sanūsī. Al-Sanūsī wrote a series of works 
discussing issues of jurisprudence, especially issues related to prayer. This may be due 
to the importance that prayer had for Muslims, especially for the school of Ibn Idrīs 
which very strongly emphasised the perfection of prayer,  and also because prayer was 780
a very visible act that distinguished one school of thought from the others. As Vikør 
noted, ‘Following one variant rather than another signals adherence to one group or 
community.’  Indeed, the members of the Sanūsiyya and the Khatmiyya were both 781
criticised for not conforming to the Mālikī school. Vikør’s studies have provided an 
overview of al-Sanūsī’s works.  What is of interest in this study specifically is al-782
Sanūsī’s great treatise Īqāẓ al-wasnān fī l-ʿamal bil-ḥadīth wa-l-Qurʾān (Waking the 
Sleeper to Act Upon the Ḥadīth and Qurʾān). Radtke et al. demonstrated that al-Sanūsī 
used Ibn Idrīs’ Risālat al-radd as the basis of his work, noting all the passages of the 
Īqāẓ ‘which appear to have been taken over word for word from the Risālat al-radd, and 
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 118-9.779
 On this see Dajani, Reassurance, 7-9.780
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others which present an exact paraphrase of corresponding passages in the Radd.’  783
Many of the key passages that form the basis of al-Sanūsī’s work, then, come from Ibn 
Idrīs. As for the conclusion, it is a ‘lengthy citation,’ - five pages in fact - ‘from Ibn al-
ʿArabī’s al-Futūḥāt al-makkiya.’  The passage that Ibn Idrīs took from al-Shaʿrānī’s 784
al-Mizān is also copied by al-Sanūsī, but al-Sanūsī also took other passages directly 
from al-Mīzān as well,  making it a work that is most heavily influenced by Ibn 785
ʿArabī both directly and indirectly.   786
 I have found that Ibrāhīm Niass (d. 1975), founder of the largest Sufi ṭarīqa in 
West Africa, the Tijāniyya-Ibrāhīmiyya, in turn relied heavily on Īqāẓ al-wasnān and 
another of al-Sanūsī’s works, al-Masāʾil al-ʿashr, in his own work Rafʿ al-malām.  787
The way that the followers of the Tijāniyya-Ibrāhīmiyya prayed had become a major 
issue of contention between scholars and ṭarīqas in Nigeria in the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
and had led to the production of several works on the issue. This conflict quickly 
became politicised, eventually leading to the Argungu riots of 1965.  This work 788
defended Niass’ departure from Mālikī practice on several acts in the ritual prayer, and 
argued against blind imitation of the schools of law. Furthermore, it is noticeable that 
Niass’ positions were in complete agreement with those of al-Sanūsī, Ibn Idrīs, and Ibn 
ʿArabī. 
 Radtke et al., Exoteric, 2. The list of passages is provided at the bottom of that page also, and a 783
supplement containing those passages side by side for comparison is provided in 81-94.
 Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 223 and 223 n. 10. See also Vikør, ‘Opening the Mālikī School,’ 11-12.784
 See for example al-Sanūsī, Īqāẓ al-wasnān, 132-3 and elsewhere.785
 Much of the core of the Īqāẓ is also excerpted from Ṣāliḥ al-Fullānī (d. 1803). Al-Fullānī was a student 786
of Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī. This means that he was connected intellectually to the ijtihād revival centred 
around the Akbarī figure al-Qushāshī and his student al-Kūrānī.
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6.5.2 Idrīsī Communities 
 The Sufi ṭuruq of today that go back to Ibn Idrīs’ students include the Idrīsiyya 
(also known in South East Asia and Somalia as the Aḥmadiyya), the Sanūsiyya, 
Khatmiyya (also known as the Mirghaniyya), Dandarāwiyya, Rashīdiyya (with its 
Ṣāliḥiyya sub-branch in Somalia), Majdhūbiyya, and Jaʿfariyya,  while many others 789
have incorporated his litanies and teachings. The history of the Sanūsiyya is very well 
known, and the Khatmiyya order remains of major political importance in the Sudan. 
The Dandarāwiyya, which commands a great following from the Middle East to South 
East Asia, has been studied by Sedgwick.  790
 From Mecca, Ibn Idrīs would send his students as missionaries to Muslim lands 
to revive the example of the Prophet. He sent al-Mirghanī as a missionary to the lands 
of modern day Eritrea, where his great success aroused the hostility of the local ruler. 
He later sent him to different regions in Egypt, and then to the Sudan. We also know 
that he sent a party from Mecca to Upper Egypt ‘for the sake of establishing the Sunna 
there.’  791
 Many of Ibn Idrīs’ great disciples built settlements and established independent 
communities in different parts of the Muslim world.  One of those was Makkī ibn 792
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, who established schools and religious centres in Nubia. The master and 
his disciple exchanged several letters, which were mostly related to specific questions of 
jurisprudence and law that would have arisen in the daily life of Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s 
community.  Ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz himself was a learned scholar, supervising centres of 793
learning and scholarship, and yet he did not turn to the classic books of jurisprudence 
for answers to his questions, even the smallest ones, and instead sought the authoritative 
(divinely inspired) answers of Ibn Idrīs. Among those questions were those that were 
 See Thābit, Min aqṭāb, 120, and al-Jaʿfarī, ʿAbd al-Ghanī in Ibn Idrīs, Awrād, 4-5.789
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crucial to the life of such communities, such as whether or not a teacher is permitted to 
listen to the voice of a woman in order to instruct her, and whether or not more than one 
mosque can be used for the Friday prayer in a single city. Ibn Idrīs’s answer in the 
affirmative to the latter question, in contradiction to the four schools, had important 
social implications, as it gave that community license to pray the Friday prayers 
together in their own mosques, instead of having to join the prayers at the main mosque 
of the town. 
  Muḥammad al-Majdhūb was also among Ibn Idrīs’ most notable disciples. He 
belonged to the important Sudanese al-Majdhūb family, which provided several 
religious leaders. Al-Majdhūb came to Medina and taught in the Prophet’s mosque for 
eight years and spent a brief time in Mecca with Ibn Idrīs. His most lasting impact, 
however, was in Suakin, the major African port on the Red Sea to which he moved in 
1829, ‘where he established a lodge (zāwiya) and within the two years that he remained 
there attracted a considerable religious following.’  Making heavy use of short 794
pamphlets and easy-to-remember poetry as his means of communication, al-Majdhūb 
‘became the most prolific author the Sudan had known up to his time...’  His works 795
were largely based on prophetic traditions and written in a simplified manner. Among 
the practices that he defended was the importance of reciting the basmala in the Fātiḥa 
in prayer,  which we discussed above. Al-Majdhūb also regularly referred to spiritual 796
unveiling and direct communication with the Prophet as evidence of his positions.  Al-797
Majdhūb wrote a treatise on transcending the divisions between the schools, the purpose 
of which, according to his successor, was to show that one should ‘be guided by all 
schools of jurisprudence and not be intolerant of others, and he rebutted what is wrong 
in this matter and refuted corrupting innovations.’  798
 Hofheinz, ‘Transcending the Madhhab,’ 230-2.794
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 The followers of al-Sanūsī and al-Mirghanī were distinguished by their 
distinctive practices, taken from Ibn Idrīs, which sometimes led to accusations of 
unorthodoxy, an exchange of fatwas, and the production of scholarly writings. Both the 
Sanūsīs and the Khatmīs (the followers of al-Mirghanī) were criticised for breaking the 
fast when traveling in Ramadan, even if it was for a short distance, a position they took 
from Ibn Idrīs. Likewise, the Sanūsīs in particular were criticised by the Mālikīs for 
moving from the Mālikī position of sadl (praying with arms to the side) to qabḍ 
(praying with the right hand on the left).  In such ways the students of Ibn Idrīs, 799
knowingly or unknowingly, carried the madhhab of Ibn ʿArabī with them wherever they 
established new communities. What is most interesting is that both sides of the debate 
used al-Shaʿrānī’s works to defend their position. Scholars from the Azhar used al-
Mīzān al-kubrā to prove that all schools of law were equally valid and correct, and that 
the opinions of the imams were divinely inspired.  At the same time, as we have 800
mentioned, Īqāẓ al-wasnān included several passages from the very same work. 
 In his study on the Ẓāhirī school, Osman pointed out a late nineteenth century 
work by an Egyptian Sufi named Ibrāhīm al-Samannūdī, who authored a work against 
the Wahhābis and another group which he called ‘the imitators of the Ẓāhirīs.’ Osman 
was unable to identify this group,  though it is clear that they were the followers of Ibn 801
Idrīs. Al-Samannūdī stated that they called themselves the Aḥmadiyya and al-
Muḥammadiyya, and that they were widespread in many regions such as the Ḥijāz, the 
Sudan, Upper Egypt, India, and the Cyrenaica where they established a strong base, 
descriptions which perfectly fit the different Idrīsī groups. He described them as 
shunning the schools, claiming absolute ijtihād, and only accepting what is stated in the 
Qurʾān and Sunna.  The clearest evidence that al-Samannūdī was referring to the 802
 See Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 257.799
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followers of Ibn Idrīs was his reference to the fatwā of shaykh ʿUllaysh regarding ‘the 
same group’ and their position on breaking the fast during travel.  Shaykh Muḥammad 803
ʿUllaysh (d.1882) had written a fatwā on the Sanūsīs in particular.  Although this work 804
of al-Samannūdī is unreliable, it does show us that the Idrīsīs were seen as Ẓāhirīs.  805
However, some of the points raised by al-Sammanūdī against them, such as their belief 
that women can lead men in prayer, or that anything called ‘travel’ makes the breaking 
of the fast obligatory, point not to the teachings of Ibn Ḥazm but to those of Ibn ʿArabī 
(see Section 6.3.1 points 4 and 7).  
 It is very possible that scholars from the Idrīsī tradition, such as Ibn Idrīs 
himself and al-Sanūsī, made use of the works of Ibn Ḥazm in much the same way as Ibn 
ʿArabī did, to defend their positions. For example, Ibn Idrīs wrote in Risālat al-radd 
that Mālik expressed regret on his deathbed for every addition he made to the Sharīʿa. 
The oldest known source for this story is Ibn Ḥazm.  In al-Sanūsī’s discussion of the 806
recitation of the basmala in prayer, his position is very similar to that of Ibn Ḥazm (see 
Section 6.3.1 point 9). However, their use of Ibn Ḥazm’s works was only due to the 
influence of Ibn ʿArabī who did the same before them, and not because they were 
Ẓāhirīs. 
6.5.3 Continued Influence 
 Several important students of Ibn Idrīs and al-Sanūsī produced works on 
jurisprudence. Among them was the Egyptian ʿAlī al-Qūsī (d. 1877), a student of both 
 Al-Samannūdī, Saʿādat al-dārayn, 2:451.803
 See Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 250-264. Vikør prefers the spelling ʿIllaysh (Sufi and Scholar, 250, n. 23).804
 The author of this work is unaware of the origin of this movement and claims that it cannot be 805
traced to any one figure, rather seeing it as a general movement or phenomena that emerged in the 
nineteenth century. Because of this, the author counted some antinomian Sufis who also claimed direct 
contact with the Prophet as part of the same movement, even though antinomianism was anathema to 
the ṭarīqa muḥammadiyya of Ibn Idrīs.
 Ibn Ḥazm, al-Iḥkām, 6:57. This story of Mālik was told by ʿAbd Allāh ibn Maslama al-Qaʿnabī (d. c. 806
220/834) to whom Mālik allegedly expressed his regrets on his deathbed. Al-Qaʿnabī, one of the 
traditionists who transmitted the Muwaṭṭaʾ of Mālik, was also a teacher of Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī.
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figures, who left a considerable body of writings. This scholar held audiences with two 
successive rulers of Egypt, before moving to Asyūṭ where he taught until his death. Al-
Qūsī, like his teachers, rejected the idea that the gates of ijtihād were closed, and was 
involved in disputes with scholars of Mecca and Medina on the issue.  Another figure 807
to be pointed out is Fāliḥ al-Ẓāhirī (d. 1910) - named after his tribe in the Ḥijāz, not the 
madhhab - who was a very close student of al-Sanūsī. Al-Ẓāhirī authored works on 
ḥadīth as well as a work on jurisprudence ‘according to the way of the ahl al-ḥadīth.’  808
However, it would be more beneficial to focus on later flowerings of Idrīsī thought, 
rather than the more immediate disciples whose influence may have died out. 
 It is difficult to gage the extent to which Ibn Idrīs’ teachings on the schools of 
law or his Akbarī fiqh opinions continued to be spread or practiced. However, it seems 
that the more dogmatic ideas on uṣūl al-fiqh (the theory) did not last as long as the 
practice. For example, even though the majority of the extant manuscripts ascribed to 
Ibn Idrīs were published by his followers in the twentieth century, the Risālat al-radd 
remained unpublished until Radtke and a team of contemporary European experts on the 
Idrīsī tradition published and translated it. As for other works of Ibn Idrīs that included 
his views on prayer, they have been published and we will return to them below. As for 
al-Sanūsī’s works, I have mentioned that Ibrāhīm Niass made extensive use of them to 
defend his stance during a time of powerful conflict in Nigeria, but other than that, their 
use remained mostly within Sanūsī circles, and it is unlikely that the Sanūsīs themselves 
continued to focus on theoretical works like Īqāẓ al-wasnān. The same seems to have 
happened with the works of al-Majdhūb. Hofheinz discovered that al-Majdhūb’s two 
theoretical works, on the principles of jurisprudence and on the need to transcend the 
schools of jurisprudence, are no longer extant. Only the devotional works and small 
treatises that defended individual points of departure from the local Mālikī practice such 
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 171-2.807
 Al-Zirkilī, al-Aʿlām, 6:326.808
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as the basmala and qabḍ have survived.  Hofheinz suggested that this may have been 809
due to a lack of interest in the more ‘dogmatic’ or theoretical content on the part of al-
Majdhūb’s later disciples.  Similarly, Sedgwick attributed this to a tendency of new 810
religious movements to lose some of their more distinctive features over time, to 
become less sectarian, and to reach a ‘state of uniformity with their socio-cultural 
environment.’  However, there is another important external factor too, which is the 811
threat of the Salafī movement which threatened the schools of law and Sufism with 
them. It is most likely that, in the interest of defending the established order, the 
followers of Ibn Idrīs avoided publishing such tracts as Risālat al-radd, for example.  812
 With regard to practice, the Sanūsī movement in Libya has preserved the fiqh 
positions of al-Sanūsī and Ibn Idrīs until this day, at least in personal matters such as 
prayer. They are viewed, however, as a new branch of the Mālikī school, the Mālikī-
Sanūsīs, who occupy the eastern parts of Libya, as opposed to the Mālikī-Khalīlīs in 
Tripoli and the western parts of Libya.  This is because al-Sanūsī did not present 813
himself as an absolute independent mujtahid like his teacher did, but as a mujtahid 
within the Mālikī school.  Often, those who travel from the west of Libya to its 814
eastern parts mistake the Mālikī-Sanūsīs for Salafīs due to the similarities in prayer.  815
Such departures from the practice of the mainstream Khalīlīs in the case of the Sanūsīs 
 Hofheinz, Internalizing Islam, 320-30.809
 Hofheinz, Internalizing Islam, 321.810
 Sedgwick, Saints & Sons, 2; ‘Upper Egypt’s Regional Identity,’ 100.811
 Sedgwick proposed the same explanation for a Damascene Idrīsī scholar’s defence of the schools. See 812
Sedgwick, Saints & Sons, 111.
 Khalīl is the author of the famed Mukhtaṣar, being the standard Mālikī textbook representing the 813
most authoritative opinions of the school. The ‘Khalīliyyūn,’ being the representatives of mainstream 
taqlīdī Mālikīs, were the object of derision in Ṣāliḥ al-Fullānī’s work against taqlīd. See Vikør, ‘Shaykh as 
Mujtahid,’ 356.
 Vikør, ‘Shaykh as Mujtahid,’ 354.814
 Shaykh Aḥmad al-Ṭalḥī al-Sanūsī (Interview, London, April 2011).815
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for example, are significant because they relate to issues of religious and regional 
identity. 
 Another significant figure in the later history of the Idrīsiyya is Ṣāliḥ al-Jaʿfarī 
(d. 1979) who was the imam of the Azhar Mosque and one of its most popular 
teachers.  Al-Jaʿfarī became a shaykh of the Idrīsī path and ‘more than any other 816
member of the Idrīsī tradition in the twentieth century [he] worked tirelessly to find and 
publish writings by or on Ibn Idrīs, publishing at least fifteen items.’  Al-Jaʿfarī 817
affiliated himself with the Mālikī school, and according to ʿAlī Jumuʿa (Grand Mufti of 
Egypt 2003-13), he was ‘among the great scholars of the Mālikī school’  and a 818
mujtahid.  However, in his prayer, for example, he followed Ibn Idrīs and hence put 819
his right hand over the left, and recited the basmala, which were two visible examples 
of  his divergence from mainstream Mālikism. The guidance that he gave his disciples 
on this issue deserves some attention. 
 Al-Jaʿfarī belonged to two traditions: he was the imam of the Azhar which was 
pro-madhhab, and a follower of Ibn Idrīs and al-Sanūsī who were anti-madhhab. The 
tension between the two conflicting stances appears in his reaction to the fatwā of the 
Azharī scholar and Sufi, Muḥammad ʿUllaysh, against al-Sanūsī’s claims to ijtihād. 
‘Ullaysh, who had been the Grand Shaykh of the Azhar and a muftī of the Mālikīs, 
received letters describing (not entirely accurately) al-Sanūsī’s claims to ijtihād, to 
which ‘Ullaysh responded in two fatwas; they are to be found in his collection of fatwas 
which was his main body of work. Al-Jaʿfarī never met ʿUllaysh who had died more 
than forty years before al-Jaʿfarī reached the Azhar at the age of twenty, but he claimed 
to have developed a strong direct spiritual connection with him and loved him greatly. 
Furthermore, al-Jaʿfarī copied a small treatise by ʿUllaysh that clarified the Ashʿarī 
 On al-Jaʿfarī see Dajani, Reassurance, 1-70.816
 O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 172.817
 Dajani, Reassurance, 38.818
 Dajani, Reassurance, xi-xii,819
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creed in very simple language into his largest and most important work, Fatḥ wa fayḍ 
wa faḍl min Allāh.  Al-Jaʿfarī spoke in his introduction to the treatise of how 820
disconcerted he had been about what happened between al-Sanūsī, his spiritual guide 
and master, and ʿUllaysh, with whom he had ‘a secret that none knows but God.’ 
However, al-Jaʿfarī wrote that a Libyan man from Tripoli told him that he had in his 
possession a letter that ʿUllaysh had sent to al-Sanūsī. In it ʿUllaysh explained that al-
Sanūsī’s views were not presented to him accurately and sought al-Sanūsī’s forgiveness. 
Furthermore, another Libyan man from a family of scholars informed al-Jaʿfarī that 
ʿUllaysh had later dedicated a treatise to praising al-Sanūsī’s knowledge and virtue; it 
was his determination, al-Jaʿfarī added, to search for it ‘so that it is printed and all 
people could read it.’  821
 Al-Jaʿfarī repeated in several places in his writings that he was Mālikī in 
jurisprudence. However, an examination of the treatment of jurisprudence in his Friday 
lessons shows that his positions were not always in line with the Mālikī school. Al-
Jaʿfarī, as a teacher and orator, would be asked many questions in his lessons. Since his 
audience was mostly Shāfiʿī or Mālikī, his response to the majority of cases would be to 
simply state the Mālikī and Shāfiʿī positions, though in a great deal of cases he would 
also add the opinions of other schools. Al-Jaʿfarī would sometimes present only the 
opinion of a single school, or compare the arguments of two or three schools and then 
express his preference for one of them, even if it was from a school different to his 
own.  On the issue of breaking the fast while traveling, he held that it is recommended 822
to break the fast while traveling but that fasting would still be accepted, a compromise 
between the stance of Ibn ʿArabī and Ibn Idrīs on one hand, and that of the Mālikīs, 
Shāfiʿīs, and Ḥanafīs on the other, which was closer to the Ḥanbalī or Awzāʿī opinions 
(See Section 6.3.1, point 4). Al-Jaʿfarī never declared himself to be a mujtahid and 
always referred to himself as a Mālikī, but it is clear that he was not a pure Mālikī. 
 Al-Jaʿfarī, Fatḥ, 41-65.820
 Al-Jaʿfarī, Fatḥ, 41-2.821
 Al-Jaʿfarī, Dars al-jumuʿa, 1:40-1; 120-1.822
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 Also of interest is the introduction that al-Jaʿfarī gave to a treatise by Ibn Idrīs 
which commented on the prophetic tradition ‘Pray as if it is your last prayer.’ Ibn Idrīs 
did not only explain the importance of having reverence and concentration in the prayer, 
but also gave a detailed description of the prayer, taking it as an opportunity to stress the 
importance of the basmala and other positions he held on prayer. Al-Jaʿfarī, in his 
introduction, had to give guidance to his disciples who read this work because Ibn Idrīs’ 
positions would undoubtedly differ from whatever school they followed on many 
points. He wrote, 
The noble Aḥmad ibn Idrīs - may God be pleased with him - explained this 
tradition based on his high spiritual understanding and also with his own ijtihād. 
His ijtihād does not go against (all of) the four schools, so whoever finds that his 
speech is in conformity with his school, then he is following his school. Whoever 
finds that [Ibn Idrīs’] speech goes against his school, we do not require him to 
leave his school, for it is obligatory upon every person to imitate the imam of his 
school. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Laqqānī said, 
Mālik and the rest of the imams 
and likewise Abū l-Qāsim (al-Junayd) are the guides of this community 
It is obligatory, then, to imitate a scholar from amongst them 
this is what the scholars have said in clear speech. 
If, therefore, he chooses to imitate his shaykh who is a knower of God most high, 
then there is nothing wrong with that.  823
  
 Al-Jaʿfarī quoted the classic text on creed by Ibrāhīm al-Laqqānī (d. 
1041/1631), which is one of the core texts of the Azhar curriculum and other Sunni 
institutions of learning. Al-Laqqānī most likely intended to say by those lines that 
Muslims should have an imam in jurisprudence that they imitate, and also an orthodox 
spiritual guide.  A literal reading of those lines, however, might suggest that having a 824
 Al-Jaʿfarī, Sharḥ al-ṣuḍūr, 7-8.823
 The author composed a commentary on his own composition, stating that it was compulsory to 824
follow one of the four imams (al-Laqqānī, Hidāyat al-murīd, 2:899).
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Sufi guide could replace having an imam in jurisprudence. It is more likely that al-
Jaʿfarī quoted these lines to support taqlīd, though he may have intended the other 
possible reading: that it was sufficient to follow either a Sufi guide or an imam of 
jurisprudence. While stressing the necessity of following one of the four schools of 
jurisprudence, al-Jaʿfarī at the same time allowed his followers to follow the juristic 
opinions of Ibn Idrīs whenever they diverged from their schools. 
6.6 From Ibn ʿArabī to the Salafīs 
 The story of Ibn ʿArabī’s conception of ijtihād did not end with the Idrīsī 
tradition. In fact, one of its most fascinating and surprising chapters is its connection 
with the rise of early Salafī thought in late Ottoman Damascus. This was demonstrated 
by Itzchak Weismann who showed how ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʾirī (d. 1855) taught 
Akbarī thought, to which he was fully dedicated, to a circle of scholars in Damascus.  825
From this circle emerged the first scholars that rejected taqlīd of the schools and 
stressed the importance of only following judgements upon investigation of their 
evidence in the revealed sources.  His direct students, and their own students, became 826
the leading reformists of Damascus and the founding fathers of the early Salafiyya. 
 There is no known transfer of ideas between Ibn Idrīs and al-Jazāʾirī but both figures are connected. 825
When al-Jazāʾīrī was nineteen years old his father took him to visit al-Sanūsī in his zāwiya in Mecca. Al-
Sanūsī reportedly took a special interest in ʿAbd al-Qādir and saw in him the signs of a promising future 
(see Vikør, Sufi and Scholar, 125-6). Upon arriving in Damascus where he would dedicate the rest of his 
life to teaching ʿArabī’s writings, al-Jazāiʾrī became a disciple of Muḥammad ibn Masʿūd al-Fāsī (d. 
1872), founder of the Shādhilī-Fāsī ṭarīqa. Al-Fāsī was in turn the deputy of Muḥammad al-Madanī (d. 
1847), founder of the Shādhilī-Madanī ṭarīqa. Al-Madanī’s main shaykh was al-ʿArabī al-Darqāwī of the 
Shādhiliyya but he also took the path from Ibn Idrīs ‘for the blessing’ because he, in his own words, 
‘found him firmly rooted in following the Sunna’ (O’Fahey, Enigmatic Saint, 71; Weismann, Taste, 197).
 For an example of al-Jazāʾirī himself applying the judgements of Ibn ʿArabī, see his 281st mawqif (al-826
Jazāʾirī, al-Mawāqif, 2:83-7), in which he discussed adding a sajda of sahw after the completion of every 
ritual prayer. Al-Jazāʾirī wrote that the first Sufi master to institute this practice for other Sufis was the 
‘fard’ al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, and that many followed him. He then quoted Ibn ʿArabī’s discussion of this 
act in his Futūḥāt where he also stated that it was the ‘madhhab of al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī’ (on this see 
Chapter Four, Section 4.3), followed by al-Shaʿrānī’s narration in Kashf al-ghumma that this was the 
practice of Ibn ʿAbbās.
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These scholars used al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya and Kashf al-ghumma as inspiration, and as 
study material for their reforms. Ironically, however, the focus of these scholars later 
shifted to the writings of Ibn ʿArabī’s greatest detractor, Ibn Taymiyya, despite retaining 
their respect and admiration for Ibn ʿArabī. For this reason, and because this subject has 
already been dealt with by Weismann, this episode in the history of the reception of Ibn 
ʿArabī’s legal theory will not be dealt with in this study.  It will suffice us here to 827
mention two significant points. First, that in their fifth meeting, the early inner circle of 
Salafī reformists chose Kashf al-ghumma as the first book to study together, a meeting 
which led to their interrogation by the Ottoman administrative council in what became 
known as the ‘mujtahids incident.’  Second, that one of the leading Salafī figures, 828
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimī (d. 1914), published a collection of essays on uṣūl al-fiqh in 
which he included Ibn ʿArabī’s chapter from the Futūḥāt on his own set of uṣūl.  829
6.7 Conclusion 
 I have shown that Ibn Idrīs was not only connected through his masters and their 
teachings to Ibn ʿArabī, but that he became wholly dedicated to his legacy and advised 
his disciples to learn Ibn ʿArabī’s works. He defended him in his debates with the 
Wahhābī scholars of ʿAsīr, and he used Ibn ʿArabī’s arguments in his epistle against the 
schools. Significantly, Ibn Idrīs’ disciples compared him in particular to al-Tirmidhī and 
Ibn ʿArabī, showing that in their minds he was a continuation of the two. More than 
that, I have demonstrated his in-depth knowledge of Ibn ʿArabī’s juristic positions and 
their spiritual significance. I have also shown that Ibn Idrīs followed and applied these 
positions. His students, aware or not of the source of their shaykh’s teachings, carried 
with them the Akbarī madhhab, or at least some of its juristic principles and a body of 
its opinions, to the lands where they preached or built communities. Some of his notable 
 On this issue see Wiesmann, ‘Ṣūfī Reformism,’ 206-237; Taste, 156-316.827
 Hudson, ‘Reading al-Shaʿrānī,’ 65-6.828
 Wiesmann, ‘Ṣūfī Reformism,’ 220, n. 46.829
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students also wrote tracts on the necessity of acting upon the Qurʾān, the Sunna, and the 
consensus of the Companions, and the necessity to transcend the schools. Al-Sanūsī 
quoted not only his master, who had based his own opinions on the teachings of Ibn 
ʿArabī, but also quoted five pages from Ibn ʿArabī directly. Ibn Idrīs, counted as the 
greatest, or one of the greatest Islamic revivalists in premodern times, was inspired and 
guided in all his teachings and reforms by the principles and positions of the Akbarī 
madhhab. This study has proven that Ibn Idrīs is the first major figure who we can 
establish with certainty applied and spread the jurisprudential positions of Ibn ʿArabī. 
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Conclusion 
 This study provided, for the first time, a comprehensive analysis of the juristic 
thought of Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī. In doing so, it analysed his juristic thought on two 
levels, which we may call the ẓāhir and bāṭin. The ẓāhir of Ibn ʿArabī’s juristic thought 
is his choice of principles (uṣūl) and positive law (furūʿ), which we studied under the 
heading of juristic method. The bāṭin of this thought is his underlying theory of 
sainthood, which we studied under the heading of juristic authority. This pattern was 
repeated with Ibn ʿArabī’s intellectual predecessor, and two of his main intellectual 
successors: al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, as well as ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī and Aḥmad 
ibn Idrīs, respectively. Again, this was the first study to give a comprehensive 
understanding of the juristic thought of each of these figures, tying their juristic thought 
to their theories on sainthood. 
 The second major contribution of this study was to prove the links and the 
transfer as well as development of ideas between these important figures. Their ideas on 
the law cannot be in any way separated from their ideas on sainthood, but rather spring 
from them. It is for this reason that when they borrowed from each other in the first 
field, the field of Sufism, they subsequently borrowed from each other in the field of 
jurisprudence. That Ibn ʿArabī benefited greatly from al-Tirmidhī’s writings on the 
nature of sainthood, has already been widely acknowledged. This is the first study, 
however, to show how this influence in the field of Sufism also led to an influence in 
the field of jurisprudence. This study also showed how this pattern was repeated again 
in the case of Ibn ʿArabī’s successors. The influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s Sufi teachings on 
al-Shaʿrānī is well known, but the transfer of this influence to the field of jurisprudence 
has been debated, particularly with regard to al-Shaʿrānī’s last and most important work 
on the subject, al-Mīzān al-kubrā. This study showed that, contrary to the latest studies, 
al-Mīzān was wholly faithful to Ibn ʿArabī’s teachings. Furthermore, this study showed 
for the first time the full extent of the influence of Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas on this work in 
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particular, and on his previous works on jurisprudence in general. With regard to Ibn 
Idrīs, the influence of Ibn ʿArabī on his ideas had not been studied at all. This was the 
first study to show that Ibn Idrīs was wholly dedicated and devoted to the teachings of 
Ibn ʿArabī and that his juristic thought was based on that of his predecessor. This study 
showed that Ibn Idrīs’ call to ijtihād was highly influenced by Ibn ʿArabī, and that 
contrary to the beliefs of previous scholars, his positive law was not simply the result of 
his own ijtihād, but was guided by the positions of Ibn ʿArabī on those issues about 
which his position was known. I will now give a summary of the more detailed findings 
and conclusions. 
 Al-Tirmidhī was the first to write at length about the different degrees and 
categories of sainthood and to discuss at length the idea, found already in the Qur’ān 
and ḥadīth literature, of men who were not prophets but received inspiration not far 
removed from that of the prophets. Al-Tirmidhī gave these people, called the 
muḥaddathūn, a rank just below prophecy, and held that their inspiration gave them 
access to an understanding of the wisdom of the Sharīʿa that was not available to others. 
As such, these men became the authorities on matters of law, and guides for the rest of 
humanity - they were those mentioned in the Qurʾān as ‘those possessing authority,’ the 
people to whom obedience meant success, prosperity, and right guidance. Those who 
did not have access to such inspiration resorted instead to rational tools in their attempt 
to understand the law and develop it, in order to respond to new problems and novel 
situations, but the product of their attempts was no better than mere conjecture: it might 
hit the mark or miss it, but they had no certain knowledge or clear guidance. Al-
Tirmidhī was concerned with putting authority in the hands in which it belonged. He, 
therefore, attempted to show the faults and contradictions in the analogical reasoning of 
the jurists, and proposed instead that true ijtihād was a process that required inspiration 
and knowledge of God’s ordering of the universe. 
 Ibn ʿArabī developed al-Tirmidhī’s gradation of the levels of sainthood. This 
study argued that Ibn ʿArabī essentially transformed al-Tirmidhī’s concept of the ‘Seal 
of Sainthood’ into a category he called the afrād. Ibn ʿArabī then placed himself as the 
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Seal of Muḥammadan Sainthood above that hierarchy. Ibn ʿArabī also developed al-
Tirmidhī’s conception of the inspiration that descended upon the hearts of the 
muḥaddathūn, adding several new elements to the modality of this inspiration and how 
it was accessed, including the idea of direct waking visions of the Prophet.  
 Al-Tirmidhī approved of opposing opinions as being correct at the same time, 
and as being based not simply on outward ijtihād but on inspired reasoning. Al-Tirmidhī 
was therefore the first to attribute inspired reasoning to the different imams and show 
how they could all be correct, while still stating that some positions were more 
preferable than others. Ibn ʿArabī did the same on a far greater scale. He stated that the 
mujtahid imams were divinely inspired saints who were firmly established in the Station 
of Proximity - a name he gave to the rank of the afrād. Like al-Tirmidhī, he explained 
the opinions of the different schools from the level of the spiritual significance behind 
them, thus attributing an inspired origin to these opinions. While al-Tirmidhī simply 
approved of opposing opinions in practice, Ibn ʿArabī provided the theoretical 
framework in which God accepted the product of everyone’s ijtihād, whether it be on 
the level of a layperson’s understanding of the Qurʾān or a scholar’s use of analogical or 
deductive tools to produce positive law. At the same time, he argued that the rejection of 
analogical reasoning was superior as it left more room for choice by limiting the scope 
of the law.  
 Al-Tirmidhī was concerned with the problem of authority. Ibn ʿArabī was more 
concerned with mercy for God’s servants. Ibn ʿArabī saw mercy in God’s silences, and 
a lifting of that mercy by the scholars who ‘filled in the blanks.’ The Qur’ān and Sunna 
are enough and those who author books of jurisprudence will one day be questioned 
about everything they add to the law. The layperson need only act upon these two 
divinely revealed sources of the law, and the saints had their inspiration and their access 
to the Prophet to know the truth of every matter ‘as it really is,’ and to likewise extract 
the answer to every problem from these two sources. 
 Ibn ʿArabī created his own set of legal principles which benefited from the 
jurisprudential thought of al-Tirmidhī and the Ẓāhirīs. I have shown that Ibn ʿArabī 
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differed from the Ẓāhirī school in some key issues, including the very purpose behind 
its methodologies. The central underlying concern behind the Ẓāhirī methodology is the 
search for certainty. As for Ibn ʿArabī, he believed that certainty could only come 
through divine inspiration and spiritual experience. Ibn ʿArabī only chose those Ẓāhirī 
principles that restricted the scope of the Sharīʿa and preserved God’s pardon of all 
actions that were left without a ruling in the revealed texts. He parted ways with the 
Ẓāhirī methodology, however, whenever it led to difficulty. I have demonstrated that 
every difference between the two methodologies points to Ibn ʿArabī’s concern for 
leniency and mercy in the law, rather than the Ẓāhirī concern for certainty.  Ibn ʿArabī’s 
legal theory was carried forward in later centuries by dedicated followers, most notably 
al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn Idrīs. 
 Al-Shaʿrānī wrote a substantial series of works, over a period of decades, that 
were essentially extracts from the works of Ibn ʿArabī coupled with his own 
elaborations on them. He wrote Kashf al-ghumma based on Ibn ʿArabī’s rejection of the 
fiqh of the schools and his preference for the revealed texts only. He then wrote al-
Mīzān which was based on the other view of Ibn ʿArabī that all the different opinions of 
the schools were approved by God. He therefore highlighted in this work the 
conciliatory aspect of his predecessor’s ideas in an effort to end factionalism between 
the schools and to give peace of mind to the layperson. He developed Ibn ʿArabī’s ideas 
into his own unique theory of the Scale and argued that the law provided more than one 
correct answer on each topic, taking into account people’s circumstances and abilities. 
This study demonstrated the extent to which the Mīẓān remained faithful to Ibn ʿArabī, 
and the extent to which it quoted him, even though it took an opposing approach to the 
earlier Kashf al-ghumma. I also looked at the possible reasons why al-Shaʿrānī chose 
the approach in the Mīzān toward the end of his life as opposed to the earlier approach 
that he chose in Kashf al-ghumma, and argued that the later approach would have been 
more acceptable to the scholars of the age. 
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 Ibn Idrīs highlighted those of Ibn ʿArabī’s principles and arguments that rejected 
the fiqh of the scholars as superfluous and constricting. Many of his disciples became 
great revivalists like him, and his movement was a powerful force in its time, with 
influence still far-reaching today. He, as this study has shown, is the only figure that we 
can conclusively prove to have lived and ruled according to the Akbarī madhhab and its 
juristic opinions. 
 This study raises the question: How many other great Muslim figures have been 
guided by the jurisprudential vision of Ibn ʿArabī? How often were the authoritative 
opinions of al-Shaykh al-Akbar applied in the personal and private lives of his admirers, 
many of whom were great scholars and Sufis? This is an avenue for future investigation. 
The true extent of the influence of these four figures and their conceptions of ijtihād is 
beyond the scope of this study. The aim of this study was to show that the ideas of these 
four great scholars were all linked - that Ibn ʿArabī built a legal theory and juristic 
methodology based on the foundations laid by al-Tirmidhī, and that al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn 
Idrīs followed Ibn ʿArabī and developed his ideas further.  
 Abū Ḥanīfa’s students Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī were, for all intents and 
purposes, independent mujtahids but they followed their master’s main principles of 
jurisprudence and left a great influence on his school. Likewise, many of Mālik’s 
students disagreed with their master on many things, but cannot be said to belong to a 
different school. Ibn Ḥazm came almost two centuries after Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī to bring 
his school back to life, but he certainly did not agree with the original founder on many 
of his opinions; yet he was arguably the greatest Ẓāhirī scholar. The same could be said 
of Ibn ʿArabī and his devoted exponents al-Shaʿrānī and Ibn Idrīs. Their works could be 
labelled as Akbarī literature to add to the founder’s writings. Likewise, al-Sanūsī’s Īqāẓ 
al-wasnān, with its reliance on Ibn Idrīs, al-Shaʿrānī, and Ibn ʿArabī, could also be seen 
as Akbarī literature. With al-Ghurāb’s anthology, the Akbarī ‘school’ acquired a fiqh 
manual for consultation and application. The question is, however, are there people who 
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will apply it? Could the life of the Akbarī school only be in its beginnings? Perhaps this 
age will witness a new revival of the Akbarī madhhab. 
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